JUDGMENT : S.D. Shah, J. 1. Rule. Mr. P.K. Jaini, waives service of rule. With the consent of the learned counsel of the parties, the matter is finally heard today. This Civil Revision Application is filed by petitioner-landlord against the judgment and decree passed by Assistant Judge, Kaira at Nadiad in Civil Appeal No. 121 of 1985 dated 21st March, 1990, whereby the learned Assistant Judge, Nadiad, has allowed the appeal preferred by the respondent-defendant against the judgment and decree passed by Civil Judge, J.D. Kapadwanj in Regular Civil Suit No. 259 of 1981. 2. The petitioner-landlord instituted Regular Civil Suit No. 259 of 1981 against the respondent tenant to recover possession of the suit premises Bombay City No. 4354, situated at Zanpi Pole and for arrears of rent at the rate of Rs. 24/- per month excluding the House Tax and other taxes payable by the respondent-tenant. The suit was instituted on the ground that respondent-tenant was the tenant in arrears of rent from Ist of November, 1978 to 10th of May, 1979 and from 11th of May, 1979 to 30th September, 1981 and that he has failed to pay the arrears of rent inspite of demand made by the petitioner-landlord under Section 12(2) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947. The second ground pressed was guilty of conduct, which would amount to nuisance or annoyance to the adjoining neighbours. 3. The said suit of the petitioner-landlord was resisted by the respondent-tenant by filing his written statement and the trial Court after framing issues at Exh. 29 and recording evidence of the parties, was pleased to decree the suit of petitioner-landlord for possession on the ground that that petitioner-plaintiff landlord has proved that the respondent-tenant has neglected to make payment of the arrears of rent within one month from the date of the receipt of the notice under Section 12(2) of the Bombay Rent Act and that it was also proved that respondent-tenant was not ready and willing to pay the rent and, therefore, he was liable to be evicted from the suit premises. The trial Court has passed a decree for the amount of Rs. 770/- for arrears of rent. The trial Court has passed a decree for the amount of Rs. 770/- for arrears of rent. However, on the question of conduct of the respondent-tenant causing nuisance and annoyance to the neighbours of the premises the trial Court held against the petitioner-landlord and since the ground of nuisance or annoyance to the adjoining neighbours is not pressed in this civil revision application, the same shall not be referred here in this judgment. 4. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and decree passed by the trial Court, the respondent-tenant preferred appeal being Civil Appeal No. 121 of 1985, the Assistant Judge, Kaira heard the said appeal. The Assistant Judge Kaira buy his judgment and decree dated 21st of March, 1990, allowed the appeal of the respondent-tenant and recorded the finding that the respondent-tenant was ready and willing to pay the rent within the period of 30 days from the date of receipt of the notice under Section 12(2) of the Bombay Rent Act, and that respondent's case was governed by provision of Section 12(3)(b) of the Bombay Rent Act, and that, quashed and decree for eviction was required to be passed. He, therefore, quashed and set aside the decree of possession passed by the Trial Court in favour of the petitioner-landlord and against the respondent-tenant. The appellate Judge also quashed and set-aside the decree for arrears of rent passed by the trial Court in favour of the petitioner-landlord and, in fact, the lower appellate Court was pleased to dismiss the suit of the petitioner-landlord. 5. The aforesaid judgment and decree passed by the Assistant Judge, Kaira at Nadiad has given to the present civil revision application. 6. Mr. M.C. Shah, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner-landlord has made the following submissions for my consideration :- (i) The lower appellate Court erred in setting aside the decree for arrears of rent for the amount of Rs. 770/-, which was already passed by the trial Court in favour of the petitioner-landlord and to that extent the judgment and order of the lower appellate Court is bad in law. (ii) The lower appellate Court erred in holding that the case is governed by the provisions of Section 12(3)(b) of the Bombay Rent Act and further erred in holding that the case is not governed by the provisions of Section 12(3)(a) of the Bombay Rent Act. (ii) The lower appellate Court erred in holding that the case is governed by the provisions of Section 12(3)(b) of the Bombay Rent Act and further erred in holding that the case is not governed by the provisions of Section 12(3)(a) of the Bombay Rent Act. (iii) The findings reached by the lower appellate Court on the question of receipt of Notice dated 3rd August, 1981 at Exh. 49 by the respondent is perverse and suffers from the well established principle of civil law that no amount of evidence could be looked into on a fact which in dispute between the parties in their pleadings, specially when the fact is an admitted fact by the parties. Re-submission No. 1 :- (i) So far as the first submission made by Mr. M.C. Shah is concerned, there is no manner of doubt that the lower appellate