SHAH, J. ( 1 ) M/s. Gandhinagar Bottling Private Limited, petitioner No. 1 is a company engaged in the business of manufacture of aerated waters. It manufactures aerated waters under the brand name of campa being owned by a company called Campa Beverages Private Limited having its registered office at New Delhi. The second petitioner is a Director of petitioner No. 1-Company. The petitioners have challenged the validity of the Notification No. 223 of 1987 dated 22/09/1987 whereby small Scale Exemption Notification No. 175 of 1986 dated 1/03/1986 was amended inasmuch as it has provided that the exemption contained in the Notification No. 175 of 1986 shall not apply to the specified goods where a manufacturer affixes the specified goods with a brand name or trade name (registered or not) of another person who is not eligible for grant of exemption. It is the contention of the petitioner that the petitioner is a small scale manufacture manufacturing aerated waters by using a brand name campa. For this purpose necessary agreement has been arrived at between the petitioner-Company and the Campa Beverages Private Limited. The petitioner-Company purchased syrup (concentrate) from the above named company for the manufacture of soft drinks. It is further contended that except the agreement (Annexure c) the petitioners are not having any relationship with the said company and therefore, as the petitioner is a small scale company, the petitioner is entitled to have exemption benefit as per the Notification no. 175 of 1986 dated 1/03/1986, but the said benefit is arbitrarily withdrawn by the impugned notification. ( 2 ) MR. Joshi, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioners, vehemently submitted that by the Notification No. 175 of 1986 the petitioners were exempted from payment of the excise duty and that exemption is withdrawn by Notification No. 223 of 1987 dated 22/09/1987 by adding paragraph 7 to the Notification No. 175 of 1986. It is his contention that the withdrawal Notification is arbitrary and discriminatory inasmuch as even though the petitioner is small scale unit, the benefit of exemption is withdrawn only on the ground that it uses the brand name or trade name of another company which is not eligible for grant of exemption. It is his contention that the withdrawal Notification is arbitrary and discriminatory inasmuch as even though the petitioner is small scale unit, the benefit of exemption is withdrawn only on the ground that it uses the brand name or trade name of another company which is not eligible for grant of exemption. ( 3 ) FOR appreciating the contention of the learned Advocate, it would be necessary to refer to Notification No. 175 of 1986-C. E. Total exemption on concessional rate of excise duty is provided to manufacturers of the specified goods on the basis of aggregate value of its cliarances. The relevant part thereof is as under :" (A) In the case of first clearances of the specified goods upto an aggregate value not exceeding rupees thirty lakhs . The relevant part thereof is as under :" (A) In the case of first clearances of the specified goods upto an aggregate value not exceeding rupees thirty lakhs . (i) in a case where a manufacturer avails of the credit of the duty paid on inputs used in the manufacture of the specified goods cleared for home consumption under Rule 57a of the said Rules, from so much of the duty of excise leviable thereon which is specified in the said Schedule read with any relevant notification issued under sub-rule (1) of Rule 8 of the said Rules and in force for the time being as is equivalent to an amount calcu-lated at the rate of 10% ad valorem: (ii) in any other case from the whole of the duty of excise leviable thereon: provided that the aggregate value of clearances of the specified goods under sub-clause (ii) of this clause in respect of any one heading No. of the said Schedule, shall not exceed rupees fifteen lakhs : (b) in the case of clearances (being the clearances of the specified goods of an aggregate value not exceeding rupees sixty lakhs) immediately following the said clearances of the value specified in clause (a) from so much of the duty of excise leviable thereon which is specified in the said Schedule read with any relevant notification issued under sub-rule (1) of Rule 8 of the said Rules as is equivalent to an amount calculated at the rate of 10% ad valorem : provided that the amount of duty of excise payable on the specified goods under sub-clause (i) of clause (a), or as the case may be, under this clause, shall not be less than an amount calculated at the rate of 5% ad valorem : provided further that the aggregate value of clearances of the specified goods in terms of clause (a) and clause (b) of this paragraph taken together, shall not exceed rupees seventy-five lakhs. 2. 2. The aggregate value of clearances of the specified goods from any factory by one or more manufacturers in any financial year under clauses (a) and (b) of paragraph j, shall not exceed rupees thirty lakhs and sixty lakhs respectively : provided that the aggregate value of clearances of the specified goods from any factory by one or more manufacturers in any financial year in terms of clause (a) and clause (b) of paragraph I, taken together, shall not exceed rupees seventy-five lakhs. 