Judgment :- VENKATASWAMI, J. 1. This appeal is preferred against the Order of the learned Principal District Judge, Madurai, in I.A. No. 213 of 1984 in O.S. No. 207 of 1982. 2. Brief facts are the following: The Second respondent herein filed the said suit (O.S. No. 207 of 1982) against the appellants herein for recovering a sum of Rs. 4,15,158.13p. with subsequent interest at 6% per annum on Rs. 4,01,521.64p. 3. Pending suit, the second respondent filed I.A. 1080 of 1980 for attachment before Judgment in respect of immoveable properties belonging to the appellants. It is necessary to mention at this juncture that the suit was originally pending on the file of the Sub Court, Dindigul in O.S. No. 433 of 1980. Later on, it was transferred to Madurai and ultimately taken on file by the District Judge and renumbered as O.S. 207 of 1982. We are concerned in this case only with items 1 and 2 of the immoveable properties, though the Court below dealt with items 1 to 3. On coming to know of the attachment before judgment obtained by the second respondent herein, the first respondent-State Bank of India, Virudhunagar Branch, (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Bank’) claiming to be an earlier eqitable mortgagee of the properties attached under I.A. No. 1080 of 1980. proferred I.A. No. 213 of 1984, under O. 38 read with O. 21, R. 58 and S. 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, for raising the attachment. In support of that petition, the first respondent herein as stated as follows:— The appellants were having credit facilities with the Bank for discounting bills, as persons doing business in cardamom for a very long time. The second appellant called on the concerned Officer in the Bank on 2-1-1970 and handed over the title deeds relating to item 2, with an intention to create a security in respect of advances made and to be made by the Bank, together with interest and charges. By so depositing, an equitable mortgage was created in respect of item 2. When the second appellant wanted an increase in the credit facilities in the year 1978, the Bank wanted further securities, and the second appellant, agreeing for the same, made his wife to give her property as security and to stand as guarantor. By so depositing, an equitable mortgage was created in respect of item 2. When the second appellant wanted an increase in the credit facilities in the year 1978, the Bank wanted further securities, and the second appellant, agreeing for the same, made his wife to give her property as security and to stand as guarantor. Accordingly, on the basis of the equitable mortgage once again created in respect of item 2 of the Schedule property, and also of the property belonging to the wife of the second appellant, the credit facilities were increased upto to Rs. 11 Lakhs. This was on 8-3-1978. On that day, documents relating to the properties of the wife of the second appellant were deposited. As we are not concerned with the third item of property, no further details are given. Later on, large number of discounted bills were found not paid by the drawees and in consequence thereof, large amounts were outstanding. Therefore, the Bank insisted upon further security of immoveable property from the second appellant. The appellants offered to mortgage Item No. 1 of the Schedule properties by depositing the title deeds. For that purpose, the second appellant called at the Bank on 10-6-1980 and deposited the title deeds relating to the item No. 1. According to the first respondent, the second respondent, suppressing the mortgages in favour of the first respondent, had obtained an attachment before Judgment over items 1 and 2 of the properties described in the suit filed by it. Therefore, it has become necessary for the bank to move the court below, to raise the attachment. 4. The application for raising the attachment was opposed both by the appellants and the second respondent. 5. The second respondent, at whose instance, the order of attachment was made, has filed a counter stating inter alia that the allegation that it obtained an order of attachment deliberately suppressing the earlier mortgages in favour of the first respondent was not admitted. The alleged equitable mortgages were not valid in law, and that those mortgages must have been created to defeat the rights of the second respondent. No details are given in the petition about the loan transactions and that the application to raise the attachment is also liable to be dismissed, for moving the court belatedly. 6. The alleged equitable mortgages were not valid in law, and that those mortgages must have been created to defeat the rights of the second respondent. No details are given in the petition about the loan transactions and that the application to raise the attachment is also liable to be dismissed, for moving the court belatedly. 6. On behalf of the appellante, a detailed statement of objections was filed, stating inter alia that the documents were handed over to the Bank only to show the financial status of the second appellant and not with an intention to create equitable mortgage. It was also contended that the Bank obtained many signatures from the second appellant in typed papers as well as printed Forms. The allegation that at the instance of the Bank, asking for additional security, the properties were given again by way of security by creating equitable mortgages, was not admitted. In short, the appellants challenged the legality and validity or the alleged equitable mortgages in favour of the first respondent. 7. In the court below, on the side of the first respondent, two wintnesses were examined and on the side of the appellants, the second appellant was examined as R.W. 1 and one doctor was examined as R.W. 2. The first respondent marked Exx. P. 1 to P. 51 and on the side of the appellants, Exx. R. 1 to R. 56 were marked. The Court below, overruling the objections raised in the counter as well as in the arguments, opposing the application for raising the attachment, allowed the petition and raised the attachment. 