Court is while allowing the appeal preferred by the respondent-defendant, quashed and set-aside the judgment and decree passed by the Civil Judge, Junior Division, Kapadwanj. The trial Court has passed a decree for arrears of rent directing the respondent-tenant to pay the amount of Rs. 770/- to the petitioner-landlord being arrears of rent from 1st of November, 1978 to 30th of September, 1981. The second part of the decree passed by the trial Court consist of directing the respondent-tenant to hand over vacant and peaceful possession of the suit premises to the petitioner-landlord. (ii) The lower appellate Court has framed the points for determination and point No. 1 framed by the lower appellate Court is as under :- "Whether learned trial Judge has committed error in holding that the plaintiffs have proved that the defendant is a tenant in arrears of rent of more than six months?" The lower appellate Court has held that respondent-tenant cannot be said to be a tenant in arrears of rent for more than six months, firstly, because according to the lower appellate Court, the notice for demand was issued by the landlord on 3rd August, 1981 at Exh. 49. The said notice, according to lower appellate Court, was received by the respondent-tenant on 14th of August, 1981 and thereafter, the respondent-tenant has sent money order for the arrears of rent on 8th September, 1981 to the Advocate of the petitioner-landlord. 49. The said notice, according to lower appellate Court, was received by the respondent-tenant on 14th of August, 1981 and thereafter, the respondent-tenant has sent money order for the arrears of rent on 8th September, 1981 to the Advocate of the petitioner-landlord. The lower appellate Court has, therefore, held that since tender of the amount equivalent to the arrears of rent was made by the respondent-tenant within the period of 30 days from the date of receipt of the notice, respondent-tenant cannot be said to be not ready and willing to pay the arrears of rent, nor can it be held that he has neglected to make the payment of arrears of rent. The second reason advanced by the lower appellate Court for recording the finding of the aforesaid point for determination in favour of the respondent-tenant is that respondent-tenant has given a notice dated 8th March, 1980 at Exh. 76, wherein, the respondent-tenant has intimated to the original landlord that he has sent the rent of 3 months in advance. From the aforesaid conduct of the respondent-tenant, the lower appellate Court has recorded the finding that such a tenant cannot be said to be a person not ready and willing to pay arrears of rent. The lower appellate Court has accepted the said Exh. 76 and the oral evidence of the respondent-tenant and has come to the conclusion that his evidence was more probable and acceptable and, therefore, it has recorded a finding that respondent-tenant cannot be in arrears of rent for a period of more than six months, and therefore decree for arrears of rent passed by the trial Court is quashed and set aside. 7. Mr. M.C. Shah has rightly submitted that even if the evidence of respondent-tenant was to be accepted and his notice at Exh. 76 was to be accepted, it was incumbent upon the lower appellate Court to discuss and record findings as to why he has quashed and set aside the decree for arrears of rent for the amount of Rs.770/- passed in favour of the petitioner-landlord. In his submission, even if a credit of rent of 3 months, is to be given by accepting Exh. In his submission, even if a credit of rent of 3 months, is to be given by accepting Exh. 76 as correct and acceptable, the lower appellate Court would have at the most deducted the rent of 3 months from the decree of Rs.770/- which was passed in favour of the petitioner-landlord and it could not have set aside the whole decree for arrears of rent. Mr. P.K. Jaini, learned counsel for respondent-tenant cannot support setting aside of the decree of arrears of rent in the amount of Rs.770/- and he submits that at least rent of 3 months, which is accepted by the lower appellate Court on having been paid as advance rent should be deducted and decree for the balance amount should be maintained. In that view of the matter, the first submission of Mr. M.C. Shah, learned counsel for the petitioner is accepted and decree passed by the trial Court for the amount of Rs.770/- being the arrears of rent minus Rs.66/- i.e. being the rent of 3 months shall have to be restored. Accordingly, I restore the decree of the trial Court for the amount of Rs.704/- and the respondent-tenant is directed to pay the said amount of arrears of rent to the petitioner-landlord. Re-submission No. 2 Mr. M.C. Shah counsel for the petitioner-landlord as vehemently submitted that the four ingredients for attracting provisions of Section 12(3)(a) of the Bombay Rent Act as enumerated by the Supreme Court in the cse of Panchal Mohanlal Ishwardas v. Maheshwari Mills Ltd., reported in 3 GLR 574, are fully satisfied in this case and the trial Court was justified in passing the decree for possession on the ground that the case was governed by provisions of Section 12(3)(a) of the Bombay Rent Act and not by the provisions of Section 12(3)(b) of the Bombay Rent Act. In his submission, the tenancy of the respondent-tenant was a