A. M. BHATTACHARJEE, ACTG. C. J. ( 1 ) -FACTS necessary for the disposal of the application before us have been succinctly stated by Ray, J. in his Judgment hereinafter following. The questions of law involved have also been dealt with by him with his usual dexterity. I have agreed wholly with the Order proposed by him and mostly with what he has stated as the reasons for the Order. I say mostly and would therefore indicate hereinbelow where I have not been able to agree with him. ( 2 ) IN the two appeals arising out of two interlocutory Orders passed in suits between the parties, one of the parties has filed an application under Order 23, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure for recording adjustment of all the suits between the parties on the basis of an alleged agreement. Order 23, Rule 3, though ex facie applying to Courts trying Original Suits, would apply to Appellate Courts also in view of section 107 (2) of the Code investing them with all the powers and duties of Courts of Original Jurisdiction. Ray, J. , has chosen to invoke section 141 of the Code for enabling Appellate Courts to exercise the powers of an Original Court. With respect, the Code applies to Appellate Courts on its own and, as already noted, section 107 (2) expressly clothes the Appellate Courts with all the powers of the trial Court. ( 3 ) TRUE, the Suits are not before us in the form of appeals from decrees, but there are only two appeals from interlocutory Orders passed in the Suits. It is also true that under Rule 3, as it stood before the 1976 Amendment, compromise could relate only to the matters in Suit. If the matter stood at that, we sitting in appeal, could record compromise only on matters so far it related to the matters covered by the appeals only and could not go beyond the matters covered by the interlocutory Orders giving rise to the appeals. But Rule 3, as now amended in 1976, authorises recording of compromise on all matters which relate to the parties before us and, therefore, nothing should prevent us from recording a compromise in these appeals on any matter provided they relate to the parties before us, even though they are not covered by the scope of the appeals. Mr. But Rule 3, as now amended in 1976, authorises recording of compromise on all matters which relate to the parties before us and, therefore, nothing should prevent us from recording a compromise in these appeals on any matter provided they relate to the parties before us, even though they are not covered by the scope of the appeals. Mr. Sen has also, with his usual fairness, conceded that, though he has opposed the application on other grounds. Ray, J. , has also no doubt as to our competence to record adjustment of all the Suits even in these appeals from interlocutory Orders; but he has rejected the application on merits. I agree with brother Ray for reasons stated hereunder. The relevant portions of the provisions of Rule 3 of Order 23 are reproduced hereunder :-"where it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that a Suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or compromise in writing and signed by the parties, or where the defendant satisfies the plaintiff in respect of the whale or any part of the subject matter of the Suit, the Court shall order such agreement, compromise or satisfaction to be recorded, and shall pass a decree in accordance therewith so far as it relates to the parties to the suit, whether or not the subject matter of the agreement, compromise or satisfaction is the same as the subject-matter of the Suit. PROVIDED that where it is alleged by one party and denied by the other that an adjustment or satisfaction has been arrived at, the Court shall decide the question, but no adjournment shall be granted for the purpose of deciding the question, unless the Court, for reasons to be recorded in writing, thinks fit to grant such adjournment". ( 4 ) THE words "in writing and signed by the parties" after the words "lawful agreement or compromise" in the first part of Rule 3 have been inserted by the Amendment Act of 1976 and as a result, under the Rule, as it now stands, the Court can and shall record an adjustment, by way of agreement or compromise, when, and only when, such agreement of compromise is in writing and signed by the parties. No citation should have been necessary for this too obvious a proposition; but since we delight to walk on, and often cannot walk without, the crunches of precedents, reference may be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in Gurpreet Singh ( AIR 1988 SC 400 ). The alleged agreement or compromise put forward by the applicant is admittedly not signed by the parties and, therefore, cannot be recorded as an adjustment under Rule 3. ( 5 ) THE words "in writing and signed by the parties", however, do not quantify the second part of Rule 3 and therefore where the defendant satisfies the plaintiff in respect of the subject-matter of the Suit, such satisfaction is not required to be evidenced by any signed instrument and once the Court is satisfied that such a satisfaction has been arrived at, the Court shall record the same without asking for a signed document. This is again irresistibly clear from the terms of the Rule, but yet reference may again be made to Gurpreet Singh (supra, at 404, para 11 ). ( 6 ) BROTHER Ray has held that an application under Rule 3, when allowed, terminates the Suit. With respect, I would like to think that even when an application under Rule 3 is allowed, it may not always terminate the Suit, for, as the words "wholly or in part" and the words "whole or any part" in Rule 3 would show, the adjustment or satisfaction sought to be recorded may relate only to a part of the claim in the Suit, and, therefore, even after adjustment or satisfaction of a portion of the suit, is so recorded, the rest of the Suit would have to be proceeded with. This question is, however, not material for our present purpose and need