JUDGMENT 1. 1. The petitioner, who is an elected member of Municipal Board, Dausa, has filed this writ petition challenging the Govt. order dated 10.4.91 (Annexure-1) by which she has been placed under suspension by the State Govt. in exercise of its power under Section 63(4) of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 1959 (for short 'Act of 1959'). 2. The case as set out by the petitioner in her petition is that she attended in the ordinary general meetings of the Municipal Board held on 26.9.90, 31.10.90 and 28.11.90. In the ordinary general meeting held on 15.12.90, the petitioner could not attend due to her illness. She could not attend subsequent two meetings held on 17.1.91 and 16.2.91 due to her continued illness. She thereafter attended ordinary general meeting 18.3.91. The State Govt. has vide its order dated 10.4.91 suspended the petitioner. She has been given out that the order of suspension has been passed because an enquiry is proposed against her for her alleged absence in three ordinary general meetings. She has stated that there are two groups amongst the elected members of Municipal Board, Dausa. These two groups belong to the ruling party and the party in opposition in the State. The petitioner belongs to Congress-I. She was one of the signatories of the no confidence motion moved against the Chairman Shri Suresh Chand Ghoshi. This no confidence motion was fixed for consideration on 11.4.91 and for that purpose a notice dated 24.3.91 was issued. Just a day before the scheduled meeting, an order was passed by the Govt. in order to prevent her from taking part in the no confidence motion scheduled to be held on 16.2.91. She had sent an application to the Board with Shri Kailash Chand, Member of the Municipal Board from Ward No.1 intimating that she will not be able to attend the meeting on account of her illness. She had not received intimation from the Board as to whether her application has been accepted or not. On 18.3.91 she was present in the meeting of the Board. 3. The petitioner has stated that she has not been served with any charge sheet till date. 4. The petitioner has claimed that the order of suspension is contrary to Section 63 of 1959 Act. On 18.3.91 she was present in the meeting of the Board. 3. The petitioner has stated that she has not been served with any charge sheet till date. 4. The petitioner has claimed that the order of suspension is contrary to Section 63 of 1959 Act. The petitioner has not been served with any charge sheet and, therefore, no enquiry can be said to have commenced against her. The order has been passed without giving any notice or opportunity of hearing. The petitioner had in fact not remained absent in three consecutive meetings of the Board. She has sent application on account of her illness and without taking her application into consideration, Respondent No. 1 has issued the order so suspension. This order has been passed on account of malice in order to prevent the petitioner from taking part in the proceedings of no confidence motion. 5. In its reply, Respondent No.2 has raised a preliminary objection by asserting that the petitioner cannot file a writ petition against the order of suspension in view of the provisions contained in Section 63 of 1959 Act. Moreover, the petitioner has a remedy available to her by way of review under Section 300 of 1959 Act. On merits it has been stated that the petitioner did not attend three ordinary general meetings of the Board held on 15.12.90, 17.1.91 and 16.2.91 without the leave of the Board. Petitioner had never sought any leave from the Board on the ground of her illness. Allegations of mala fide have been controverted by Respondent No.2, which has asserted that the order of suspension has been passed by the State Govt. and not by the Chairman. It has been stated that no application has ever been submitted by the petitioner for leave from the meeting of the Board. 6. Reply filed by Respondent No. 1 is almost ad-verbatim reproduction of the reply field by Respondent No. 2. A perusal of paragraphs 2, 4, 6 and 7(c) go to show that Respondent No. 1 has filed reply as if the reply is being filed on behalf of Municipal Board and the State Govt. has substituted itself in the shoes of the Municipal Board. 7. Before I consider the merits of the controversy, it will be proper to dispose of the preliminary objections. has substituted itself in the shoes of the Municipal Board. 7. Before I consider the merits of the controversy, it will be proper to dispose of the preliminary objections. Shri Choudhary, learned counsel for the Board, has argued that the petitioner has got an alternative remedy under Se. 300 of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 1959 and therefore, this Court must not entertain this writ petition in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction. The objection, as it has been raised, in my opinion is wholly without merit. The order in question has been passed by the State Govt. in exercise of its power under Section 63(4) and there is no higher authority before which the petitioner can agitate grievance against her suspension. Section 63(5) of 1959 Act treats the order so suspension as final. Therefore, it cannot be said that the petitioner can avail remedy against the order of State Govt. either before the Divisional Commissioner or before the State Govt. itself. So far as State Govt. is concerned, even if it can be said that it has a power of reviewing its own order, the remedy of review cannot be treated as an alternative remedy. In V. Vellaswamy v. Inspector General of Police, Tamil Nadu, Madras and another, AIR 1982 SC 82 the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order by which the High Court had dismissed the writ petition only on the ground of availability of alterative remedy of review. Somewhat similar view has been expressed by the Supreme Court in Collector of Customs and Excise, Cochin and others v. M/s. A.S. Bava, AIR 1968 SC 13 . The other preliminary objection which has been raised by learned counsel for Municipal Board is that Section 63(5) operates as a bar to the maintainability of the writ petition. This contention has been mentioned by me only to be rejected. In fact such objections must