8. The second respondent did not file any appeal against the order raising the attachment. However, the appellants, against whom the order of attachment was obtained by the second respondent, have preferred this appeal, presumably for the reason that the Court below has overruled the contention raised by the appellants that there were no valid equitable mortgage created in favour of the first respondent herein. 9. Mr. A.D.C. Guruswami, learned counsel appearing for the appellants, raised the following contentions:— The Court below should have accepted the case of the appellants that the documents were not handed over by the second appellant with an intention to create an equitable mortgage. 9. Mr. A.D.C. Guruswami, learned counsel appearing for the appellants, raised the following contentions:— The Court below should have accepted the case of the appellants that the documents were not handed over by the second appellant with an intention to create an equitable mortgage. As regards item 2, the document handed over to the Bank was only a registration copy of a partition deed and there is nothing to suggest that an equitable mortgage was created in respect of item 2 as there are number of other items dealt with in that document. The other contention was that on the basis of a registration copy of a partition deed, no valid equitable mortgage can be created. In any event, the letters written by the second appellant, namely, Exx. P. 7, P. 8 and P. 29 require registration, and in the absence of that, the Bank cannot contend that it has got valid equitable mortgages over items 1 and 2. Lastly, it was contended that as regards the first item, only for a part of the property, document was produced and not of the whole of item 1 and, therefore, there was no valid mortgage for the whole of item 1. 10. Learned counsel attempted to raise another contention, namely, that so far as item 2 was concerned, assuming that there was valid equitable mortgage, it is not subsisting for enforcement as the limit has not been renewed. This point having not been raised or argued in the Court below and having not been raised in the Memorandum of Grounds of appeal, we did not allow the learned counsel to raise that ground for the first time at the time of arguments in this appeal, as the contention was not a pure question of law, but a mixed question of law and fact requiring evidence. 11. Mr. A.R. Ramanathan, learned counsel appearing for the Bank, submitted that none of the contentions advanced on the side of the appellants would hold water as there is overwhelming documentary evidence to answer those contentions. According to the learned counsel, in view of Exx. P. 7, P. 8 and P. 29, it does not lie in the mouth of the appellants to contend that the documents were not handed over to the bank with an intention to create equitable mortgage. According to the learned counsel, in view of Exx. P. 7, P. 8 and P. 29, it does not lie in the mouth of the appellants to contend that the documents were not handed over to the bank with an intention to create equitable mortgage. A reading of those exhibits will establish that they only evidence the equitable mortgage already created and, therefore, those documents do not require any registration. The contention that so far as Item 2 was concerned, the partition deed handed over to the Bank deals with many items along with Item 2 and, therefore, it cannot be contented that a mortgage was created in respect of Item 2, is again unsustainable in view of the attending circumstances explained by the Court below in detail. Likewise, the argument that an equitable mortgage cannot be created in the absence of original document is not the correct position of law in the light of judgments of this Court. He also submitted that as regards Item 1, the second appellant has not only handed over the orginal registered sale deed in his favour. But also the property tax receipts for the whole of item 1, expressing his intention to create an equitable mortgage in respect of whole of the property. He submitted that the Court below has cosidered elaborately before rendering findings on each of the objections raised before it. 12. Learned counsel on both sides cited judgments generally on the scope of section 56(f) of the Transfer of Property Act and also to support their respective stand. We shall refer to them at the relevant place while dealing with the respective contentions. 13. After going through the order of the Court below and the arguments of the learned counsel on both sides, we find that the main question to be answered by us in this appeal are, whether Exx. p. 7, p. 8 and p. 29 require registration to create valid equitable mortgages in favour of the Bank; and whether for creating a valid equitable mortgage all the orginal documents relating to the property should be deposited with the mortgagee, and, whether, in the absence of orginal, registration copy can be deposited or other documents can also be produced with an intention to create an equitable mortgage. The other two questions raised before us, namely, whether the appellants handed over the documents with an intention to create an equitable mortgage or not, and whether the handing over of partition deed by itself will not amount to an intention to create an equitable mortgage in respect of item 2, are only questions of fact that are to be decided on evidence. 14. We will first dispose of the later two questions in the light of the evidence, both oral and documentary, available in this case. The contention that the appellants, in particular, the second appellant, had no intention of creating an equitable mortgage when he handed over the documents to the bank, is clearly an afterthought and also contrary to documentary evidence. In fact, in the objections to the application for raising the attachment, in pargaraph 10, the creation of equitable mortgage has been a dmitted. Not only that, the fact that such an admission was made in the objections, has been elicited from the second appellant when he was in the witness box as R.W. 1. The statement that the documents were produced only to show that he was financially sound cannot also be accepted as the second appellant in his various communications to the Bank, in unmistakable terms, had admitted the handing over of documents with an intention to create equitable mortgage. — Vide Exx. p. 1, p. 7, p. 8, p. 29, p. 32 and p. 20. The very fact that the second appellant applied for encumbrance certificate and obtained and produced the same in respect of item 2 will clearly show that his intention was to create an equitable mortgage only in respect of Item 2 even though the partition deed dealt with many more items — vide Exx. p. 4 to p. 6. These factors were taken note of by the court below for holding that there was no substance in these two contentions. We entirely agree with the reasonings given by the court below a nd hold that there is no substance in these two contentions. 