not accordingly be pursued any further. ( 7 ) FOR the reasons stated above, I would reject the application for recording adjustment of the Suits solely on the ground that the purported agreement or compromise is not signed by the parties as required under the provisions of Rule 3. ( 8 ) THIS is sufficient to dispose of the matter at hand. ( 7 ) FOR the reasons stated above, I would reject the application for recording adjustment of the Suits solely on the ground that the purported agreement or compromise is not signed by the parties as required under the provisions of Rule 3. ( 8 ) THIS is sufficient to dispose of the matter at hand. But Ray, J. , has also adverted to the question as to the legality and efficacy of an oral or unsigned adjustment and has held that notwithstanding the insertion of the words "in writing and signed by the parties" in Rule 3 by the 1976 Amendment, such oral or unsigned adjustment, agreement or compromise can be given effect to, but only at, and not before, the stage of final hearing. For the proposition that, in principle, a Court is bound to act upon a compromise howsoever reached, orally or otherwise, Ray, J. , has relied on the decision of Supreme Court in K. Venkata Seshiah (1991-3 Supreme Court Cases 338 ). I have however failed to find any such proposition in the said decision, but have rather noted (at paragraphs 3 and 7) that the "compromise deed" and the "compromise petition" in that case were signed by the parties. The observation of the Orissa High Court and approved by the Supreme Court (at paragraphs 8 and 9 of the Report) to the effect that "once the Court Was satisfied that there was a compromise, it was for the Court to record the same and no option lay before the Court to act otherwise" must be read in that context. The Supreme Court (at paragraph 9) found the compromise petition to be in order and proceeded to act thereon. ( 9 ) WITH respect to Brother Ray, I have my doubt as to whether, in view of Rule 3, as it now stands after the 1976-Amendment, any oral or unsigned adjustment, agreement or compromise can, in law and on its own, be the foundation of a decree. Rule 3 having categorically mandated agreement or compromise adjusting a Suit to be in writing and under signature, it would be going against the such clear legislative mandate to still search for and find place for an unwritten and unsigned one as adjusting a suit. Rule 3 having categorically mandated agreement or compromise adjusting a Suit to be in writing and under signature, it would be going against the such clear legislative mandate to still search for and find place for an unwritten and unsigned one as adjusting a suit. As held by the Privy Council in Nazir Ahmed (AIR 1936 PC 253 at 257), when statute directs a thing to be done in a particular manner, it must be done either in that manner or not at all. ( 10 ) IN Clause 77 (iii) of the Statements of Objects and Reasons accompanying the Bill for the Amendment Act of 1976, it has been clearly indicated that provisions are being made "that an agreement or compromise under Rule 3 should be in writing and signed by the parties" and that it was so done "with a view to avoiding the setting up of oral agreements or compromises. . . . . ". These would go a long way to show that once the Legislature has done away with unwritten or unsigned agreements or compromises, it can be in no mood to allow them to show their heads at any stage of the Suit in the shape and form of an adjustment of Suit or compromise-deed to found a decree solely on such agreement or compromise. There are sufficient indication in the Supreme Court decision in Gurpreet Singh (supra, at paragraph 9) that the object of the 1976-Amendment is to prevent oral or unsigned agreement or compromise to form the sole basis of a decree. The Supreme Court decision in Byram Pestonji Gariwala ( AIR 1991 SC 2234 ), relied on by the Counsel for the proposition that the expression "parties" in Rule 3 would include their Counsel, has also indicated (at paragraph 8) that the object of the Amendment "is intended to clarify that a compromise has to be in writing". ( 11 ) TRUE, as Ray, J. , has pointed out, oral agreements we also equally legal and efficacious as written agreements. Oral applications are also quite legal, as would appear from Article 134a of the Constitution. Oral statements are also quite lawful. But since the Code of Civil Procedure directs filing of plaint or written statements, oral statements, however otherwise lawful, cannot take their place. Oral applications are also quite legal, as would appear from Article 134a of the Constitution. Oral statements are also quite lawful. But since the Code of Civil Procedure directs filing of plaint or written statements, oral statements, however otherwise lawful, cannot take their place. Therefore, once the Code in Rule 3 directs a written and signed agreement or compromise, nothing oral can be any substitute. ( 12 ) I agree with Ray, J. , that though oral agreement or compromise can have no place under Rule 3, it is not absolutely useless or ineffective. If any such oral adjustment or compromise or any offer therefore is brought to the notice of the Court as a piece of evidence, the Court trying the proceeding shall have to take the same into account along with all other materials on record and dispose of the proceeding on a consideration of all the materials including the oral compromise or the offer to compromise. But the decree, if any, in such a case would not in form be a compromise-decree, but a decree on merits. ( 13 ) ONE word more before I conclude. I have attempted to construe Rule 3, as amended, in the light of the Statement of Objects and Reasons. In Gurpreet Singh (supra, paragraphs 8, 9) the Supreme Court has also done are same thing and has stated that "for a proper appreciation. . . . . . it is necessary to set out the Statement of Objects and Reasons". In Byram Pestonji (supra, paragraphs 7, 8) also, the Supreme