JUDGMENT Ramakrishmanan, J. 1. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by T. V. Ramakrishnan, J.- These writ Appeals, 9 in number, are against a common judgment disposing of 8 Original Petitions raising a common issue. While writ appeal No. 493 of 1992 is by the Government, the other 8 writ Appeals are by parties affected by the impugned judgment. Writ appeal Nos. 411, 414, 415, 427 and 469 of 1992 are by third parties and the rest are by parties to the O. Ps. disposed of by the common judgment. O. P. No. 5894 of 1992 is an Original Petition filed by 4 Village Officers after the impugned judgment was pronounced and while the order was under challenge in some - of the Writ Appeals. Apart from the common issue raised in the disposal of Original Petitions, a new issue is also raised in the said O. P. and as such the O. P. was directed to be heard and disposed of along with these Writ Appeals. 2. The common issue raised in the O. Ps. disposed of by the learned Judge related to the question of finalising the integrated seniority list of Village staff and Revenue staff as on 10th September 1984, the date of integration. Appellants in all the Writ Appeals excepting the Writ Appeal filed by the Government and the petitioners in O. P. No. 5894 of 1992 are officers who belonged originally to the Village establishment and were integrated with the staff of the Revenue establishment. The party respondents in all such Writ Appeals and the O. P. are officers of the Revenue establishment with whom Village staff was integrated. By common consent of the parties, the learned Judge has treated O.P.No. 11565 of 1991 as the main O. P. References to the documents in this judgment are to the documents produced in that O. P. unless otherwise indicated specifically. 3. Brief facts necessary to appreciate the dispute raised in the O. P. and the W. As. can be stated thus: The 3rd Kerala Pay Commission in its report recommended the integration of Village staff with Revenue staff; mainly for the purpose of improvement of promotional avenues of the Village staff who were found to be not having sufficient promotional avenues. Accepting the recommendation of the Pay Commission, Government issued Ext. can be stated thus: The 3rd Kerala Pay Commission in its report recommended the integration of Village staff with Revenue staff; mainly for the purpose of improvement of promotional avenues of the Village staff who were found to be not having sufficient promotional avenues. Accepting the recommendation of the Pay Commission, Government issued Ext. P-1 G. O. dated 10th September 1984 ordering integration of Village staff and Revenue staff with effect from 10th September 1984 subject to the terms mentioned in the appendix to that order. The equalisation of posts on integration was as follows: Revenue Staff Village Staff Lower Division Clerk Village Assistant Upper Division Clerk Village Officer The integration was effected on the basis of pay parity and functional parity. The order specifically contemplated the introduction of common select list and seniority list for Village Assistants and Lower Division Clerks and common seniority list for Upper Division Clerks and Village Officers. In the appendix to Ext. P-1 order it was specifically made clear that the Revenue and Village establishments will be integrated with effect from 10th September 1984. It was further provided that on the crucial date of integration all those who are Village Officers and Upper Division Clerks will be integrated into one unit and an integrated seniority list will be maintained for that unit. Similarly it was provided that on the crucial date of integration all those who are Village Assistants and Lower Division Clerks will be integrated into one unit and an integrated seniority list will be maintained. It was also provided specifically that the integrated seniority list will be used for promotion to the vacancies that may arise after the date of integration. Two other conditions which are of special importance as far as the issue arising for consideration in these appeals are the following: "The Village Assistants will be given exemption for the period of two years, from passing the obligatory test such as Account Test etc., prescribed for the post of Upper Division Clerk. Similarly the Lower Division Clerks will be given exemption for a period of two year, from passing the obligatory test prescribed for the post of Village Officer. The Village Officer will be given exemption for a period of two years from acquiring the test qualification for promotion as Revenue Inspector, Deputy Tahsildar etc. The Upper Division Clerk will been quired to pass Village Officer's test. The Village Officer will be given exemption for a period of two years from acquiring the test qualification for promotion as Revenue Inspector, Deputy Tahsildar etc. The Upper Division Clerk will been quired to pass Village Officer's test. The Special Rules now in force will be amended to the extent necessary. The Special Rules so amended and made applicable to the integrated unit of Village and Revenue Establishments, will be given effect to from the date of integration." Ext. P-1 was given statutory validity by issuing Special Rules for the Kerala Revenue Ministerial Subordinate Service (Amendment) Rules, 1989 (for short "the Amendment Rules") issued as per Ext. P-2 G. O. dated 12th July 1989. The Amendment Rules amended the existing Special Rules of the year 1985. After the amendment, the Rules were called 'Special Rules for Kerala Ministerial Subordinate Service 1989' (hereinafter referred to as "the Special Rules"). From the categorisation of the posts in R.2, it can be seen that the post of Village Officer/Special Village Officer and the post of Upper Division Clerk belong to the same category and are interchangeable. Similarly, Village Assistants including Special Village Assistants and the post of Lower Division Clerk belong to same category are interchangeable. R.9 prescribes qualification for the candidates for appointment to the various categories governed by the rules. For categories 1 and 2, namely, Firka Revenue Inspector/ Special Revenue Inspector and Upper Division Clerk/ Village Officer including Special Village Officer the tests prescribed are: (1) Revenue Test, (2) Account Test (Lower) and (3) District Office Manual Test. For the third category of Lower Division Clerk/Village Assistant including Special Village Assistant the test prescribed is Chain Survey Test. 4. 1st April 1989 was fixed as the time or the Village Officers and Village Assistants to pass the tests specified as per the Special Rules. However, the Special Rules were brought into force only by Ext. P-2 G. O. dated 12th July 1989 which was published in the Gazette dated 17th July 1989, long after 1st April 1989, the date fixed for passing the tests. As such the time for passing the test introduced by the Special Rules was extended till 30th June 1990 as per Ext. P-3 order dated 31st October 1989. 5. Challenging the validity of Ext. As such the time for passing the test introduced by the Special Rules was extended till 30th June 1990 as per Ext. P-3 order dated 31st October 1989. 