15. The next contention to be considered is. whether the documents namely, Exx. p. 7, p. 8 and p. 29 require registration. To appreciate that, it is necessary to set out the recitals contained in those documents. They are as follows:— Ex. P. 7 From Mr. A.V.R. Nataraja Nadar, Ull Street, Virudhunagar. 15. The next contention to be considered is. whether the documents namely, Exx. p. 7, p. 8 and p. 29 require registration. To appreciate that, it is necessary to set out the recitals contained in those documents. They are as follows:— Ex. P. 7 From Mr. A.V.R. Nataraja Nadar, Ull Street, Virudhunagar. To The Agent State Bank of India, Virudhunagar. Dear Sir, I am writing this to confirm that I have deposited with you on the 2nd Janauary 1970 title deeds relating to my property at Virudhunagar described below (hereinafter referred to as the ‘said property’) with the intention of creating an equitable mortgage on the said property by way of collateral security for the amounts due to the bank from the concern of M.A.V.R. Natraja Nadar & Sons under the following credit facilities extended to it by the Bank. 1. Clean Demand Draft purchase limit Rs. 10,000/- 2. Documentary Demand Draft purchase limit Rs. 50,000/- Rs. 60,000/- The said property is ancestral and as such no one else has any interest in the said property. The said property is under my sole occupation. There is no subsisting agreement for the sale of the said property nor has any prospective or any intending purchaser taken possession of it or a part of it. The said property is free from encumbrances. Yours faithfully Sd/- M.A.V.R. Nataraja Nadar Description of the Property given as security. VirudhunagarSub District VIRUDHUNAGAR TOWNWard No. 12, Ull Street, Virudhunagar House bearing Door No. 75, T.S. 257. Sd/- M.A.V.R. Nataraja Nadar” Ex. P. 8 From M.A.V.R. Nataraja Nadar & Sons Cardamom Exporters, VIRUDHUNAGAR To The Branch Manager, State Bank of India, VIRUDHUNAGAR. Date: 9.3.78 Dear Sir, 1. I/We am/are writing this to confirm that I/We deposited with you on .. the title deeds relating to my/our property at Virudhu Nagar Village/Taluk. District described below (hereinafter referred to as the “said property”) with intention of creating an equitable mortgage over the said property by way of security for the amounts due to the bank From me/us the concern of M.A.V.R. Nataraja Nadar and sons under the folowing credit facilities extended to me/us the concern ofby the bank. NATURE OF FACILITY LIMIT IN Rs. (a) Clean and Loc. D.D. purchase 60,000/- (b) (c) (d) Total 60,000/- “2. NATURE OF FACILITY LIMIT IN Rs. (a) Clean and Loc. D.D. purchase 60,000/- (b) (c) (d) Total 60,000/- “2. At my/our request you were pleased to grant me/us the said concern of an enhancement of the above mentioned credit facilities as noted below. NATURE OF FACILITY ORIGINAL LIMIT ENHANCED LIMIT Rs. Rs. (a) Clean D.D purchase 60,000/- 10,00,000/- (b) Doc D.D. purchase- 1,00,000/- (c) (d) 60,000/- 11,00,000/- 3. This is to confirm that consequent upon the enhancement of the credit facilities as stated and for the purpose of having the enhanced limits of the credit facilities covered by the security of the said property, I/We called on you on 8-3-78 and admitted and declared in the prersence of your.that the benefit to the Bank of mortgage by deposit of deeds relating to the said property created, as stated above on the 2nd January 1970 shall also apply for, stand extended to and cover the enhanced aggre gate limits of Rs. 11,00,000/- granted to me/us/the concern of M.A.V.R. Nataraja Nadar & Sons, by the bank. 4. The said property belongs to me/us absolutely and no one else has any interest therein. The said property is under my/our sole occupation. 5. There is no subsisting agreement for the sale of the said property nor have any prospective or any intending purchaser taken possession of it or part of it. The said property is free from encumbrance. Description of property given as security: VIRUDHUNAGAR SUB DISTRICT, VIRUDHUNAGAR Town Ward No. 12, U11 Street, Virudhunagar, House bearing Door No. 75, T.S. No. 257. For M.A.V.R. Nataraja Nadar & Sons, sd/- M.A.V.R. Nataraja Nadar, PARTNER.” Ex. P. 29 “From M.A.V.R. Nataraja Nadar, Date: 10-6-80. Merchant, Virudhunagar. To The Branch Managar, State Bank of India, Virudhunagar. Dear Sir, I am writing this to confirm that I have deposited with you on 10-6-80 title deeds relating to my property at Virudhunagar described below (hereinafter referred to as ‘the said property’) with the intention of creating as equitable mortgage on the said property by way of collateral security for the amounts due to the Bank from me/the concern of M.A.V.R. Nataraja Nadar & Sons, under the following credit facilities extended to me/it by the Bank. Limit (a) Demand Drafts purchase clean Rs. 10,00,000/- (b) Demand drafts purchase documentart Rs. 1,00,000/-Rs. 11,00,000/- sd/- M.A.V.R. Nataraja Nadar. Limit (a) Demand Drafts purchase clean Rs. 10,00,000/- (b) Demand drafts purchase documentart Rs. 1,00,000/-Rs. 11,00,000/- sd/- M.A.V.R. Nataraja Nadar. The said property is self-acquired, and as such, no one else has any interest in the said property. The said property is under my sole occupation (a portion of the building is under tenancy occupation of .on monthly rent. There is no subsisting agreement for the sale of the said property, nor has any prospective or intending purchaser taken possession of it or a part of it. The said property is free from encumbrance. Yours faithfully, M.A.V.R. Nataraja Nadar. Description of the Property given as Security: Ramnad District, Ramnad Sub-Registration District, Virudhunagar Municipal Town Ward previously C.C. Road now as Sankarapandia Nadar Road T.S. No. 329/3B & T.S. No. 328/2 land west - previous C.C. Road, Sankarapandia Nadar Street, North of M.A.V.N. Velappan land East of Plot No. 2 M.A.V. Kandasamy Nadar land south of T.S. No. 329/3B & 323/2 - 30 feet Road within North East 70 1/2 feet South East 74 feet West South 64 1/2 feet East south 67 feet (including the superstructure built on the land)”. 