Judgment N. K. JAM, J. ( 1 ) THIS revision petition is disrected against the order of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Banswara dated 24/12/1980 in Case No. 59/80. ( 2 ) THE relevant facts which are necessary for the disposal of this revision are that one Labh Singh, Finance Controller and Secretary of Banswara Syntex Limited made a complaint on 20. 12. 1979 with the allegation that goods which were despached on the order of Subhdra Textile amounting to Rs. 2,26,815. 47 against the Hundi, which was accepted but the payment was not made by Subhdra Textile. It was also alleged that later on after a great deal cheques of Rs. 40,000. 00 were given but they were dishonored and thereby the company, the non-petitioner complainant has been cheated as they have not received the amount of the goods supplied. On this complaint, police registered a case and a challan vas a filed before the learned Chief Judicial. lagistrate, Banswara who took cognizance vide his order dated 24/12/1980 against the petitioner who is the proprietor of Subhdra Textile. Aggrieved with this order, the petitioner has preferred this revision. ( 3 ) THIS revision is pending in this court since 9/2/1981 and further proceedings in the case were stayed by this court. ( 4 ) MR. M. L. Garg, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the learned Chief judicial Magistrate, Banswara has no jurisdiction 0 take cognizance as transaction took place at Delhi. He has also submitted that the complainant subsequently filed a Civil Suit No. 1460/91 on 9/12/1981 in the Delhi High Court. That apart no case u/s. 406 and 420, I. P. C. can be constituted on he basis of the complaint. He has placed reliance in Suresh Kumar Gupta v. Omprakash, Trilok Singh v. Satya Dev, V. V. Chary v. Matu and Ors. , and Munnalal v. State of Raj. He has also prayed that this revision may be treated a petition u/s. 482, Cr. P. C. ( 5 ) MR. T. S. Champawat, learned counsel for the non-petitioner has submitted that simply the complainant-plaintiff has subsequently filed a civil suit, proceedings u/s. 420, I. P. C. cannot be quashed. He has submitted that as per condition of Hundi, petitioner was to make payment within 45 days. He has also submitted that the-complainant suffered loss as Hundi was not honoured and remained un-discharged. He has submitted that as per condition of Hundi, petitioner was to make payment within 45 days. He has also submitted that the-complainant suffered loss as Hundi was not honoured and remained un-discharged. The petitioner thereupon gave four post dated cheques but simultaneously directed the bank to stop payment thus it is clear that the petitioner had intention of cheating and not to make payment of goods and this fraudulent action of the petitioner clearly falls within the ambit of Sec. 420, IPC and on the basis of which the learned CJM has rightly taken cognizance. ( 6 ) I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the impugned order as well as the case-law. ( 7 ) IN Suresh Kumar Gupta v. Om Prakash (supra) it was held that where allegation in the complaint did not constitute offence alleged and the proceedings can be quashed by High Court u/s. 482, Cr. P. C. ( 8 ) IN Trilok Singh v. Satya Dev (supra), purchaser launched criminal prosecution against financer. It was held that the dispute raised was of purely civil nature and criminal proceedings initiated was an abuse of the process of the court and they were quashed. ( 9 ) IN V. V. Chary v. Matu (supra), post dated cheque for the goods already delivered. The accused not said to be available that he had no funds in the account and he did not intend to provide funds. It was held that dishonor of the cheques do not give rise to criminal offence u/s. 420, IPC and the High Court quashed the proceedings. ( 10 ) IN this case both the parties entered into an agreement on 30/12/1978, on certain conditions to supply syntex yarn. The petitioner placed on order for 1000 kgs of syntex yam on 10/12/1978 at Delhi office of the complainant. Hundies of different dates were drawn at their Delhi office. The Hundies were sent by the complainant which were accepted by the petitioner and the due date of the payment of hundies were 8th Feb. 1979/1st March, 1979, i. e. within 45 days. The petitioner gave further orders for the supply of 4000 kgs. 500 kgs. , and 600 kgs. of syntex yarn on 30/12/1978 and the goods were dispatched from Banswara to Faridkot. 1979/1st March, 1979, i. e. within 45 days. The petitioner gave further orders for the supply of 4000 kgs. 500 kgs. , and 600 kgs. of syntex yarn on 30/12/1978 and the goods were dispatched from Banswara to Faridkot. The petitioner raised objection that company failed to dispatch any yam as agreed in time and it has committed breach of contract and thus he is entitled to damages as he has suffered losses because of the breach of contract and non-supply or short-supply. The accused petitioner gave four cheques of Rs. 10,000. 