Judgment : The petitioner, viz., G.S.Naidu claiming to be the owner of the house situate at Door No.37, Kannikaparameswari Koil Street, Vellore and also claiming to be in possession thereof came forward with the present action, invoking the inherent jurisdiction of this Court under Sec.482 Crl.P.C. impleading one Jacob Manickam the Sub-Inspector of Police, and one Ganesan, the Inspector of Police, Vellore (North) as respondents 1 and 2 stating that the said respondents, abusing their position as police officials locked the said premises forno reason whatever and even without any authority of law and took away the key and in such circumstances, he would say that the ends of justice would require this Court to pass a suitable order directing the respondents to hand over the key to him. .2. Learned counsel for the petitioner Mr.V.Sairam would however make a vociferous argument the this Court is definitely having power under Sec.43 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (II 1974) in short the Code to order for the return the key as prayed for by the petitioner in the circumstances of the case. In amplification of the argument he would further say and lay so much of emphasis upon the pharseology, viz., otherwise to secure the ends of justice occurring in Sec.482 thereof and according to him the said pharcealogy does not restrict the power of this. Court to do anything, if the court derives satisfaction that what is asked for to be done. if done, will serve the ends of justice. 3. To such a submission, I am not able to affix my seal of approval in the facts and circumstances of the case. The inherent power of this Court is dealt with by the salient provisions adumbrated under Sec.482 of the Code and it reads thus: “Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Court, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.” 4. A cursory perusal of the provisions extracted above, would make it appear that the inherent powers therein can be extended to meet the three exigencies contemplated therein that is to say (i) to give effect to any order under this Code or, (ii) prevent abuse of the process of any court or, (iii) otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Really speaking, the provisions of the said section cannot at all be read as above as if it consists of three clauses, if one carefully goes through the section giving meaning to the syntax used in the section. 5. It is to be pointed out that affter the first clause as stated above, viz., ‘to give effect to any order under this Code, a syntex.comma is there suffixed by the distinctive conjection “or” and the other clause commences and it is like this: ‘to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.‘It is to be pointed out here that after the pharseology namely ‘to prevent the abuse of process of any Court,‘no syntex is there and it is immediately followed by the distinctive conjection “or” followed by the pharseology. “otherwise to secure the ends of justice.” .6. In such circumstances, if the section is properly read, giving true import and meaning to all the syntexes used therein, it will be plain and clear that the section consists of only two clauses as stated above. There cannot be any difficulty in interpreting the meaning of-the first clause viz., “to give effect to any order under this Code”. It simply means that the inherent powers under this Code can be extended to give effect to any order under this Code. 7. So far as the second clause is concerned, viz., “to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice” is concerned, the same had been interpreted by an order dated 31. 1991 by the Division Bench of this Court consisting Mishra, J. and Govindasamy, J. in Crl.M.P.No.64821 of 1990 and other batch of cases on a reference having been made and the Division Bench clearly expressed the view that the inherent power of this Court can be extended under this clause to prevent prejudice being caused to the cause of justice of an order emanating from the order of a Subordinate Court and not otherwise. Therefore, the second clause cannot be invoked in this case. 8. If the second clause is not attractable to the case on hand, what remains for consideration is as to whether the first clause of the section could be invoked for securing redressal of the petitioner. Chapter XXXIV of the Code deals with disposal of property. A criminal court will be having power to order for interim custody of the property pending trial or enquiry or to order for the return of the property from whom the same is seized after the conclusion of the trial under certain circumstances. Those contingencies and circumstances are taken care of by the salient provisions adumbrated under Secs.451, 452 and 457 of the Code. 9. Sec.451 of the Code deals with the order to be passed for custody and disposal of property pending trial in certain cases. The said section prescribes as follows: “When any property is produced before any Criminal Court during any inquiry or trial, the Court may make such order as it thinks fit for the proper custody of such property pending the conclusion of the inquiryor trial, and, if the property is subject to speedy and natural decay, or if it is otherwise expendient so to do, the Court may, after recording such evidence as it thinks necessary, order it to be sold or otherwise disposed of.” A plain reading of the provisions, as extracted above, makes it crystal clear that it is not at all attractable to the casty viz., key was not stated to have been produced before any Criminal Court during any inquiry or trial. 10. Sec.452 of the Crl. P.C. deals with an order to be passed for disposal pf property at the conclusion of the trial. In the instant case, no case is registered and the property is also not produced before the Court. Therefore, Sec.452 of the Code can by no stretch of imagination, be stated to be attracted for any order to be passed. .11. Sec.457 of the Code deals with the procedure by police upon seizure of property. In the instant case, no case is registered and the property is also not produced before the Court. Therefore, Sec.452 of the Code can by no stretch of imagination, be stated to be attracted for any order to be passed. .11. Sec.457 of the Code deals with the procedure by police upon seizure of property. Sub-sec.(1) of the said section reads as follows: .“Whenever the seizure of property by any police officer is reported to a Magistrate under the provisions of this Code, and such property is not produced before a Criminal Court during an inquiry or trial, the Magistrate may make such order as he thinks fit respecting the disposal of such property or the delivery of such property to the person entitled to the possession thereof, or if such person cannot be ascertained, respecting the custody and production of such property.” 12. A perusal of the provisions extracted above, reveals that for the applicability of the said section, the seizure must have been effected by a police officer and such seizure ought to have been reported to the Magistrate under the provisions of the Code. Then only the Section could be invoked even if the seized property is not before court. 13. In the case on hand, there is an allegation of seizure of the property viz., the key by the respondents police officers and the same, it is admitted, is not at all reported before court under the provisions of this Code. In such an eventuality, it goes without saying that there is no jurisdiction for the Criminal Court to make any order for the return of the property viz., Key, under Sec.457 of the Code. 14. Thus, it is clear that even the first clause of Sec.482 of the Crl.P.C. cannot at all be said to be attracted for the invocation of the inherent powers of this Court. 15. The petition, as such, deserves to be dismissed even at the admission stage and is accordingly dismissed.