JUDGMENT - PATEL H.D., J.:---The 12 petitioners have come forward to challenge the notifications issued by the Competent Authority under sub-section (1) of section 10 as well as sub-section (3) of section 10 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as "the U.L.C. Act"). Similarly, the petitioners claim that a notification issued under section 4 on 18-5-1989 and notification issued under section 6 on 24-8-1989, both under the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as "the L.A. Act") be quashed and set aside. 2. The petitioners, who are residents of Shivangaon, Tahsil and District Nagpur, are the owners of agricultural lands, the details of which are to be found in the schedule filed by the respondent No. 2. The said schedule is accepted to be correct on behalf of the petitioners. The schedule provides even other details which will be referred to at appropriate places. The petitioners allege that they are dependent on the income derived from those lands. The Competent Authority issued notifications under sub-section (1) of section 10 of the U.L.C. Act giving particulars of vacant land held by each of the petitioners in excess of the ceiling limit and stating therein that such vacant land is to be acquired by the State Government. Mostly the notifications are of the year 1981 except two, one of which was published in the year 1982 and the other in the year 1988. The petitioners then contend that they learnt about the publication of second notification under sub-section (3) of the said section only when the competent authority issued notices to the petitioners for determination of the amount of compensation under sub-section (7) of section 11 of the U.L.C. Act. According to the petitioners either of the notifications are bad in law, illegal and liable to be quashed. Two grounds are urged on behalf of the petitioners for challenging these notifications. The first relates to the inordinate delay in processing their Urban Land Ceiling Cases. After publication of the notification under sub-section (1) of section 10, it took eight to nine years before publication of the notification under sub-section (3) of that very section under the U.L.C. Act. This delay is enough to quash the impugned notifications. The first relates to the inordinate delay in processing their Urban Land Ceiling Cases. After publication of the notification under sub-section (1) of section 10, it took eight to nine years before publication of the notification under sub-section (3) of that very section under the U.L.C. Act. This delay is enough to quash the impugned notifications. The second ground urged was that the notification under sub-section (3) of section 10 was liable to be quashed for non-application of mind by the concerned authorities in publishing those notifications without specifying the date on which the surplus land came to be vested in the State Government. As a matter of fact the space meant for date is left blank in each of the notifications. Both these grounds will be dealt with one by one. 3. In order to deal with the first ground of delay, it is necessary to begin right from the stage when Urban Land Ceiling cases commenced. Section 3 of the U.L.C. Act prohibits any person from holding any vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit in the territory to which the said Act applies. Breach of this section is an offence made punishable under section 38 of the U.L.C. Act. Every person including the petitioners must follow the mandate of the section. The proceedings under the U.L.C. Act commence by filing of the returns as contemplated by section 6(1). As can be seen from the schedule (also referred to earlier), the petitioners filed their returns because they were holding lands in excess of the ceiling limit. All the cases were filed in the year 1976 except one which came to be filed in the year 1979. After draft statement of vacant lands held by the petitioners in excess of ceiling limit were prepared, notices came to be issued under sub-section (3) of section 8 to each of them. These notices were served between the years 1977 and 1980. By those notices the petitioners were called upon to file their objections to the draft statement and in pursuance thereto only two of the petitioners filed their objections. Orders came to be passed in all the cases and final statement of surplus land with each of the petitioners came to be prepared. By those notices the petitioners were called upon to file their objections to the draft statement and in pursuance thereto only two of the petitioners filed their objections. Orders came to be passed in all the cases and final statement of surplus land with each of the petitioners came to be prepared. In accordance with the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 10 of the U.L.C. Act, notifications came to be published giving particulars of the vacant land held in excess of the ceiling limit by each of the petitioners and declaring that such excess land will be acquired by the State Government. These notifications are not even placed on record. The fact, however, remains that these notifications were published on different dates but mostly in the year 1981 except for two notifications one published in the year 1982 and the other in the year 1988. These notifications have become final since not challenged by the petitioners earlier. It is too late now for the petitioners to challenge these notifications Factually also we find no grounds for impugning these notifications. 