5. Challenging the validity of Ext. P-3 order and the validity of some of the provisions contained in the Special Rules Officers who belonged to Revenue establishment before integration, filed a series of Original Petitions, namely, O. P. Nos. 333 of 1990, 8653 of 1984 and 9017 of 1989 etc. It was contended in the said O. Ps. that the extension of the time granted by the Special Rules by Ext. P-3 executive order is illegal and as such the order extending time is liable to be quashed. The principle regarding the counting of seniority of village staff on integration was also challenged. By a common judgment a learned Single Judge repelled the contentions and upheld the validity of Ext. P-3 order and the principle of integration challenged in the O. Ps. A Division Bench of this Court by a common judgment in Writ Appeal Nos. 362, 367 and 369 of 1990 confirmed the said judgment of the learned Single Judge. The Writ Appeals were disposed of on 27th June 1990. After the disposal of the Writ Appeals, the Government published the State provisional seniority list of the staff belonging to the Kerala Revenue Ministerial Subordinate Service as on 10th September 1984, as per Ext. P-5 proceedings dated 8th March 1991 directing the incumbents to file claims and objections if any thereto. On 21st October 1991, just prior to the issuance of Ext. P-5, the Secretary to Government issued a letter to the Secretary to Board of Revenue styled as Government letter No. 32224/B2/90/RD, dated 20th October 1990. The said letter is to the following effect: "Government have decided that persons in the category of U. D Clerk/Village Officer including Special Village Officer who originally belonged to the Village establishment before the integration of Revenue and Village Establishments and who were Village Officers/ Special Village Officers/U. D. Clerks on 30th June 1990 may not be reverted Officers/U. D. C. to the category of L. D. Clerk/Village Assistant for want of the test qualification prescribed in item (2) of the table in G. O. (P) 601/85/RD, dated 12th June 1985. You may take action accordingly. . . .." 6. You may take action accordingly. . . .." 6. Two of the Lower Division Clerks who belonged to the Revenue establishment before integration and who claimed that they are fully qualified to De promoted as Upper Division Clerks in February, 1986 and December, 1990 filed O. P. No. 11565 of 1991 alleging that a large number of persons who are unqualified to hold the post of Village Officer/Upper Division Clerk are allowed to continue in such posts and their names are also illegally included in Ext. P-5 seniority list. They prayed for a direction to revert such unqualified hands and to promote them and other qualified candidates in such vacancies, before finalising the seniority list. They also contended that the direction contained in Ext. P-4 letter is directly contrary to the Special Rules and as such illegal and discriminatory. Respondents 5 to 14 were impleaded as persons who are illegally continuing in service without the requisite test qualifications. While the O. P. was pending Government issued a letter containing certain guidelines to be followed by all the District Collectors while finalising the seniority list. The said letter was produced as Ext. P-6 in the O.P. The reliefs prayed for in the O. P. are as follows: "(i) to issue a writ of mandamus or other appropriate writ, direction or order directing the respondents 1 to 4 and other District Collectors to prepare the final seniority list of Village Officers, and U. D. Clerks strictly in accordance with the qualifications prescribed in the Special Rules; (ii) to issue a writ of. mandamus or other appropriate writ, direction or order directing the respondents 1 to 4 to exclude all the unqualified persons like respondents 5 to 14 from Ext. P-5 seniority list; (iii) to issue a writ of mandamus or other appropriate writ, direction or order directing the respondents 1 to 4 and all other District Collectors to revert the unqualified persons from the post of Village Officers or LJ, D. Clerks ignoring Ext. P-4 letter; (iv) to grant such any other relief as this Honourable Court deems fit to grant". 7. A large number of officers working in the post of Village Officer and who belonged to Village establishment prior to Integration filed O. P. No. 8205 of 1990 and other 6 O. Ps. P-4 letter; (iv) to grant such any other relief as this Honourable Court deems fit to grant". 7. A large number of officers working in the post of Village Officer and who belonged to Village establishment prior to Integration filed O. P. No. 8205 of 1990 and other 6 O. Ps. challenging the validity of the order of integration as well as the Special Rules to the extent they required them to pass tests newly introduced as per the Special Rules without giving them an option to continue as Village Officers without passing such tests as in the past. They prayed for a declaration that Ext. P-1 order and Ext. P-2 notification in so far as they effect compulsory integration of the staff of the Revenue and Village establishments without giving option to the Village Assistants and Village Officers to remain outside the integrated unit, are void and unenforceable being illegal, arbitrary, unjust and discriminatory. A further declaration was prayed for to the effect that Village Officers are entitled to continue in the post of Village Officer without passing the Revenue Test, Account Test (Lower) and District Office Manual Test newly introduced by the Special Rules. Alternatively they prayed for an exemption from passing the tests till 17th July 1991 or till the petitioners get 4 chances to appear in each of the above tests whichever is later. 8. In O. P. No. 8091 of 1990, one of the Original Petitions filed by some of the Village Officers, the Government filed a detailed counter affidavit taking up the stand that the integration of the staff belonging to the Revenue and Village establishments was effected as early as 10th September 1984 on terms and conditions contained in Ext. P-1 order and the appendix attached to that order and made known to all and that the integrated service is now governed by the Special Rules prescribing General and special qualifications for appointment and promotions. P-1 order and the appendix attached to that order and made known to all and that the integrated service is now governed by the Special Rules prescribing General and special qualifications for appointment and promotions. No exemption can be made in regard to the acquisition of test qualifications for the purpose of holding the post of Village Officer as prayed for by the petitioners in the O. P. All promotions to the post of Village Officer made after 10th September 1984 are to be reviewed before finalising the provisional seniority list and unqualified persons if any holding the post of Village Officer have to be reverted to regularise the promotions given after 10th September 1984 without insisting upon test qualifications. It was also admitted in the counter that promotions made after 10th September 1984 were all made on the basis of separate seniority lists of Revenue staff and Village staff and not on the basis of any integrated seniority list and that as a result certain anomalies have occurred in the seniority list which requires rectification on review. 