16. Before answering the contention, it is useful to refer to the judgments of the Supreme Court, this Court and other High Courts cited and relied on by the learned counsel on both sides. 17. In Rachpal Maharaj v. Bhagwandas A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 272 the Supreme Court considered the question of requirement of registration with reference to the recitals in a document which are as follows: “We write to put on record that to secure the repayment of the money already due to you from us on account of the business transactions between yourselves and ourselves and the money that may hereafter become due on account of such transactions we have this day deposited with you the following title deeds in Calcutta at your place of business at Sambhu Mullick Lane relating to our properties at Samstipur with intent to create an equitable mortgage on the said properties to secure all monies including interest that maybe found due and payable by us to you on account of the said transactions.” The Supreme Court construed the above recitals in the following manner:— The document purports only to record a transaction which had been concluded and under which the rights and liabilities had been orally agreed upon. No doubt it was taken by the respondents to show that the title deeds of the appellants properties were deposited with them as security for the moneys advanced by them and to obviate a possible plea that the deeds were left with them for other purposes as indeed was contended by the appellant in the written statement, taking advantage of the non-registrati on of the memorandum in question. But that is far from intending to reduce the bargain to writing and make the document the basis of the rights and liabilities of the parties.” 18. Again, the Supreme Court had occasion to consider a similar question in United Bank of India Ltd. v. Lekharam Sonaram and Co. A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1591. The document considered by the Supreme Court reads as follows: “I hereby authorise my son Mr. Babulal Ram to deposit with you on my behalf at your Calcutta Office the following title deeds with a view to create an eqitable mortgage on the said properties to make your advance in the A/C of Lakharam Sonaram and Co., Giridih, better secured, I hereby further declare that I am the sole owner of the Giridih property as per schedule below and am legal joint heir with my sons dealing in the name of Lakharam Sonaram and Co., of the Malho property as described in the schedule below. I hereby further declare that both the properties described in the schedule are free from all encumbrances and nobody else has any claim, right or title to the properties.” The Supreme Court opined as follows:— “The document was not imtended to be an intergral part of the transaction and did not, by itself, operate to create an interest in the immoveable property and therefore the document does not require registration under S. 17 of the Indian Registration Act.” 19. In Deb Dutt Seal v. Raman Lal Phumra and others A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 659, the Supreme Court considered the following recitals for the purpose of finding out whether the letter containing such recitals requires registration:— “I write to record that I delivered to and deposited with you this day my title deeds relating to the premises No. 36 Puddapukur Road, Calcutta, solely belonging to me with intent to create security for my liability for the moneys payable under the three hundies dated this day for the sum of Rs. 80,000/- drawn by me in your favour and I have undertaken to execute a legal mortgage at my cost whenever called upon by you to do so. I further assure you that the said premises No. 35, is free from all encumbrances and the same absolutely belongs to me.” The defence was that the letter required registration and was therefore inadmissible in evidence.” The Supreme Court held as follows: “Held, (per Sikri and Jaganmohan Reddy, JJ., Mitter, J. dissenting) that the letter on its true interpretation and in the surrounding circumstances merely recorded a past transaction and did not intend to create any mortgage. The undertaking to execute a legal mortgage and assurance that the premises were free from all encumbrances did not create or declare any interest, in the premises. xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx It is not correct to say that even if a document on the face of it and properly interpreted in the light of the circumstances does not disclose the creation of a mortgage, or even if the document itself is not an operative instrument and is merely evidential, it requires registration. xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx xxxx In order to require registration the document must contain all the essentials of the transaction and one essential is that the title deeds must be deposited by virtue of the instrument or acknowledge an earlier deposit of title deeds and say further that the title deeds shall be held as security on the said mortgage.” 20. In Indian Bank Ltd., Hyderadad v. Anomula Seshagiri Rao & Sons Co., Vijayawada and others A.I.R. 1971 Andhra Pradesh 287, a Division Bench of that High Court, on the facts of that case, held that the document required registration. The Division Bench observed as follows:— “But this is a case where a deposit is made by letter explaining why the title deeds are deposited and in such a case the document required registration as the parties intended to reduce the bargain into writing. Therefore, having regard to what the Supreme Court has laid down in A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 272 and A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1591 we uphold the finding of the Court before that Ex. A.27 is a document which is compulsorily registrable and in as much as it is not registered, it cannot be recieved in evidence.” 