Court proceeded to construe Rule 3 on the basis of what the "statement of Objects and Reasons indicates" and also what it does not indicate (at paragraph 28 ). In fact, I always do so with anxious advertence while Brother Ray is of the view that it must not be done unless the "accepted classical methods of interpretation" yield no fruit and should be done only when it cannot but be. ( 14 ) I do not lay any claim to any semblance of scholarship in the classical rules of interpretation. But I know this much that many of the so-called classical rules have been or are being steadily discarded. One such rule was not to rely on the Marginal Notes. But now we do rely on them and the Supreme Court did so in Bengal Immunity Co. But I know this much that many of the so-called classical rules have been or are being steadily discarded. One such rule was not to rely on the Marginal Notes. But now we do rely on them and the Supreme Court did so in Bengal Immunity Co. ( AIR 1955 SC 661 at 676) and also in Golaknath ( AIR 1967 SC 1643 at 1658 ). Another such rule was not to rely on Punctuations. But in modem statutes, we always do so and the Supreme Court has done so in A. K. Gopalan ( AIR 1950 SC 27 at 45) and also in Aswini Kumar Ghose ( AIR 1952 SC 369 at 383 ). As would appear from the last mentioned decision, phere the Long Title of the Act was very much relied or in construing the statute, even under the old rule such Titles used to be excluded from consideration. Then again, though debates in Parliament used to be 'no-entry' area for Courts under the classical rule, our Courts are now freely construing our Constitution and other statutes with reference to such debates. The classical Rule of 'literal interpretation" has now yielded place to 'purposive interpretation'. The old methods have thus changed considerably and the practice of 'don't-touch'ism so much prevalent under the classical methods no longer persists with that rigour and we now endeavour to derive light, aid and assistance from every reasonable source. The Statement of Objects and Reasons being the statement of the author of the legislative measure cannot but be a very reasonable source and should ordinarily be of great help in ascertaining the objects and intention of the legislation. This may not be conclusive as the Bill may undergo radical change during passage and may go much beyond or may fall much short of the avowed objects in the Statement. And in that sense, neither the Titles, nor the Marginal Notes, nor the legislative debates are in any way conclusive. But if we can look at the Title or the Marginal Note at any time for the purpose of interpretation, there is no reason why we should not took to the Statements either, and why we should be entitled to look at it only as the last resort, as held by brother Ray. But if we can look at the Title or the Marginal Note at any time for the purpose of interpretation, there is no reason why we should not took to the Statements either, and why we should be entitled to look at it only as the last resort, as held by brother Ray. As already pointed out, the Statements were looked into and heavily relied upon by the Supreme Court as a matter of prime importance both in Gurpreet Singh (supra) and in Byram Pestonji (supra ). ( 15 ) AS to the Rules of Interpretation, reference may be made to the observations of Chandrachud, CJ. in Sankalchand Seth ( AIR 1977 SC 2328 at 2336) as hereunder :-"statutory interpretation, with conflicting rules pulling to different directions has become a murky area and just as a case-law digest can supply an authority on almost any thinkable proposition, so the new editions of old classics have collected over the years formulae which can fit in with any interpretation which one may choose to place. Perplexed by a bewildering mass of irreconcilable dogmas, Courts have adopted and applied to cases which come before them rules which reflect their own value judgments. . . . . . . ". ( 16 ) TO quote from Denning (Discipline of Law-1979-page 9), "if you find a maxim or rule on your side, your opponent will find one on his side to counteract it". Be that as it may, I do not propose to decide the question as to the legality and efficacy of an oral adjustment, agreement or compromise and would leave the question open to be decided by the Appellate Beach where the appeals are pending. I only hold, in agreement with Ray, J. , that the application for recording adjustment of the Suit must be rejected as the agreement or compromise is not signed by the parties or their counsel. It would now be for the appellate Bench to proceed with the appeals and to decide the matter relating to oral and unsigned agreement or compromise in such manner as it would think fit, if the question is raised before that Bench in due course. ( 17 ) IN his application, of July 1991, the applicant Molla Sirajul Haque prays for recording of certain terms of compromise and directions for working out the said compromise. ( 17 ) IN his application, of July 1991, the applicant Molla Sirajul Haque prays for recording of certain terms of compromise and directions for working out the said compromise. ( 18 ) THERE are four sets of parties involved. The applicant is one, the second set are the two Mullicks being respondents No. 1 and 2. The third set is composed of respondents 3 to 7 and the fourth set is the 8th respondent, Adarsh Lal Chopra. ( 19 ) IN the applicant's suit (No. 1085 of 1988 filed on 23. 12. 88) he claims for specific performance of an alleged oral agreement made in June'88 for sale of certain premises in Lenin Sarani by the two Mullicks to him. The numbers of the premises are given in paragraph 2 of the application. The respondents 3 to 7 state that they again have an alleged written agreement dated 1. 12. 88 for purchase of the same property from the Mullicks, who say that they have received from the said group a sum of Rs. 7. 