monthly tenancy and it shall to have to be accepted that the tenancy was a monthly tenancy. Secondly, have to be accepted that the tenancy was monthly tenancy. Secondly, the rent according to him was payable by month. In his submission, the tenancy of the respondent-tenant was a monthly tenancy and it shall to have to be accepted that the tenancy was a monthly tenancy. Secondly, have to be accepted that the tenancy was monthly tenancy. Secondly, the rent according to him was payable by month. Thirdly, the respondent-tenant was in arrears of rent for a period of more that six months, and fourthly, the respondent-tenant has failed to pay the arrears of rent within the period of 30 days from the date of demand made by the petitioner-landlord by his notice dated 3rd of August, 1981 at Exh. 49, which was according to him received by the respondent-tenant on 6th of August, 1981. He, therefore, submits that all ingredients set out for attracting the provisions of Section 12(3)(a) of the Bombay Rent Act were satisfied and the trial Court was justified in passing the decree for possession. 8. It is now accepted position that Section 12(3)(a) of the Bombay Rent Act provides four conditions which are required to be satisfied and if all the four ingredients are satisfied, the Court shall pass a decree for eviction. The ingredients are :- 1. The rent is payable by month; 2. There is on dispute regarding the amount of standard rent of permitted increases; 3. Such rents or permitted increases or arrears for a period of 6 months or more and 4. The tenant neglects to make payment thereof until the expiration of the period of one month after notice referred to under Section 13(2) of the said Act. In the present case, it shall have to be seen as to whether ingredients of the said Section are satisfied and as to whether liability of eviction from the premises in incurred by the tenant. 9. Ordinarily, the rent is payable by month and unless the contract of tenancy otherwise provides in a monthly tenancy, it shall have to be assumed that the rent is payable by the tenant by month. The question is as to what would happened when over and above the liability to pay rent, the tenant is also liable to pay the monthly or local taxes and education cess and when demand is made not only of the amount of rent but of the amount of municipal tax and or education cess. The question is as to what would happened when over and above the liability to pay rent, the tenant is also liable to pay the monthly or local taxes and education cess and when demand is made not only of the amount of rent but of the amount of municipal tax and or education cess. In the case of Panchal Mohanlal Ishwardas v. Maheshwari Mills Limited reported in 3 GLR p. 574, indentical questions arose and this Court took the view that where rent is in arrears and also municipal taxes are demanded by the landlord by notice under Section 12(2) Clause (a) of sub-section (3) of the Bombay Rent Act is not attracted as municipal tax is not payable by month. Thereafter, when along with demand for arrears of rent, landlord makes demand for municipal tax, local tax, Panchayat Tax or Education Cess, the rent cannot be said to be payable by the tenant to the landlord every month and it will be a rent which would become payable at the end of the years and when the amount of tax would become payable under the taxes law. 10. Keeping the aforesaid position of law in mind, it shall have to be examined as to whether in the present case provisions Section 12(3)(a) are attracted or not ? Secondly it is also required to be examined as to whether tenant was in arrears of rent for a period of more than six months and as to whether he has failed to pay the arrears of rent and permitted increases as demanded by notice under Section 12(2) of the Act within a period of 30 days from the date of the receipt of the notice by the tenant. If a dispute is raised about standard rent within the said period of one month either in reply to notice or by making an application for giving a standard rent under Section 11 of the said Act, the case would not be governed by Section 12(3)(a) of the said Act. If a dispute is raised about standard rent within the said period of one month either in reply to notice or by making an application for giving a standard rent under Section 11 of the said Act, the case would not be governed by Section 12(3)(a) of the said Act. However, when no dispute of standard rent is raised by the tenant without one month from the date of the receipt of the notice and if dispute, of standard rent is settled prior thereto, the tenant is required to pay the entire arrears of rent and mesne profit to the landlord with 30 days from the date of the receipt of the notice. 