21. Therefore, having regard to what the Supreme Court has laid down in A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 272 and A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1591 we uphold the finding of the Court before that Ex. A.27 is a document which is compulsorily registrable and in as much as it is not registered, it cannot be recieved in evidence.” 21. In H.G. Nanjappa v. M.F.C. Industries (P) Ltd. represented by its Director-in-charge V. Sivaprasad, Commercial Road, Ootacamund 1987-1-M.L.J. 180 = 100 L.W. 4, M.N. Chandurkar, C.J., had occasion to consider a similar question. The learned Chief Justice considered the following recitals as one not requiring registration, applying the ratios laid down by the Supreme Court: “I, H.G. Nanjappa, son of Hanuma Gowder, Hindu, resident of Yellanahalli, Ketti village The Nilgiris, in consideration of the sum of Rs. 20,062.29p (Rupees Twenty Thousand and Sixty Two and paise Twenty-nine) advanced to me by Mysore Fertiliser Company, Commercial Road, Ootacamund, on a promissory note, which I do hereby acknowledge, have this 1st day of July 1980, at Coimbatore, deposited with the said Mysore Fertilizer Company, the deeds and documents set out in the list hereto, as security for the repayment of the said sum of Rs. 20,062.29p with interest thereon at 18% per annum from the date thereof till full payment.” The learned Chief Justice observed as follows:— “The question, therefore, which must be posted in a case like the present one is, did the parties intend to reduce their bargain regarding the deposit of title deeds to the form of a document?. It has to be pointed put that the defendant has admitted that the title deeds were deposited. It is he who has executed the memorandum and the memorandum merely states that he has deposited with the said company the deeds and documents set out in the list hereto, as security. “It is not the case of the defendant that there was an agreement between the parties that the mortgage was to take effect only on the execution of this Memorandum. “It is not the case of the defendant that there was an agreement between the parties that the mortgage was to take effect only on the execution of this Memorandum. The memorandum clearly and plainly appears to me to be something in the nature of a forwarding letter or acknowledging the tact that the defendant has deposited the said deeds of title as security which is obvious, because, according to the plaintiff, there is admittedly a promissory note which has been executed much earlier and a sum of money was due on the basis of the said promissory note. The mere statement that a deposit is made by way of security for repayment of the loan cannot be read as a contract which is arrived at by the document itself. The document, therefore, cannot be read as recording an agreement between the parties, namely, agreement to create a mortgage for deposit of title deeds. It is at best an evidence of the fact that the title deeds have been deposited with the plaintiffs”. 22. On a careful perusal of the various judgments extracted above, we find that except the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, all other cases support the case of the Bank. The Andhra Pradesn Judgment, though at first blush seems to support the case of the appellants in respect of Ex. P. 8, we do not think that will be the correct position. In this case, under Ex. P. 7, an equitable mortgage has already been created in respect of item-2. Under Ex. P. 8, the appellants have agreed that the equitable mortgage already created shall stand extended to cover the limit already enhanced. This document is only evidencing the transaction that had already taken place, by using past tense, and there was nothing to suggest that the intention was to create mortgage by deposit of title deeds under Ex. P. 8. So far as Ex. P. 7 and P. 29 are concerned, they will clearly come within the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court and other High Courts to the effect that they being evidential, do not require registration. We answer the point against the appellants. 23. The only question that remains to be considered is whether an equitable mortgage can be treated without depositing the original document and also without depositing all the relevant documents. We answer the point against the appellants. 23. The only question that remains to be considered is whether an equitable mortgage can be treated without depositing the original document and also without depositing all the relevant documents. Here again, the decisions cited at the Bar give us full guidance, to decide the issue. 24. In The Official Assignee of Madras v. Basudeva Doss Badrinarayan Doss A.I.R. 1925, Madras 723, a Division Bench of this Court, on this aspect, after referring to earlier English cases had taken the view that patta can be treated as document of title for the purpose of creating an equitable mortgage. In that case, Srinivasan Aiyangar, J., observed as follows:— “In the case of copyholds, copies of court rolls and in the case of the registered lease, have been field to suffice. In Ireland a map of the property was, by deposit held to create an eqitable mortgage ( Simmons v. Montague ). So far as South India is concerned, there is no doubt that a patta has generally been regarded as a document of title. I use the words “document of title” and not “title deed”, because it may be that there is some plausible distinction between the two expressions. I have no hesitation in holding that a patta has always been regarded by people in this country as a document of some evidence with regard to possession if not also the title. 