JUDGMENT - S.M. DAUD, J.:---This is a suit for recovery of Rs. 95,000/- representing various sums allegedly due to the plaintiff whose services were terminated by the defendant No. 1---hereinafter referred to as the 'Corporation'---vide an order passed on 4th September, 1974. 2. Plaintiff joined the services of the Corporation in the Legal Department and in the course of time rose to the rank of Legal Advisor. On 8-10-1969, the Corporation resolved to recall an order relieving the plaintiff, and, in place thereof, to hold a departmental enquiry against him. To give effect to this resolution, the Corporation on 18-10-1969 passed an order of suspension against the plaintiff. The order listed various acts of misconduct attributed to the plaintiff. The suspension order gave a general description of the different acts of misconduct attributed to the plaintiff---one of them being taking of bribe or illegal gratification for doing or not doing an act in connection with the business of the Corporation covered by Item 21. The item referred to was to be found in the Discipline and Appeal Procedure governing the Corporation's employees. Subsequently, a charge-sheet particularising the factual aspect of the acts of misconduct of plaintiff was served upon him. At about the same time or a little thereafter a criminal case came to be filed against the plaintiff for the alleged commission of offences punishable under section 161 of the Indian Penal Code and section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. That case was numbered as Special Case No. 6 of 1972 and it ended in plaintiff's conviction on 16-11-1972. The plaintiff appealed the conviction and sentence recorded against him vide Criminal Appeal No. 1456 of 1972. The appeal was dismissed on 4-9-1974. The enquiry initiated against the plaintiff was challenged by him in a suit bearing No. 2966 of 1970. The order passed by the Judge of the City Civil Court in that suit was impugned vide A.O. No. 202 off 1970. In that appeal, parties entered into consent terms, the effect whereof was that the Corporation was allowed to continue the departmental enquiry but restrained from passing any order of punishment pending the decision in the suit. Be that as it may, the plaintiff reached the age of superannuation, but his services were extended pending the decision of the enquiry into the charges against him. This order was passed on 4th May 1970. Be that as it may, the plaintiff reached the age of superannuation, but his services were extended pending the decision of the enquiry into the charges against him. This order was passed on 4th May 1970. Coming back to the dismissal of the appeal by the High Court against the plaintiff's conviction in the criminal case, the Corporation followed it up by an order on 4th September, 1974, which order, reads as follows : "In view of the conviction of Shri G.L. Puri, Legal Adviser, in the Criminal Case and the dismissal of his Appeal No. 1456 of 1972, by the High Court, Bombay, his services in Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation are in supersession of the orders issued under GEO No. 241/G-148 dated 4-5-1970, hereby terminated, with effect from the date of passing this order, under the provisions of Regulation 81 of the Bombay State Road Transport Employees Service Regulations." These regulations shall hereinafter be referred to as "SRS" and have been framed under section 45 of the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950. 2. In the present suit instituted on 28-9-1976 plaintiff seeks a decree for Rs. 95,000/-. He contends that the order of termination cannot deprive him of the retirement benefits. These benefits include gratuity and bonus. Certain sums have been wrongfully withheld by the Corporation and these are the balance of the salary for the period 18-10-1969 to 4-9-1974. The total claimed on this score comes to Rs. 52,950.25 ps. and it represents the difference between the total salary for the said period and the subsistence allowance received by the plaintiff. Having regard to the fact that the suspension stood revoked by the order purporting to fall under Regulation 81, the Corporation could not withheld the balance of the salary. Next, the item of Rs. 15,880/- representing the provident fund dues payable along with interest which interest as from 4-9-1974 to 15-11-1974 comes to Rs. 4,934/-. The Corporation is liable to pay gratuity amounting to Rs. 15,000/-. A sum of Rs. 182.70 ps. has been illegally recovered from the plaintiff. Rs. 2,959.05 are payable into him as ex-gratia in lieu of bonus. All these sums allegedly due to him have been withheld for no just reason, and therefore, the Corporation is liable to pay interest therein which comes to Rs. 3,094/-. 15,000/-. A sum of Rs. 182.70 ps. has been illegally recovered from the plaintiff. Rs. 2,959.05 are payable into him as ex-gratia in lieu of bonus. All these sums allegedly due to him have been withheld for no just reason, and therefore, the Corporation is liable to pay interest therein which comes to Rs. 3,094/-. The termination order under Regulation 81 cannot deprive him of the retirement benefits as the termination is a termination simpliciter incapable of taking away rights acquired by him by rendition of service. 