9. Learned Judge has as per the impugned judgment directed the District Collectors to implement the directions contained in Ext. P-6 letter of Government in the light of observations made in the judgment within one month from the date of receipt of the copy of the judgment. Learned Judge also made the following observations which would indicate that the judgment was one passed on the basis of the consent of the counsel appearing for the parties. "If the above directions are implemented, it is conceded by learned counsel appearing in these case, the individual grievances of the petitioners will be redressed and that this Court need not deal with the facts in each case separately. In the light of this submission, I am not pronouncing on the individual claims of the petitioners vis-a-vis those of the respondents." 10. It is against the judgment so delivered the appellants have preferred the Writ Appeals as indicated already. 11. The stand taken by the Government as revealed in the memorandum of appeal in W. A. No. 493 of 1992 is different from the stand they have taken in their counter - affidavit filed in O. P. No. 8091 of 1990. It is against the judgment so delivered the appellants have preferred the Writ Appeals as indicated already. 11. The stand taken by the Government as revealed in the memorandum of appeal in W. A. No. 493 of 1992 is different from the stand they have taken in their counter - affidavit filed in O. P. No. 8091 of 1990. In the appeal, the Government has expressly stated that they have taken a policy decision not to revert the officers of the erstwhile Village establishment who have got promotion after 10th September 1984 for want of test qualifications introduced for the first time as per the Special Rules and that such a decision was taken after due deliberation with all concerned. It has been made clear that Government wanted to implement Ext. P-4 letter issued on the basis of the policy decision taken by it so as to mitigate the hardship felt by the Village staff on account of the integration ordered without giving the Village staff any option to stand out of the integrated unit. If integration was not ordered they would have been in the normal course promoted as Village Officers. It may not be justifiable to deny them even such benefits which they would have got before integration as a result of integration which was mainly done for giving them better chances of promotion. The stand so taken by the Government would also indicate that the Government is not prepared to give a general relaxation of the rule requiring test qualifications for promotion to the post of Village Officer and wanted only to avoid reversion of those who have already been promoted between 10th September 1984 and 30th June 1990. 12. The main question to be considered in these Writ Appeals is whether the direction contained in the impugned judgment to revert the Village Officers who were promoted after 10th September 1984 and who have not acquired the obligatory test qualifications prescribed by the Special Rules on or before 30th June 1990 is sustainable in law? In fact the appellants are aggrieved only by the above direction in the judgment. There are certain incidental but important questions arising for consideration which we may mention while considering the main question. In fact the appellants are aggrieved only by the above direction in the judgment. There are certain incidental but important questions arising for consideration which we may mention while considering the main question. Apart from the common question raised in the Writ Appeals, the additional point raised in O. P. No. 5894 of 1992 regarding the constitutional validity of the provisions contained in the orders of integration and the Special Rules prescribing test qualifications for promotion to the post of Village Officer on the grounds of arbitrariness and illegal discrimination is also to be decided. 13. Before going into the merits of the common contention raised and the incidental points arising for consideration in all the writ Appeals, we may first deal with the additional point raised in O.P. No. 5894 of 1992. It is the contention of the petitioners that the newly introduced tests are totally unnecessary for discharging the duties of the village officers and as such the prescription of the new test qualifications for promotion has no reasonable nexus with the purported objected to be achieved, namely, administrative efficiency. Having passed the Chain Survey Test and Village Officers Manual Test, petitioners are fully qualified to be promoted to the post of Village Officer. It was on that basis they were promoted in the available substantive vacancies, during the period between 10th September 1984 and 30th June 1990. If the petitioners and other similarly situated persons are to be reverted from the post of Village Officer it will amount to an unreasonable restriction or deprivation of their rights to continue in the post of Village Officer to which they were promoted in the normal course as fully qualified persons according to their seniority. In the circumstances, it was contended that R.9 of the Special Rules, to the extent it prescribes three new tests as obligatory qualification for promotion to the post of Village Officer is arbitrary, discriminatory and violative of the fundamental rights of the petitioners under Art.14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. 14. In the counter affidavit filed in O.P. No. 8091 of 1990, the Government has specifically asserted that for the efficient functioning of the Revenue Department officers occupying higher posts must pass the tests prescribed by the Special Rules. 14. In the counter affidavit filed in O.P. No. 8091 of 1990, the Government has specifically asserted that for the efficient functioning of the Revenue Department officers occupying higher posts must pass the tests prescribed by the Special Rules. The tests were prescribed for village staff also because the benefit of further promotion to various higher posts in the service was extended to the village staff also. When once a person is promoted to the post of Village Officer in the normal course he can aspire to get promotion to higher posts on the basis of this seniority without any need to acquire additional qualifications. In the light of the contention taken by the State in its counter, it is difficult to hold that the obligatory tests prescribed for promotion to the post of Village Officer and other higher posts is totally unnecessary or irrelevant. The petitioners have themselves admitted that test qualifications are necessary to discharge the duties of the posts of Head Clerk/ Revenue Inspector and other superior posts. It is clear from the scheme of integration and the stand