3. Nothing contained in this notification shall apply if the aggregate value of clearances of all excisable goods for home consumptions : (a) by a manufacturer, from one or more factories, or (b) from any factory, by one or more manufacturers, had exceeded rupees one hundred and fifty lakhs in the preceding financial years. " (Emphasis added) it would also be necessary to refer to Notification No. 223 of 1987 dated 2 2/09/1987 which reads as under : "in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-rule (I; Rule 8 of the Central Excise rules, 1944, the Central Government hereby makes the following further amendments in the notification of the Government of India in the Ministry of Finance (Department of Revenue) No. 175 of 1986 Central Excise, dated 1/03/1986, namely : in the said Notification : (i) after paragraph 6, the following paragraph shall be inserted, namely : "7. The exemption contained in this notification shall not apply to the specified goods where a manufacturer affixes the specified goods with a brand name or trade name (registered or not) of another person who is not eligible for grant of exemption under this notification : provided that nothing contained in this paragraph shall be applicable in respect of the specified goods cleared for home consumption before the ist day of October, 1987. " (ii) after Explanation VII, the following Explanation shall be inserted, namely : "explanation VIII : "brand Name" or "trade Name" shall mean a brand name or trade name, whether registered or not, that is to say a name or a mark, such as symbol, monogram, lable, signature or invented word or writing which is used in relation to such specified goods for the purpose of indicating or so as to indicate a connection in the course of trade between such specified goods and some person using such name or mark with or without any indication of the identity of that person. " explanatory Note : this amendment seeks to deny small scale exemption in respect of specified goods utilised with the brand name/trade name of a person who is not eligible for the exemption under Notification No. 175 of 1986-CE dated 1-3-1986. " ( 4 ) THE Notification No. 175 of 1986 provides that the Central Government has granted exemption to the excisable goods of the description specified in the Annexure to the Notification to a manufacturer on the basis of the aggregate value of the clearances made by the manufacturer during a financial year. If the aggregate value of the specified goods is not exceeding thirty or sixty lakhs, then exemption to certain extent as provided in clause (a) or (b) would be available. It also fully exempts the specific goods in certain cases. It also provides that the aggregate value of the clearances of the specifed goods from any factory by one or more manufacturers in any financial year under clauses (a) and (b) of paragraph 1 shall not exceed rupees thirty lakhs and Rupees sixty lakhs respectively. Further, it provides that nothing contained in the Notification will be applicable if the aggregate value of clearances of all excisable goods for home consumption by a manufacturer from one or more factories had exceeded Rupees one hundred and fifty lakhs in the preceding financial year. Therefore, the basis of grant of exemption or concessional rate of excise duty is total value of clearances of specified goods. Hence it would be amply clear that the purpose of giving exemption was to see that the manufacturer of specified goods beyond the particular value is not entitled to get the exemption. Therefore, the basis of grant of exemption or concessional rate of excise duty is total value of clearances of specified goods. Hence it would be amply clear that the purpose of giving exemption was to see that the manufacturer of specified goods beyond the particular value is not entitled to get the exemption. ( 5 ) A manufacturer with a brand name or a trade name who is not eligible for grant of exemption under the Notification is not permitted by the Notification No. 223 of 1987 to get the exemption of excise duty by backdoor entry of manufacturing the goods through other manufacturers. It cannot be said that the classification by this Notification of manufacturers who were affixing the specified goods with a brand name or a trade name of another person for grant of exemption and a manufacturer who does not affix such brand name or trade name is in any way irrational. The classification is clear. The object is to see that the company having a brand name or a trade name which is not entitled to get exemption under the notification does not get it by manufacturing specified goods through different units. ( 6 ) EVEN the agreement between the petitioners and Campa Beverages private Limited which is produced at Annexure c clearly provides that the petitioner-Company is required to manufacture the beverages in the fashion prescribed by Campa Beverages Private Limited and not to sell the Beverage base or the Syrup or to let it get into the hands of third parties. The detailed procedure is prescribed. It specifically provides that it shall distribute the Beverage only into the distinctive bottles (design registered under the design Act of 1911 for the purpose) and for protecting the original taste, quality and flavour of the Beverage Base and/or the Syrup to cap and seal such bottles containing the Beverage only with such crown stoppers as shall be approved from time to time by the Company and not to use such distinctive bottles of crown stoppers for any purpose other than the manufacturing of the Beverages out of the said Beverage Bases and/or Syrup. ( 7 ) IN any set of circumstances, it is well settled by the series of decisions that in choice of granting the concessional rate of duty or granting exemption to certain manufacturers with regard to the tax, the Government has a wide latitude of discretion. It need not give exemption or concession to everyone. The object of granting the