5 lacs. ( 20 ) THE applicant is apparently in possession of the property and there is another suit by the Mullicks (No. 1065 of 1988 filed on 22. 12. 88) against the applicant for eviction. ( 21 ) THE 8th respondent is a tenant in the property, whose tenancy, according to the landlords, i. e. , the Mullicks, has been terminated. Two sons of the applicant claim to have become entitled to the tenancy by reason of their having entered into a partnership with Chopra. A suit in the City Civil Court was filed in this regard on 5. 12. 88. One of the Mullicks claims that he was forcibly dispossessed at night on 6/7. 12. 88 by the applicant, his sons and Chopra. The said suit has since been transferred to the High Court (E. O. 15 of 1990 ). In yet another suit, Chopra has obtained an injunction restraining the Mullicks from selling the property, without leave of Court (Order dt. 19. 6. 89 in Suit No. 313 of 1989 ). The above facts are set out for appreciation of the contentions in the above application and are not to be taken as final decisions on facts in regard to any of the suits or other proceedings that are now pending amongst any of the parties herein. 19. 6. 89 in Suit No. 313 of 1989 ). The above facts are set out for appreciation of the contentions in the above application and are not to be taken as final decisions on facts in regard to any of the suits or other proceedings that are now pending amongst any of the parties herein. ( 22 ) THERE was an interlocutory order passed on the 23rd of August 1990, in each of the two suits Nos. 1085 and 1065 mentioned above. In his application of September 1990, the applicant has prayed for stay of the order passed in his suit, which was as follows :-suit No : 1085/88 in THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction before The Hon'ble Mr. Justice Baboo Lall Jain ( 23 ) 8. 90 molla Sirajul Haque versus gora Chandra Mallick the COURT : The defendants Nos. 1 and 2 are restrained from seeking or transferring the property mentioned in the plaint filed in the suit. This order will, however, not prevent the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 if at all they find a ready purchaser to purchase the property subject to "lis pendence" and subject to he is being made a party defendant to this suit. Save as aforesaid, all other interim orders are vacated. All parties to act on a xerox copy of the minutes of this order duly signed by the Assistant Registrar of this Court. 23. Appeals were preferred from both the aforesaid interlocutory orders. Applications for stay were made in the Court of Appeal in aid of the aforesaid interlocutory appeals. Orders for stay are said to have been passed in regard to both the orders dated 23. 8. 90 (Application, para 6 ). The applicant's case is that during the pendency of the proceedings before the Appeal Court the parties came to a compromise substantially covering the scope of all the suits mentioned above. The application states that the agreement took the form of a finalised draft prepared by Counsel for the 8th respondent which was also signed by the said respondent. The draft is annexure 'g' to the application for recording of compromise. ( 24 ) THE scheme of compromise was that the property would be conveyed by the Mullicks to the applicant for a consideration of Rs. 37. 5 Lacs. The draft is annexure 'g' to the application for recording of compromise. ( 24 ) THE scheme of compromise was that the property would be conveyed by the Mullicks to the applicant for a consideration of Rs. 37. 5 Lacs. The amount already paid by respondents 3 to 7 would be returned by the applicant along with interest for the blocked up period. The 8th respondent, like all other parties, would abide by the aforesaid scheme and no suit relating to the aforesaid property would be further proceeded with. ( 25 ) MR. P. K. Dutt appeared for the applicant. Mr. P. C. Sen appeared for the Mullicks. Mr. Bimal Kumar Chatterjee appeared for the respondents 3 to 7 and Mr. P. K. Roy appeared for the 8th respondent. ( 26 ) MR. Sen stated before us that the Mullicks were ready to convey the property for the agreed consideration, provided the same was obtained as an outright sale. Mr. Dutt on the other hand, said that in accordance with clause (1) of annexure 'g' to his application his client was entitled either to take an absolute transfer or a lease for 999 years at his choice. Mr. Dutt insisted upon a lease for the long period. One of the reasons mentioned by him was that his client would otherwise have had to pay more than Rs. 7 lac of excess stamp duty in case of an outright conveyance. According to him the excess duty would now be in the region of Rs. 23 lac in view of recent West Bengal amendments regarding stamp duty. Mr. Sen stated that if his clients at all conveyed the property, they would wish to be completely rid of the property, once for all, as otherwise liabilities might remain, with his clients, in regard to the property, and in regard to the activities carried on there, even after execution of the long lease. ( 27 ) MR. Dutt stated that even though there is no single agreement in writing signed by all the parties or their advocates, yet, from the facts and circumstances a lawful agreement, valid according to the Indian Contract Act, could be spelt out. He said that Chopra had signed the finalised draft. That the Mullicks had continued in their willingness to sell the property outright, though according to clause (1) of annexure 'g', Mr. He said that Chopra had signed the finalised draft. That the Mullicks had continued in their willingness to sell the property outright, though according to clause (1) of annexure 'g', Mr. Dutt's client was given the option to take by long lease instead of by absolute conveyance. That Mr. N. K. Nandi solicitor for the Mullicks had shown willingness to accept even the option for the long lease and that such consent would be seen from the writings of Mr. Nandi on documents relating to preparation of the final conveyance in accordance with the compromise; Mr. Dutt said that copies of these writings would appear from pages 52 and 100 of the annexures to his application. Mr. Dutt stated that the willingness of respondents 3 to 7 to take their deposited money and walk out of the property could be inferred from the statements contained in their affidavits in these proceedings as well as from a letter dated 17th June 1991 written by their acting advocate, the copy of the letter being annexed at page 133 of the application for compromise. Mr. Dutt also relied upon the other affidavits and papers including the affidavit of Gora Chand Mullick dt. 6. 