Judgment :- Mohammed, J. Four members of a family were subjected to brutal attack by a single assailant in three successive incidents within a short span of thirty minutes culminating in the murder of one among them. Appellant was convicted under Ss.302,307 and 449 of the Indian Penal Code and was sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life, rigorous imprisonment for seven years and one year respectively. The correctness of the conviction and sentence awarded to him comes up now for evaluation in this appeal. 2. The material facts in a nut-shell are outlined here under: On 2-1-1987 at about 7.00 p.m. appellant inflicted an injury on the neck of P.W.2 Bhaskaran with M.O.1 knife while he was standing the front of P.W.S's shop. He then trespassed into the house of P.W.2 and saying "I will kill you all" he stabbed P.Ws. 3 and 4 on the necks who are the wife and sister of P.W.2 respectively. His simmering wrath did not end with it and he trespassed into the house of deceased Thankamma (another sister of P.W.2) and inflicted a stab injury on her neck also. Thereafter the appellant abruptly decamped. Injured were removed to the Government Hospital, Neyyattinkara by P.Ws.1 and 6. The doctor pronounced Thankamma dead. 3. First information statement was laid by P.W.I, daughter of the deceased, at 9.00 p.m. On the same day S.I. of Police, Parassala roistered the crime. The appellant was arrested on 12-1-1987 and on the same day M.O.1 knife was recovered by P. W.17 as per Ext.P5 mahazar. Exts.P4 to P6 are the wound certificates issued by P.W.13 in the case of P.Ws. 2 to 4. Ext.P7 is the post-mortem certificate issued by P.W.14 who conducted autopsy on the body of the deceased. P.W.14 deposed that the injury on the body of the deceased could be caused with M.O.1 and that it is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. P.W.13 doctor who examined the other injured deposed that the injuries noted in Exls.P4 to P6 could be caused with M.O.1 knife. 4. The murder of Thankamma is the end of the three consecutive stages of mayhem indulged in by the appellant. First among 1 hem was sought to be proved through the testimony of P.W.1 and P.W.2 injured. The second was spoken to by P.Ws. 6 and 7. 4. The murder of Thankamma is the end of the three consecutive stages of mayhem indulged in by the appellant. First among 1 hem was sought to be proved through the testimony of P.W.1 and P.W.2 injured. The second was spoken to by P.Ws. 6 and 7. The third and the last part was spoken to by P.Ws. 8 and 9. We have absolutely no reason to disbelieve the testimony of any of them. We have also no hesitation to hold that the appellant is the sole culprit who stabbed with M.O.1 knife in the above transactions. 5. Smt. Rosamma Joseph, counsel for the appellant very zealously argued that the prosecution has not proved any motive for the offence being committed by the appellant. Our attention is drawn to the fact that the prosecution has not produced a copy of the alleged complaint filed by P.W.2 before P.W.17. According to the prosecution, appellant was enraged when a complaint was filed by P.W.2 before police. The said complaint appears to have been filed four months prior to the date of occurrence and the appellant had thereafter been taken to task. It is staled to be the root cause for developing animosity in the mind of the appellant against P. W.2 and his family. That might be or might not be a circumstance, which impelled the appellant to commit the crime. But prosecution did not very much bank on that circumstance since it has other convincing evidence to prove the guilt of the appellant. The stand taken by the prosecution appears to us to be correct. 6. The motive is not a decisive test for determination of the criminal character of human acts. An unlawful act will not become lawful even if it is done with a good motive. To put it conversely, a lawful act will not become unlawful even if it is done with a bad motive, A man who carries a guilty mind is not punished under the penal law; he is punished only for his unlawful actions. The law will judge a man by his actions and not by the motions of his mind. 7. The Supreme Court in Krishna Filial Sreekumar v. State of Kerala (AIR 1981SC1237) observed that the variations inhuman nature are being so vast, murders arc actuated by much lesser motives. The law will judge a man by his actions and not by the motions of his mind. 7. The Supreme Court in Krishna Filial Sreekumar v. State of Kerala (AIR 1981SC1237) observed that the variations inhuman nature are being so vast, murders arc actuated by much lesser motives. It is further held "In any case, it is not a sine qua non for the success of the prosecution that the motive must be proved. So long as the other evidence remains convincing and is not open to reasonable doubt, a conviction may well be based on it". A Division Bench of this court in Kosfty Baby v. State (1991 (l) KLJ. 453) held that no inference adverse to prosecution can be drawn if there is weakness in supplying the proof regarding motive. The absence of proof relating to motive is of no consequence, when cogent and reliable evidence as to the guilt of the accused is available. The motive need not be the immediate objective of an act of murder and it does not form an ingredient of the offence. 