ORDER The limited question involved in this writ petition is whether a meeting held on 21st February 1991 of the Rajendrapur Gram Panchayet by which the petitioner had been removed from the office of the Pradhan had been properly held. The only ground on which the petitioner has assailed the meeting is that it had been called in violation of the provisions of s. 16 of the West, Bengal Panchayet Act, 1973 (referred to as the Act). 2. Section 16 of the Act in so far as it is relevant provides :–– “(1) Every Gram Panchayat shall hold a meeting at least once in a month in the office of the Gram Panchayat. Such meeting shall be held on such date and at such hour as the Gram Panchayat may fix at the immediately preceding meeting : Provided that the first meeting of a newly constituted Gram Panchayat shall be held on such date and at such hour and at such place within the local limits of the Gram concerned as the prescribed authority may fix : Provided further that the Pradhan when required in writing by one third of the members of the Gram Panchayat subject to a minimum of three members to call a meeting shall do so fixing the date and, hour of the meeting within fifteen days after giving intimation to the prescribed authority and seven days notice to the members of the Gram Panchayat, failing which the members aforesaid may call a meeting after giving intimation to the prescribed authority and seven clear days notice to the Pradhan and other members of the Gram Panchayat. Such meeting shall be held in the office of the Gram Panchayat on such date and at such hour as the members calling the meeting may decide. The prescribed authority may appoint an observer for such meeting who shall submit to the prescribed authority a report in writing duly signed by him within a week of the meeting on the proceedings of the meeting. The prescribed authority shall, on receipt of the report, take action thereon as it may deemed fit.” 3. According to the petitioner, on 3rd December, 1990 a notice was issued to the petitioner by the respondents 7-19 who are all members of the Gram Panchayat to call a meeting for taking a decision for removal of the petitioner from the office of the Pradhan. According to the petitioner, on 3rd December, 1990 a notice was issued to the petitioner by the respondents 7-19 who are all members of the Gram Panchayat to call a meeting for taking a decision for removal of the petitioner from the office of the Pradhan. The petitioner did not call the meeting. In view of the petitioner's failure a second notice was issued by the respondents 7-19 requisitioning a meeting for 21st February, 1991 for discussion on the item “PRADHANER BIRUDHAY APASARANER PRASTAB ALOCHANA EBONGSIDHY ANTA GRAHAN” which being roughly translated means discussion and decision on the removal of the Pradhan. According to the petitioner he was served with the copy of the notice on 21st February, 1991. According to the respondents he was served with a copy of the notice on 14th February, 1991. The petitioner has relied upon an endorsement on the copy of the notice of the Chowkidar who is said to have served the notice on him. The respondents have relied upon the affidavit of the Chowkidar to the effect that the endorsement was not his and that he bad effected service on the petitioner on 14th February, 1991. 4. On 21st February, 1991 the meeting was held. Thirteen members out of the 20 members of the Gram Panchayat passed a resolution to the effect that the petitioner should be removed from the office of the Pradhan. The Block Development Officer's representative was present as an observer at the meeting. On 25th February, 1991 the Block Development Officer being the Prescribed Authority under the Act directed the petitioner to hand over charge as Pradhan in respect of the cash, assets, documents, registers and seals which he may have in possession, custody or control to the Upa Pradhan of the Gram Panchayat on 4th March 1991. 5. On 4th March 1991 the petitioner moved this writ application challenging the resolution adopted at the meeting on 21st February 1991 as well as the order of the BDO dated 25th February, 1991. An interim order was passed on 19th March, 1991 to the effect that neither the Pradhan nor the Upa-Pradhan should act as Pradhan and that their functions should be carried out by the BDO without prejudice. 6. On 2nd April, 1991 an application was made by the respondents 7-19 for vacating the order dated 19th March, 1991. An interim order was passed on 19th March, 1991 to the effect that neither the Pradhan nor the Upa-Pradhan should act as Pradhan and that their functions should be carried out by the BDO without prejudice. 6. On 2nd April, 1991 an application was made by the respondents 7-19 for vacating the order dated 19th March, 1991. The Court was of the view that the writ petition would be rendered infructuous if the order dated 19th March, 1991 were vacated. The application order for vacating the interim order was directed to be heard expeditiously. 7. This Court has heard the main writ application as it was otherwise ready for hearing. 