3. The Corporation in its written statement contends that the order of termination is not an order of termination simpliciter but an order of dismissal. That being the position, the plaintiff cannot get any retirement benefits - whether it be the employer's share of the contribution to the plaintiff's provident fund, gratuity, bonus etc. As to the balance of the salary claimed by the plaintiff the sum was not admissible unto him as his suspension was not revoked for any honourable reason. The suspension in fact ended with an order of dismissal and this would suffice to preclude the plaintiff from claiming the balance of the salary. The suit was mis-conceived and deserved to be dismissed with costs. 4. The points arising for determination are : (1) Whether the order passed on 4-9-1974 is an order of termination simpliciter not depriving the plaintiff of his retrial benefits such as provident fund, gratuity and bonus ? (2) Whether plaintiff is entitled to the balance of the salary for the period 18-10-1969 to 4-9-1974 ? (3) What interest---if any---is plaintiff entitled to ? (4) Relief and costs ? My findings, for reasons given below, are : (1) No; not so. (2) Yes. (3) Nil. (4) See para 8. REASONS 5. Learned Counsel Mr. Oka appearing for the plaintiff submits that the order passed on 4-9-1974 is an order of termination simpliciter. In this connection Mr. Oka relies upon the use of the word 'termination' occurring both in Regulation 81 as also 61. His contention is that the expression 'termination' has been used in contradistinction to the expressions 'dismissal'. 'removal' or 'discharge'. Consequently, whatever be the background behind the order of termination, the said termination cannot deprive plaintiff of his retiral benefits. In this connection Mr. Oka relies upon the use of the word 'termination' occurring both in Regulation 81 as also 61. His contention is that the expression 'termination' has been used in contradistinction to the expressions 'dismissal'. 'removal' or 'discharge'. Consequently, whatever be the background behind the order of termination, the said termination cannot deprive plaintiff of his retiral benefits. At one stage I was of the view that the order of termination was incomplete in that it did not specify the deprivations to which plaintiff was subjected as a consequence of the passing of the said order. Having heard Counsel at length I do not adhere to this view any longer. On behalf of the Corporation the stand taken is that the mere use of the word 'termination' will not preclude the Court from going into the substance of the matter and ascertain its true nature or character. The parties have relied upon a number of decisions in support of their rival contentions, to some of which I shall turn in due course. Presently let me begin with a reference to the relevant regulations and provisions governing the matter. Some of the SRS to which a reference has already been made need to be reproduced to the extent relevant. These are as under : "61. The services of an employee, who does not hold a permanent appointment in the State Transport or a lien on a permanent appointment in any Government Department from which he is transferred, are liable to be terminated by the Competent Authority by giving a calendar month's notice or a calendar month's pay in lieu, provided that --- (a) ... (b) a permanent employee of the State Transport shall be entitled to 60 day's notice or 60 day's pay in lieu. (c) ... (d) ... 80. The Corporation may specify the acts of misconduct or omission which shall be liable to be treated as "acts of misconduct" or "minor lapses or delinquencies" and also prescribe a procedure for dealing with cases of acts of misconduct and minor lapses and delinquencies and shall appoint appropriate authorities to impose punishments and to hear appeals or order disciplinary action. 81. Notwithstanding the provisions of Regulation 61, the services of an employee, if he has been convicted in a Criminal Court or has been declared insolvent by a Competent Court, shall be liable to be terminated without notice. 83. 81. Notwithstanding the provisions of Regulation 61, the services of an employee, if he has been convicted in a Criminal Court or has been declared insolvent by a Competent Court, shall be liable to be terminated without notice. 83. (a) In the case of suspension the decision shall be given within 90 days from the date of suspension. If no decision is arrived at within 90 days for any reason except the employee's own default, the employee will be eligible to be treated after the expiry of 90 days, as if he had not been suspended, provided that the Corporation shall be competent to extend the period of 90 days in exceptional cases. (b) ... (c) The case of an employee who has been retained in service beyond the date of compulsory retirement pending decision of an enquiry into a charge against him and who has been subsequently honourably acquitted of the charge shall be regulated under sub-clause (a) of Clause (2) and sub-clause (a) of Clause (3) of Regulation 84 if his suspension is held to have been wholly unjustified and under sub-clause (b) of Clause (2) and sub-clause (b) of Clause (3) of the said Regulation if it is held to have been not wholly unjustified. 