B. J. HEGDE, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner in these three petitions filed under Section 482, Cr. P. C. is the managing Partner of a firm which runs factory at Mangalore. The respondent-Regional Director, E. S. I. Corporation, Bangalore, filed three complaints before the Special Court for Economic Offences at Bangalore, alleging that the petitioner is punishable under Section 85 (l) (a) of the Employees' State Insurance act (for short 'the Act') for an offence under Section 40 of the Act on the ground that he has not paid the contribution required to be paid under the Act. Three complaints have been filed by the respondent for the alleged default committed by the petitioner for three different periods. ( 2 ) THE Magistrate issued process and after the summons were served on the petitioner, he filed these petitions under Section 482, Cr. P. C. for quashing the three proceedings initiated before the Special Court for Economic Offences, Bangalore, on the ground that it has no jurisdiction. It is his case that since the allegations are made in relation to a factory run by the petitioner at Mangalore, the Special Court for economic Offences at Bangalore, which has been established for dealing with certain economic offences within the area comprising the revenue district of bangalore including the metropolitan area of the City of Bangalore, has no jurisdiction. ( 3 ) SRI Papanna, learned counsel for the respondent, contended that the in her entjurisdiction of this Court under Section 482, Cr. P. C. cannot be invoked by this Court as the Magistrate himself can decide the question of jurisdiction. It is also his contention that the cause of action has taken place in Bangalore and therefore the magistrate has jurisdiction. ( 4 ) IT is not in dispute that the petitioner has not contended before the Magistrate that he has no jurisdiction to try the case. ( 5 ) SRI Gunjal, learned counsel for the petitioner, relying on a decision in the case of R. P. Kapur v State of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC 866 , points out that the inherent jurisdiction of this Court can be exercised to quash the following proceedings:" (I) Where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the criminal proceeding in respect of the offence alleged. Absence of the requisite sanction may, for instance, furnish cases under this category. (ii) Where the allegations in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not constitute the offence alleged; in such cases no question of appreciating evidence arises; it is a matter merely of looking at the complaint or the First Information report to decide whether the offence alleged is disclosed or not. (iii) Where the allegations made against the accused person do constitute an offence alleged but there is either no legal evidence adduced in support of the case or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. In dealing with this class of cases, it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is manifestly and clearly inconsistent with the accusation made and cases where there is legal evidence which on its appreciation may or may not support the accusation in question. In exercising its jurisdiction under Section 561 - A the high Court would not embark upon an enquiry as to whether the evidence in question is reliable or not. That is the function of the trial Magistrate, and ordinarily it would not be open to any party to invoke the High Court's inherent jurisdiction and contend that on a reasonable appreciation of the evidence the accusation made against the accused would not be sustained". This decision is not applicable to the controversy now raised. ( 6 ) SECTION 482, Cr. P. C. can be invoked when (i) grave injustice and not of a trivial character is brought to the light of the high Court. (ii) the complaint made is very clear and not doubtful, and (iii) there exists no other remedy by which the relief could be obtained. It is well-settled that this power should be exercised sparingly with circumspection and in the rarest of rare cases. ( 7 ) IT is the contention of Sri Gunjal that the learned Magistrate has no jurisdiction to decide whether he has jurisdiction to try the offence or not. Sri Papanna, on the other hand, contends that every Court has jurisdiction to decide whether it has jurisdiction over a case before it or not. In Abhaya Lalan v Yogendra Madhavlal, 1981 Cr. Sri Papanna, on the other hand, contends that every Court has jurisdiction to decide whether it has jurisdiction over a case before it or not. In Abhaya Lalan v Yogendra Madhavlal, 1981 Cr. L. J. 1667, it has been stated that a trial in a criminal Court can be commenced only after deciding the question of jurisdiction, if it is raised before it. It is, therefore, clear that the petitioner has got a right to contend before the learned magistrate that he has entertained the complaints without jurisdiction. If the petitioner has such a right, it is not open to him to approach this Court for quashing the proceedings or to request this Court straightaway to decide the question of jurisdiction. In view of this conclusion, I do not want to express any opinion as to whether the Magistrate has jurisdiction or not. ( 8 ) THE Magistrate is, therefore, directed to decide whether he has got jurisdictionor not if the petitioner raised that question and proceed to trial only after such a decision. The Magistrate is further directed to dispose of the said dispute within two months from the date of raising of that question by the petitioner. With these observations, the petitions are disposed of. The parties in all the three cases are directed to appear before the learned magistrate on 1-9-1992 on which date he is directed to take up all these three cases for further orders. --- *** --- .