Mr. S. B. Wad, J. ( 1 ) THESE writ petitions raise common question of lawand are, therefore, disposed of by one judgement. ( 2 ) THE Delhi Administration issued a notification under Section 4 (1)read with Section 17 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act on 13/02/1981proposing to acquire Land measuring Bighas 848 and Biswas 09 from Villagepooth Kalan for a public purpose of construction of a supplementary drain. After the notification under Section 9 of the Act, the possession of the land inquestion was taken over by Delhi Administration. This supplementary drainwas to be constructed for the benefit of the resident of Rohini Residentialscheme, the biggest residential scheme in Asia. The acquired land was handedover to Irrigation and Flood Control Department of Delhi Administration. ( 3 ) ACCORDING to the petitioner, the original purpose of constructionof a supplementary drain was given up by Delhi Administration before theaward was made and the land in question was handed over to the D. D. A. andthe D. D. A. is developing the land for various purposes under planneddevelopment of Delhi. ( 4 ) THE respondents have denied that the public purpose was changedbefore the rendering of the award. It was asserted that after the technicalre-examination of the supplementary drain site, the Administration was of theopinion that instead of constructing a supplementary drain separately, it shouldbe re-alligned with the existing Nangloi drain. For the re-allignment of thedrain with the existing Nangloi drain, the additional land was already availablewith the D. D. A. acquired earlier. Therefore, the necessary land was takenfrom the D. D. A. for the new re-allignment scheme and the petitioner s land wasmade over to the D. D. A. as the same was not required for the new project. The new project was cleared by the Technical Committee on the ground ofpractical feasibility, reduction of expenditure and better convenience for therohini Residential Scheme. The petitioners participated in the furtherproceedings before the Land Acquisition Collector which culminated in theaward made by the Collector on 22-9-1986. The petitioners accepted thecompensation without any protest but also filed an application for a referenceunder Section 18 for enhanced compensation. ( 5 ) ACCORDING to the petitioners, it was for the first time in 1989 thatthey found that the D. D. A. was carrying out construction and developmentactivity on the said land instead of construction of a supplementary drain. The petitioners accepted thecompensation without any protest but also filed an application for a referenceunder Section 18 for enhanced compensation. ( 5 ) ACCORDING to the petitioners, it was for the first time in 1989 thatthey found that the D. D. A. was carrying out construction and developmentactivity on the said land instead of construction of a supplementary drain. Thepetitioners have, therefore, filed a petition challenging the entire acquisition ofland by the respondents. ( 6 ) THE Counsel for the petitioners submits that a land acquired for onepublic purpose cannot be utilised for another public purpose, particularly wherethe original notification under Section 4 is coupled with Section 17 for urgentlytaking the possession of the land. Where the second public purpose has nourgency, notification of Section 17 would be bad in law as it would deprive thepetitioners of the valuable right under Section 2-A to life their objectionsagainst the acquisition. According to the Counsel, the land is now being handedover to the D. D. A. for planned development of Delhi and since it is an ongoing activity, there can be no urgency for its acquisition. ( 7 ) THE Counsel further submits that the original purpose of constructionof a supplementary drain was given up in 1985 before the award was rendered. He has relied on the decision of this Court in Union of India v. Nand Kishore,air 1982, Delhi 462 and the decision of Bombay High Court in industrialdevelopment and Investment Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. State, AIR 1989 Bom 156 . ( 8 ) WHILE opposing the petition, the Counsel for respondent submitsthat the lands in question were acquired in 1981 and the petitions are filed in1989. The petitioners, thus, suffer from latches. It is then submitted that thepetitioners had acquiesed in the land acquisition by accepting the compensationwithout protest. The petitioners are, therefore, estopped from challenging theacquisition now. It is then submitted that if the land acquisition was valid atthe initial stage in 1981, when the decision was taken on urgent basis, suchacquisition does not become bad or illegal by any subsequent development. Once the acquisition is made, the property vests in the government free of allencumberances and the government is free to utilise the same for any purposeother than the purpose for which the land was originally acquired. Once the acquisition is made, the property vests in the government free of allencumberances and the government is free to utilise the same for any purposeother than the purpose for which the land was originally acquired. Therespondents have relied upon Gulam Mustafa v. State of Maharashtra, AIR1977 Supreme Court 448 and Mangal Oram v. State of Orissa, AIR 1977supreme Court 1456 which follows the decision in AIR 1977 Supreme Court448. Counsel for respondent also submitted that the original scheme of thesupplementary drain had to be given up and the new scheme had to beadopted on the advice of the Technical Committee. ( 9 ) THE respondents, by their additional counter affidavit, have furnishedadditional material and charts. These charts show the vast area including theland originally covered by the supplementary drain wherein constructionactivity is already on. The first chart shows the portions of the roads passingthrough the acquired land. The second plan shows the passing of the sewerlines and development of the trunk sewer on the lands in question. The thirdplan shows the water mains passing through the said lands. The fourth planshows the development of parks, higher secondary school, primary school. shopping centre and local shopping centre which are to be built on the landaround and including the acquired land. These developmental activities areon the areas connecting or nearing the Rohini Residential Scheme. Atpresent, the part of the development activity is stopped because of the stay ofdispossession granted in the writ petitions. The submission of the Counsel isif the acquired lands are to be released from acquisition it would completelyupset the total development plan of the area as the roads, sewer lines, dramaand water lines are passing through the acquired land. ( 10 ) IN Gulam Mustafa (supra) the Supreme Court has held (page 449)that "there is no principle of law by which the valid compulsory acquisitionstands voided because long later the requiring authority diverts it to