taken by the Government in its counter referred to above, that the test qualifications are made obligatory mainly to afford the village staff better promotional avenues maintaining administrative efficiency in the service. Admittedly, the tests prescribed are common to all. No option to continue as Village Officers without further promotion was given to the village staff since such a course was found to be against the very object for which integration was effected, namely, increasingly the promotional avenues of the village staff. In fact, that was the then specific demand of the village staff. Further the integration was effected on the basis of functional parity also. To achieve functional parity it was only reasonable to prescribe common test qualifications applicable to all for the purpose of promotion to the higher posts in the integrated service. As such the prescription of new test qualifications for promotion in the instant case cannot be considered as either arbitrary or discriminatory. It cannot also be considered as totally unnecessary or irrelevant. 15. As such the prescription of new test qualifications for promotion in the instant case cannot be considered as either arbitrary or discriminatory. It cannot also be considered as totally unnecessary or irrelevant. 15. The argument that the petitioners' were fully qualified to hold the post of Village Officer at the time they were promoted prior to the introduction of the Special Rules and as such they cannot be deprived of their right to continue in the post of Village Officer for want of test qualifications forgets the significant fact that their promotions were temporary. Though the Special Rules were published only on 12th July 1989 certainly the rules have got operation with effect from 10th September 1984. In the integrated service, regular promotion to the post of Village Officer is permissible only after acquisition of the test qualifications prescribed by the Special Rules. As such they had no legal right to be promoted to the post of Village Officer or to continue as such without passing the tests within the time allowed, on a regular basis. The fact that they were fully qualified for promotion prior to 10th September 1984 may not be sufficient to hold that they were fully qualified for promotion after 10th September 1984. In the circumstances, the petitioners cannot complain that any of their legal right much less any fundamental right is deprived or restricted by the application of R.9 of the Special Rules if they are reverted for want of test qualifications on a review of promotions granted to them after 10th September 1984. As such the attack against the provisions in the integration G.O. and the rules contained in the Special Rules prescribing test qualifications for promotion on the ground of violation of Art.14 and 16 of the Constitution cannot be sustained. 16. Turning to the main controversy, it may be pointed out at the outset that the appellants have objection only regarding the direction in the judgment to revert the Village Officers who were promoted after 10th September 1984 and who have not acquired the test qualifications on or before 30th June 1990. Again, it is fairly clear from the contentions raised in the W.As. that their objection to the above direction is mainly based upon Ext. P-4 letter and the policy decision taken by the Government at the time of issuing Ext. P-4. 17. Again, it is fairly clear from the contentions raised in the W.As. that their objection to the above direction is mainly based upon Ext. P-4 letter and the policy decision taken by the Government at the time of issuing Ext. P-4. 17. There cannot be much controversy about the legal nature of Ext. P-4. It is a Government letter signed by the Secretary to the Government and issued to the Secretary, Board of Revenue. It is not an order issued in accordance with the requirements contained in Art.166 of the Constitution of India. It can at best be considered only as an administrative instruction or direction. Regarding the effect of Ext. P-4 also there cannot be much dispute. Even though no exemption or relaxation of test qualifications is specifically given in as per Ext. P-4 in substance and effect, the direction contained in Ext. P-4 is to relax the qualifications prescribed for promotion to post of Village Officer in favour of a group of village staff in the integrated service who were promoted as Village Officers after 10th September 1984 and who have not acquired the requisite test qualifications prescribed as per the Special Rules and allow them to continue in service without such qualifications. That, that is the effect of Ext. P-4 cannot be disputed seriously. If that be so, the conclusion is irresistible that in substance and effect Ext. P-4 letter runs contrary to R.9 of the Special Rules or at least it whittles down the scope and effect of the said rule and must be held to be invalid in law following the settled principle of law laid down in a number of decisions of the Supreme Court including a recent decision reported in State of M.P. v. G. S. Dall and Flour Mills ( AIR 1991 SC 772 ) where the Supreme Court has stated the principle thus: "...... Executive instructions can supplement a statute or cover areas to which the statute does not extend. But they cannot run contrary to statutory provisions or whittle down their effect....." Rule 9 of the Special Rules prescribes the qualifications for promotion to the post of Village Officer and effect of Ext. P-4 as already indicated is certainly to whittle down the scope and effect of the said rule and as such it cannot be sustained in law. 18. P-4 as already indicated is certainly to whittle down the scope and effect of the said rule and as such it cannot be sustained in law. 18. But at the same time it is equally a well settled principle that unless a court of law either sets aside or declares an administrative instruction, direction or order as invalid and inoperative, it will be presumed to be valid and operative. The Supreme Court in the decision reported in State of Punjab v. Gurudev Singh (AIR 1991 SC 2219) has stated the principle thus: "Apropos to this principle, Prof. Wade states: the principle must be equally true even where the 'brand of invalidity' is plainly visible; for there also the order can effectively be resisted in law only by obtaining the decision of the court (see: Administrative Law 6th Ed. p. 352). Prof. Wade Sums up these principles: The truth of the matter is that the Court will invalidate an order only if the right remedy is sought by the right person in the right proceedings and circumstances. The order may be hypothetically a nullity, but the Court may refuse to quash it because of the plaintiff's lack of standing, because he does not dereserve a discretionary remedy, because he has waived his rights, or for some other legal reason. In any such case the 'void' order remains effective and is in reality valid. It follows that an order may be void for one purpose and valid for another, and that it may be void against one person but valid against