11. Mr. M.C. Shah, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that in the plaint filed by the petitioner-plaintiff, it was clearly averred that the landlord has given notice dated 3rd August, 1981 under Section 12(2) of the said Act and the said notice was received by the respondent-tenant on 6th August, 1981. These averments which were made in the plaint were not specifically denied by the tenant in his written statement. Since this fact was not denied by the tenant, according to Mr. M.C. Shah, appearing for the landlord, the said fact should have been treated as admitted by the tenant. He has further submitted that tenant has replied to the said notice by his reply dated 2nd of September, 1981 at Exh. 56 and in same reply the tenant has admitted the fact that notice dated 3rd August, 1981 was received by the tenant on 6th August, 1981. In that view of the matter, the notice of demand of arrears of rent under Section 12(2) should be treated as received by the tenant on 6th August, 1981 and in fact there was no cause for the appellate Court to examine evidence on this issue. In the submission of Mr. Shah, learned counsel appearing for the landlord that the notice of demand under Section 12(2) was received by the tenant on 6th August, 1981 and since the amount of arrears of rent was also not tendered within the period of one month from the date of the receipt of the notice, tenant cannot be said to be ready and willing to pay the rent as stipulated by Section 12(3)(a) of the said Act. He further submitted that the rent was tendered by the tenant by money order dated 8th September, 1981, such tender of rent was not legal firstly, because it was not within one month from the date of the notice and secondly because such rent was sent to the advocate of the landlord and not to the landlord. He, therefore, submitted that landlord was not bound to accept such tender and this was not a valid tender of arrears of rent and, therefore, tenant has not shown his readiness and willingness to pay rent by making valid tender of the arrears of rent within the period stipulated by Section 12(3)(a) of the said Act. 12. Normally as principle of law, it can be stated that the parties to a suit should be confined to their pleadings and ordinarily the Court will not travel beyond pleadings. It is also true that no amount of evidence will be looked into if there was absence of pleadings on the issue. However, in my opinion, when despite absence of pleadings, the trial Court permitted the parties to lead evidence and when parties do not object to receipt of such of evidence in trial. The Court is not debarred from looking into such evidence. In this case, it is true that on the question of respective notice, it was the case of the landlord that notice was received by the tenant on 6th August, 1981. This fact was admitted in reply to the notice given by the advocate of the tenant. In fact, in the original reply to the notice initially blank space was kept for mentioning the date of the receipt of notice, and same was subsequently filled in by ink. It can be said that, therefore, assertion made by the landlord that the notice was received by the tenant on 6th of August, 1981 was admitted in reply to the notice. In written statement to the plaint, there was no specific denial that the notice was received by the tenant on 6th of August, 1981. However, from this stage of pleadings, it can be said that factum of receipt by the tenant was not seriously disputed. Despite this state of pleadings, the trial Court permitted the parties to lead evidence and to produce documentary evidence. Documentary evidence produced by the parties consisted of the postal acknowledgment at Exh. 59. However, from this stage of pleadings, it can be said that factum of receipt by the tenant was not seriously disputed. Despite this state of pleadings, the trial Court permitted the parties to lead evidence and to produce documentary evidence. Documentary evidence produced by the parties consisted of the postal acknowledgment at Exh. 59. The round seal of the Postal Department on this postal acknowledgement is dated 12th of August, 1981 and 13th of August, 1981 are clearly mentioned the question which would, therefore, arise would be as to whether assertion of the landlord that the notice was received by the tenant on 6th August, 1981, which was mistakenly accepted by the advocate of the tenant should debar any further enquiry when the round seal of the postal acknowledgement was indicating that the notice must have been delivered on 12th August, 1981 or 13th of August, 1981. The lower appellate Court has taken this fact into consideration and has come to the conclusion that the notice was received by the tenant on 12th of August, 1981 and not on 6th of August, 1981 as admitted by his advocate and that thereafter defendant-tenant has tendered the arrears of rent within one month from the date of the receipt. Strictly, legally and procedurally the trial Court could have refused to received such evidence in view of the pleadings of the parties. However, when such evidence is received and the evidence consist of postal acknowledgement issued by postal Department and when the evidence is such that its genuineness cannot be doubted in my opinion, there was nothing wrong for the lower appellate Court to refer to and rely upon such document. After all the rules of procedure are handmaid of justice and they are evolved in the course of time to supplement the cause of justice and not to supplant the cause of justice. 13. Blind adherence to the rule that no amount of evidence can be looked into when there is absence of pleading would result into turning a blind eye to a very important piece of document, which shows that notice sent by the landlord must have been received by the tenant on 12th of August, 1981 or 13th of August, 1981. 