00 each dated 10/3/1979, 25/3/1979, 3/4/1979 and 13/4/1979. The first cheque was submitted for encashment in bank on 16th March, 1979 but the cheque was returned by the bank with the endorsement at item No. 11 that the payment has been stopped by the drawer. The petitioner has also complained that the delivery which has been effected against the order dated 10/12/1978 is not in accordance with the terms of the contract and made a claim of 4000 kgs waste vide his claim dated 28/2/1997. The correspondence which ensued between the parties for the payment of the amount is also on record, and on the Jasis of above facts admittedly the parties are having transactions before entering into agreement and even after that. It is also on record that after dispute supplies were made by the complainant on 4/5/1979. It also goes to show that the accused made certain allegations of breach of contract and also for non-supply/short supply of goods by which as alleged by the petitioner he has suffered loss and ultimately cheques were issued which were not honoured by the bank on the direction of the petitioner. It is true that the same set of facts can give rise both to a civil liability and a criminal prosecution but if there is no mens rea, or if the other essential ingredients of an offence are lacking, the same facts may not sustain a criminal prosecution though a civil action may lie. The object of civil proceedings is of recovery of money or property but the object of criminal proceedings is the punishment of public offence. The complainant has also filed a civil suit which has not been disputed by the petitioner. The object of civil proceedings is of recovery of money or property but the object of criminal proceedings is the punishment of public offence. The complainant has also filed a civil suit which has not been disputed by the petitioner. In the instant case a perusal of the complaint shows that the complainant has no-where stated that the petitioner had dishonest and fraudulent intention and the complainant has also not disclosed the fact in complaint that the petitioner was aware of the fact that he was deceiving the complainant and, therefore, it appears that ingredients of Sec. 420, I. P. C. are lacking and in the absence of dishonest and fraudulent intention the criminal proceedings cannot proceed as offence will depend upon the intention of the accused at the time of alleged inducement. As stated above it has not been disclosed in his compliant and, therefore, in my opinion, prima facie merely on the ground that cheques were dishonoured no case u/s. 420, I. P. C. can be made out against the petitioner. ( 11 ) SO far as the point regarding territorial jurisdiction in criminal case is concerned, the ordinary or general rule of jurisdiction in criminal cases embodied in s. 177, Cr. P. C. based on the principle that all crime in local is that the jurisdiction to try a person for an offence depends upon the crime having been committed within the area of such jurisdiction. This court while considering the same question in Munna Lal v. State (supra) observed that the various sections following s. 177, Cr. P. C. creating several exceptions to this rule, should be reasonably and properly construed and their scope should not be enlarged on analogous considerations. Consequently, considerations relevant under s. 183 should not enter in the interpretation of s. 180, illustration (b) -and s. 181 (3), Cr. P. C. and ids proper to give effect to their plain meaning and not to widen their scope. Since the complainant after filing of the FIR. has himself subsequently filed a civil suit in the Delhi High Court and the proceedings against the petitioner as stated above are not sustainable, therefore, this point need not be decided. P. C. and ids proper to give effect to their plain meaning and not to widen their scope. Since the complainant after filing of the FIR. has himself subsequently filed a civil suit in the Delhi High Court and the proceedings against the petitioner as stated above are not sustainable, therefore, this point need not be decided. ( 12 ) AS discussed above, in my opinion, if the order taking cognizance against the petitioner is allowed to sustain under the facts and circumstances of this case and after an inordinate delay it will amount to abuse of the process of the court and to secure ends of justice the same is liable to be quashed. In the result, this revision petition u/s. 482 is allowed. The order passed by learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Banswara dated 24/12/1980 is set aside and the proceedings initiated against the petitioner in Cr. Case No. 59/80 are quashed. Petition allowed.