another". (Ibid p. 352) The Court has further observed that "the party aggrieved by the invalidity of the order has to approach the court for relief of declaration that the order against him is inoperative and not binding upon him". In this connection it is also useful to refer to the following observation of Redcliffe in the decision reported in Smith v. Eastelloe Rural District Council ((1956) A.C. 376 at p. 769). "An order even if not made in good faith is still an act capable of legal consequences. It bears no brand of invalidity upon its forehead. Unless the necessary proceedings are taken at law to establish the cause of invalidity and to get it quashed or otherwise Upset, it will remain as effective for its ostensible purpose as the most impeccable of orders". It bears no brand of invalidity upon its forehead. Unless the necessary proceedings are taken at law to establish the cause of invalidity and to get it quashed or otherwise Upset, it will remain as effective for its ostensible purpose as the most impeccable of orders". In the light of the above principles it may have to be held that unless Ext. P-4 is set aside or declared to be void and inoperative it will remain efficacious for the purpose for which it was issued. If that is so it is also beyond doubt that the impugned direction in the judgment appealed against is directly opposed to the direction contained in Ext. P-4. The question thus is which of the two directions should be allowed to stand in law. 19. In this case while issuing the impugned direction, the learned Judge has neither set aside Ext. P-4 nor has declared the same to be invalid and inoperative. The learned Judge has also not considered the question whether Ext. P-4 is valid or not even though the petitioners in O. P. No. 11565 of 1991 have specifically contended that Ext. P-4 is invalid and inoperative and has to be ignored. It is also to be noted that there was no specific prayer in the O.P. either to set aside Ext. P-4 or to declare that it is invalid and inoperative. It was, in this connection pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellants that the petitioners in O.P. No. 11565 of 1991 nave not impleaded all the beneficiaries of Ext. P-4 or persons who are likely to be affected by the invalidation of Ext. P-4. In the circumstances, learned counsel for the appellants have contended that O.P. No. 11565 of 1991 was liable to be dismissed as not maintainable. As such it was further contended that it may not be either legal or proper for this Court also to consider the question of validity or otherwise of Ext. P-4 in these proceedings for the first time. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the party respondents (petitioners in O. P. No. 11565 of 1991 and respondents in the W.As.) have submitted that since the appellants are claiming the protection of Ext. P-4 and since the respondents have in fact specifically challenged the validity and enforceability of Ext. P-4 in these proceedings for the first time. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the party respondents (petitioners in O. P. No. 11565 of 1991 and respondents in the W.As.) have submitted that since the appellants are claiming the protection of Ext. P-4 and since the respondents have in fact specifically challenged the validity and enforceability of Ext. P-4 and it was not on account of any of their fault that the learned Judge has not considered the matter; it is only just and proper that this Court considers the question whether Ext. P-4 is valid or not in these W.As. Regarding the non-impleadment of all necessary parties to the O.P. and the absence of such parties before this Court and the consequential disability of this Court in going into the question, it was submitted that being an administrative instruction or direction issued on the basis of a policy decision taken by the government and intended to have general application to a large group of similarly situated persons and since some of them were actually made parties to the O.P. and some others have got themselves impleaded in the O.P. or have filed W.As. with permission from this Court, non-impleadment of all beneficiaries of Ext. P-4 may not be a ground either to dismiss the O. P. as not maintainable or to refuse to consider the said question on its merits and to give necessary reliefs to the petitioners in O.P. No. 11565 of 1991 in these proceedings. 20. The question thus arising for consideration are; (1) whether we can properly go into the question of validity or otherwise of Ext. P-4 in these writ appeals in the absence of all persons who may be affected by the invalidation of Ext. P-4 letter and (2) Even if we can go into the merits of the matter whether we should go into it in these proceedings and grant necessary relief to the petitioners in O.P. No. 11565 of 1991 and similarly situated persons based on our decision on the question of validity or otherwise of Ext. P-4. 21. In this connection, it has to be held that while the petitioners in O.P. No. 11565 of 1991 have specifically contended that Ext. P-4. 21. In this connection, it has to be held that while the petitioners in O.P. No. 11565 of 1991 have specifically contended that Ext. P-4 is totally invalid, the appellants have relied strongly upon the same as a valid order conferring benefits on them and has contended that the said letter is also liable to be implemented just like Ext. P-6 letter which has been directed to be implemented by the judgment under appeal. In the appeal filed by the State, Government has also contended that the direction to revert Village Officers contained in the judgment is against the direction contained in Ext. P-4 and as such the judgment is liable to be set aside. Elaborate arguments were also addressed before us by all concerned. In these circumstances, we do not think that it will be proper on our part to refuse to go into the said question only on the ground that it was not considered by the learned Judge; if otherwise it can properly be gone into in these proceedings. 22. The other objection raised against the consideration of the question of validity of Ext. P-4 in these proceedings is the fact that necessary parties were not impleaded in O.P. No. 11565 of 1991 and are not before this Court also, either as appellants or respondents. It has been contended that there are about 600 and odd Village Officers who are entitled to the benefit of the direction contained in Ext. P-4 and unless all of them were made parties either individually or in a representative capacity, the challenge raised against Ext. P-4 in O.P. No. 11565 of 1991 could not have been gone into and the O.P. challenging the same ought to have been dismissed as not maintainable. It was contended that the benefit conferred as per Ext. P-4 is a very valuable one and cannot be deprived of by an order of court passed in proceedings to which all such persons were not parties. 