84. (1) If an employee, who has been suspended, discharged or dismissed for any of the acts of misconduct specified by the Corporation in accordance with Regulation 80, is re-instated, the Competent Authority shall consider and make a specific order--- (a) regarding the pay and allowances to be paid to the employee for the period of his absence from duty; and (b) whether the period of absence is to be treated as a period spent on duty for all purposes or some purposes; if not for all purposes, whether it is to be treated as a period of leave and, if so, what kind of leave. (2) (a) Where the authority mentioned in Sub-Regulation (1) is of the opinion that the employee has been fully exonerated or, in the case of suspension, that it was wholly unjustified, the employee shall be given the full pay and allowances to which he would have been entitled, had he not been dismissed, removed or suspended, as the case may be. 120(M)(a) If a subscriber is dismissed from service for grave misconduct, the Competent Authority may direct deduction, to the extent of the contribution by the Corporation for the last two years and currency of the year of dismissal, from the amount of contribution by the Corporation with interest thereon credited to the account of the subscriber under Regulations 115 and 117. The deduction (forfeiture) shall not be effected unless the subscriber concerned is called upon to show cause why the deduction should not be made; ....." The relevant provision in regard to gratuity is to be found in the Gratuity Fund Regulations of 1968 framed by the corporation and it recites thus:- "11(i)(b). No gratuity shall be payable nor granted, to any officer who even if he has rendered the continuous service of the prescribed number of years, is retired or dismissed from service for misconduct." Under Regulation 80, certain provisions have been formulated and they are known as "Discipline and Appeal Procedure for the Bombay State Road Transport Corporation Employees". Provision 3 of these provisions divides offences into acts of misconduct and minor lapses and delinquencies. Provision 5 details the procedure to be followed when an employee is alleged to have committed an act of misconduct. Provision 6 enables the procedure laid down in Provision 5 to be waived in certain case, one of them being "when the order of punishment , i.e. dismissal, removal or reduction is to be based on facts which have led to the conviction of the person charged in a Criminal Court." Provision 7 sets out different types of punishments which can be awarded for good and sufficient reasons. Two punishments awardable for acts of misconduct separately listed are (f) termination of services and (i) dismissal. 6. It is conceded that the order dated 4-9-1974 was passed on account of the conviction of the plaintiff for offences punishable under section 161 of the Indian Penal Code and section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. In other words, plaintiff was convicted of bribery. Notwithstanding that, Mr. Oka argues that the corporation was content with a benign order of termination. This it could do under Regulation 81, for had it wanted to pass an order of dismissal there was nothing to stop it from taking recourse to the punishment of dismissal specifically provided in item (i) of Clause 7 of the Discipline and Appeal Procedure. Oka argues that the corporation was content with a benign order of termination. This it could do under Regulation 81, for had it wanted to pass an order of dismissal there was nothing to stop it from taking recourse to the punishment of dismissal specifically provided in item (i) of Clause 7 of the Discipline and Appeal Procedure. The submission is that the mere fact of the order making a reference to the conviction recorded against the plaintiff, should not be taken to mean that plaintiff was being dismissed from service. Reliance in support of this contention is placed upon certain decisions to which I now turn. First, is the Full Bench decision of Punjab and Haryana High Court in (Om Prakash v. The Director, Postal Services)1, reported in A.I.R. 1973 Punjab and Haryana 1. There are certain observations in the judgment which may lead to the supposition that a mere conviction of a Criminal Court is not enough to warrant the punishment of dismissal from service. These observations have to be read in the context of rules applicable to the public servant concerned in that case, the facts of that case, and, in particular, the fact that the employee had been given the benefit of section 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. The relevant paragraphs from the decision make this clear and I can