8. 91. ( 28 ) THE first point which arises for consideration is whether an agreement for compromise, of the nature mentioned above, can form, according to today's law, the subject of a successful application under order 23, rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure. ( 29 ) THE provisions of order 23 rule 3 as those stood before 1976 are set out below : order 23 Rule 3 - "compromise of suit. ( 29 ) THE provisions of order 23 rule 3 as those stood before 1976 are set out below : order 23 Rule 3 - "compromise of suit. (OLD) - Where it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that a suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or compromise, or where the defendant satisfies the plaintiff in respect of the whole or any part of the subject matter of the suit, the Court shall order such agreement, compromise or satisfaction to be recorded, and shall pass a decree in accordance therewith so far as it relates to the suit." ( 30 ) THE provisions of order 23 rule 3 as those are today are set out below :-order 23 Rule 3 "where it is proved (NEW) satisfaction of the Court that a suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or compromise in writing and signed by the parties or where the defendant satisfies the plaintiff in respect of the whole or any part of the subject-matter of the suit, the Court shall order such agreement, compromise or satisfaction to be recorded, and shall pass a decree in accordance therewith so far as it relates to the parties to the suit, whether or not the subject-matter of the agreement, compromise or satisfaction is the same as the subject-matter of the suit. Provided that where it is alleged by one party and denied by the other that an adjustment or satisfaction has been arrived at, the Court shall decide the question; but no adjournment shall be granted for the purpose of deciding the question, unless the court, for reasons to be recorded, thinks fit to grant such adjournment. Explanation.-An agreement or compromise which is void or voidable under the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872), shall not be deemed to be lawful within the meaning of this rule. " ( 31 ) ACCORDING to today's law, in my opinion, an application under order 23 rule 3 for summary recording of compromise by way of an adjustment will not succeed unless the same is contained in writing signed by the parties. ( 32 ) THE case of Gurpreet Singh reports in AIR 1988 Supreme Court page 400 is an authority for the above proposition. In that case a plaintiff in a suit for specific performance was successful in two Courts. ( 32 ) THE case of Gurpreet Singh reports in AIR 1988 Supreme Court page 400 is an authority for the above proposition. In that case a plaintiff in a suit for specific performance was successful in two Courts. In a second appeal before a High Court Division Bench, he had agreed to accept a certain sum of money, if paid by a certain date, in lieu of his claim for specific performance. In spite of authenticated statements before Court, the plaintiff tried to back out of the aforesaid agreement. The Division Bench accordingly fixed a date of hearing of the appeal. That was objected to. The Supreme Court said that the objection was unsound. The date for hearing of the appeal had been rightly fixed. That in spite of authenticated statements before Court, the appeal could not be summarily disposed of under order 23 rule 3 as there was no agreement in writing signed by the parties. ( 33 ) ORDER 23 rule 3 is one of those provisions in the Code whereby an application by itself brings a suit to termination. An application for rejection of the plaint under order 7 rule 11 is also an application of this nature. An application made after the preliminary decree in a partition suit, or in a mortgage suit, is also an application of this nature. An application for revocation of leave under clause 12 of the letters patent is an application of this nature. If these applications succeed, the suit terminates; if the application does not succeed in terminating the suit, the suit remains alive for further decision. In the same manner, the second appeal had remained alive in the matter before the Supreme Court, when the pleas taken under order 23 rule 3 failed to terminate it summarily. ( 34 ) THE following in my opinion are the effect of the new amendments to order 23 rule 3 and the above Supreme Court decision : (A)for summary success in an application under order 23 rule 3 by way of recording of an adjustment, there must be an agreement in writing signed by the parties. The word 'parties' will include their pleaders and advocates as has been pointed out in the case of Byram Pestonji, reported in AIR 1991 Supreme Court 2234. The word 'parties' will include their pleaders and advocates as has been pointed out in the case of Byram Pestonji, reported in AIR 1991 Supreme Court 2234. (B)whether there is an agreement to settle the claims of the plaint, or a compromise of what has been claimed in suit, i. e. , say, there is a compromise on the part of the plaintiff to accept a lesser amount, than what is claimed, in either case, there must be a signed writing, for summary recording under Order 23 Rule 3. (C)if it is a question of satisfaction of any claim in suit, then the same is not necessarily to be in writing signed by the parties. Satisfaction of claim is of an