13. Blind adherence to the rule that no amount of evidence can be looked into when there is absence of pleading would result into turning a blind eye to a very important piece of document, which shows that notice sent by the landlord must have been received by the tenant on 12th of August, 1981 or 13th of August, 1981. It appears that in view of the said document, the admission made by the advocate of the tenant in reply to the notice is not only falsified but it is proved to be inadvertent. When between an inadvertent admission and actual fact established by documentary evidence, which is contrary to such inadvertent admission, a choice is to be made, the Court should lean in favour of undoubted acceptable documentary evidence and lower appellate Court rightly reached the conclusion that notice was received by the tenant on 12th of August, 1981. 14. Mr. M.C. Shah, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has yet another submission to deny the benefit of Section 12(3)(b) of the Act to the tenant. He submitted that even if notice is accepted to have been received the tenant on 12th of August, 1981, there was no valid tender of arrears of rent by the tenant to the landlord within a period of 30 days from the date of the receipt of the notice. It is an admitted fact that the tenant has sent the arrears of rent by money order, first coupon of money order at Exh. 82. The tenant then sent the rent of five months i.e. Rs. 110/- by money order, which was refused by the landlord on 17th of January, 1980. The second coupon of money order at Exh. 83 is sent by the tenant on 13th of January, 1980, which money order was also refused. Thereafter, on 8th of March, 1980, tenant has sent the money order of rent of eight months, which was also refused by landlord and that coupon of money order is at Exh. 84. It becomes clear that the tenant was thus ready and willing to pay rent of the suit premises to the landlord and thrice he has tendered the arrears of rent which was unjustifiably refused by the landlord. After receipt of the notice within one month i.e. on 8th of September, 1981, the tenant has tendered entire amount of arrears of rent. After receipt of the notice within one month i.e. on 8th of September, 1981, the tenant has tendered entire amount of arrears of rent. This time, money order was sent to the Advocate of the landlord, and Advocate has refused the money order on the ground that in his notice he has directed the tenant to pay rent to the landlord and that, therefore, he has no authority to receive rent on behalf of landlord. Mr. M.C. Shah, learned counsel for the landlord has submitted that tender of rent to be advocate of the landlord is not a valid tender an that in order to avoid, the liability of eviction for non-payment of rent under Section 12(3)(a) of the Rent Act, tender must be made, to landlord himself and not to anyone else. In my opinion, the submissions misconceived and shall have to be rejected. For the purpose serve notice on the tenant calling upon the tenant to pay the arrears of rent within the period of one month. The landlord has delegating such function to his authorised agent viz. the Advocate and Advocate who is giving notice on behalf of the landlord calling upon the tenant to pay up arrears of rent is thus for all purpose acting as authorised agent of the landlord and tender of arrears of tent to such authorised agent is in my opinion, a valid tender. A tenant cannot be denied the protection of Section 12(3)(b) of the Rent Act because he has shown his readiness and willingness to pay up the arrears of rent by tendering full amount of arrears of rent to the authorised agent of the landlord from whom he has received the notice. Even otherwise, in my opinion the tender of full amount of arrears of rent within the stipulated period by the tenant by money order to the landlord or his authorised agent would be sufficient to establish that the tenant was ready and willing to pay arrears of rent and that he was not a person, who has neglected or wilfully defaulted in making the payment of arrears of rent. I am, therefore, of the opinion that this objection of the landlord also cannot be accepted and the lower appellate Court was justified in holding that the tenant was ready and willing to pay the arrears of rent and that tenant has not neglected the payment of arrears of rent. It must be stated that before the lower appellate Court, the Advocate of the landlord has conceded that tender of arrears of rent to the authorised agent of the landlord viz. Advocate, was a valid tender and the lower appellate Court has recorded such concession in clear terms. Therefore, also landlord cannot be permitted to agitate that there was no valid tender of arrears of rent by the tenant to the landlord within the stipulated period. 