Judgment S. N. Jha, J. 1. This appeal by the defendant Ist party arises out of a suit for declaration that the sale of structures of the house in an execution case is void which did not affect the title of the plaintiff, recovery of possession of the house property as well as permanent injunction. 2. Admitted facts of the case are that the suit property comprising holding Nos.50 to 53 of Golmuri market in Jamshedpur town had been leased out by the Tata Iron and Steel Company Limited (in short tisco) to the plaintiff, a limited company registered under the Indian Companies Act 1913. The premises were given to defendant Ist party on rent. The plaintiff defaulted in payment of rent. Tisco in the circumstances instituted t. S. No.276 of 1952 which was decreed on 20-8-1954 only for arrears of rent for Rs.861.60. The decree was put on exacution and on 15-12-1955 the materials of the house, namely, the corrugated sheets of the wall and the roof were sold for Rs.952/- in Execution Case No.454 of 1955. In the meantime the Calcutta High Court passed an order of winding up of the plaintiff company on 7-2-1955 and appointed an official liquidator on 23-2-1955. The aforesaid execution proceeding commenced thereafter on 11-6-1955 in which the premises were attached on 15-9-1955 and the sale took place on 15-12-1955, as stated above. The official liquidator filed application to set aside the sale under Order 21, Rule 90 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short the Code) which was registered as Misc. Case No.11 of 1956. By order dated 16-6-1956 the miscellaneous case was dismissed with the observation that the sale of the materials of the house was void and could be ignored. The instant suit was instituted on 12-12-1967. 3. I shall refer to the relevant pleadings later in this judgment. Suffice it to say here that the suit was filed purportedly on a fresh cause of action namely, orders passed regarding mutation of the names of defendant in respect of the suit premises. 4. According to the defendant, it came in possession of the premises on the date of sale, namely, 15-12-1955 and in course of time in april, 1957, the land comprising the suit premises was settled with them by Tisco, Then after, they rebuilt the house on the said land. 4. According to the defendant, it came in possession of the premises on the date of sale, namely, 15-12-1955 and in course of time in april, 1957, the land comprising the suit premises was settled with them by Tisco, Then after, they rebuilt the house on the said land. Plea has been taken that the decree passed in T. S. No.276 of 1952 was valid inasmuch as the order of winding up of the company as also appointment of the official liquidator were passed later. The defendant second party, namely, Tisco also filed written statement supporting the case of the defendant Ist party. 5. The trial court decreed the suit holding that the auction sale of the building materials held on 15-12-1955 in Execution Case No.454 of 1955 was void did not affect the title of the plaintiff. It also held that the plaintiffs was entitled to decree for possession on the basis of title in the suit property. 6. Mr. Ram Chandra Jha, learned counsel appearing for the defendant-appellant submitted that even assuming that the sale dated 15-12-1955 was void by reason of the dismissal of the application in Misc. Case No.11 of 1956 it was incumbant upon the then liquidator of ths plaintiff company to file the suit under Sec.47 of the Code in the same court and within the period of three years from the date of the sale. It was submitted that Sec.47 of the code as it stood prior to its amendment by amendment Act 104 of 1976 barred any proceeding or suit except in accordance with the said provision and that having not been done, the instant suit was not maintainable. 7. Mr Chunni Lal, learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff-respondent, on the other hand, contended that in view of the finding recorded in the miscellaneous proceeding, namely, Misc. Case No.11 of 1956 it was not necessary for the plaintiff to get a declaration that the sale was void and therefore, the issue raised in the instant suit does not come within the purview of Sec.47 and the said provision cannot be said to be applicable. It was submitted that in the instant suit the proceeding in execution Case No.454 of 1956 or the sale were not under challenge as being incompetent or void. It was submitted that in the instant suit the proceeding in execution Case No.454 of 1956 or the sale were not under challenge as being incompetent or void. The suit is a simple suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession based on title on a new cause of action, namely, order of mutation of the name of the defendant Ist party with respect to the suit premises. 