executed nature and is different from the executory nature of an adjustment agreement. Such satisfaction may be proved by permissible evidence such as a cheque payment or a receipt or other modes envisaged in the first two rules of order 21 as now amended. (D)if it is alleged that there is an adjustment by way of a signed writing and the same is disputed, then that dispute would have to be resolved by the Court in the Order 23 Rule 3 application itself and not at the hearing of the suit. (E)if there is an alleged agreement to settle the suit otherwise than in writing signed by the parties, and the same is disputed, then all disputes relating thereto shall be decided by the Court at the trial of the suit itself, and not in an Order 23 Rule 3 application, which would not be maintainable without a written agreement. (F)an agreement which is in accordance with the Indian Contract Act, 1872, can be the subject matter of any adjustment in a suit, whether the agreement is in writing or not. The fifth proposition given above requires elucidation. The instant case is an instance of the said proposition. ( 35 ) AN oral agreement is a valid agreement. It is not unlawful by reason of its being oral. It is not possible to hold that by reason of the amendments to Order 23 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure all oral agreements relating to adjustment of suits were rendered either unlawful or unenforceable. ( 35 ) AN oral agreement is a valid agreement. It is not unlawful by reason of its being oral. It is not possible to hold that by reason of the amendments to Order 23 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure all oral agreements relating to adjustment of suits were rendered either unlawful or unenforceable. ( 36 ) IN the above Supreme Court case, nothing was said by the Supreme Court as to what would happen at the date of hearing of the second appeal on merits. The Supreme Court did not say that the willingness of the plaintiff to accept a sum of money in lieu of his claim for specific performance would not be considered as a material or relevant factor by the appellate court when hearing the appeal on merits. This is of crucial importance. If a party agrees orally to settle a claim and such agreement is proved by, say, authentic Court records, or other evidence, then no Court can, at the time of trial, overlook such an agreement; the Court cannot overlook such a proven agreement even if the same is oral. Parties are bound by agreement whether those are oral or whether those are in writing. An agreement to compromise suits need not necessarily be in writing, like, say, non charitable trust instruments relating to immovable property. The effect of the amendment of Order 23 Rule 3 is that when, say, an oral agreement is made to compromise a suit, the same has to be proved at the trial of the suit itself; it cannot be proved at an interlocutory stage by way of an application under Order 23 Rule 3 for summary termination of the suit. ( 37 ) THAT, in principle, a Court is bound to act upon a compromise, however reached, is shown also by the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of K. Venkata Seshiah, reported in (1991)1 Judgements Today, 642 and in (1991) 3 Supreme Court cases page 338. The Court would be failing in its duty if at trial it did not permit evidence to be led of any lawful agreement or compromise of any claim relating to the suit, notwithstanding that such adjustment was made orally. ( 38 ) THE words, agreement or compromise in writing, occurring in Order 23 Rule 3, mean, in my opinion, a written compromise or a written agreement. ( 38 ) THE words, agreement or compromise in writing, occurring in Order 23 Rule 3, mean, in my opinion, a written compromise or a written agreement. If the agreement is to be proved by bits of writings here and there, containing signature or other writing of the parties, or of their advocates or pleaders, or the agreement is partly oral and partly in writing, then such an agreement would not be encompassed within the meaning of Order 23 Rule 3. ( 39 ) THE reason for this is that Order 23 Rule 3 now permits recording of only those agreements which would not need much time to prove. An agreement composed of writing here and there might be proved definitively, but it would take time. Evidence would have to be given. Correlation of different documents would have to be made. Such a procedure is possible at the trial of the suit itself. If such a procedure were permitted in an Order 23 Rule 3 application, the object of the amendment would be totally defeated. The object, as would appear from the amended (Rule) section itself, is to prevent adjournment of suits save on pleas of adjustment which are ordinarily easily proveable. I purposely refrain from referring to the statement of objects and reasons, as the same should not be referred to unless the accepted classical methods of interpretation are first exhausted without giving any clue to interpretation; that is, however, only very rarely the case. ( 40 ) IT should be seen that in the proviso, a dispute is said to be determinable by the Court in case it is raised in respect of an agreement or a compromise or satisfaction. The word 'such' is absent. The dispute therefore, need not relate to an agreement or compromise only of the type envisaged in the first part of Order 23 Rule 3 i. e. , a written adjustment. The dispute might, of course, relate to a written adjustment, in which case the Court would have to determine the same in the Order 23 Rule 3 application itself. This is indicated by the beginning of Order 23 Rule 3, which envisages proof to the satisfaction of the Court of an agreement or compromise in writing. The dispute might, of course, relate to a written adjustment, in which case the Court would have to determine the same in the Order 23 Rule 3 application itself. This is indicated by the beginning of Order 23 Rule 3, which envisages proof to the satisfaction of