8. It may be stated at this stage that this is the fourth writ application moved by the petitioner in respect of the office of the Pradhan of the Gram Panchayat. The petitioner was initially elected as Pradhan in 1988. A requisition meeting was sought to be held on 27.7.89 to remove the petitioner from the post of Pradhan. The petitioner challenged the notice by way of a writ application (C.O. No. 8686 (W) of 1989). An interim order was issued on 26th July, 1989 at the instance of the petitioner directing that any resolution adopted in the meeting to be held on 27.7.89 should not be given effect to. The meeting was held on 27.7.89 and a resolution passed expressing lack of confidence against the petitioner. On the application of some of the private respondents in the first writ application, the order dated 26.7.89 was modified to the extent that effect was allowed to be given to the resolution dated 27.7.89 subject to the outcome of the writ petition. This virtually amounted to the removal of the petitioner as Pradhan. By a letter dated 19.8.89 the BDO asked the petitioner to hand-over charge to the Upa-Pradhan. 9. The petitioner filed a second writ application challenging the order dated 19.8.89 (CO. No. 11515 (W) of 1989). An order was passed directing the BDO to appoint an officer as administrator of the Gram Panchayat. The second writ petition was disposed of on 28.2.90 by directing the BDO to hold an election in accordance with law. 10. The petitioner was again elected as Pradhan. On 3 8 90 the respondents 7-19 requested the petitioner to convene a meeting to discuss the motion of confidence against the petitioner. The second writ petition was disposed of on 28.2.90 by directing the BDO to hold an election in accordance with law. 10. The petitioner was again elected as Pradhan. On 3 8 90 the respondents 7-19 requested the petitioner to convene a meeting to discuss the motion of confidence against the petitioner. As the petitioner defaulted in calling such a meeting the requisitionists issued a notice on 5th September, 1990 for consideration of a no confidence motion against the Pradhan and to take a decision to remove him from his office. A meeting was held on 15.990 and a resolution was passed for removing the petitioner from the post of Pradhan. The notice and decision dated 15.9.90 were challenged by the petitioner in a 3rd writ petition (C.O. No. 10710 (W) of 1990) The 3rd writ petition was disposed of by an order dated 23.11.90. By that order it was held that the resolution dated 15.9.90 did not have the effect of removing the petitioner from the office of the Pradhan. The requisitionists however, were given the liberty to issue a fresh notice with a proper agenda and to hold a fresh meeting in accordance with law. 11. The recital of the past history is not otherwise germane to the issues involved in this application except to a limited extent as noted hereafter. 12. In this writ application the petitioner has contended that the petitioner was not given seven clear days notice of the meeting, held on 21.2.91 as was required to be given under the second proviso to s. 16 of the Act. It is submitted that the language of the second proviso would show that the period of notice was mandatory. It is stated that in this case the meeting was held the day after notice was served on the petitioner. 13. In the alternative it has been contended that even if the respondents case were accepted that the service of the notice was effected on 14.2.91, seven clear days had not elapsed between 14.2.91 and the date of the meeting namely 21.2.91. 14. The affidavit of the chowkidar, Latif Ali has been sought to be discredited on the ground that there was no endorsement that the contents of his affidavit in which he had stated that he had effected service on 14.2.91 had been read over and explained to him although be did not know any English. 14. The affidavit of the chowkidar, Latif Ali has been sought to be discredited on the ground that there was no endorsement that the contents of his affidavit in which he had stated that he had effected service on 14.2.91 had been read over and explained to him although be did not know any English. 15. Finally it is contended that the Order of the BDO dated 25.2.91 was illegal as the BDO had not taken any steps to verify as to whether the petitioner had been removed from the office of the Pradhan in accordance with law. It is submitted that the BDO's representative was obliged to have enquiry whether the procedure for the petitioner's removal as Pradhan had been strictly adhered to. This the BDO's representative had not done. It is submitted that the allegation against the BDO in the writ petition remained uncontroverted as no Affidavit-in-opposition had been filed by the State respondents. 16. Although the State respondents have not filed any affidavit, the original records relating to the case have been produced before this Court. The records show that upon receipt of a notice signed by thirteen member of the Gram Panchayat for a requisition meeting to be held on 21.2.91, the BDO as the Prescribed Authority under the Act by an order dated 14.2.91 appointed one Dipak Kumar Ghosh as observer at the meeting. The observer was asked to submit a report in writing to the Prescribed Authority within a week of the meeting on the proceedings of the meeting. 