JUDGMENT B.L.Yadav 1. Whether those persons who have no interest in the land sold, or who are not heirs of the vendor, can file suit for cancellation of the sale deed ; and whether a private individual other than Gaon Sabha, can file suit for cancellation of sale dsed as contemplated by section 167 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, (for short the Act) : and whether the sale deed in question can be cancelled just on the ground that the vendor died before preparation and issuance of the Sanad Bhumidhari ; and whether the vendor would acquire bhumidhari right in the land sold from the date of deposit in view of principles of feeding the grant by estoppel and by section 134 of the Act (as applicable on the date of deposit), are the short substantial questions of law which fall for determination in the prerent Second Appeal filed by the defendant appellants, the vendees in a suit filed by plaintiff respondents 1 and 2 for cancellation of sale deeds dated 31-1-1974 The first sale deed was in favour of appellants and the second was in favour of one Chabinath, against whom the respondents, the plaintiffs have filed a suit. However, in that suit they entered into a compromise upholding the validity of the sale deed. 2. The plaintiff respondents filed written statement and alleged that there had been a partition about 10 years back in the family between the parties, and Sheobadan, the vendor, (as shown in the pedegree given at page 1 of the judgment of the lower appellate court) got possession separately over his share and even in consolidation proceedings he was allotted separate Chak, but he deposited 20 times rental on 31-1-74 and executed sale deed in favour of the appellants and he died on 12-2-74, before order for preparation of Sanad Bhumidhari could be passed on 13th March, 1974. or the same could be prepared in the name of deceased, hence the sale deed executed in favour of the defendant appellants was void and the vendees could not derive any title on that basis, and that the sale deed was obtained by the defendants by practising fraud, coercion and undue influence on the vendor. The suit was contested by defendant appellant? The suit was contested by defendant appellant? on the ground that the sale deed in their favour was legal and valid as the deposit was made on 31-1-74 and the sale deed was executed the same day in favour of appellants and they have paid sufficient consideration on the assurance of the vendor that he has got transferable rights, and as the sale deed was executed on the same day immediately after the deposit was made, hence the death of deceased would not make any difference, as the same was not contemplated to deprive the vendor from acquiring bhumidhari rights either under section 134 or 137 or under any other provision of the Act, and the sale deed was not obtained by fraud, coercion or undue influence, and in any case it is only the Gaon Sabha who can file suit and the plaintiffs, respondent nos 1 and 2 were not the heirs of Sheobadan in the family pedigree shown and hence they have got no right to sue and the suit was liable to be dismissed. 3. The trial court by its judgment, and decree dated 14-2-76, decreed the suit and the lower appellate court dismissed the appellants' First Appeal and the present Second Appeal has been filed against the judgment and decree of the courts below. 4. Sri A. N. Bhargava, learned counsel for the appellants urged that the plaintiffs were not the heirs of Sheobadan, the vendor, who has got land in dispute in the family partition and even during consolidation operations the vendor was allotted separate Chak. The appellants did not challenge the rights of the vendor during consolidation! operation, and in any case even if the sale deed is assumed to be illegal or- void (though not conceded), nevertheless under section 167 of the Act only the Gaon Sabha has right to file the suit for cancellation and the plaintiffs, as private individuals, who have no interest in the land, nor were heirs of the vendor Sheobadan under the provisions of section 171 of the Act, which provides father's father's son's son, the last heir under section 171 (r) and plaintiff-respondents 1 and 2 being far away from the last category of heirs, cannot file suit for cancellation of sale deed in favour of appellants. The deposit was made under the provisions of section 134 of the Act and after deposit the vendor became entitled with effect from the date of deposit to a declaration of bhumidhari rights, that there are no provisions either under section 134 or 132 or 130 etc. providing that in case vendor dies before the issuance of Sanad Bhumidhari, he would not acquire bhumidhari rights. Hence that cannot be assumed as that would amount to legislation by the court. In case the intention of legislature would have been to deprive vendor from acquiring bhumidhari rights simply because the vendor dies before the Bhumidhari Sanad could be issued, that can be specifically provided under the relevant provisions of section 137-A of the Act which provides cancellation of certificate wholly in cases where the certificate was obtained fraudulently or by an untrue allegation of facts essentially on the point of law, or that a decree or order passed by a competent court in a suit or other proceedings has been granted showing that the appellant was not entitled to certificate and that the relief for cancellation of sale deed was an equitable relief and another sale deed executed by the same vendor on the same date in favour of Chabinath was in a compromise decree held to be valid by the plaintiffs, hence the plaintiff respondents were not entitled to equitable relief as the principle was 'he who seeks equity must do equality' lit was further urged that the substantial questions of law have been incorrectly decided by the courts below. Sri Sankatha Rai, learned counsel appearing for plaintiff respondents 1 and 2, on the other hand, urged that as the vendor Sheobadan died before the Bhumidhari Sanad could be issued in his name, hence he did not acquire bhumidhari rights and the sale deed executed by him was illegal and void and the plaintiffs have right to sue and can file suit for cancellation and the Gaon Sabha could, no doubt, file a suit for cancellation, but the plaintiff respondents 1 and 2 have right to file suit and the sale deed being executed by a person who did not acquire bhumidhari righs, rather who remained only as a sirdar, hence the sale deed was void under sections 166 and under section 167 the transferee was liable to ejectment and the interest of sirdar extinguished under section 190 (1) (cc) of the Act and the Gaon Sabha could only file suit under section 167 (1) of the Act and substantial questions of law were correctly decided by the courts below as contemplated under section 100 CPC and the present Second Appeal deserves to be dismissed. Reliance was placed on Ram Sabodh v. D.D.C., 1982 ALJ 1252. 