the Court of an agreement or compromise in writing. If, say, the signature is disputed, or if the authority of the signing person is disputed, then disputes of such nature would be appropriately determinable in the application stage, under Order 23 Rule 3. ( 41 ) HOWEVER, the disputes might relate to an agreement or compromise other than a signed written agreement. In that case the parties should not seek to file it under Order 23 Rule 3. In case they do so seek to file it, the Supreme Court case of Gurpreet Singh would stand in the way. ( 42 ) THE proviso to Order 23 Rule 3 states that in case of disputes relating to agreement of compromise, meaning thereby in my opinion, agreement or compromise of any nature whatsoever, whether written or oral, the Court shall determine the question. Two questions are not answered by the express words of the proviso. The first question is, when will the Court determine the dispute? Will it be at an interlocutory stage or will it be at the hearing of the suit? The second question is, what will the Court do upon such determination? ( 43 ) IN my opinion, the determination of disputes as to agreement or compromise which are not written and signed, would have to take place only at the trial of suit. It is my further opinion that upon such determination, the Court must act thereupon, as the Court acts upon determination of the existence of any other valid and lawful agreement. In other words, if satisfied at trial that there has been even an oral adjustment settling the suit, or any part of it, the Court shall enforce the same, and shall not decree the suit otherwise than in accordance with such oral agreement or compromise. ( 44 ) MR. Bimal Chatterjee most appropriately cited the case of Comr. of Duties v. Atwill reported in (1973)1 All England Reports 576 and relied upon the passage at pages 579-581. The portion of the judgment occurring there contains also extracts from other judgments. ( 44 ) MR. Bimal Chatterjee most appropriately cited the case of Comr. of Duties v. Atwill reported in (1973)1 All England Reports 576 and relied upon the passage at pages 579-581. The portion of the judgment occurring there contains also extracts from other judgments. The passage, with respect, is both wise and penetrative in the matter of determining the statutory effect of provisos. It is stated there to this effect, as I venture to read it, that a proviso might be worded as a proviso but might yet not be a true proviso. If the words are contained in a true proviso, then the words thereof must be subservient to the words in the main portion of the statute. If however, the proviso, though called a proviso, contains substantive enactments of equal importance as those in the "main" portion of the section, then the proviso would have to be put at par with the so called main portion. In other words, the substance contained in the proviso is more important than the word proviso; though called a proviso, it might successfully prove in some case to be even more important than the so called main section, if that appears to be the rational interpretation on a true construction of the entirety of the enactment. ( 45 ) IN my opinion, the proviso to Order 23 Rule 3 is at least as important as the main section because it preserves the right of the parties to prove at trial oral and other agreements and compromise which cannot be made the subject matter of a summary application under Order 23 Rule 3 for terminating the suit at once. ( 46 ) IN the instant case there is no adjustment signed by the parties; accordingly an application under Order 23 Rule 3 must fail. It does not however mean that the agreement which was sought to be recorded in this application might not conceivably form the basis of decrees in the suits mentioned above. Parties will be free to prove the effect of the signature or writing of Mr. Nandi and all the other attending circumstances, by reason by which, according to the applicant, a valid agreement or compromise has already been reached. ( 47 ) THE second point urged by the contesting respondents was that the agreement being annexure 'g' was unlawful. Parties will be free to prove the effect of the signature or writing of Mr. Nandi and all the other attending circumstances, by reason by which, according to the applicant, a valid agreement or compromise has already been reached. ( 47 ) THE second point urged by the contesting respondents was that the agreement being annexure 'g' was unlawful. It was said that the agreement intended to evade stamp duty and was thus not lawful. ( 48 ) THERE is nothing in law which prevents the execution of a lease for 999 years or a grant to that effect. If stamp duty is saved thereby, then the same cannot be helped. Either the law relating to the stamp duty has to be changed or parties must be prohibited from entering into long leases if all anomaly with regard to stamp duty amount is to be avoided. ( 49 ) MR. Sen relied upon the cases of M/s. Mc Dowell (reported in AIR 1986 Supreme Court page 649) and Wood Polymer (reported in 47 Company Cases page 597) stating that according to the present law, tax avoidance and tax evasion are not treated in the same manner as these were treated earlier. Courts are stricter. They would analyse transactions to a greater degree to see if tax was intended to be evaded and not merely avoided in accordance with law. Mr. Sen said that especially in the case of Wood Polymer the refusal of the Court to sanction a company scheme showed that the Court pierced the veil and refused the sanction which would have the effect of transfer of property without payment of necessary duty. ( 50 ) HOWEVER much might one analyse the transaction in the instant case, it would remain, if the deed is executed, a lease of 999 years and a lease of 999 years only. In fact there is nothing to analyse; parties are permitted by law to grant and take the lease at a lesser duty than for outright conveyance. There is nothing unlawful