17. On 22.2.91 the observer, Dipak Kumar Ghosh submitted a report to the BDO. In that report it was stated that the notice had duly been served on all the members of the Gram Panchayat. The meeting was held at 12 noon at the time, place and date fixed by the notice. It was further reported that thirteen out of twenty members were present and that votes were cast by secret ballot. All the thirteen members voted in favour of the removal of the Pradhan. A copy of the resolution was submitted by the observer to the BDO. The BDO issued the order on 25.2.91 directing the petitioner to hand-over the change to the Upa-pradhan on 4.3.91. This was not carried out. As such the prescribed authority instructed the Up-pradhan to take over the charge as the Pradhan of the Gram Panchayat. A copy of the resolution was submitted by the observer to the BDO. The BDO issued the order on 25.2.91 directing the petitioner to hand-over the change to the Upa-pradhan on 4.3.91. This was not carried out. As such the prescribed authority instructed the Up-pradhan to take over the charge as the Pradhan of the Gram Panchayat. This the Upa-pradhan did on 6th March 1991. 18. It also appears from the record that an election was held on 21.3.91 for the appointment of Pradhan and that Mr. Yakub Ali Gazi was elected as Pradhan of the Gram Panchayat without contest. 12. The respondents 7 to 19 have filed an affidavit-in-opposition and have also made following submissions :– 1. The petitioner had been served with the notice dated 11.2.91 on 14.2.91 by Latif Ali. In any event the Secretary of the Pradhan had received the notice on behalf of the Pradhan on 14.2.91. The acceptance of service by the Secretary was valid. It is stated that in C.O. No. 8686 (W) of 1989 the petitioner had accepted the service of notice on the Secretary of the Pradhan as good service under s. 16 of the Act. 2. The provisions of seven days clear notice under s. 16 (1) of the Act was mandatory. Reliance has been placed on the decision in K. Narasimhaiah v. H. Sinri Gowda reported in AIR 1966 SC 330 and Jnanendra Nath Pramanik v. D.M. Nadia & Ors. reported in 81 CWN 986. 3. The petitioner had deliberately allowed the meeting to be held and the order to be passed by the prescribed authority on 25.2.91 and approached this Court only on 4.3.91 without raising any objection either at the meeting or by making any representation before the BDO that the meeting had not been properly called. It is stated that the petitioner having allowed the meeting to be held had acted mala fide and should not be granted any equitable relief. Reliance has been placed on the decision reported in AIR 1967 All. 465 in this context. 4. Disputed question of facts were involved which could not be resolved in writ proceedings. The dispute d questions included whether the signature of the chowkidar showing the service of notice on 20.2.91 was forged and whether the chowkidar had in fact served the notice to the petitioner on 14.2.91 as stated by the chowkidar in his affidavit. 4. Disputed question of facts were involved which could not be resolved in writ proceedings. The dispute d questions included whether the signature of the chowkidar showing the service of notice on 20.2.91 was forged and whether the chowkidar had in fact served the notice to the petitioner on 14.2.91 as stated by the chowkidar in his affidavit. Reference has been placed on D.L.P. Housing Construction v. Delhi Municipal Corporation reported in AIR 1976 SC 386 in this connection. 5. The court should not interfere with the views of the majority members of the Panchayat. Admittedly the Panchayat had only 20 members of which 13 members had voted in favour of removal of the petitioner. It is further submitted that the writ petition was not maintainable by reason of 204(3) of the Act. It is contended that the petitioner's alternative remedy was under s. 204(1)(a) of the Act. 6. No demand for justice having been made the application was not in keeping with Rule 20 of the Rule of this Court relating to applications under Article 226 of the Constitution and therefore was not maintainable. Reference has been made to the decision in AIR 1955 Cal 529 in this context. 20. The only point involved is whether the notice period under the second proviso to s. 16 of the Act is mandatory or in other words would a shorter notice period render the meeting pursuant to such notice invalid? In my view the period of 7 clear days mentioned in the second proviso to s. 16 is directory provision and not a mandatory one. A similar provision was construed by the Supreme Court in the case of K. Narasimhaiah v. H. Singh Gowda & Ors. ( AIR 1966 SC 330 ). The Supreme Court held that the period of the notice was directory because the main object of giving the notice is to make it possible for the voters so to attend to their other business as to be able to attend the meeting. ( AIR 1966 SC 330 ). The Supreme Court held that the period of the notice was directory because the main object of giving the notice is to make it possible for the voters so to attend to their other business as to be able to attend the meeting. The Supreme Court also held :– “A consideration of the object of these provisions and the manner in which the object is sought to be achieved indicates that while the legislature did intend that ordinarily the notice as mentioned should be given it could not have intended that the fact that the notice is of less than the period mentioned in the Section and thus the Councilors had less time than is ordinarily considered reasonable to arrange his other business to be free to attend the meeting, should have the serious result of making the proceedings of the meeting invalid.” 