4. It appears from the return filed on behalf of the respondent No. 2 as well as from the schedule that third party or parties were given opportunity to file their objections as contemplated by sub-section (2) of section 10 of the U.L.C. Act and thereafter the State Government published the notifications under sub-section (3) of that section in the Gazette of 21st September, 1989. It is by that notification that the excess lands owned by the petitioners came to be vested in the State Government. Undoubtedly these notifications are published after the lapse of eight or nine years from the date the final statement of the vacant land came to be published, but this delay cannot vitiate the impugned notification for more than one reasons. 5. An attempt is made on behalf of the petitioners to show that the courts have always deprecated delay or laches in the matter of acquisition of lands under the Land Acquisition Act on the ground of colourable exercise of power. It was urged that there is no reason why these very principles should not also apply to the acquisitions made under the U.L.C. Act. The contention has to be rejected because the two Acts operate in different fields and there can be no comparison between the two. 6. It was urged that there is no reason why these very principles should not also apply to the acquisitions made under the U.L.C. Act. The contention has to be rejected because the two Acts operate in different fields and there can be no comparison between the two. 6. In (Bharat Kheta and others v. Nagpur Improvement Trust and others)1, 1992 Mh.L.J. 179, this Court was of the view that there can be no dispute in so far as the principle is concerned that if the writ Court comes to the conclusion that any action under a statute is not bona fide but only a misuse or abuse of power conferred, then it has the power of quashing the same and indeed it is duty bound to do so. It further observed that in construing the challenge to acquisition proceedings on the ground of colourable exercise of power the Court has to take an overall prospective of the whole matter and irrespective of finical decisions based on various stages of acquisition. This Court has to consider the whole spectrum from initiation of proceedings till the time of challenge raised by claimants, in which delay may well be the most important and relevant if not the conclusive factor. This criteria cannot be ipso facto applied to proceedings under the U.L.C. Act. 7. In order to explain the situation further it is necessary to first consider the object, the reasons and the purpose for enacting the U.L.C. Act. The Supreme Court had an occasion to consider the same in (Maharao Saheb Shri Bhim Singhji; Anantalakshmi Pathabi Ramasharma Yeturi and others v. Union of India and others)2, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 234. The objective to be achieved is chanalised by Sen, J. into four categories. They are: (1) to prevent the concentration of urban property into the hands of few persons and speculation and profiteering therein, (2) to bring about socialism of urban land in urban agglomeration to subserve common good to ensure its equal distribution (3) to discourage luxury housing leading to conspicuous consumption of scare building material and (4) to secure orderly urbanisation. Thus the dominant object and purpose is to bring about the socialism of urban land. 8. Coming to the scheme of the U.L.C. it is crystally clear that no person can retain vacant land in urban area more than the prescribed ceiling limit. Thus the dominant object and purpose is to bring about the socialism of urban land. 8. Coming to the scheme of the U.L.C. it is crystally clear that no person can retain vacant land in urban area more than the prescribed ceiling limit. The excess or better still the surplus land has to vest in the State. There can thus be no question of escaping the prohibition imposed by the statute, the validity of which is already tested before. Therefore, once the surplus land is determined by the competent authority, the original owner has no right over such land and in due course those lands must vest in the State. 9. Looking to the aforestated objectives as well as the scheme of the U.L.C. Act, the lands which are found to be in excess of the prescribed limit can never revert back to the owner under any of the circumstances. It must end with the vesting of such surplus lands with the State Government. Otherwise the very object and purpose for which the Act has been enacted would frustrate and the holder of excess land would contravene the provisions of section 3 exposing him to prosecution for offence under section 38 of the Act. 10. One more aspect that falls for consideration is the use of the word "may" in sub-section (3) of section 10 of the U.L.C. Act. The said section reads as under: "10(3) At any time after the publication of the notification under sub-section (1) the Competent Authority may, by notification published in the Official Gazette of the State concerned declare that the excess land referred to in the notification published under sub-section (1) shall, with effect from such date as may be specified in the declaration, be