C. SHIVAPPA, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioners have sought for quashing the orders bearing nos. Laq-cwd- 188, dated 5-94988 (Annexure-C) and No. Laq-cwd - 145 / 1988 - 89, dated 5-9-1988 (Annexure-D) and also for a mandamus directing the 1st respondent to pass an award determining the amount of compensation on the basis of the judgment and award, dated 18-2-1988 passed by the additional civil judge, bagalkot in lac. 958/1981. ( 2 ) THE relevant facts for determination of the questions involved in these petitions are: apreliminary notification was published on 10-4-1975 under the Land Acquisition Act acquiring the lands and structures of islampur village for the purpose of submergence coming under narayanpur reservoir. The declaration under Section 6 was published on 5-2-1976. The award was passed on 15-3-1977. One other house property bearing vpc No. 73 owned by one sharanappa mahantappa ganiger was also acquired and on reference the compensation was enhanced and that judgment and award became final. The petitioners, since similarly situated, applied for certified copy of the said judgment and award and the same was delivered to them on 30-3-1988. Thereafter they filed an application under Section 28-a of the Land Acquisition Act on 19-5-1988 seeking redetermination of the amount of compensation on the basis of the aforesaid judgment and award. The first respondent declined to redetermine the compensation on the basis of the judgment and award in lac. 958 of 1981 on the ground that Section 28-a of the act is not applicable to structures. The first respondent also relied on a circular produced at Annexure-E. ( 3 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioners questioned the said order on the following grounds : (I) that the circular issued by the government has no statutory force and the first respondent is not bound by such circular when he is discharging the statutory functions under the act; (II) the reasons assigned by the 1st respondent that Section 28-a is not applicable to the structures is totally incorrect and that land includes structures ; (III) the first respondent has rejected the application without complying the principles of natural justice. The learned counsel submitted that declining to entertain the application for redeter- mination of the compensation is opposed to Section 28-a of the act. The learned counsel submitted that declining to entertain the application for redeter- mination of the compensation is opposed to Section 28-a of the act. ( 4 ) RE: point No. 1: Section 28-a of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 reads thus :"28-A. Redetermination of the amount of compensation on the basis of the award of the court (1) wherein an award under this part, the court allows to the applicant any amount of compensation in excess of the amount awarded by the collector under Section 11, the persons interested in all the other land covered by the same notification under Section 4, sub-section (1) and who are also aggrieved by the award of the collector may, notwithstanding that they had not made an application to the collector under Section 18, by written application to the collector within three months from the date of the award of the court require that the amount of compensation payable to them may be redetermined on the basis of the amount of compensation awarded by the court :"a plain reading of the Section shows that the land acquisition officer has jurisdiction to redetermine the amount of compensation on the basis of the award of the court. But in the instant case he has declined to exercise the jurisdiction on the basis of a circular. The question is whether the circular has the force of law. In d. Bhuvan Mohan Patnaik and others v State of Andhra Pradesh and others, AIR 1974 SC 2092 at 2097, the Supreme Court held : xxx xxx xxx such instructions are neither 'law' within the meaning of Article 13 (3) (a) nor are they "procedure established by law" within the meaning of Article 21 of the constitution. " it is also made clear in another decision of the Supreme Court in Dwarka Nath Tewari and others v State of Bihar and others, AIR 1959 SC 249 that"circular instruction has no greater sanction than an administrative order or Rule, and is not based on any statutory authority or other authority which could give it the force of law. " ( 5 ) IN the instant case the circular issued is not routed to any statutory authority which has the force of law. Therefore, it has no binding force and cannot divest the authority from perfonning a statutory duty and a circular cannot have the effect of superseding the main Section itself. " ( 5 ) IN the instant case the circular issued is not routed to any statutory authority which has the force of law. Therefore, it has no binding force and cannot divest the authority from perfonning a statutory duty and a circular cannot have the effect of superseding the main Section itself. Instructions must be to carry out the intention and object of the Section and not contrary to it therefore, on point No. 1 the first respondent is not justified in refusing to exercise his jurisdiction under Section 28-a of the act and the basis for such non-exercise of the jurisdiction being the circular, it cannot prevent the authority from exercising its statutory duty. ( 6 ) RE. Point No. 2: the other reason assigned by the first respondent is that the definition 'land' does not include structure. This reason is unsustainable because the definition of the word 'land' in Section 3 (a) of the act includes "benefits to arise out of land and things attached to the earth or permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth. " even in the case of Bai Malimabu etc. V State of Gujarat and others, AIR 1978 SC 515 , the Supreme Court held that "land" in Section 3 (a) includes superstructure and it is not the requirement of the law to mention the structure, if any, in the notification. " so the second reason of the first respondent to reject the application on the ground that the land does not include structure is incorrect. ( 7 ) RE. Point No. 3: the authority while deciding an application which has civil consequence must comply with the principles of natural justice. The claim of a litigant should not be rejected without giving an opportunity of being heard. Even though the statute does not contemplates an opportunity of being heard in express terms, courts have read the principles of natural Justice by implication only to show fair play in action. Here the first respondent has arbitrarily exercised his power without hearing the petitioners when they approached him with an application for rcdetermination of the compensation. This act of the first respondent is opposed to the principles of natural justice. Here the first respondent has arbitrarily exercised his power without hearing the petitioners when they approached him with an application for rcdetermination of the compensation. This act of the first respondent is opposed to the principles of natural justice. Therefore I agree with the submissions of the learned counsel for petitioners that the circular has no force of law to divest the jurisdiction of the first respondent, that the land includes structures and that the action of the first respondent to reject the application of the petitioners for determination of the compensation, without affording an opportunity of being heard, is in violation of the principles of natural justice. Therefore the orders, annexures-c and d impugned in these petitions are unsustainable and liable to be quashed. Hence I pass the following order : (i) the orders of the first respondent, annexures-c and d, dated 5-9-1988 are quashed. (ii) a writ in the nature of mandamus shall be issued to the first respondent to consider the application of the petitioners for redetennination of the compensation in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made above. --- *** --- .