JUDGMENT S.C. Mathur, J. - This revision is directed against the order of the learned Civil Judge, Lucknow allowing the application of the State under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short the Code) and dismissing the applicant's execution application on the ground that the order of the U.P. Public Services Tribunal is of declaratory nature and is, therefore, in-executable. 2. The applicant had approached the Tribunal and obtained relief from it: 3. The applicant sought from the Tribunal certificate referred to in Section 5(7) of the U.P. Public Services (Tribunals) Act, 1976 which was granted. Thereafter he made an execution application which came up before the Civil Judge, Lucknow. Against this execution application, the State of Uttar Pradesh filed objections contending that the order of the Tribunal sought to be executed was of declaratory nature and was covered by sub-section (6) of Section 5 of the Act and was in-executable in view of the provisions contained in sub-section (7) support of the plea, reliance was placed on the revision of a learned Single Judge of this Court in C. Verma v. State of U.P. and others, 1986 UPLBEC 11 . The tribunal upheld the objection of the State and relied the execution application. It is against this her that the applicant had approached this Court. 4. At the very out-set it may be pointed out at the judgment of the learned Single Judge in C. Verma's case (supra) has been specifically over-ruled by a Division Bench in K.U.M. Samiti, Hardoi v. Rajesh Kumar Singh, 1989(7) LCD 67 (See paragraph-8 of the report). Section 5 of the Act deals with powers and procedure of the Tribunal. Sub-sections (6) and (7) of this section read as follows: "(6) A declaration made by the Tribunal shall be binding on the claimant and his employer as well as on any other public servant who has, in respect of any claim affecting his interest adversely, been given an opportunity of making a representation against it, and shall have the same affect as a declaration made by a Court of law. "(7) Where the Tribunal makes an order other than a declaration referred to in sub-section (6), in favour of any party and such order remains un-complied with for a period of three months from the date of such order, the Tribunal may, on the application of the party in whose favour the order stands, issue a certificate for recovery of the amount awarded or, as the case may be, for any other relief granted by the Tribunal. Any party, in whose favour such certificate is issued, may apply to the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in Uttar Pradesh within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the employee is for the time being serving, or, as the case may be, last served such employer, for execution of the order of the Tribunal, and such Court shall thereupon execute the certificate or cause the same to be executed in the same manner and by the same procedure as if it were a decree for like relief passed by itself in a suit." Under sub-section (6) a declaratory order made by the Tribunal has been given the same status as a declaratory decree of a court of law. Thereafter sub-section (7) refers to the executability of the orders passed by the Tribunal. The mode of execution prescribed in sub-section (7) is to obtain a certificate from the Tribunal and file the same in the principal civil court of original jurisdiction. After the certificate has been filed, the civil court is enjoined to execute the same or cause the same to be executed in the same manner and by the same procedure as if it were a decree for like relief passed by itself in a suit. This procedure has been prescribed in respect of cases not covered by subsection (6) meaning thereby that no certificate is to be issued by the Tribunal in respect of an order which is of declaratory nature. 5. Although Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1936 (Act No. 47 of 1936) specifically sanctions filing of a declaratory suit and to obtain decree therein, the Code does not make any specific provision for execution of such a decree. The question, therefore, is whether a declaratory decree passed by the civil court is a waste paper and futile? 5. Although Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1936 (Act No. 47 of 1936) specifically sanctions filing of a declaratory suit and to obtain decree therein, the Code does not make any specific provision for execution of such a decree. The question, therefore, is whether a declaratory decree passed by the civil court is a waste paper and futile? In my opinion, declaratory decrees are divisible into two categories:- (i) decrees which merely declare the right or status of the decree holder and the declaration alone is sufficient to give complete relief to him and nothing is required to be done by the judgment debtor; and (ii) decrees which do not bring complete relief to the decree holder unless the judgment debtor does something in pursuance of the declaration. Decrees or orders of the former nature will not require execution, but decrees or orders of the latter nature may require execution. Implicit in the decree or order of the latter nature is a command or injunction to obey the decree or order and give consequential benefit to the holder of the decree or order. Such a decree or order, in my opinion, will be executable under Order 21 Rule 32 of the Code. This provision deals with the execution of decrees for specific performance of a contract, for restitution of conjugal rights and for an injunction. In view of the implicit command referred to herein, declaratory decree or order will be in the nature of a decree for mandatory injunction. 