8. The plea of Mr. Chunni Lal has no substance at all. The main relief sought in the suit is for declaration that the sale of the materials and the structures of the house is illegal and void which has not affected the title of the plaintiff. It is true that the nature and the character of the suit is not to be determined conclusively by the reliefs claimed in the plaint and in order to determines the true nature of the suit, the plaint as a whole has to be seen but as it would appear the pleadings also do not suggest otherwise. In this connection the following passage occurring in paras 6 and 9 of the plaint may be noticed : . . . . . That it is therefore, submitted that the aforesaid attachment and sale of the properties mentioned above are void and defendant No.1 has acquired no title or interest in the aforesaid properties. " "that under the circumstances it has become necessary for the plaintiff to have a declaration that the sale of the materials of the structure of the house described in Schedule a in Execution case No.454 of 1955 is void and defendant No.1 has not acquired any title thereto. " It is obvious that the competence of the proceedings and validity of sale in execution Case No.454 of 1955 is very much under challenge in the suit and that notwithstanding the finding recorded in Misc. Case No.11 of 1956, the plaintiffs has specifically claimed a declaration that the sale offered in the said proceeding was void and did not affect the plaintiffs title. In this view of the matter, I am unable to agree with the contention of Mr. Chunni Lal that the validity of the sale held on 15-12-1955 has not been challenged in this case and, therefore, Sec.47 has no application. 9. In this view of the matter, I am unable to agree with the contention of Mr. Chunni Lal that the validity of the sale held on 15-12-1955 has not been challenged in this case and, therefore, Sec.47 has no application. 9. The question for consideration is whether the suit is maintainable by reason of the provisions of both Sec.47 of the Code and the limitation Act, 1908. Answer to this depends on answer to another question which, in my opinion, is the basic question as to whether the issue regarding invalidity of the sale dated 15-12-1955 is a question relating to the execution of the decree so as to attract the mischief of Sec.47. Subsections (1) and (2) of Sec.47 as they stood prior to the amendment of 1976 read as follows : " (1) All questions arising between the parties to the suit in which the decree was passed, or their representatives, and relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree, shall be determined by the Court executing the decree and not by a separate suit. (2) The Court may, subject to any objection as to limitation or jurisdiction, treat a proceeding under this section ae a suit or a suit as a proceeding and may, if necessary, order payment of any additional Court-fees. " In Court of Wards V/s. Maharajah Coomar Ramaput, (1872) 14 M. I. A.605, it was observed that the difficulties of a litigant in India begin after he obtains a decree. In order to obviate the difficulties of a decree holder it has been consistently held by the Privy Council and following that by the Supreme Court and the High Courts of India that Sec.47 should be liberally construed so that the questions capable of determination by the executing court may be disposed of expeditiously by the executing court itself and the parties are not driven independent suit unless the case be clearly outside its scope and purview. In Harnandrai Badridas V/s. Debidutt Bhagwati Prasad and others, AIR 1973 SC 2423 Their Lordships observed that if a liberal construction be put upon Sec.47, there is no reason why the question relating to delivery of possession concerning the nature of rights purchased cannot be decided in a proceeding under section 47 by the Executing Court itself. In Harnandrai Badridas V/s. Debidutt Bhagwati Prasad and others, AIR 1973 SC 2423 Their Lordships observed that if a liberal construction be put upon Sec.47, there is no reason why the question relating to delivery of possession concerning the nature of rights purchased cannot be decided in a proceeding under section 47 by the Executing Court itself. Ia Merla Ramanno V/s. Nallaparaju and others, AIR 1956 SC 87 upon which strong reliance was placed by mr. Jha, it has been held- "it is well settled that when a sale in execution of a decree is impugned on the ground that it is not warranted by the terms thereof, that question could be anitated, when it arises between the parties to the decree, only by an application under Section 47, Civil P. C. and not in a separate suit. " In that case the Court had passed mortgage decree authorising the sale of only mortgage rights and not the lands which was the subject-matter of that mortgage. However, in the execution proceeding the property covered by the mortgage itself had been sold and it was held that the sale being in excess of the decree was void and, therefore, any question arising between the parties as to the execution of the decree would be a question relating to execution which has to be decided on an application under section 47 itself. The instant case and the point for consideration arising herein, is covered by the principle laid down in the case of Merla Ramanna (supra ). 