25. In Angu Pillai v. Kasi Visvanathan Chettiar 1973 (1) M.L.J. 334 = 86 L.W. 94 (D.B.) a Division Bench of this Court had occasion to consider the scope of S. 58(f) of the Transfer of Property Act. The learned Judge observed as follows:— “In Dixonv. Nuckleston, the question of priorities between two parties who claimed equitable mortgage arose for consideration. The owner of a farm deposited deeds of conveyance byway of security for money then due, writing at the same time a letter which stated that the deeds were the title deeds of the farm and were to be security. Subsequently, he deposited the subsequent title deeds of the farm with certain bankers by way of security for money due to them. The bankers investigated the title deeds and they had no notice of the prior charge. The question arose whether the letter under which the earlier title deeds was deposited created an equitable mortgage or not. Subsequently, he deposited the subsequent title deeds of the farm with certain bankers by way of security for money due to them. The bankers investigated the title deeds and they had no notice of the prior charge. The question arose whether the letter under which the earlier title deeds was deposited created an equitable mortgage or not. It was held that the said letter created an equitable mortgage on the farm and that the owner of the prior charge had not been guilty of negligence so as to deprive herself of her priority. In Indian Law, deposit of patta has been held to constitute a valid equitable mortgage, though a patta is not in itself a deed of title, but is only an evidence of title. This Court has consistently taken the view that the main object of tender of patta is merely to give information of the land revenue payable and the details of the property and that the exact weight to be given to the patta would depend upon the circumstance of the case. It is pointed out that in case of pattas in respect of a land in Zamindari, if the land be at the disposal of the landlord at the time of granting the patta, prima facie such patta would not be a mere bill of rent but something more and that if it is not so, it would not create any rights in the pattadar in derogation of the rights of a person who would be entitled to the land subject to the proper and regular payment of rent. The question directly arose before a Bench of this Court in Official Assignee v. Basudevadoss , as to whether a deposit of patta is enough to constitute an equitable mortgage. The Bench answered the question in the affirmative. Srinivasa Aiyangar, J., who delivered the leading judgment in that case, has pointed out that the answer to the question as to whether the patta in respect of a land is a document which would be sufficient by being deposited to evidence the intention required for an equitable mortgage would vary according to the conditions of the country and the consciousness on part of the members of the community and that though a patta is not a document of title, still a deposit of the same with intention to create an equitable mortgage would create an equitable mortgage. The decision of the Rangoon High Court in V.E.R.H.A.R. Chettiar Firm v. Ha Foo Teen, upon which the trial Judge relied, was over-ruled by a Full Bench of the Rangoon High Court in Chidambaram Chettiar v. Aziz . This Full Bench decision unfortunately does not appear to have been brought to the notice of the trial Judge. The Full Bench has reviewed the English and Indian authorities and has pointed out that in order to create a valid mortgage, it is not necessary that the whole, or even the most material of the documents of title to the property should be deposited, that the documents deposited should show a complete or good title in the depositors and it is sufficient if the deeds deposited bone fide relate t o the property or are material evidence of title and shown to have been deposited with the intention of creating security thereon.” 26. In C. Assiamma v. State Bank of Mysore A.I.R. 1990 Kerala 157, a Division Bench considered the fact of creating mortgage with registration copy. The learned Judge held as follows:— “According to learned counsel for 2nd defendant, deposit of the above documents was not sufficient to create an equitable mortgage, as the original document of title deed was not among the documents of title deposited. In support of his contention, learned counsel relied on a decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Syndicate Bank v. Modern Tile and Clay Works (1980 Kerala L.T. 550). In that case, Janaki Amma, J., speaking for the Bench said as follows:— “By ‘documents of title’ we mean the legal instruments which prove the right of a person in a particular property. Evidence supplied By documents may in some cases be conclusive while in other cases it may be insufficient in proving the title or the right claimed. When a person who is acclaimed and recognised by law as the owner of property transfers his rights by an instrument which satisfies all the requirements of law, the instrument of transfer is a title deed in a respect of the property so far as the transferee is concerned. The document may amount to conclusive proof of such transfer. On other hand, a document may be of such a kind that it tends to prove such transfer of right but it is not conclusive of a transfer of ownership. The document may amount to conclusive proof of such transfer. On other hand, a document may be of such a kind that it tends to prove such transfer of right but it is not conclusive of a transfer of ownership. Thus a receipt for payment of revenue may not be conclusive proof of the ownership of the person in whose name it is issued even though the liability to pay revenue is on the owner. This is because in practice revenue is recieved by the concerned authorities from a pers on even without an enquiry whether he is the owner of the property. A revenue receipt is therefore insufficient evidence to prove title to property and is therefore not by itself a document of title. ..A parity of reasoning applies in the case of a copy of deed of transfer. A copy of the deed of transfer is not ordinarily a document of title for the purposes of an equitable mortgage. It is the original deed of transfer that is the document of title. This is because the rules for the issue of copies pe rmit the obtaining of copies by an owner even while he is in possession of the original document of title. To hold that a copy of a deed of transfer is also a document of title for purposes of S. 58(f) of the Transfer of Property Act would amount to giving facilities to the owner to misuse the