23. We feel that in the light of the principles laid down in A. Janardhanan v. Union of India ( AIR 1983 SC 769 ) it may not be possible to accept the said objection also. 23. We feel that in the light of the principles laid down in A. Janardhanan v. Union of India ( AIR 1983 SC 769 ) it may not be possible to accept the said objection also. In the above decision in more or less similar circumstances, the Supreme Court has repelled a similar contention in the following manner: "......Therefore, the case of direct recruits has not gone unrepresented and the contention can be negatived on this short ground. However, there is a more cogent reason why we would not countenance this contention. In this case, appellant does not claim seniority over any particular individual in the background or any particular fact controverted by that person against whom the claim is made. The contention is that criteria adopted by the Union Government in drawing up the impugned seniority list are invalid and illegal and the relief is claimed against the Union Government restraining it from upsetting or quashing the already drawn up valid list and for quashing the impugned seniority list. Thus the relief is claimed against the Union Government and not against any particular individual. In this background, we consider it unnecessary to have all direct recruits to be impleaded as respondents. We may in this connection refer to General Manager, South Central Railway, Secundrabad v. A. V. R. Sidhanti (1974) 3 SCR 207 at p. 212: ( AIR 1974 SC 1755 at p. 1759). Repelling a contention on behalf of the appellant that the writ petitioners did not implead about 120 employees who were likely to be affected, by the decision in the case, this Court observed that the respondents (original petitioners) are impeaching the validity of those policy decisions on the ground of their being violative of Art.14 and 16 of the Constitution. The proceedings are analogous to those in which the constitutionality of a statutory rule regulating the seniority of Government servant is assailed. In such proceedings, the necessary parties to be impleaded are those against whom the relief is sought, and in whose absence no effective decision can be rendered by the Court. The proceedings are analogous to those in which the constitutionality of a statutory rule regulating the seniority of Government servant is assailed. In such proceedings, the necessary parties to be impleaded are those against whom the relief is sought, and in whose absence no effective decision can be rendered by the Court. Approaching the matter from this angle, it may be noticed that relief is sought only against the Union of India and the concerned Ministry and not against any individual nor any seniority is claimed by any one individual against another particular individual and, therefore, even if technically the direct recruits were not before the court, the position is not likely to fail on that ground. The contention of the respondents for this additional reason must also be negatived." That was a case where the appellant Janardhana in his petition questioned the validity and legality of the revised seniority list (1974) and prayed for cancellation of a panel of promotion drawn up in respect of 102 officers. A mandamus was sought directing respondents to give effect to the earlier seniority list. The contention raised was that those members who have scored a march over the appellant in 1974 seniority list having not been impleaded as respondent, no relief can be given to the appellant. In the petition filed in the High Court there were in all 418 respondents. Among them first two were the Union of India and Engineer in Chief, Army Headquarters and the rests presumably were persons shown as seniors in the seniority list. However, respondents 3 to 418 were deleted by an order of the court. Later some of the direct recruits who have scored a march over the appellant appeared through counsel before the court and made submissions on their behalf. While the matter was pending some more direct recruits got impleaded and appeared through counsel before the Supreme Court also. It was in these circumstances the Supreme Court has made the above observations. 24. The learned counsel for the appellants have pointed out that in the present case there was a prayer to exclude respondents 5 to 14 from the seniority list and as such the principle laid down in Fanardhana's case ( AIR 1983 SC 769 ) may not be applicable to the case on hand. 24. The learned counsel for the appellants have pointed out that in the present case there was a prayer to exclude respondents 5 to 14 from the seniority list and as such the principle laid down in Fanardhana's case ( AIR 1983 SC 769 ) may not be applicable to the case on hand. We do not think that On that ground alone we will be justified in distinguishing the said case and holding that in this case all the beneficiaries of Ext. P-4 are necessary parties. As indicated in the decision the petitioners in O.P. No. 11565 of 1991 were impeaching the validity of a policy decision taken by the Government on the ground that the said decision and direction issued thereon is contrary to the Special Rules and as such illegal, arbitrary and discriminatory. It is also to be noted that the petitioners were not claiming seniority over any particular individual in the background of particular facts controverted by that persons against whom such claim is made. The contention raised was that the policy decision taken by the Government on the basis of which Ext. P-4 direction was issued is invalid being contrary to the provisions contained in the Special Rules. In these circumstances we feel that proceedings initiated by the petitioners by filing O.P. No. 11565 of 1991 are analogous to those in which the constitutionality of a statutory rule regulating the seniority of Government servants is assailed and as such though technically all the beneficiaries of Ext. P-4 were not before the Court, the petition was not liable to be dismissed on that ground. Accordingly going by the principles laid down in the above decision which we feel are applicable to the case on hand we hold that the said objection is also unsustainable. 25. On the merits of the contention that Ext. P-4 is invalid being contrary to R.9 of the Special Rules, we have already indicated that the effect of the Ext. P-4 direction is to whittle down the scope and effect of R.9 of the Special Rules. In the circumstances, going by the principle laid down in State of M.P. v. G. S. Dall and Flour Mills ( AIR 1991 SC 772 ) to which we have already referred to, it has to be held that Ext. P-4 is invalid and inoperative being contrary to R.9 of the Special Rules. 26. In the circumstances, going by the principle laid down in State of M.P. v. G. S. Dall and Flour Mills ( AIR 1991 SC 772 ) to which we have already referred to, it has to be held that Ext. P-4 is invalid and inoperative being contrary to R.9 of the Special Rules. 