concessional rate of duty to protect smaller units in the industry from the competition by the larger ones cannot be said to be in any way unreasonable. In the Explanatory Note it has been. clarified that the amendment seeks to deny small scale exemptions in respect of specified goods utilised with the brand name/trade name of a person who is not eligible for the exemption. Therefore, the object of amendment in the Notification no. 175 of 1986 is to see that concessional rate of excise duty protects the smaller units in the industry from the competition by the larger ones. That object would have been frustrated by adopting the device of granting permission to utilise the brand name or trade name by the larger units to smaller units by recovering certain amount or by any other means. It is for the Central Government to decide what economic and social policy it should pursue and it is well settled that the State enjoys widest latitude in taxation methods. It cannot be said that once the benefit of concessionat rate of excise duty is given, it should be given either to all or to none. Therefore, it cannot be said that classification based between manufacturers who use the brand name or trade name of another company which is not entitled to get the benefit of the Notification and other manufacturers who are not using such brand name is in any way unreasonable or without any nexus with the object which is sought to be achieved. ( 8 ) IN the case of Union of India v. P. M. Works, AIR 1974 SC 2349 , the Court dealt with the similar contention. The Court observed that the purpose of granting exemption was to see that small bona fide units who were in the field when the Notification was issued get benefit. The concessional rate was not intended to benefit the large units which had split up into smaller units to earn the concession. The Court observed that the purpose of granting exemption was to see that small bona fide units who were in the field when the Notification was issued get benefit. The concessional rate was not intended to benefit the large units which had split up into smaller units to earn the concession. The tendency towards fragmentation of the bigger units into smaller ones in order to earn the concessional rate of duty has been noted by the Tariff Commission in its report. The Court further observed that in the matter of granting concession or exemption from tax the Government has a wide latitude of discretion. It need not give exemption or concession to everyone in order that it may grant the same to some. It is also held that the concessional rate of duty can be availed of only by those who satisfy the conditions which have been laid down under the Notification. The Court further held that the object of granting the concessional rate of duty was to protect the smaller units in the industry from the competition by the larger ones and that object would have been frustrated if, by adopting the device of fragmentation the larger units could become the ultimate beneficiaries of the bounty. ( 9 ) FURTHER, in the case of P M. Ashwathanarayana Selty v. State of Harnataka, 1989 Supp. (1) SCC 696, the Supreme Court dealt with the similar contention of alleged discrimination in Taxation Law and has pertinently observed as under :"the problem is indeed, a complex one not free from its own peculiar difficulties. Though other legislative measures dealing with economic regulation are not outside Art. 14, it is well recognised that the State enjoys the widest latitude where measures of economic regulation are concerned. These measures for fiscal and economic regulation involve an evaluation of diverse and quite often conflicting economic criteria and adjustment and balancing of various conflicting social and economic values and interests. It is for the State to decide what economic and social policy it should pursue and what discrimination advance those social and economic policies. In view of the inherent complexity of these fiscal adjustments, Courts give a largest discretion to tha legislature in the matter of its preferences of economic and social policies and effectuate the chosen system in all possible and reasonable ways. In view of the inherent complexity of these fiscal adjustments, Courts give a largest discretion to tha legislature in the matter of its preferences of economic and social policies and effectuate the chosen system in all possible and reasonable ways. If two or more methods of adjustments of an economic measure are available, the legislative preference in favour of one of them cannot be questioned on the ground of lack of legislative wisdom or that the method adopted is not the best or that there were better ways of adjusting the competing interests and claims The legislature possesses the greatest freedom in such areas. . . the legislature has to reckon with practical difficulties of adjustments of conflicting interests it has to bring to bear a pragmatic approach to the resolution of these conflicts and evolve a fiscal policy it thinks is best suited to the felt needs. The complexity of economic matters and the pragmatic solutions to be found for them defy and go beyond conceptual mental modes- Social and economic problems of a policy do not accord with preconceived stereotypes so as to be amenable to predetermined solutions. . . the lack of perfection in a legislative measure does not necessarily imply its unconstitutionality. It is rightly said that no economic measure has yet been devised which it free from alt discriminatory impact and that in such a complex arena in which no perfect alternative exist, the Court does well not to