do no better than reproduce them here : "Section 12 (Probation of Offenders Act, 1958) removes a disqualification attaching to a conviction. To disqualify a person for a particular purpose means to deprive that person of the qualities or conditions necessary to make him fit for that purpose. Disciplinary proceeding cannot be called a disqualification but is at best a liability incurred in certain circumstances. Departmental proceedings are not taken because the man has been convicted. The proceedings are directed against the original misconduct of the Government servant. Only the procedure varies in a case where the necessity of a formal inquiry into the allegations of misconduct is rendered unnecessary on account of such an inquiry having been held by a Criminal Court on the basis of a much higher standard of proof required for the conviction of an accused. Section 12 does not wash away the misconduct of the Government servant. Section 12 does not wash away the misconduct of the Government servant. No part of section 12 is intended to exonerate a Government servant of his liability to departmental punishment for misconduct.....If an appointing authority holds that a person who has been dealt with under section 4 of the Act is disqualified from being appointed to a particular service on account of his conviction, such an order is liable to be set aside because of the provisions of section 12. But in absence of any rule to the contrary mere conviction of a Government servant by a Criminal Court does not per se disqualify him from continuing to hold the post...An order of dismissal or removal or for compulsory retirement can be passed under Rule 19(i) (without conforming to the procedure prescribed in Rules 14 to 18) not on the basis of the conviction, but only if the competent authority finds that the relevant misconduct of the concerned Government servant renders his further retention in public service undesirable. An order imposing a punishment on a Government servant simply because of his conviction on a criminal charge without reference to the conduct which led to the conviction, is not sustainable." The next case relied upon by learned Counsel in (Kunwar Bahadur v. Union of India)2, reported in A.I.R. 1969 Allahabad 414. The prominent aspect of that case was that the impugned order of removal from service on ground of conviction on a criminal charge was passed, despite the pendency of an appeal assailing the conviction which was the basis for the order of removal. That is not the position here for the termination order against the plaintiff in the instant case was passed after the confirmation of the conviction recorded against him by the Court of the first instance. Mr. Oka however does find some support from the decision in (Setappa v. The State of Mysore)3, reported in 1964(1) Cri. L.J. 112. In that case a Driver in the Mysore Road Transport Corporation was tried and convicted under section 323 of the Indian Penal Code for obstructing an Octroi Department official and the said official's Peon. Later on an order of dismissal came to be passed and this order was sought to be justified as being based upon a conviction recorded by a Criminal Court. Later on an order of dismissal came to be passed and this order was sought to be justified as being based upon a conviction recorded by a Criminal Court. The Division Bench held that even in cases where Proviso (a) to Article 311(2) was applicable, the punishment was for the conduct which led to the conviction, and not for the conviction itself. The punishment was imposed not because the Government servant was convicted, but because of his conduct for which he was so convicted. If the observations are intended to mean that no order of conviction can by itself be enough for founding an order of dismissal or removal from service, the same has to be negatived. Of course it is not every conviction which would justify an order of dismissal or removal from service. The conviction must be for an offence which involves an element of moral stigma. In other words, it must be for an act which is immoral or unethical having regard to the duties the public servant performs or is expected to perform. Mr. Oka then relies upon (Division Personal Officer Southern Railway v. P.R. Challappan)4, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 2216 to contend that a mere conviction is not enough to impose the penalty of dismissal upon an employee. A further requirement from the employer is a consideration of the facts which have led to the employee's conviction. Such a consideration is totally missing in the instant case. This is because the order of termination was passed on 4-9-1974 i.e. on almost the same day as the one on which the High Court dismissed plaintiff's appeal bearing No. 1456 of 1972. Assuming that the order of 4-9-1974 was passed on the very day the High Court dismissed the plaintiff's appeal against the conviction and sentence recorded against him by the Special Judge and further assuming that the authority passing the order of termination had not even