26. In view of our finding that Ext. P-4 is invalid and inoperative, the further question to be considered is whether the petitioners in O.P. No. 11565 of 1991 are entitled to get a declaration to that effect in these proceedings in the absence of a specific prayer to that effect in the O. P. Though there is no specific prayer for declaration, there is a prayer to direct the concerned authorities to settle the seniority list ignoring Ext. P-4. Such a relief was apparently made on the basis of the specific ground taken in the original petition to the effect that "Ext. P-4 letter which is at variance with the Special Rules and the General Rules is illegal, arbitrary and discriminatory". If the challenge against the validity of Ext. P-4 specifically raised by the petitioners was gone into by the learned Judge, a definite finding would have been recorded upholding or rejecting the contentions of the petitioners. If it was found that Ext. P-4 was invalid, we do not think that a relief to that effect could have been denied to the petitioners merely on the ground that the petitioners have not made a specific prayer for declaration that Ext. P-4 is invalid and inoperative. If Ext. P-4 was duly declared to be invalid and inoperative the proper direction to be given in the matter of finalising the seniority list would have been the one prayed for by the petitioners in O.P. No. 11565 of 1991, namely, settlement of the seniority list ignoring Ext. P-4. In these circumstances, we are of the view that petitioners in O.P. No. 11565 of 1991 (party - respondents in the W.As.) cannot be denied the relief of declaration regarding the invalidity of Ext. P-4 on the ground that they have not made a specific prayer to that effect. P-4. In these circumstances, we are of the view that petitioners in O.P. No. 11565 of 1991 (party - respondents in the W.As.) cannot be denied the relief of declaration regarding the invalidity of Ext. P-4 on the ground that they have not made a specific prayer to that effect. The view taken by the Supreme Court in the decision reported in Charanjit Lal v. Union of India ( AIR 1951 SC 41 ) and this Court in Rajalekshmi Motor Service v. Kerala Government (A.I.R. 1960 Kerala 229) would support the view which we have taken in this behalf. This Court has in the above decision stated clearly that the High Court can mould remedy to suit the exigencies of the case. Similarly the Supreme Court has in the above decision held that an application under Art.226 or 32 of the Constitution should not be rejected merely on the ground of formal defects in the expression of the prayers. 27. Before we finally dispose of the question whether we should grant necessary relief of declaration to the effect that Ext.P-4 is invalid and inoperative based upon our finding that Ext. P-4 is invalid in law, we must consider one more contention raised by the counsel for the appellants. The contention is this: Even if it is found that Ext. P-4 is liable to be declared as invalid and inoperative I such a declaration may be refused in this case, exercising the discretion vested in the court in favour of the appellants in view of the great hardship which the Village Officers may suffer on their reversion. It was submitted that none of the appellants may be in a position to pass the required tests and claim promotion on that basis. Because of the newly prescribed tests they are not only not going to get any benefit by integration but also are going to lose whatever little chance they had for promotion before integration. They were entitled to get promotion to the post of Village Officer with the qualifications they now possess prior to the integration Prescription of new test qualifications for promotion to the post of Village Officer has effectively deprived them of all chances of promotion. It was taking note of the above facts and circumstances, the Government has taken a policy decision not to revert the Village Officers already promoted for want of test qualifications. It was taking note of the above facts and circumstances, the Government has taken a policy decision not to revert the Village Officers already promoted for want of test qualifications. It is only just and equitable to allow the direction in Ext. P-4 letter to stand. We are of the view that we may not be justified in accepting the said submission of the learned counsel for the appellants in view of the clear legal position that Ext. P-4 is invalid and inoperative. This is especially so in a case where the petitioners have specifically challenged the validity of Ext. P-4 on the ground that it is illegal and arbitrary. The inability to pass the new tests and the consequential disability to claim further promotion may cause very great hardship to the Village Officers, But so long as the prescription of new test qualifications for promotion is not in any war illegal or arbitrary it may not be justifiable to allow unqualified persons to hold on to the post contrary to R.13A(2) of the K.S. and S.S.R. unless appropriate legal action is taken to regularise their retention in service. If the hardship involved in the matter is such that it should be remedied in the circumstances of the case; it is upto the Government to take appropriate steps to remedy the evil. It may not be a proper exercise of discretion to refuse necessary relief to the petitioners who have succeeded in their challenge against the validity of Ext. P-4 on the ground of hardship which is likely to be caused to the parties who are going to be affected by the invalidity of Ext. P-4. Accordingly we reject the said contention also. 28. The result of the above discussions is that the petitioners in O.P. No. 11565 of 1991 is entitled to get a relief of declaration that Ext. P-4 is invalid and inoperative. Accordingly, Ext. P-4 is declared to be invalid and inoperative. 29. It was then contended that even if Ext. P-4. Accordingly we reject the said contention also. 28. The result of the above discussions is that the petitioners in O.P. No. 11565 of 1991 is entitled to get a relief of declaration that Ext. P-4 is invalid and inoperative. Accordingly, Ext. P-4 is declared to be invalid and inoperative. 29. It was then contended that even if Ext. P-4 is declared to be invalid and ineffective, still the direction to revert the Village Officers contained in the judgment cannot be sustained in law as such reversion will be against the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the decisions reported in W.T. Commr., A. P. v. Court of Wards, Paigah ( AIR 1977 SC 112 ), Miss Shaindha Hassan v. State of U.P. ( AIR 1990 SC 1381 ), H.C. Puttaswamy v. Hon'ble Chief Justice of Karnataka ( AIR 1991 SC 295 ), Munindra Kumar v. Rajiv Govil ( AIR 1991 SC 1607 ) and Union of India v. Shri Pratap Narain ( 1992 (3) JT 423 ). It is true that in each of these cases Supreme Court has interfered with the order of reversion or termination of the service of one individual or a group of persons in the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case. In each of the cases the learned Judges have elaborately dealt with the very long period after the expiry of which the reversion or termination has taken place in each case and various other facts and circumstances which justified an interference with the orders of termination or reversion. Except showing that in certain cases the Supreme Court has