provision. He may get an advance from one person by delivering the original document of title and then use the copy of the document for getting an advance from some other who may not be aware of the earlier equitable mortgage. It should be the policy of law to see that such contingencies are avoided. At the same time there may be cases where the original document is lost and there are no chances of that document being made use for any purpose. In the absence of the original deed of transfer the next best evidence of the owners title to the property is a certified copy of that document. A certified copy in such cases may with sufficient safeguards be received as a document of title . The essential pre-requisite for the use of a certified copy as a document of title is the loss of the original deed. A certified copy in such cases may with sufficient safeguards be received as a document of title . The essential pre-requisite for the use of a certified copy as a document of title is the loss of the original deed. Unless and until it is made out that the original is lost, a certified copy of a document cannot be considered to be a document of title for the purpose of S. 58(f) of the Transfer of Property Act. (Emphasis supplied). We have not understood observation of the Division Bench to mean that only in cases where the original title deed is lost that deposit of a registration copy can validly create an equitable mortgage. The Division Bench has referred to the rulings in Mrs Jessie Moyle Stewart v. Bank of Upper India Ltd., Simla (1916) 34 Ind Cas. 937; (A.I.R. 1916 Lah. 39), in which it was held that “title include copies, where the originals are not forthcoming” and also to Surendra Mohan Rai Choudhury v. Mohendra Nath Banerjee , A.I.R. 1932 Cal 589, where a similar view was expressed. In the later decision, a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court made the following observations. “It is sufficient if the deeds deposited bona fide relating to the property are material evidence of title and are shown to have been deposited with the intention of creating a charge; see Exp. We-therell supra (1805) II Ves. 398, Lacon v. Allen , (1856) 3 Drew 579, Robert v. Croft (1857) 24 Beav 223 and Roches Estate (1890) 25 L.R.Ir. 58. As regards attested copies, there is no clear decision but it seems that an attested copy would not be enough unless, perhaps, there is proof of the original not being available; He Barrow, Experts Broadbent, (1834) I Mont & A.635”. It is to be noticed that in the Calcutta case, besides the certificate of probate, only a certified copy of the redemption certificate was produced as the Court held that deposit of certified copy of redemption certificate taken along with the probate clearly indicates an intention to create a security on the probate. Supreme Court had occasion to consider the question of creation of equitable mortgage in K.J. Nathan v. S.V. Maruthi Rao. , A.I.R 1965 S.C. 430. After referring to the observation in V.E.R.M.A.R. Chettiyar Firm v. Ma Joo Teen, I.L.R. II, Rang. Supreme Court had occasion to consider the question of creation of equitable mortgage in K.J. Nathan v. S.V. Maruthi Rao. , A.I.R 1965 S.C. 430. After referring to the observation in V.E.R.M.A.R. Chettiyar Firm v. Ma Joo Teen, I.L.R. II, Rang. 239; (A.I.R. 1933 Rang 299), to the effect that what the terms ‘documents of title’ and ‘title deeds’ denote is that such a document or documents as show a prima facie or apparent title in the depositor or some interests therein quoted with approval the following passage from the Judgment (at P. 435 of A.I.R.): “If the form of the documents of title that have been delivered to the creditor is such that from the deposit of such documents alone the Court would be entitled to conclude that the documents were deposited with the intention of creating a security for the repayment of debt, prima facie a mortgage by deposit of title deed would be proved; although, of course, such an inference would not be irrebuttable, and would not be drawn if the weight of the evidence as a whole told against it.” After reviewing the relevant decisions on the subject Supreme Court finally held that (at P. 436 of A.I.R.): “A Court will have to ascertain in each case whether in substance there is a delivery of title deeds by the debtor to the creditor. If the creditor was already in possession of the title deeds it would be hyper-technical to insist upon the formality of the creditor delivering the title deeds to the debtor and the debtor re-delivering them to the creditor. What would be necessary in those circumstances is whether the parties agreed to treat the documents in the possession of the creditor or his agent as delivery to him for the purpose of the transaction.” The Bench further held as follows: “The same question came up for consideration of a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in Angu Pillai v. M.S.M. Kasiviswanathan Chettiar , A.I.R. 1974 Mad. 16. 16. The Court relied on the Full Bench decision of the Rangoon High Court in Chidambaram Chettiyars case (supra) and held that it was not necessary that the whole, or even the most material of the documents of title to the property should be deposited; nor that the documents deposited should show a complete or good title in the depositor and it is sufficient if the deeds deposited bona fide relate to the property or are material evidence of title or are shown to have been deposited with the intention of creating security thereon. In an earlier decision in Dohagann v. jammanna , A.I.R. 1931 Mad. 613, the Madras High Court has taken the same view.” Ultimately, the Division Bench, on the facts of that case, held as follows: “In the instant case, registration copy of the title deed, Ext. A.19, tax receipts Ext. A.21 and A.21(a) and the certificate issued by the President of Kumbala Panchayat Ext. A22 to the effect that door Nos. referred to therein are situated in S. Nos. 119/5 and 113/7 of Koipady village clearly establish the title of the 2nd defendant to the properties in Sy. Nos. 119/5 and 113/7 of Koipadi village covered by Ext. A.19. The intention of the appellant to create an equitable mortgage in respect of those properties was confirmed