15. Lastly, it was submitted by Mr. M.C. Shah that lower appellate Court was not justified in holding that the rent was not payable by month house tax and education cess. In the suit notice as well as in the plaint, the landlord has claimed an amount of Rs.147/- towards other taxes and education cess. Since the demand for tax was made both in the suit notice as well as in the plaint, it was a demand for permitted increases plus rent and since part of such demand was assessed annually and since liability would be incurred annually, rent shall have to be recorded as payable annually. Mr. M.C. Shah has relied upon the decision of the learned Single Judge (A.S. Qureshi, J.) of this Court in the case of Somabhai Kalidas Patel v. Bachubhai S. Modi, reported in 1986 Gujarat Law Herald (UJ) 22. In the said case, it was the case of the landlord that since he has not claimed the municipal tax and education cess in his notice as well as in suit, Section 12(3)(a) of the Bombay Rent Act was not attracted. The learned Single Judge negatived such contention. The Court held that whether the landlord claims taxes and cess are not immaterial. The crucial question is whether the tenant is liable to pay the taxes and cess. The learned Single Judge negatived such contention. The Court held that whether the landlord claims taxes and cess are not immaterial. The crucial question is whether the tenant is liable to pay the taxes and cess. If the tenant is liable to pay the municipal tax, house tax or education cess the case will not fall under Section 12(3)(a) of the Act because the rent then would not be payable by month as part of the rent (permitted increases) is payable annually as and when the liability if assessed. By reference to this decision, Mr. M.C. Shah wanted to reiterate that despite demand of education cess by the landlord in the notice as well as in the plaint, Court was required to determine as to whether annually education cess was payable. In this case, in his submission since the rent payable was less than Rs.300/- there was no liability to pay education cess and, therefore, the rent was payable by month. It is true that pay ability of the rent inclusive of municipal taxes shall have to be determined by the Court. It is also true that merely because the landlord claims the said amount of education cess, it does not become payable. However, in this case, the landlord has also demanded other taxes and the other taxes were payable by the tenant. Therefore, it is not necessary for me to decide the submission made by Mr. Shah because at least part of the rent was payable annually as house tax was payable by the tenant and the demand for taxes was made both in the plaint as well as in the notice by the landlord. In my opinion, therefore, the lower Courts made right in holding that the rent was not payable by month and that ingredient of Section 12(3)(a) was not satisfied. In my opinion, the lower appellate Court was justified in holding that Section 12(3)(b) would apply to the facts of the case and, therefore, in refusing the decree for possession. I, therefore, do not find any substance in any of the aforesaid submissions of Mr. M.C. Shah. No case is, therefore, made out for my interference in revisional jurisdiction. In my opinion, the lower appellate Court was justified in holding that Section 12(3)(b) would apply to the facts of the case and, therefore, in refusing the decree for possession. I, therefore, do not find any substance in any of the aforesaid submissions of Mr. M.C. Shah. No case is, therefore, made out for my interference in revisional jurisdiction. While exercising my revisional jurisdiction, in my opinion, I shall have to keep in mind the observations of the Supreme Court of India in the case of Helper Giradharbhai v. Mirasaheb Kadri reported in 1987(2) RCR 124, Late Justice Sabyasachi Mukharji observed as under :- "The High Court must ensure that the principles of law have been correctly borne in mind. Secondly, the facts have been properly appreciated and a decision arrived at taking all material and relevant facts in mind. It must be such a decision which no reasonable man could have arrived at. Lastly, such a decision does not lead to a miscarriage of justice. We must, however, guard ourselves against permitting in the case of revision substitution of one view where two views are possible and the Court of Small Causes has taken up a particular view. If a possible view has been taken, the High Court would be exceeding its jurisdiction if it substitutes its own view with that of the Courts below because it considered it to be a better view." 16. Consistent with the aforesaid observations, I am of the opinion that the view taken by the lower appellate Court was absolutely just and proper and the second view canvassed by Mr. M.S. Shah was not a permissible view. 17. In the result, this civil revision application partially succeeds. The judgment and order of the lower appellate Court in so far as it reverse the judgment and decree of arrears of rent passed by the Civil Judge, Junior Division, Kapadwanj in Regular Civil Suit No. 259 of 1981 and the same is required to be quashed and set aside the judgment and order of the Civil Judge, Junior Division, Kapadwanj, for the amount of Rs.704/- being arrears of rent is required to be restored and confirmed. The judgment and decree passed by the lower appellate Court reversing the judgment and decree for possession passed by the trial Court is hereby confirmed. Rule is partially made absolute. There shall be no order as to costs. The judgment and decree passed by the lower appellate Court reversing the judgment and decree for possession passed by the trial Court is hereby confirmed. Rule is partially made absolute. There shall be no order as to costs. Revision allowed.