interfered with orders of reversion or termination of service on the ground of great hardship or very long lapse of time ranging from 13 to 20 years after the actual promotion or appointment or on the ground of acquiences, we do not think that the Supreme Court has laid down any principle for general application in any of the said decisions. In this case, none of the appellants have been able to prove satisfactorily that they were promoted on a permanent basis. In this case, none of the appellants have been able to prove satisfactorily that they were promoted on a permanent basis. Accordingly the reversion in the case of the appellants can only be treated as the direct result of the application of R.9 of the Special Rules and R.13A of the K.S. and S.S.R. On a careful consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case and keeping in mind the guidelines indicated in the Supreme Court decisions referred to above, we are of the view that it is not a fit case where we should hold that the reversion of Village Officers for want of test qualifications is impermissible. Of course, we make it clear that our finding in this regard will not stand in the way of the Government taking all suitable actions to remedy the hardship which the counsel for the appellants have highlighted if the Government is satisfied that the same should be remedied. 30. Yet another submission advanced by all the learned counsel appearing for the appellants was that Ext. P-4 may be treated as an order passed under R.39 of the K.S. and S.S.R. in view of the fact that the Government has already taken a policy decision to allow the Village Officers promoted after 10th September 1984 and before 30th June 1990 to continue as such without insisting upon test qualifications. But the learned Government Pleader while arguing the appeal filed by the State has specifically stated before us that the Government has not so far exercised its power under R.39 of the K.S. and S.S.R. and Ext. P-4 is not an order issued in exercise of the powers under R.39. In the light of the above categoric statement of the Government Pleader on behalf of the Government, we may not be justified in considering the above submission on its merits. We leave it there. 31. P-4 is not an order issued in exercise of the powers under R.39. In the light of the above categoric statement of the Government Pleader on behalf of the Government, we may not be justified in considering the above submission on its merits. We leave it there. 31. Lastly the counsel appearing for the appellants in all these appeals have submitted before us that taking note of the hardship which will be caused to the appellants and similarly situated persons if they are reverted from the post which they were holding for the last so many years, this Court may be pleased to direct the Government to grant exemption from passing the tests prescribed by the Special Rules in exercise of the very wide powers conferred on the Government under R.39 of the K.S. and S.S.R. We do not think that we will be justified in giving any such direction to the Government as prayed for by the appellants. However, we strongly feel that it is a case where the Government should be given an opportunity to examine whether it is a fit case for exercise of its power under R.39 of the K.S. and S.S.R. before the direction contained in the impugned judgment is enforced in view of the definite stand taken by the Government while issuing Ext. P-4 letter and while filing the Writ Appeal. It may be necessary for the Government to take all aspects of the problem into consideration before taking a decision as to whether it is a fit case where the powers granted to it under R.39 of the K.S. and S.S.R. has to be exercised or not. It will also be open to the Government to take any other appropriate action to avoid reversion of the Village Officers prompted after 10th September 1984, for want of test qualifications, if they are satisfied that there is justification for doing so. 32. One more question remains to be considered. Learned counsel appearing for the appellants have submitted that as per the provisions contained in R.13A of the K.S. and S.S.R. and the finding of the Division Bench of this Court in W.A. No. 362 of 1990, the Village staff is entitled to get time till 12th July 1991 for passing the prescribed tests. As such the direction to review the promotions and effecting reversion treating 30th June 1990 as the cut off date is illegal. As such the direction to review the promotions and effecting reversion treating 30th June 1990 as the cut off date is illegal. The contention so raised has been sought to be met by the learned counsel for the respondents stating that R.13A(1)(b) of the K.S. and S.S.R. will not be applicable in the instant case as the Special Rules itself fixes the period within which the tests prescribed by the Special Rules is to be acquired. In such circumstances it was contended that the provisions contained in the Special Rules will prevail over the General Rules as provided in R.2 of Part II of K.S. and S.S.R. The learned counsel has submitted that in the light of the provisions in the Special Rules and the General Rules referred to above, decision of the Division Bench holding that the Village staff is entitled to get the benefit of R.13A(1)(b) of the K.S. and S.S.R. is clearly erroneous and requires reconsideration. We do not think that respondents are Gopalakrishnan Nair v. State of Kerala - Ramakrishnan, J. entitled to take up such a contention in these proceedings so long as the decision of the Division Bench rules the field. Accordingly, we accept the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants and hold that the Village staff is entitled to get time till 12th July 1991 for acquiring the test qualifications newly prescribed by the Special Rules. The judgment of the learned Judge to the extent it has adopted 30th June 1990 as the cut off date for review of promotions and effecting reversion will stand modified substituting 12th July 1991 as the cut off date for review of promotions and effecting reversions. 33. In the circumstances while confirming the judgment of the learned Judge with the modifications indicated above, we wood keep in abeyance the implementation of the directions in the judgment for a period of two months from today with a view to give the Government an opportunity to consider whether it is a fit case for exercise of their jurisdiction to grant exemption under R.39 of the K.S. and S.S.R. and to take appropriate action based upon the decision they may take in the matter. It is also open to the Government to adopt any other suitable course to implement their decision otherwise than under R.39 of the K.S. and S.S.R. Writ Appeals are disposed of subject to the above observations and modifications. O.P. No. 5894 of 1992 is also disposed of subject to the direction that if the petitioners have got any individual grievance, the petitioners will be at liberty to agitate the same after finalisation of the seniority list as directed in the impugned judgment. No order as to costs.