by the 2nd defendant in Ext A.17 in clear and unambiguous terms. In our view, this is sufficient to constitute an equitable mortgage by the 2nd defendant in favour of the Bank in respect of right of 2nd defendant in properties in Schedule ‘F’ to Ext. A.19. It is evident from the correspondence between the 2nd defendant and the Bank that the 2nd defendant had made it clear to the Bank that the original title deed was not available with her as properties were gifted to her mother, brothers and sisters also thereunder. It was impossible for all the donees in such circumstances to possess the orginal deed.” 27. As against the above judgments, learned counsel for the appellants cited the decision in K. Praksa Rao v. N. Ramakrishna Rao A.I.R. 1982 Andhra Pradesh 272 and G.R. Krishna v. K.K. Venkatachalam 1990 (2) M.L.J. 260 to contend that by producing registration copy, a valid equitable mortgage cannot be created. As against the above judgments, learned counsel for the appellants cited the decision in K. Praksa Rao v. N. Ramakrishna Rao A.I.R. 1982 Andhra Pradesh 272 and G.R. Krishna v. K.K. Venkatachalam 1990 (2) M.L.J. 260 to contend that by producing registration copy, a valid equitable mortgage cannot be created. In the Andhra Pradesh Case, the question for consideration was, as between the mortgage created by producing original document and registration copy, which is to prevail. Therefore, that is not helpful for the appellants. No doubt, 1990 (2) M.L.J. 260 (supra) seems to support the case of the appellants. Bellie J. in that case, has observed as follows: “The question is what is document of title? Ordinarily any deed that vests title in a person is a document of title. Obviously that deed is orginal deed. Therefore when the section says documents of title it must be understood to mean original documents of title and not copies of orginal documents of title. It must be remembered that as per section 58(f) a mortgage by deposit of title deeds can be created only in certain towns specified therein. Thus, it is a special provision for particular places. It appears to be intended for raising loans urgently to meet urgent requirements especially by commercial people. In these circumstances, the provision of section 58 (f) must be strictly-construed. This is what Gokulakrishnan, J., (as he then was) has said in his judgment in Adaikappa Chettiar v. Official Assignee 1972 T.L.N.J. 589 and held that a mortgage by deposit of title deeds cannot be created by depositing copy of a title deed. Of course he has also stated that, “When the orginals are not available in stated circumstances such as when it is lost or when it is not readily available to produce, the copies can be accepted for the time being.” But the effect of this also is that without original title deed mortgage cannot be created. If it is to be held that with a copy of title deed a mortgage can be created then there is no doubt that it may lead to fraudulent transactions. With many copies one can create many mortgages with many different people without the knowledge of one of the mortgages with the other persons. If it is to be held that with a copy of title deed a mortgage can be created then there is no doubt that it may lead to fraudulent transactions. With many copies one can create many mortgages with many different people without the knowledge of one of the mortgages with the other persons. Therefore, I do not think that the legislators while enacting section 58(f) would have thought that mortgage can be created by deposit of even a copy of a title deed. True, if the orginal deed is lost one will not be able to create a mortgage if it is held that a copy of the title deed is not sufficient. That may be so, when the orginal is lost the person who has lost it may have to suffer. It is not as if he cannot create any other mortgage like simple mortgage, usufructuary mortgage, etc. Therefore, this argument cannot be contenanced. In Syndicate Bank v. Modern tile and Clay works 1980 K.L.T. 550 a Division Bench has observed that to hold that a copy of a deed of transfer is also a document of title for purposes of Sec. 58(f) of the Transfer of Property Act would amount to giving facilities to the owner to misuse the provision. It was further held that a copy of the deed of transfer is not ordinarily a document of title for the purposes of an equitable mortgage. But however it has been then observed that when the original is lost, with sufficient safeguards a certified copy of d ocument can be received as a document of title. But for the reasons stated above, I am unable to agree with this observation of the learned Judges.” (Paras 11 and 12). Even though the decision reported in 1973 (1) M.L.J. 334 (supra) was brought to the notice of the learned Judge, the learned Judge has distinguished that case by saying that the facts are different in that case. With respect, we are unable to share the view of Bellie, J., when the learned Judge makes a sweeping observation by stating that if the original is lost, one will not be able to create a mortgage. In 1973 (1) M.L.J. 234 ( supra ), the learned Judges cited with approval, the earlier Division Bench Judgment in A.I.R. 1925 Madras 723 ( supra ). In 1973 (1) M.L.J. 234 ( supra ), the learned Judges cited with approval, the earlier Division Bench Judgment in A.I.R. 1925 Madras 723 ( supra ). Further, we are inclined to take the same view as was taken by the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court in A.I.R. 1990 Kerala 157 ( supra ), wherein the learned Judges have dealt with the question elaborately. 28. In the light of the pronouncements of the Supreme Court, this Court and other High Courts, we have no hesitation to answer the two questions against the appellants. Apart from that, we also find that the conduct of the appellants leaves no doubt that they intended to create equitable mortgage to avail credit facilities from the Bank. Here again, the trial court has dealt with the oral and documentary evidence in full, and we agree with the conclusion reached by the trial court on this aspect. 29. In the result, the appeal fails and accordingly we dismiss the same. The order of the Court below is confirmed. No costs.