1978 RD 183, AIR. 1968 Alld. 262 and Banshi Dhar v. Smt. Dhirajdhari, 197I ALJ 937. 5. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, the first point for determination is as to whether plaintiff respondent nos. 1 and 2 have right to file suit against the appellants, the vendees, when the plaintiffs were not heirs in view of provisions of section 171 (r) of the Act and under section 167 (1) only the Gaon Sabha has been, given right to file suit It was the case of plaintiff respondent nos. 1 and 2 that in the family- partition land in dispute was allotted separately in the name of Sheobadan, and the plaintiffs and other branches being descendent of the common ancestor Prem Upachyaya were given different land in their share. The pedigree as admitted by the parties, has been given at page 1 of the judgment of the lower appellate court. Prem Upadhyaya had three sons, namely, Polahwan, Ram Shabad and Achaiber. Polahwan has three sons, namely, Mahavir, Kirpal and Kapil Deo. Plaintiff no 1 Chandra Shekhar is the son of Mahavir, whereas plaintiff no. 2 Ram Briksha is the son of Kapil Deo. Prem Upadhyaya had three sons, namely, Polahwan, Ram Shabad and Achaiber. Polahwan has three sons, namely, Mahavir, Kirpal and Kapil Deo. Plaintiff no 1 Chandra Shekhar is the son of Mahavir, whereas plaintiff no. 2 Ram Briksha is the son of Kapil Deo. Ram Shabad has two sons, namely, Sheobadan (the vendor) and Sheonath Achaiber is the son of Prem Upadhvaya, deceased, who died issueless. In case right of succession is counted under section 171 which applies in respect of agricultural holding, the plaintiffs who have filed suit are beyond the father's father's father's son's son as given under section 171 (r) of the Act. To be more precise, Sheobadan in the pedigree is vendor, his father wis Ram Shabad and father's father was Prem Upadhyaya and son was Pulahwan and Polahwan's son was Mahabir, who was father of Chandra Shekhar. Similarly Pulahan's other son was Kapil Deo, whose son was Ram Briksha. In this way they were not within the permitted degree of the last male (i. e. Sheobadan), rather beyond that. Consequently they have no right to file suit for cancellation of the sale deed in favour of defendant appellants. Even though in subsequent paragraphs I would discuss about the legality of sale deed in favour of the appellants, but so far as the maintainability of suit by the plaintiffs is concerned, even assuming that the sale deed was executed by a sirdar, in that event that would be void under section 166 of the Act. The consequences of void transfers have been provided under section 167 (1) of the Act. The right to sue has been given only to the Gaon Sabha or the Collector where the transfer is made by a sirdar, whereas right to sue has been given to the land holder in the case of transfer by an asami. Any private individual, including plaintiffs who were totally strangers, so far as the right of succession was concerned as provided under section 171 the plaintiffs were not the heirs of the vendor Sheobadan within trie meaning of section 171 (r) of the Act, hence they have certainly no right to sue and in other words, no right to file suit for cancellation of sale deed in favour of defendant appellants. 6. 6. Reverting to the second question as to whether the vendor having died before the preparation and issuance of Sanad Bhumidhari, could be deemed to be bhumidhar from the date of deposit in view of the principles of 'feeding the grant by estoppel' ; as envisaged by section 43 of Transfer of Property Act. In Banshidhar v. Smt. Dhirajadhari, 1971 ALJ 937. Relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents Full Bench of this Court held that once a Sirdar has made an application under section 134 of Act and made necessary deposit acquires the status; of a bhumidhar when the Assistant Collector makes the order of the grant of a certificate, the event of actual issuance of the certificate is immaterial. If the applicant is alive on the date of the order granting a certificate to him, he will become a bhumidhar from the date of deposit, irrespective off the actual issuance of the certificate. After his death, his widow is not entitled to make an application for the refund of the deposit made by him, or to say that the certificate be not granted. 7. In the present case, however, the controversy was slightly different in as much as the plaintiff respondents have alleged that Sheobadan the vendor has made deposit of 20 times rental on 31-1-74 but before the order for preparation of Sand Bhumidhari could be passed on 13-3-1974, he died On 12-2-74, he has made representation on the date of deposit that he had transferable bhumidhari rights and therefore immediately after the deposit the same day he executed sale deed dated 31-1-74 in favour of appellants. As the representation was made by the deceased vendor Sheobadan to the vendees that he has transferable bhumidhari rights hence in case the vendees are entitled to the benefit of section 43 of T. P. Act by virtue of principle of "feeding the grant by estoppel"; they would become bhumidhar from the date of deposit. 