a publicpurpose other than one stated in Section 2 (3) declaration. " That case relatedto the acquisition of land under the Hyderabad Land Acquisition Act. Therationale behind the said principle is that once the land vests in the governmenton lawful acquisition, the owners of the land cannot challenge the diversionof the purpose by the government and utilisation of the land for some otherpurpose. " That case relatedto the acquisition of land under the Hyderabad Land Acquisition Act. Therationale behind the said principle is that once the land vests in the governmenton lawful acquisition, the owners of the land cannot challenge the diversionof the purpose by the government and utilisation of the land for some otherpurpose. ( 11 ) THE crucial question is whether the diversion of a public purposeby giving up the original public purpose is done before the acquisition iscomplete or after the acquisition. The other question is whether the presenceof Section 17 notification alongwith Section 14 would make any difference inprinciple mentioned above. ( 12 ) THE Counsel for the petitioner has heavily relied upon the decisionof this Court in Union of India v. Nand Kishore (supra) and the decision ofthe Bombay High Court in Industrial Development and Investment Co. (supra ). But on careful reading of the said decisions it is clear that they do not help thepetitioners, nor lay down any separate principle of law. In NandKishore,this Court had held that "the Government has no right to change the publicpurpose in midstream. The government cannot change the origonal publicpurpose till the acquisition is complete. . . . . . . . . If they want to depart from theoriginal purpose, the only course is to start fresh acquisition proceedings. After the land is vested in it, the government has a right to change the use towhich it will put the land. " The same principle is reiterated by Bombay Highcourt in the Industrial Development and Investment Co. case (supra ). Thebombay High Court held that "the purpose must continue to subsist until theland proposed to be acquired vest in the state in terms of Sections 16 or 17 ofthe Land Acquisition Act, as the case may be. If the public purpose specifiedin Section 6 notification is altered or ceases to exist, there would be no furtherjurisdiction to continue the proceedings for acquiring of such non-existantpurpose. " ( 13 ) THUS, it is clear that change of purpose before the acquisitionis complete is impermissible but the purpose can be changed after the landsvest in the government either under Section 16 or 17 of the Land Acquisitionact. Thus, presence of Section 17 notification does not make any differencein the basic position. " ( 13 ) THUS, it is clear that change of purpose before the acquisitionis complete is impermissible but the purpose can be changed after the landsvest in the government either under Section 16 or 17 of the Land Acquisitionact. Thus, presence of Section 17 notification does not make any differencein the basic position. ( 14 ) ON reading the said decision of the Supreme Court and the Highcourts, it is clear that since the original acquisition in the present case was fora lawful public purpose, and there existed the real urgency in taking possessionof the land, the acquisition was proper and legal and subsequent events havenot made it unlawful. ( 15 ) THE Counsel for the petitioner has tried to rely upon Annexurer-4 dated 27-9-1985, which is a letter from the Irrigation and Flood Controlwing of Delhi Administration addressed to the Chief Engineer, Rohini Project. The letter refers to the proposed change in the supplementary drain schemeand exchange of land with D. D. A. but on careful reading of the said letterit is clear that this is not the letter whereby the decision was taken for finallygiving up the supplementary drain scheme. In fact, the letter states that themeeting be called of the Chief Engineer Rohini, M. C. D. and the Delhiadministration. Pursuant to the said letter, meetings were held from time totime. The decision in regard to giving up of the original plan for thesupplementary drain and securing the land for the D. D. A. for the implementation of the new scheme was finally taken in 1988, as evidenced from Annexurer-6. The idea of giving up the original scheme of supplementary drain andthe new scheme of re-alligning the drain with the existing Nangloi schemecould not have been implemented unless the land for the new scheme was madeavailable by the D. D. A. ( 16 ) THUS, it is clear that the original scheme of supplementary drainwas finally given up in 1988 and not in 1985, as contended by the petitioner. This is after the award made in the present case on 22/09/1986. The submission of the Counsel for the petitioner that the change of purpose hasvitiated the original land acquisition is without any merit and is rejected. ( 17 ) IT is true that the petitioners had acquiesed in the acquisition ofland at the initial stage by taking the compensation without protest. The submission of the Counsel for the petitioner that the change of purpose hasvitiated the original land acquisition is without any merit and is rejected. ( 17 ) IT is true that the petitioners had acquiesed in the acquisition ofland at the initial stage by taking the compensation without protest. Theirpreferring a reference under Section 18 for enhancement of compensation doesnot change the position that the compensation was accepted by them withoutdemur. It is also true that the petitioners were challenging the acquisitionafter a layse of 8 years. It is well settled in law that where the petitionersacquiesed in the acquisition of land and tried to challenge the acquisition afterinordinate delay, such challenge is not competent in the eye of law. Thepetitioners are stopped from rasing such pleas before any Court of law. ( 18 ) IN case of acquaisance or latches, the Courts do not assist thepetitioner because of their consent and long silence, the reason being that aninterest is created in the respondents or the third parties. In equity suchinterest created due to the latches on the part of the petitioners cannot beignored. This principle was recognised by Bombay High Court in Industrialdevelopment and Investment Company case (supra ). ( 19 ) THE lands were handed over to the D. D. A. in the present case,development plan for the entire vast area including the lands in question havebeen prepared and the action is started. There are roads passing throughthe said land, water and sewer connections are also passing below the acquiredland, some public amenities such as schools, parks and community centres arealso covering the said land. We cannot ignore these developments which aremeant for the entire population covering this vast land and also the residentsof the Rohini Scheme. ( 20 ) FOR the reasons started above, the writ petitions are dismissed. The rule is discharged. There shall be no order as to costs.