gone through the order of the High Court dismissing the appeal, does it necessarily follow that the facts upon which the conviction was based were not before the minds-eye of the competent authority? It is difficult to give an affirmative answer to this question. The superiors of the plaintiff must have been aware of the facts which had led to the prosecution of the plaintiff. It is difficult to give an affirmative answer to this question. The superiors of the plaintiff must have been aware of the facts which had led to the prosecution of the plaintiff. This is because plaintiff had allegedly committed an act of misconduct while in the employ of the defendant Corporation. Officers of the defendant Corporation must have figured as witnesses in the special case against the plaintiff. They were following the progress of that case for they knew of his conviction by the Court of the first instance and the affirmative of that conviction by the High Court. In this background and having regard to the termination order being passed as consequential to the dismissal of the appeal, it cannot be said that the competent authority passing the order of termination had not applied its mind to the reasons for passing the order of termination. The background as also the reason for the termination order, was, the conviction visited upon the plaintiff. None of the authorities cited by Mr. Oka go to the extent of saying that there has to be a detailed enquiry when an employer visits an employee with an order of dismissal consequent to an order of conviction, which order of conviction is based upon facts constituting the misconduct leading to the prosecution against the employee. It is enough if the employer is aware of the facts leading to the conviction and makes this a reason for imposing the punishment bringing about the termination of employment. Mr. Oka contends that even if the Corporation was aware of the conviction of the plaintiff for reasons disreputable, the Corporation could in its wisdom take a benign view of the matter for after all it had to consider all aspects including the plaintiff's unblemished past into consideration. Having taken an overall view of plaintiff's services the Corporation may have decided to impose upon the plaintiff the lesser punishment of termination simpliciter instead of passing an order of dismissal. In support of this contention Counsel refers to Clause 7 of the Discipline and Appeal Procedure making a distinction between termination of services and dismissal. In either case, the Corporation could have acted without following the detailed procedure prescribed by Clause 5. But the consequences of the two orders would differ. In support of this contention Counsel refers to Clause 7 of the Discipline and Appeal Procedure making a distinction between termination of services and dismissal. In either case, the Corporation could have acted without following the detailed procedure prescribed by Clause 5. But the consequences of the two orders would differ. In the first case plaintiff would not lose the terminal benefits, whereas in the second case the plaintiff would be deprived of his retirement benefits. The mere use of this or that word to express a certain situation is not conclusively determinative of what has occurred. Several decisions have been cited in support of this contention and I cannot do better than refer to the latest precedent in (Dr. Dattatraya Mahadev Nadkarni v. The Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay)5, reported in 1992 Vol. I S. V.L.R. 55. The appellant before the Supreme Court had been served an order of removal from service and he took exception thereto, contending that the same was in effect an order of dismissal, which dismissal was invalid as it had not been precedent by the rules governing an enquiry etc. The respondent Municipal Corporation maintained that the order of removal was nothing more than a removal simpliciter. Having considered the background, the Supreme Court held that courts were entitled to go behind the form and ascertain the true character of the order. The entire facts and circumstances of the case had to be considered and one could not go by the mere use of this or that word. Now here, Regulations 61 and 81 cannot be placed on par i.e. as if they refer to the same thing. Termination under Regulation 61 is the benign form of termination, in that the employee's unsuitability is the only reason for putting an end to the contact of employment. The unsuitability involves no moral stigma on the employee and that is why recourse can be had to the power of termination under Regulation 61. As against this form of termination, Regulation 81 speaks of termination following a conviction by a Criminal Court. As said earlier, it is not enough that there be a conviction to enable the passing of an order of termination. As against this form of termination, Regulation 81 speaks of termination following a conviction by a Criminal Court. As said earlier, it is not enough that there be a conviction to enable the passing of an order of