10 Chunni Lal in order to wriggle out of the mischief of Sec.47 submitted that by reason of the finding recorded in the aforesaid miscellaneous proceeding the sale being void could be ignored and, therefore it was hot necessary for the plaintiff to have challenged the sale, I have already referred to the relevant portions of that the plaintiffs case as set out in the plaint. In my opinion, the aforesaid so, called finding assidnously relied upon by the learned counsel was only in the nature of an observation and cannot be said to have any binding effect since the miscellaneous case ultimately stood dismissed. In my opinion, the aforesaid so, called finding assidnously relied upon by the learned counsel was only in the nature of an observation and cannot be said to have any binding effect since the miscellaneous case ultimately stood dismissed. The defendant by reason of dismissal of the miscellaneous case could not have preferred any appeal and, therefore, any finding recorded or observation made therein could be at best used only for collateral purpose and cannot be said to be a finding in the strict sense. In this view of the matter, it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to have challenged the sale which he has in fact, done. It would also appear that the pleadings apart, the parties have gone into the question of nature of sale in a fulfledged manner and led evidence. The Court also in view of the pleadings of the parties framed an issue as to whether auction sale of building materials of the disputed house held in Execution case No.454 of 1955 was void and ineffective as against the title of the plaintiff and recorded its finding in the affirmative in favour of the plaintiff on consideration of evidence and the relevant provisions of the Companies act. For these reasons I am of the opinion that the issue raised by the plaintiff relates to a question relating to the execution of the decree within the meaning of sub-section (1) of Sec.47. 11. The said provisions lays down that any question relating to execution, satisfaction or discharge of a decree shall be determined by the court executing the decree and not by a separate suit. Sub-section (2)provides that the court may, subject to any objection, as to limitation or jurisdiction, treat a proceeding under that section as a suit or a suit as a proceeding, if necessary on payment of additional court fee. In terms of sub-section (2) the suit, no doubt, could be held to be maintainable as a proceeding, but the same had to be filed before the same court, namely, the executing court and that also subject to the limitation. 12. The question of limitation was also vehemently argued by Mr. Jha and the answer thereto is contained in the case of Merla Ramanna (supra) itself. 12. The question of limitation was also vehemently argued by Mr. Jha and the answer thereto is contained in the case of Merla Ramanna (supra) itself. In para 10 of the judgment, it has been held that when a sale in execution is inoperative and void, an application by a judgment debtor to have it declared void and for appropriate reliefs is governed by article 181 of the Limitation Act, 1908 . The aforesaid Article 181 corresponding to Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 with certain changes provides for a period of three years when the right to apply accrues. Once the applicability of the particular article of the Limitation Act is decided there hardly remains any dispute that the suit for the application within the meaning of Sec.47 had to be instituted or filed within a period of three years, in the instant case, from 15-12-1955 when the sale took place, and the right to apply accrued. The instant suit, as stated above, was instituted on 12-12-1967 i. e. well after the expiry of period of limitation. 13. Mr. Chunni Lal tried to over come the bar of limitation on the plea that the suit was instituted on as fresh cause of action. I have already dealt with the aforesaid submission and it is not necessary to repeat the discussion. One thing that I would like to mention in this connection is that although in para 8 of the plaint it has been averred that the plaintiff has been informed subsequently that defendant No.2 has mutated the name of defendant No.1 with respect to the holdings in schedule a below even though the holdings were never sold in the aforesaid execution case, no specific details as to when the order of mutation had been passed and so on have been furnished. It is difficult to hold on the basis of such vague and bald averment that a new cause of action had arisen. The term cause of action has been herd to mean the whole bundle of material facts which it is necessary for the plaintiff to allege and prove in order to succeed. " It was incumbent upon the plaintiff to state the necessary material facts. That having not been done, it is difficult to accept the submission of Mr. Chunni Lal that the suit was instituted on new cause of action. " It was incumbent upon the plaintiff to state the necessary material facts. That having not been done, it is difficult to accept the submission of Mr. Chunni Lal that the suit was instituted on new cause of action. In my opinion, the suit in form and in essence seeks a declaration that the impugned sale was void. The averment in para 8 about the alleged fresh cause of action appears to have been made only to circumvent the provisions of Sec.47. 14. On the basis of the discussion made above, I hold that the instant suit was not maintainable. Necessarily, therefore, the judgment and decree of the trial court cannot be said to be in accordance with law. 15. In the result, this appeal is allowed. The judgment and the decree of the trial court are set aside but without any order as to costs. Aftab Alam, J.-I agree appeal allowed.