G. T. NANAVATI, J. ( 1 ) THE petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by the appellant against the order of removal was dismissed by the learned single Judge of this Court. Aggrieved by that decision he has filed this Letters Patent Appeal. ( 2 ) THE appellant was appointed as a Section Writer on 1-9-1964 by the Chief City Magistrate Ahmedabad. At the relevant time i. e. between 5 and 18-9-72 he was working as a Bench Clerk in Court No. 6. Many cases decided by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate presiding over the said court were taken in revision suo motu by this Court for the purpose of enhancement of sentence. In four cases the accused stated before this Court that they had given bribe to the learned Magistrate through his Bench Clerk (the appellant Mahendrakumar ). Three of them filed affidavits before the learned single Judge. who was hearing those matters. The said three accused were also put some questions with respect to their affidavits and the answers given by them were also recorded. On the basis of this material departmental proceedings were instituted against the appellant. He was served with a charge-sheet on 1-10-75. The Inquiry Officer was of the view that there was no legal evidence against the appellant but the disciplinary authority i. e. the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate did not agree with the said finding and on being satisfied that the charges levelled against the appellant were proved passed an order of removal from service on 30 The appellant filed an appeal to this Court on its Administrative side but that was dismissed as this Court agreed with the finding recorded by the disciplinary authority that the misconduct of the appellant was established satisfactorily and that the order of removal from service was quite proper. Therefore this Letters Patent Appeal. ( 3 ) ONLY two contentions have been raised before us. First contention raised on behalf of the appellant was that there was no legal evidence on the basis of which finding of misconduct could have been recorded against the appellant. It was submitted that the three persons whose affidavits were tendered in this Court and whose statements were recorded by this Court were not examined before the Inquiry Officer. The three witnesses who were examined before the Inquiry Officer did not have any personal knowledge about the transactions in question. It was submitted that the three persons whose affidavits were tendered in this Court and whose statements were recorded by this Court were not examined before the Inquiry Officer. The three witnesses who were examined before the Inquiry Officer did not have any personal knowledge about the transactions in question. Thus there was no direct evidence as regards the demand and giving of bribe. Even though the affidavits were filed in this Court and even though the statements were recorded by a Judge of this Court it was not open to the disciplinary authority to proceed on the basis that they were true in absence of any evidence before him by the persons filing those affidavits and giving statements. It was submitted that in absence of such substantive evidence the charge against the appellant could not have been held proved. ( 4 ) IN support of this contention the learned Advocate appearing for the appellant relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Central Bank of India Ltd. v. Prakash Chand Jain AIR 1969 SC 983 The following observations made in that judgment were relied upon: however we find that on the other ingredients of the first charge the Tribunal was justified in arriving at the conclusion that the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer were perverse. The Tribunal gave the reason that these finding were based on hearsay evidence. This view taken by the Tribunal appears to be fully justified. . . . It is in this connection that importance attaches to the views expressed by this Court in the cases cited above there it was pointed out that a finding of a domestic tribunal may be perverse if it is not supported by any legal evidence. It is true that in numerous cases it has been held that domestic tribunals like an Enquiry Officer are not bound by the technical rules about evidence contained in the Indian Evidence Act; but it has nowhere been laid down that even substantive rules which would form part of principles of natural justice also can be ignored by the domestic tribunals. The principle that a fact sought to be proved must be supported by statements made in the presence of the person against whom the enquiry is held and that statements made behind the back of the person charged are not to be treated as substantive evidence is one of the basic principles which cannot be ignored on the mere ground that domestic tribunals are not bound by the technical rules of procedure contained in the Evidence Act. . . . ( 5 ) THE Supreme Court referred to its two earlier judgments in State of Mysore v. Shivabaseppa AIR 1963 SC 375 Kasoram Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Gangadhar AIR 1964 SC 708 and Khardah Co. Ltd. v. Their Workmen AIR 1964 SC 719 and made clear that the observations made by it in the case of departmental inquiries held against public servants that if the deposition of a witness has been recorded by the Enquiry Officer in the absence of the public servant and a copy thereof is given to him and an opportunity is given to him to cross-examine the witness after he affirms in a general way the truth of his statements already recorded that would conform to the requirements of natural justice have to be applied with caution to enquiries held by domestic Tribunals against the industrial employees. The Supreme Court then pointed out that it is desirable that all witnesses on whose testimony the management relies in support of its charge against the workman should be examined in his presence. The Supreme Court has also referred to the following observations made by it in the case of Keshoram Cotton Mills:. . . Therefore the nature of the inquiry and the status of the person against whom the inquiry is being held will have some hearing on what should be the minimum requirement of the rules of natural justice. . . . Thus the Supreme Court itself has drawn a distinction between departmental inquiries held against public servants and inquiries held by domestic Tribunals against industrial employees. The case of Prakash Chand Jain was a case of an inquiry held by an Administrative Tribunal against an industrial employee and it was in that context that the Supreme Court made the above-quoted observations. Thus the Supreme Court itself has drawn