termination. The conviction has to be for certain facts and those facts have to be something in the nature of that which brings the employee's character and conduct into disrepute, rendering him unfit to continue in the employment of the employer. This termination contemplated by Regulation 81 would be the 'dismissal' from service contemplated by Regulation 63, and, an act of misconduct not falling within item (f) but item (i) in Clause 7 of the Discipline and Appeal Procedure. Once we reach this conclusion, the consequences follow almost automatically. Plaintiff is not entitled to gratuity having regard to Regulation 11(i)(b) of the Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation Gratuity Fund Regulations, 1968. This is because he was dismissed from service for misconduct. Bonus would also be inadmissible to him for the same reason. 7. There however remains the question of the plaintiff's eligibility to the balance of salary and provident fund contribution. The enquiry commenced against the plaintiff was on various charges not including the act of bribery which was the subject matter of the charge framed against him in the Special Case. The departmental enquiry did not come to an end in the sense of plaintiff's guilt being established or his being exonerated. It was abandoned. Mr. Sawant for the Corporation argues that the plaintiff cannot claim the balance of the salary because he was dismissed for an act of misconduct. In support of this contention Counsel relies upon Regulation 84. The contention advanced by Mr. Sawant cannot be accepted. The order of suspension against the plaintiff was with a view to hold a departmental enquiry against him; the charges framed for the enquiry not including the accusation which figured in the prosecution launched against the plaintiff. In such a case when a servant is placed under suspension pending an enquiry, but the authorities withdraw the enquiry thereby depriving the servant of an opportunity to prove that the charge against him was wrong and the suspension was wholly unjustified, the servant cannot be deprived of his full pay and allowances see (South Eastern Railway v. Kartar Singh)6, 1969 (I) L.L.J. 620 . It was held in that case that in the absence of any specific rule governing payment in cases of an abortive enquiry, the servant, cannot be deprived of his full pay and allowances. The suspension in such a case must be held to be "wholly unjustified". This is also clear from Clause (a) of Regulation 83 where it says that after the expiry of a certain period the employee shall be treated as if he had not been suspended. On behalf of the Corporation it was argued that there was no order of re-instatement. But the order of re-instatement has to be inferred from the revocation of the earlier orders of suspension as also extension of service. Implicit in this revocation and supersession passed on the very day an order of termination was passed, is the national re-instatement of the plaintiff, followed of course with an immediate order of termination. As to the liability of the Corporation to pay the employee's share of the provident fund, if plaintiff's employment continued till 4-9-1974 as I have so found, there is no reason why the plaintiff should be deprived of getting the employer's share of contribution to his provident fund. It was argued that a matching contribution is not admissible to an employee unless he himself contributes to the provident fund. But plaintiff was prevented from contributing to the provident fund his share of the contribution because of his not getting the full salary. Therefore the Corporation cannot take advantage of its own wrong in withholding the full salary of the plaintiff and deprive him of the matching contribution. Further, there has been no enquiry and order in terms of Regulation 120(M)(a) which is a condition precedent to depriving an employee of that benefit. To the extent of the employer's share of the provident fund, plaintiff's claim has to be sustained. Plaintiff has claimed certain sum on this score. Being doubtful of its correctness I will leave the exact sum to be ascertained later. 8. Last, there remains the claim for interest. This claim is not pressed by Counsel and very rightly so. The result of the foregoing discussion is that plaintiff's claim succeeds in part. 9. Decreed that defendant No. 1 do pay to the plaintiff a sum of Rs. 52,950.25ps. and the employer's share of the contribution for the period ranging from 18-10-1969 to 4-9-1979. This claim is not pressed by Counsel and very rightly so. The result of the foregoing discussion is that plaintiff's claim succeeds in part. 9. Decreed that defendant No. 1 do pay to the plaintiff a sum of Rs. 52,950.25ps. and the employer's share of the contribution for the period ranging from 18-10-1969 to 4-9-1979. This sum, along with interest at rate 6% per annum as calculated from today until realisation, be paid to the plaintiff by the defendant No. 1. Rest of the plaintiff's claim is dismissed. Parties shall bear their own costs. Order accordingly. -----