JUDGMENT V. D. GYANI, J. - By this petition under article 226 of the Constitution the petitioner challenges the levy of purchase tax and prays for quashing of revisional orders dated August 10, 1988, for the assessment years 1981-92, 1982-83 and May 28, 1989 for 1984-85 passed by the Additional Commissioner, Sales Tax, Indore (filed as annexure P. 4 and P. 5 along with the petition), and prays for quashing of penalty imposed under section 17(3) of the M.P. General Sales Tax Act, 1958 (for short "the Act"). 2. By order dated February 28, 1991, a show cause notice was directed to be issued against the respondents calling upon them to show cause as to why the petition be not admitted. The respondents have accordingly entered appearance and filed their reply. With the consent of the parties it was taken up for final hearing. Accordingly they were heard. 3. The petitioner, a partnership firm, running a rolling mill at Ujjain, is a registered dealer under both the State Act as well as the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956. 4. It is the petitioner's pleaded case that the firm purchases iron scraps from registered dealer of Madhya Pradesh and also imports goods from outside the State. Respondent No. 2 by his orders dated October 30, 1985, December 31, 1985 and March 17, 1988, filed as annexures P. 1, P. 2 and P. 3, levied purchase tax at the rate of 1.5 per cent on iron and steel and at the rate of 10 per cent on building material and also imposed penalty under section 17(3) of the State Act for the assessment years 1981-82, 1982-83, 1984-85. Petitioner challenged these orders in revision. The Additional Commissioner, Sales Tax, by his orders dated August 10, 1988 and September 28, 1989 filed as annexures P. 4 and P. 5, upheld the levy of purchase tax and imposition of penalty. 5. Shri N. L. Garg, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner basing his argument on sub-clause (iii) of clause (r) of section 2 of the State Act, contended that iron and steel sold on declaration to a registered dealer declaring in the prescribed form that the goods are for resale or for use in manufacture by him, are exempted from sales tax therefore, no purchase tax could be levied, on its purchase price. It was also contended that the goods iron and steel as purchased by the petitioner having not been used or consumed by the petitioner in the manufacturing or processing of other goods, in view of entry No. 1 of Part I of Schedule II dealing with iron and steel, read with sub-section (2) of section 6 of the State Act, it was urged that the entry as enumerated in clause (iv) of section 14 of the Central Sales Tax Act, is wide and comprehensive enough to include petitioner's product, as such no purchase tax could be levied. 6. Shri Singh, learned Additional Advocate-General appearing for the respondents, on the other hand, submitted that the impugned orders are quite legal and proper and do not call for any interference. He argued that petitioner's contention that iron and steel sold to a registered dealer on declaration are exempted from sales tax and when no sales tax is liable to be levied, no purchase tax can be levied on purchase price of such goods (sic). He explained that when iron and steel is sold to a registered dealer on declaration in the prescribed manner, it is exempted from sales tax but exemption from levy on sales tax does not mean that iron and steel are not taxable under section 6 of the State Act, if the same is sold to an unregistered dealer, without declaration. His submission is that iron and steel is taxable under the Act. By according exemption, the Legislature has merely given a facility to a dealer for sale of iron and steel on declaration because it is taxed on the last point. It cannot, therefore, be said that iron and steel are not liable to sales tax under section 6 of the State Act repelling petitioner's contention that the iron scrap purchased by him has not been used or consumed in the manufacture or processing of other goods. 7. As per entry 1 of Part I of Schedule II of the State Act, clause (iv) of section 14 of the Central Sales Tax Act, enumerates as many as 16 categories of iron and steel. They are all of different kinds falling under different heads or categories. The conversion of iron and steel from one category to another is definitely a manufacturing process. They are all of different kinds falling under different heads or categories. The conversion of iron and steel from one category to another is definitely a manufacturing process. The petitioner cannot, therefore, contend that the iron scraps as purchased are not used in the manufacture of iron rods and angles. 8. The term "manufacture" has been defined under the State Act - Section 2(j). It reads as follows : "'Manufacture' includes any process or manner of producing, collecting, extracting, preparing or making any goods and in respect of trees which have been served from the land or which have been felled, also the process of lopping the branches, cutting the trunks or converting them into logs, poles or ballies or any other articles of wood, but does not include such manufactures or manufacturing process as may be notified." On a plain reading of this definition it would be clear that the conversion of one category of iron and steel to another is manufacture within the meaning of above definition. 9. The Supreme Court in Devi Dass Gopal Krishnan v. State of Punjab [1967] 20 STC 430 has very clearly propounded that making iron rods and iron wires from scraps of iron, is a manufacturing process. The Supreme Court has observed : "Now coming to Civil Appeals Nos. 39 to 43 of 1965, the first additional point raised is that when iron scrap is converted into rolled steel it does not involve the process of manufacture. It is contended that the said conversion does not involve any process of manufacture, but the scrap is made into a better marketable commodity. Before the High Court this contention was not pressed. That apart, it is clear that scrap iron ingots undergo a vital change in the process of manufacture and are converted into a different commodity, viz., rolled steel sections. During the process the scrap iron loses its identity and becomes a new marketable commodity. The process is certainly one of manufacture." 10. A similar view has been expressed by the Supreme Court in State of Tamil Nadu v. Pyare Lal Malhotra [1976] 37 STC 319. The Supreme Court has observed : "It appears to us that the position has been simplified by the amendment of the law, as indicated above, so that each of the categories falling under 'iron and Steel' constitutes a new species of commercial commodity more clearly now. The Supreme Court has observed : "It appears to us that the position has been simplified by the amendment of the law, as indicated above, so that each of the categories falling under 'iron and Steel' constitutes a new species of commercial commodity more clearly now. It follows that when one commercial commodity is transformed into another, it becomes a separate commodity for purposes of sales tax." 11. In view of the foregoing discussion there is no force in petitioner's contention that scrap iron purchased by him is not used or consumed in manufacturing its products - iron rods and iron angles. And that the conversion of scrap iron, is covered under the category "iron and steel", although it changes in its shape, size and utility. 12. Shri T. N. Singh, learned Additional Advocate-General, rightly argued that petitioner's contention is based on iron and steel exempted from payment of sales tax but this exemption is not absolute; it is conditional and even exemption pre-supposes leviability of tax. 13. Sub-section (1) of section 6 of the State Act provides for levy of tax and speaks of taxable turnover which has been defined under section 2(r) of the Act. 14. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, heavily relying upon sub-clause (iii) of clause (r) of section 2 which defines taxable turnover and referring to expression "circumstance" as occurring in sub-section (1) of section 7 of the State Act, strenuously urged that purchase tax could not be levied on the petitioner. This submission deserves to be rejected. Reading section 7(1) as a whole, and coupled with our conclusion as recorded above, that the goods scrap iron as purchased by the petitioner is used or consumed in the manufacture or processing of other goods, namely, iron rods and angles, petitioner's contention that purchase tax is not leviable, must fail. 15. For the foregoing reasons this petition is liable to be dismissed. It is accordingly dismissed, however, with no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.