deemed to have been acquired by the State Government and upon the publication of such declaration, such land shall be deemed to have vested absolutely in the State Government free from all encumbrances with effect from the date so specified." The use of word "may" after the words "the Competent Authority" and before the words "by notification published in Official Gazette....." will have to be construed as "shall" if the object and purpose of the U.L.C. Act as discussed above have to be achieved. The word "may" though primarily permissive is in certain circumstances to be treated as mandatory and those circumstances are available looking to the scheme of the Act. 11. At this stage it will be appropriate to refer to the guidelines given in the circular letter in the matter of cultivation of agricultural lands within the Master Plan in an urban agglomeration. The Central Co-ordination Committee felt that section 10 of the Act gave sufficient flexibility to the State Government to allow the owner to continue to use the land for agriculture till it was required for urban development. It also felt that it would be better that the State Government took over the excess vacant land and then lease it out to the same person or another person till it is actually required for urban development. These views were placed before the Central Government who accepted them and it was decided that the excess vacant land should be licensed to the holders or other persons till such time they are required for urban development on such terms and conditions as the State Government may prescribe, the licence being renewable on year to year basis. The State Governments were, therefore, requested to take necessary action accordingly. It appears that no Rules are yet framed by the State Government in this regard, but the circular letter clearly specifies that the holder can continue to cultivate the land till it is required by the State Government for urban development. The petitioners continued to earn the income as admitted by them in the opening paragraph of the petition. The petitioners have not been prejudiced by the delay in publishing the notifications. 12. There is yet another distinction which needs to be brought out in the matter of payment of the compensation under the L.A. Act as well as the U.L.C. Act. Under the L.A. Act market value as on the date of section 4 notification is to be paid. The inordinate delay in conclusion of the acquisition proceedings could in some cases result in pegging down the prices. It is not so in the U.L.C. cases. The amount of compensation payable to the owner is the fixed sum to be computed in terms of sub-section (1)(b) of section 11 of the U.L.C. Act. Even the mode of payment is specified in section 14. It is not so in the U.L.C. cases. The amount of compensation payable to the owner is the fixed sum to be computed in terms of sub-section (1)(b) of section 11 of the U.L.C. Act. Even the mode of payment is specified in section 14. Therefore, the time taken by the State Government in publishing the impugned notification can be of little consequence. 13. The notifications published under sub-section (3) of section 10 of the U.L.C. Act are filed on record. It does not give the date of vesting. The space meant for the date is left blank. Taking advantage of this position, non-application of mind on the part of the authorities is urged and according to the petitioners, that vitiates the notifications. When the matter was brought to the attention of the authorities, a corrigendum was promptly issued that the blank space left should be read as dated 21st September, 1989, which also is the date of Gazette in which the notification is published. The corrigendum was published in the State Government Gazette on 31st May, 1990. With the insertion of the date the error which had crept in through oversight came to be rectified. It was merely an irregularity, which came to be subsequently cured. We see no substance even in this ground. 14. It appears that apart from the fact that the State Government acquired surplus and under the U.L.C. Act, they are also acquiring the 'retainable' land of the petitioners under the L.A. Act. These lands are being acquired along with those of others for a public purpose called "the Gajraj Project of Air Force" and which is the purpose of the Union. A notification under section 4 came to be published on 18-5-1989 followed by a notification dated 24-8-1989 under section 6 of the L.A. Act. The total area under acquisition is approximately 88 hectares and 57 ares. Even these notifications are impugned by the petitioners on the ground that they would be rendered landless. It is not possible to strike down these notifications on this ground and shelve the prestigious project of National importance. The petitioners would adequately be compensated by payment of market value for the lands acquired under the L.A. Act. 15. Even these notifications are impugned by the petitioners on the ground that they would be rendered landless. It is not possible to strike down these notifications on this ground and shelve the prestigious project of National importance. The petitioners would adequately be compensated by payment of market value for the lands acquired under the L.A. Act. 15. It appears from the averments in the petition as well as from the