20A. This decision of the Supreme Court was followed by a learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Jnanendra Nath Pramanik v. District Magistrate Nadia & Ors. (81 CWN 986). In that case the Court was called upon to consider the construction of s. 61 (1) of the Bengal Municipal Act 1932 which provided for the removal of a Chairman. Section 61 (3) provided that a special meeting could be convened for such purpose provided that “not less than 15 clear days notice of the meeting” was given. The learned Single Judge held that the provision was directory and not mandatory. There is no material distinction between the facts before the Court and those in the case of Jnanendra Nath Pramanik and indeed the petitioner has not sought to draw any. On the other hand no decision whatsoever bas been cited by the petitioner in support of his contention that non-compliance of the period provided in the second proviso to s. 16 would render the meeting invalid. There is also nothing in the Act itself to show that the period of the notice is a mandatory requirement. I therefore respectfully agree with and adopt the reasoning in the decision of Jnanendra Nath Pramanik and hold that the requirement of 7 days clear notice is only directory in nature. 21. There is also nothing in the Act itself to show that the period of the notice is a mandatory requirement. I therefore respectfully agree with and adopt the reasoning in the decision of Jnanendra Nath Pramanik and hold that the requirement of 7 days clear notice is only directory in nature. 21. Having held that the provision relating to the period of notice is directory and not mandatory the' question whether the petitioner was served on 20th February 1991 or 14th February 1991 becomes Irrelevant. If the object of the exercise in giving notice was to enable the petitioner to attend the meeting it cannot be said that this object was not achieved as service was admittedly effected on the petitioner and it is not the petitioner's case that the notice was not sufficient so that the, petitioner was unable to attend. 22. The petitioner in fact could have pointed out that there was a defect in the procedure or could have protested against the inadequacy of the notice so that the other members of the Panchayat could have either adjourned the meeting or issued a fresh notice as they might have been inclined. As it was the petitioner completely lay low and did not point out the defect possibly in the hope that if the motion were passed he would press the want of adequate notice in service to stifle the resolution (See : Dr. B.M. Sarin v. State of U.P. AIR 1967 All. 465 , 467). The petitioner also did not complain to the BDO of the short notice. As held in the case Dr. B.M. Sarin the petitioner should not in the circumstances be allowed to impeach the resolution for want of notice. “His inequitable conduct inhibits him from challenging the resolution”. 23. The decision in Dr. B.M. Sarin has also been noted with approval in the case of Jnanendra Nath Pramanik. 24. Finally even if there was an irregular notice, such irregularity cannot by itself invalidate the meeting unless the petitioner has suffered prejudice thereby. The shortness of notice cannot be said to have prejudiced the petitioner or materially affected the outer me of the proceedings. There were only 20 members of the Gram Panchayat. No other member has come forward to complain of the shortness of the notice. 13 of the members who attended the meeting unanimously held against the petitioner. The shortness of notice cannot be said to have prejudiced the petitioner or materially affected the outer me of the proceedings. There were only 20 members of the Gram Panchayat. No other member has come forward to complain of the shortness of the notice. 13 of the members who attended the meeting unanimously held against the petitioner. These 13 members in any event constitute the majority required for passing the resolution. As held by the Supreme Court in Singri Gowda's case :–– “We are, therefore, of opinion that the fact that some of the Councillors received less than three clear days notice of the meeting did not by it elf make the proceedings of the meeting or the resolution passed there invalid. These would be invalid only if the proceedings were prejudicially affected by such irregularity. As already stated, nineteen of the twenty Councillors attended the meeting. Of these 19, 15 voted in favour of the resolution of no-confidence against the appellant. There is thus absolutely no reasons for thinking that the proceedings of the meeting were prejudicially affected by the irregularity in the service of notice. We have, therefore come to the conclusion that the failure to give three clear days notice to some of the Councillors did not affect the validity of the meeting or the resolution of no confidence passed there against the appellant.” 25. The petitioner's challenge to the meeting, the outcome of which was not in any event materially affected by any shortness in the period of notice of the meeting, cannot be sustained. In view of these findings it is not necessary to go into the other grounds raised by the respondents for dismissing the writ application. Accordingly the writ application is dismissed and all interim orders are vacated. There will be no order as to costs. Application dismissed.