be considered as frivolous and vexatious and wholly untenable. Section 63(5) or for that reason no statutory provision, enacted by the State Legislature can be construed as a proviso to Article 226 of the Constitution. No law enacted by a State Legislature can put any restriction on the exercise of powers by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Section 63(5) or for that reason no statutory provision, enacted by the State Legislature can be construed as a proviso to Article 226 of the Constitution. No law enacted by a State Legislature can put any restriction on the exercise of powers by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Even the Parliament cannot enact a law, except those specified in Article 323(A) and 323(B), which may have the effect of restricting or abridging or putting a fetter on the jurisdiction of the High Court to issue appropriate writ, order or direction. The finality of the order envisaged by Section 63(5) cannot in any manner be construed as a bar to the maintainability of the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 8. Now coming to the merits of the case; it may straight-away be observed that Sec-63(4) provides for suspension of a member against whom proceedings have been commenced under Section 63. Such suspension can continue until the conclusion of the enquiry and passing of the final order. A suspended member is not entitled to take part in any proceeding of the Board or otherwise perform the duties of a member thereof. This provision envisages suspension of a member against whom proceedings have been commended. Therefore, before power under Se. 63(4) can be exercised, proceedings for removal of the member of the Board must have been commenced. Commencement of proceedings, therefore, constitute a condition precedent before the power of suspension can be exercised by the State Govt. Proceedings can be treated to have been commenced only when a show cause notice is issued by the State Govt. for enquiry and the member is called upon to explain the charges levelled against him at an enquiry, which may be held by the Govt. itself or through such officer/authority to whom the Govt. my direct. This view of mine is fully supported by the decision of the Supreme Court in P.R. Nayak v. Union of India, AIR 1972 SC 554 . That was a case of suspension of a member of All India Service under Rule 3(1) of the All India Services (Disciplinary and Appeal) Rules, 1969. In that case, the Govt. of India had issued order of suspension of the petitioner in contemplation of disciplinary action. That was a case of suspension of a member of All India Service under Rule 3(1) of the All India Services (Disciplinary and Appeal) Rules, 1969. In that case, the Govt. of India had issued order of suspension of the petitioner in contemplation of disciplinary action. The Court held that Rule 3(1) of All India Services (Disciplinary and Appeal) Rules, 1969 which envisages suspension after initiation of the disciplinary proceedings and the not in contemplation of disciplinary proceedings and disciplinary proceedings can be held to have been initiated only when the charge sheet is issued to the delinquent employee. The actual initiation or starting of disciplinary proceedings constitutes condition precedent before it can be said that the disciplinary proceedings have been initiated. 9. In Ugamsee Modi v. State of Rajasthan, 1962 RLW 184, provisions contained in Section 63(4) came up for consideration by a Division Bench of this Court. In that case a show cause notice had been issued to the petitioner on the basis of report of Collector, Jalore and Inspector General of Police. He was called upon to show cause as to why action be not taken against him. He did not furnish any explanation and the State Govt. gave sanction to prosecute him under various offences under the I.P.C. and, thereafter the State Govt. placed him under suspension. The Court after considering the provisions of Section 63(4) held : "If these facts are correct that there were certain allegations of misconduct against the petitioner of his having abused his powers as Chairman of the Municipality, that on those allegations there was some inquiry be certain officers and that on the report submitted by those officers the Government called upon the petitioner to explain the allegations made against him, it can hardly be contended that proceedings cannot be taken to have been commenced against the petitioner within the meaning of sub-section (2) of section 63 of the Municipalities Act." 10. The above observations clearly go to show that the notice issued by the Govt. for calling the explanation of the Chairman/Member of the Board in respect of the allegations made against him, constitute a condition precedent for passing an order of suspension. A somewhat similar view has been taken by this Court in Ajmer Singh Yadav v. State of Raj. and ors., 1986 RLR 16 . for calling the explanation of the Chairman/Member of the Board in respect of the allegations made against him, constitute a condition precedent for passing an order of suspension. A somewhat similar view has been taken by this Court in Ajmer Singh Yadav v. State of Raj. and ors., 1986 RLR 16 . Of course, that was a case pertaining to Section 63(1) (d) (i) read with Section 63(2) and Section 63(4). 11. In the present case the petitioner has come forward with a specific case that no charge sheet has been served upon her till date. Statement made by the petitioner in para 5 of the writ petition about the non-service of charge sheet has not been disputed by the Respondents No. 1 and 2 in their returns. It is, therefore, clear that proceedings under Section 63 cannot be said to have commenced against the petitioner upto 10.4.91 when the impugned order of suspension was issued. That order is, therefore, unsustainable in the eye of law. 12. In view of this finding, I do not consider it necessary to decide other points, which has been raised on behalf of the petitioner. 13. The Writ Petition succeeds and it is hereby allowed. The order dated 10.4.91 of the suspension of the petitioner is declared as illegal and it is hereby quashed. The petitioner shall get cost of Rs. 2,000/- from Respondent No. 1.Petition allowed with costs. *******