impose too rigorous a standard of criticism, under the equal protection clause reviewing fiscal services In G. K. Krishnan v. State of Tamilnadu, this Court referred to, with approval, the majority view in Sanantonio independent School District v. Rodriguz speaking through Justice Steward (SCC p. 389 para 38 ). no scheme of taxation, whether the tax is imposed on property, income or purchases of goods and services, has yet been devised which is free of all discriminatory impact. In such a complex arena in which no perfect alternative exist, the Court does well not to impose too rigorous a standard of scrutiny lest all local fiscal scheme become subjects of criticism under the Equal Protection clause. In such a complex arena in which no perfect alternative exist, the Court does well not to impose too rigorous a standard of scrutiny lest all local fiscal scheme become subjects of criticism under the Equal Protection clause. "and also the dissent of Marchall, J. who summed up this conclusion thus (SCC 389, para 38) : in summary, it seems to me inescapably clear that this Court has consistently adjusted the care with which it will review State discrimination in light of the constitutional significance of the interests affected and the invidiousness of the particular classification. In the context of economic interests, we find that discrimfc. natory State action is almost always sustained, for such interest are generally removed from constitutional guarantees. Moreover the extremes to which the Court has gone in dreaming up rational bases for State regulation in that area may in many instances be ascribed to a healthy revulsion from the courts earlier excesses in using the Constitution to protect interests that have more than enough power to protect themselves in the legislative halls. the observations of this Court in ITO v. KUN. Takin Roy Rymbai made in the context of taxation laws are worth recalling (SCC p. 923) : Formulae or doctrinaire tests or precise scientific prioeiplines of exclusion are to be applied. The test should only be one of palpable arbitrariness applied in the context of the felt needs of the times and societal exigencies informed by experience. Classification based on differences in the value of articles or the economic superiority of the persons of incidence are well recognised. A reasonable classification is one which includes all who are similarly situated and none who are not. In order to ascertain whether persons are similarly placed, one must look beyond the classification and to the purpose of the law. " applying the aforesaid test, it cannot be said that the classification between a manufacturer who uses the trade name or brand name of a manufacturer who is not entitled to get exemption and a manufactures who does not use such trade or brand name can be said to be by any standard arbitrary. ( 10 ) HOWEVER, the learned Advocate for the petitioners relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Government of India and Ors. v. Dhanalaxmi Paper and Board Mills, 1989 (39) ELT 171 (SC ). ( 10 ) HOWEVER, the learned Advocate for the petitioners relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Government of India and Ors. v. Dhanalaxmi Paper and Board Mills, 1989 (39) ELT 171 (SC ). After considering the facts of the case, the Court arrived at the conclusion that the prescribed date 9/11/1963 mentioned in clause (a) of the notification does not have any significance whatsoever and does not bear any rational relationship to the object sought to be achieved by the Notification. The Court pertinently observed that the Notification bearing No. 110 which provided that application is to be made on or after 9/11/1963 was not produced on the record of the High Court; the High Court judgment does not throw any light on the nature of the Notification No. 110 and the learned Counsel could not draw any inference about its provisions from the judgment. Even at the time of hearing of the appeal the learned Counsel for the Government of India was not in a position either to produce it or tell to the Court what it was about and therefore, the Court observed that no explanation for the choice of the date in clause (a) was forth coming. In that set of circumstances, the Court held that as the benefit of concessional rate was bestowed upon the entire group of assessees referred therein and by clause (a) of proviso (3) the group was divided into two classes without adopting any differentia having a rational relation to the object of the notification and the benefit to one class was withdrawn while retaining it in favour of the other. Therefore, the Court held that clause (a) of the proviso 3 of the impugned Notification was ultra vires. The judgment would have no bearing in the present case. As discussed above, the classification by the notification No. 223 of 1987 is based upon reasonable criteria. It denies benefit of small scale exemptions in respect of specified goods utilised with the brand name/trade name of a person who is not eligible for exemption under Notification No. 175 of 1986 dated 1/03/1986, The object is to give benefit to small scale manufacturer. Total exemption or concessional rate of excise duty is provided on the basis of value of manufacturers clearances during a financial year. Total exemption or concessional rate of excise duty is provided on the basis of value of manufacturers clearances during a financial year. ( 11 ) HENCE there is no substance in this petition and it deserves to be rejected. ( 12 ) IN the result, the petition is rejected. Rule discharged with no order as to costs. Ad interim relief stands vacated. .