6. The above view taken by me has the support of a decision of a Division Bench in K. U.M. Samiti (supra). I may usefully reproduce the observations made in paragraphs 6 and 7 thereof:- "6. The spirit of Section 5, sub-section (6) of the Act which has been passed by the Legislation is that in case the Tribunal grants a declaration, the employer, who is bound by it, has to give full effect to the same. As the order passed by the Tribunal is binding, it seems, the Legislature did not consider it necessary to make any specific provisions for its execution as the order cannot be ignored or by-passed. The State Government or the statutory bodies, as the case may be, are bound to obey the law and give effect to the order passed by the Tribunal." "7. The State Government or the statutory bodies, as the case may be, are bound to obey the law and give effect to the order passed by the Tribunal." "7. The declaration only declares a pre-existing order or correct legal position and wipes out the order against which declaration has been made which means that the person continues to remain in service and that is why the Legislature has not made any specific provision for its execution as the person is restored back to the old position as if nothing happened in between." So far as a decree which does not require anything further to be done by the judgment-debtor is concerned, it is obvious that it will not require any execution. It is for this reason that the Code does not contain any provision for execution of such a decree. It is for this reason that sub-section (6) has been referred to in sub-section (7) of Section 5 of the Act. The declaration referred to in sub-section (6) is one falling under the first category. If a contrary view is taken, it will lead to multiplicity of proceedings. If consequential benefits arc not granted to the decree-holder, he will have to file fresh proceeding to obtain almost same relief which he could otherwise obtain by execution of the order previously passed. 7. It is in the above back-ground that the executability of the declaration given by the Tribunal is required to be considered. It appears from the Judgment of the learned Civil Judge that on behalf of the applicant, it was pleaded that the order of the Tribunal was divisible into three parts and even if first two parts of the order were not executable, the last part was executable and, therefore, sub-section (7) of the Act was not attracted. Learned Civil Judge has dealt with this argument saying that the third part of the Tribunal's order was dependent upon the first and second parts of the order and since the first and second parts of the order contained merely declarations, the third part could not be executed. For the reasons recorded herein-above, this line of reasoning cannot be supported. If the third part of the order grants consequential benefit, it will be executable in view of the observations made herein-above. For the reasons recorded herein-above, this line of reasoning cannot be supported. If the third part of the order grants consequential benefit, it will be executable in view of the observations made herein-above. On the facts of the present case,, the learned Civil Judge should not have rejected the execution application on the mere ground that the executable part of the Tribunal's order was dependent for its executability on the declaratory part of the order. Since the Civil Judge has not recorded a finding that even the third part of the order was declaratory in nature, I refrain from making any further observation in respect of the executability of the Tribunal's order. It will be for the learned Civil Judge to see whether consequential benefits claimed by the applicant directly flow from the declarations given by the Tribunal. Once the learned Civil Judge comes to the conclusion that the reliefs claimed directly flow from the declarations given by the Tribunal, he will not reject the applicant's application for execution. 8. In view of the above, the revision is allowed and the judgment and order passed by the learned Civil Judge Lucknow dated 25th March, 1988 is hereby set-aside. The learned Civil Judge shall re-admit the execution case to its original number as also the State's objection under Section 47 of the Code. He will thereafter proceed to decide the State's objection under Section 47 of the Code in accordance with law taking into account the observations made herein-above. The applicant will have his costs from the opposite parties. The executing court shall proceed to decide the matter expeditiously as the execution case was filed in the year 1986 and the applicant has retired from service.