submissions made that the petitioner should be paid the market value of the land acquired under the U.L.C. Act. In other words, the petitioners want to emphasise that uniformity should be maintained in payment of market price, particularly when the land is needed for the project of public importance. In this context the petitioners rely upon the letter dated 8-9-1988 written by the Under secretary to the Government of India and addressed to the Chief of Air Staff whereunder an amount of Rs. 3,26,67,242/- is sanctioned for being paid to the private land holders for acquisition of 363 acres of land. We cannot accept the contentions since what is claimed is contrary to law laid down by the Apex Court of the land. 16. In A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 234 (cited supra) three issues were decided by majority judgment and they were the alleged artificiality of 'family' as defined under section 2(f) of the U.L.C. Act, the invalidity of section 28 of the Act as discriminatory and, therefore, unconstitutional and the invalidity of section 11(6) on the score that the compensation offered is illusory and, therefore, violative of Article 31(2) of the Constitution. We are only concerned with the last issue. The majority view on the point is as follows: "......So what we have to consider is whether the amount of Rs. 2 lakhs is so utterly deceptive and totally nominal to be discarded as a farthing with contempt. Having regard to the human condition of a large percentage of permanent dwellers and slum dwellers in our urban areas and proletarian miserables in our rural vastnesses, any one who gets Rs. 2 lakhs can well be regarded as having got something substantial to go by. In a society where half of the humanity lives below the breadline, to regard Rs. 2 lakhs as a farthing is fare-well to poignant facts and difficult to accept. 2 lakhs can well be regarded as having got something substantial to go by. In a society where half of the humanity lives below the breadline, to regard Rs. 2 lakhs as a farthing is fare-well to poignant facts and difficult to accept. In my view, with the greatest respect for my learned brother, I am unable to assent to the view that section 11(6) contravenes Article 31(2) because the payment stipulated is a mere mockery." The maximum payment of compensation cannot exceed two lakhs of rupees under section 11(6) of the U.L.C. Act, whereas the property of Maharao Saheb Shri Bhim Singhji, the former Maharashtra of Kotah is valued for the purposes of Rajasthan Lands and Building Tax Act at Rs. 4,12,27,726.84/-. Even then the majority view was in favour of upholding the validity of section 11(6) of the Act. 17. It has been observed in (State of Gujarat and others v. Parashottamdas Ramdas Patel)3, A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 220, that when lands in question or bulk of them are likely to be acquired under the ceiling law by paying compensation as provided therein, it would not be proper to compel the Government to acquire them under the provisions of the L.A. Act. It also held that the U.L.C. Act has an overriding effect on all other laws. 18. In another case of (Dattatraya Shankarbhat Ambelgi v. State of Maharashtra)4, 1981 Bom.C.R. 938, it is held that the land to the extent of which falls within the ceiling area stands in a class different from the land which is in excess, of the ceiling area and is liable to be declared surplus to give effect to the purpose and object of the Act. It is further held in para 10 of the judgment that the provisions of the Ceiling Act are applicable with regard to vacant land and if for some fortuitous circumstances a particular category of land does not fall within the definition of vacant land, the provisions with regard to vacant land can obviously not be applied to such land. Here again the lands falling under the two categories constitute separate classes and cannot consequently be treated alike. Here again the lands falling under the two categories constitute separate classes and cannot consequently be treated alike. We find further observation in para 11 of the judgment that once the land falls beyond the ceiling limit and is capable of being acquired as surplus land under section 10 of the U.L.C. Act, it would be wholly inappropriate to acquire the same very land or a portion thereof under the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, that is, Act No. XXXVII of 1966 inasmuch as it would inter alia result in misuse of public funds by granting higher compensation when the purpose of acquisition can be achieved on payment of lesser amount of compensation prescribed by section 11. It may be relevant to observe here that the mode of acquisition under the Act No. XXXVII of 1966 is by taking resort to the Land Acquisition Act. 19. We are also not impressed by the offer made during the arguments that the petitioners would land over the possession of their lands in case the market value of the land is assured. As discussed above, the petitioners have no right to claim market value of land acquired under the U.L.C. Act. In the matter of possession the law will take its own course. 20. The petition is hence devoid of any substance and it is dismissed, but in the circumstances without any costs. Needless to mention that interim orders passed stand vacated. Petition dismissed. -----