8. Appellant further contended that P.W.9 who was examined to prove the third stage of violence, in which he caused the death of Thankamma, was a 'chance witness'. It is true that the learned Sessions Judge distrusted his evidence simply branding him as 'chance witness". This, according to us, is unnecessary in this case. 9. A witness who gives evidence on oath can be presumed to be speaking the truth. Of course, his evidence can be impeached in the manner provided by law. The evidence of a witness cannot be simply rejected at sight or brushed aside or viewed with suspicion by calling him 'chance witness'. If by coincidence or chance a person happens to be at the place of occurrence at the time it is taking place, he is called a chance witness." (Sec: Bahal Singh v. State of Haryana - AIR 1976 SC 2032) "He must be independent of bias for or against the prosecution. He may be free of personal interest in the out come of the trial". (Sec: 1991 (2) KLT 217). The statement of a 'chance witness' in court will therefore come within the juristic conception of the expression 'oral evidence' included under the term 'evidence' in S.3 of the Evidence Act. He may be free of personal interest in the out come of the trial". (Sec: 1991 (2) KLT 217). The statement of a 'chance witness' in court will therefore come within the juristic conception of the expression 'oral evidence' included under the term 'evidence' in S.3 of the Evidence Act. That being so, credibility of the evidence given by the chance witnesses shall be evaluated just as any other 'oral evidence' available without any pre-conceived notion. 10. P.W.9 had seen the accused running to the house of P.W. Swith a knife while he and Mohanan were strolling along the pathway. Being anxious to know about the incident they followed him and reached in front of the house. Then they saw the accused stabbing Thankamma. This testimony of P.W.9 is corroborated by P.W.8 who deposed that P.W.9 and Mohanan came there. This is distinctly clear because they were following the accused when they saw him furiously advancing with the knife. The fact that he did not go to the hospitaler that he happened to be there accidentally by coincidence will not diminish the evidentiary value nor will it destroy the credibility of his version. Our anxious evaluation of the evidence of P.W.9 with corroborative statements of P.W.5. as well as P.W.1 drives us to conclude that the evidence of P.W.9 is also trustworthy. 11. The last contention advanced on behalf of the appellant is that there are contradictions, inconsistencies and omissions in the oral evidence of witnesses and hence the entire prosecution has fallen flat as being unbelievable. Though we have noticed certain discrepancies in the oral evidence of prosecution witnesses they are not sufficient enough to shake the credit or worth of their testimony. We have, before us a set of three incidents connected to each other transaction culminating in the murder of the deceased, which took place within a short span of thirty minutes. There will naturally be discrepancies, or omissions while narrating the facts of the whole story. Even in the case of a single incident, when witnesses give narration, discrepancies-and omissions usually occur. It all depends on how the mind of each witness absorbed the incident and how he can recollect and reproduce it. Naturally we have to give some allowance for human frailties while evaluating the evidence of witnesses. Even in the case of a single incident, when witnesses give narration, discrepancies-and omissions usually occur. It all depends on how the mind of each witness absorbed the incident and how he can recollect and reproduce it. Naturally we have to give some allowance for human frailties while evaluating the evidence of witnesses. We are persuaded to hold that the discrepancies pointed out here are so insignificant and insufficient that they cannot tarnish their testimony. The prosecution case did not suffer on that account. 12. It is therefore proved that the appellant had intentionally inflicted the fatal injury on Thankamma, which ultimately eroded her life. 13. In the result, we confirm the conviction and sentence passed against the appellant by the learned sessions judge. We dismiss the appeal accordingly.