in this. In case the applicant is otherwise able to prove the agreement at trial, the question of any illegality should not trouble parties any further, with regard to this matter of obtaining of a lease for 999 years. There is nothing unlawful in this. In case the applicant is otherwise able to prove the agreement at trial, the question of any illegality should not trouble parties any further, with regard to this matter of obtaining of a lease for 999 years. ( 51 ) IN paragraph 9 of the agreement sought to be recorded, i. e. , annexure 'g', there is a provision for payment of Rs. 20,000/- and Rs. 5,000/- for execution and registration of a deed of conveyance selling the revision of the Mullicks. If a deed of lease for 999 years as well as a deed for conveyance of the reversion are compounded into a single deed, then it is arguable that the deed is not one for grant of lease, nor one for grant of reversion, but a deed, which, upon a true construction, is a deed in reality for an outright sale. It would be for the parties to press this issue in case the same arises in any suit. Even this would involve no illegality. If the true construction is that the deed would have to be treated as a deed of sale, then parties would have to pay stamp duty in accordance therewith. Any payment of a lower duty would attract the consequence of deficit stamp duty payment. It would not be a case of illegality invalidating the contract. Payment of lesser sum as Stamp Duty than required under the law has never been construed as an illegality or invalidity about the substance of the agreement itself. Nothing more need to be said in this regard at this stage of the proceeding. ( 52 ) MR. Sen did not dispute that in case the provisions of Order 23 Rule 3 were otherwise satisfied, the suits could be compromised before the Appeal Court even though the Appeal Court was in seisin of only appeals from interlocutory orders, and not appeals from decrees in suits. In my opinion, under Order 23 Rule 3 a compromise is today permitted even beyond the scope of a suit. Under section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure the proceeding with regard to suits is to be followed in all proceedings as far as possible. The proceeding before the Appeal Court thus could very well encompass compromises beyond the scope of the Appellate proceeding itself. Under section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure the proceeding with regard to suits is to be followed in all proceedings as far as possible. The proceeding before the Appeal Court thus could very well encompass compromises beyond the scope of the Appellate proceeding itself. In other words, the appeal Court in seisin of an interlocutory matter could compromise the entire suit, just as the suit Court in seisin of the suit could compromise matters beyond the scope of the suit itself. ( 53 ) MR. Dutt said that his client had purchased pay orders in the name of the Mullicks to the extent of Rs. 37. 5 Lac. He said that on this basis the Court should at least record a satisfaction which does not need an agreement in writing. I am afraid the purchase of pay orders does not constitute a payment though it is a step towards payment. It could not form the recording of any satisfaction. Moreover, the applicant is the plaintiff in his suit for specific performance; it would be odd indeed, if the pay orders obtained by the plaintiff himself were recorded in satisfaction of the claim for specific performance, by way of purchase price to be paid to the defendant. There could be no recording of satisfaction of money payment to the defendant unless the plaintiff succeeds first in obtaining a decree for a right to conveyance being declared in his favour, in return for the amount of money in question. ( 54 ) MR. Dutt also said that the pay orders could be recorded as satisfaction in the suit in which the applicant is a defendant. The same is also not possible as Mr. Dutta has never submitted to any mesne profits being adjudged as due from his client who is defendant in the eviction suit. Nor were the pay orders ever purchased for meeting any claims made by the Mullicks in their suit. The same is also not possible as Mr. Dutta has never submitted to any mesne profits being adjudged as due from his client who is defendant in the eviction suit. Nor were the pay orders ever purchased for meeting any claims made by the Mullicks in their suit. ( 55 ) UNDER these circumstances there will be no order on this application but that in any of the suits referred to above, all the parties or any of them would be free to prove any compromise or agreement entered into by and between them or any of them notwithstanding that such agreement was either wholly or in part either oral or not in writing or not signed by the parties or any of them or their agents. ( 56 ) IT is made clear that this order disposes of only the July'91 application of the applicant Haque for recording of compromise. Final orders will have to be passed by another appropriate Appeal Court on the appeals and on the stay applications of Haque (made in September'90) and the Mullicks, made in aid of their appeals Nos. 429 of 90 and 395 of 90, preferred from the two orders both dated 23. 8. 90 passed respectively in suits 1085 of 1988 and 1065 of 1988. We were not addressed in regard to the stay matters, or the appeals, but only in regard to the compromise matter. If the compromise matter had succeeded, the stay applications and the appeals would lose force. Now that the compromise application has failed at this summary stage, the suits, the stay applications and the appeals would have to be proceeded with. If the stay applications or the appeals are recorded as heard in part before us, the same is only a mechanical recording, and in any event, we release the stay applications and the appeals from our list, and those are not to be treated as part heard before us, even if so recorded. There will be no order as to costs.