8. In Ram Sabodh v. Deputy Director of Consolidation U. P. Faizabad, 1982 ALJ 1252, relied upon by trie learned counsel for the respondent, learned Single Judge of this Court held that in case during the life time of vendor, no order for grant of bhumidhari Sanad is passed the vendee was not entitled to the benefit of principles of feeding the grant by estoppel contained under section 43 of T. T. Act. Similar view was taken in some other decisions of this court relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent Section 43 of the T. P. Act contains equitable principle of feeding the grant by estoppel. Once the vendor represented to the vendee that he has become bhumidhar of the land in dispute and can convey the title, he can convey the same title of bhumidhar as he was holding on the date of deposit. I am of the considered opinion that there is nothing to prevent the vendees the defendant appellants from claiming the benefit of principles of feeding the grant by estoppel. Tie cardinal rules of interpreration are that the interpretation has to be textnal and contextual. In respect of context the provisions of sections 134, 137-A and other sections of the Act may be read together. Section 137-A enacts the provisions for cancellation of a certificate. 1st ground for cancellation is that the certificate was obtained fraudulently by making a false suggestion or the concealment from the Assistant Collector of material facts or the certificate was obtained by untrue allegations or in case any decree has been passed in a suit to the effect that the applicant was not entitled to the certificate. Section 137-A does not contain any other provision that in case vendor dies before the order for grant of certificate has been passed on that the certificate has been granted, in that event the certificate may be cancelled. In case the submissions of the learned counsel for the respondents are accepted that would amount to legislation by the Court. But in such matters the maxim is A -'VERBIS LEGIS NON EST RECEDENDUM to the effect that from the words of law there must be no departure. The court cannot rewrite, recaste or reframe the legislation. 9. IN Union of India v. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal, JT 1991 (3) SC 608, it was held as follows ;- "It is not the duty of the court either to enlarge the scope of the legislation or the intention of the legislature when the language of the provision is plaim and unambiguous. The Court cannot rewrit, racast or reframe the legislation for the very good reason that it has no power to legislate. The power to legislate has not been conferred on the courts. The Court cannot rewrit, racast or reframe the legislation for the very good reason that it has no power to legislate. The power to legislate has not been conferred on the courts. The Court cannot add words to a statute or read words into it which are not there." I am accordingly of the opinion that as there is no such provision either under section 137-A of the Act or in any other section of Rule that in case the vendor dies before the order for grant of certificate was passed or the certificate was actually issued, in that event the certificate shall be deemed to have been cancelled; once the certificate has been granted and vendor was alive on the date of deposit and the execution of the sale deed particularly when the vendor made a representation that he has got transferable rights there is nothing in law to prevent the vendee from becoming bhumidhar or from claiming the benefit of principles of feeding the grant by estoppel. 10. In Ram Pyare v. Ram Narain, AIR 1985 SC 694 , considering the relevant provisions of Act including sections 137-A, 134 and 43 of T. P. Act, their lordships of Supreme Court held as follows. "The amount of deposit under section 134 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition Act was made on October, 28. 1961 and it was on the same day that the ?ale deed was executed by Matbar Mai. It is clear that Matbar Mai erroneously represented to the vendee that he was authorised to transfer the property and professed to transfer such property for consideration. The very execution of the sale deed cm the same day as the deposit of the requisite amount under section 134 is significant enough to establish that the sale deed was the result of an erroneous representation of Matbar Mai. It is also clear that the present plaintiffs who are the sons of the vendor, transferees in good faith which indeed they do act claim to be. Section 43 clearly applies to the situation." Under para 5 of the aforesaid case the ratio was that the provisions of section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act were attracted. IN other words the vendee was entitled to claim the benefit of principle of feeding the grant by estoppel and that it was sufficient to consult the plaintiff. Section 43 clearly applies to the situation." Under para 5 of the aforesaid case the ratio was that the provisions of section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act were attracted. IN other words the vendee was entitled to claim the benefit of principle of feeding the grant by estoppel and that it was sufficient to consult the plaintiff. The law as declared by their lordships of Supreme Court in aforesaid case Ram Pyare v. Ram Narain clearly indicates that the vendee was entitled to the benefit of principles of feeding the grant by estoppel. With profound regards, the view taken by this Court in different cases that in such situation vendee would not be entitled to take benefit of section 43 is no longer good law. As it is obvious that the sale deed was legal and the vendee was entitled to the benefit of section 43 of T. P. Act there is no justification to decide the point as to whether the Gaon Sabha could file a suit or to assume that the sale deed was voidable or void- 11. It has already been held that the plaintiff respondents were not heirs of Sheobadan in view of the provisions of section 177- A (r) of the Act hence that point itself was sufficient to consuit the plaintiff. 12. IN view of the premises aforesaid the judgment and decree passed by the courts below decreeing the suit cannot be sustained. IN the result the appeal succeeds with costs throughout and is allowed. The judgment and decree of the courts below dated 7-8-1979 and 14-2-1976 are set aside and the suit of the plaintiff respondents lis dismissed. Petition allowed.