a distinction between departmental inquiries held against public servants and inquiries held by domestic Tribunals against industrial employees. The case of Prakash Chand Jain was a case of an inquiry held by an Administrative Tribunal against an industrial employee and it was in that context that the Supreme Court made the above-quoted observations. Therefore it is difficult to accept the contention raised on behalf of the appellant that the Supreme Court has laid down in that case a general proposition applicable to all domestic inquiries. ( 6 ) IN State of Haryana v. Rattan Singh AIR 1977 SC 1512 the Supreme Court has in terms held that in a domestic inquiry all materials which are logically probative for a prudent mind are permissible and there is no allergy to hearsay evidence provided it has reasonable nexus and credibility. In that case a bus-conductor of a State Transport bus was charge-sheeted for not collecting fares from certain passengers. The Inspector of the Flying Squad who had questioned the passengers and had obtained that information was examined before the Inquiry Officer. He had not recorded the statements of the passengers whether they were not willing to give statements. Those passengers were not examined during the inquiry. It was in this context that it was urged on behalf of the bus-conductor that the evidence of the Inspector being hearsay ought not to have been considered at all on the ground that it was no legal evidence. The Supreme Court rejected that contention and held the the evidence of the Inspector was some evidence which had relevance to the charge against the bus-conductor and that the sufficiency of evidence in proof of the finding by a domestic tribunal is beyond scrutiny by Court. By way of caution the departmental authorities and administrative tribunals must be careful in evaluating such material and should not glibly swallow what is strictly speaking not relevant under the Evidence Act. ( 7 ) IN J. D. Jain v. the Management of the State Bank of India and Another AIR 1982 SC 673 the Supreme Court has observed: the law is well settled that the strict rules of evidence are not applicable in a domestic enquiry. The word hearsay is used in various senses. ( 7 ) IN J. D. Jain v. the Management of the State Bank of India and Another AIR 1982 SC 673 the Supreme Court has observed: the law is well settled that the strict rules of evidence are not applicable in a domestic enquiry. The word hearsay is used in various senses. Sometimes it means whatever a person is heard to say; sometimes it means whatever a person declares on information given by someone else. For the purpose of a departmental enquiry complaint certainly not frivolous but substantiated by circumstantial evidence is enough. What the Bank sought to establish in the domestic enquiry was that the complainant had made a verbal complaint with regard to the withdrawal of excess money by the appellant in presence of the four witnesses against his advice. On the complaint the evidence of these four witnesses is direct as the complaint is said to have been made by the complainant in their presence and hearing; it is therefore not heresay. No Rule of law enjoins that a complaint has to he in writing as insisted by the Tribunal. In view of these clear observations made by the Supreme Court in Rattan Singhs case (supra) the first contention raised by the learned Advocate for the appellant deserves to be rejected. ( 8 ) IT was next contended that in view of Rule 9 (13) of the Gujarat Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules 1971 it was obligatory on the part of the presenting officer to examine said three persons who had given their affidavits in this Court and they should have been ordered for cross-examination. As that was not done neither their affidavits not (sic.) their statements recorded before this Court should have been considered by the Inquiry Officer particularly when they were facing enhancement proceeding in this Court. As rightly pointed out by the learned single Judge the provision of examining witnesses would he applicable when a fact is sought to be proved by oral evidence. If a fact is sought to be proved by filing affidavits alone obviously the question of examining witnesses would not arise. So also the obligation to examine witnesses would arise when the witnesses are available but if they are not available for same reason it cannot be said that the previous statements of such witnesses cannot be relied upon at all for proving the charge against the delinquent. So also the obligation to examine witnesses would arise when the witnesses are available but if they are not available for same reason it cannot be said that the previous statements of such witnesses cannot be relied upon at all for proving the charge against the delinquent. As pointed out by the Supreme Court. strict rules of evidence and procedure do not apply to domestic inquiries and even hearsay evidence can be relied upon. If there is some material which is credible then that call form valid basis in holding that the charge against the delinquent is proved. It is obvious that in view of the facts and circumstances of this cases that part of sub-Rule (13) of Rule 9 which provides for examining witnesses had no application. The disciplinary authority was therefore fully justified in relying upon the affidavits and statements of the three persons even though they were not examined before him. Again as observed by the Supreme Court what value should be attached to the evidence is always left to the disciplinary authority and such matters are not open for scrutiny by Courts unless either perversity or arbitrariness can be pointed out. Therefore merely because those three persons were facing enhancement proceedings in this court their affidavits and statements did not cease to be creditable material and it was for the disciplinary authority to decide whether the said material deserved to be relied upon or not. After close scrutiny of these affidavits and statements and after considering the circumstances attendant upon filing those affidavits and making those statements the disciplinary authority thought it fit to rely upon the same. It cannot therefore be said that in doing so the disciplinary authority has either acted arbitrarily or in a perverse manner. or had committed any illegality. The order of removal passed by him was therefore quite proper and this Court on its Administrative Side did not commit any wrong in dismissing the said appeal. We do not find any flaw in the judgment of the learned Single Judge and therefore this appeal is dismissed. No order as to costs. Appeal dismissed. .