JUDGMENT G. C. Bharuka, J. - The petitioner, which is a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 is aggrieved by the Award dated 2.5.1985 of the Respondent Labour Court in Reference no. 15 of 1981 by which Respondent no. 3, Sri Sahdeo Tiwary, has been directed to be reinstated in service with .full back wages and all consequential reliefs. 2. The facts giving rise to the dispute in question may be briefly summarised as below: Respondent no. 3 was employed as cook-cum-bearer by the petitioner in its Guest House on 30.8.1977. Subsequently by a letter dated 29th April, 1980, his services were terminated forthwith by allowing him pay and allowances for the period of notice (Annexure - 1) by the Registrar of the petitioner in purported exercise of powers under sub-rule (ii) of Rule 7 (A) of the Bye-laws of the petitioner society. This gave rise to a dispute between the Management and the workmen and since the same could not be resolved by reconciliation, the State Government by its notification dated 14.10.1981 referred the dispute to the Respondent - Labour Court for adjudication under Section 10 (1) (c) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act only). 2A. The Labour Court after due consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced by the contesting parties directed for reinstatement of the Respondent - workman with all back wages and consequential reliefs on the ground that the termination was violative of both the bye-laws of the petitioner - society as well as Section 25 F of the Act. 3. Mr. M. M. Banerjee, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has sought to assail the impugned Award on two grounds, namely, (i) The State Government is not the appropriate Government within the meaning of Section 2 (a) of the Act and, therefore, the reference made by it under Section 10 of the Act was incompetent rendering the entire consequential adjudication proceedings and the Award as null and void, and (ii) the Respondent no. 3 being a temporary employee on probation, his termination was legal under Rule 7 (A) (ii) of the relevant bye-laws. 4. 3 being a temporary employee on probation, his termination was legal under Rule 7 (A) (ii) of the relevant bye-laws. 4. So far as the first ground of challenge is concerned, it is relevant to state that the Indian School of Mines, which is now wider the administration of the petitioner - society was originally set up by the Central Government and was an organisation thereof. But subsequently considering the expediency of providing a better management and administration to the said institution, the Central Government under its resolution dated 21st June, 1967, decided to form a society under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, and also to give the institution the status of a deemed university under Section 3 of the University Grants Commission Act, 1956. It was also resolved that on registration of the society, there will be change in the proprietorship of the school inasmuch as it will become an autonomous body as a registered society as that of a Government organisation and its status of a Government organisation will cease to exist. Accordingly since the date of registration i.e. 1st July, 1967, the administration of the Indian School of Mines, Dhanbad, has vested in the petitioner society. 5. According to the Memorandum of Association, the general council of the school has to consist of the official and non-official members. The submission of Mr. Banerjee that since the general council and executive committee of the Board arc filled up by the Central Government either by official or nonofficial members, therefore, the petitioner as a society should be deemed to be carried on by and under the authority of the Central Government, and, as such, for making reference under Section 10, of the Act, the Central Government is the appropriate authority and not the State Government and, therefore, the reference in question is bad. In my opinion, the submissions made by Mr. Banerjee has no substance. After the petitioner was registered as a society under the Societies Registration Act, it acquired a distinct and independent legal status different from that of the Central Government and its affairs arc governed and regulated by its own general council and the Executive Board, which derives their powers and functions not from the Central Government but from the Memorandum of Association and Rules and Regulations of the petitioner-society. I need not discuss this aspect of the matter in greater details because the matter stands concluded by a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Heavy Engineering Mazdoor Union v. State of Bihar and others reported in 1969 (1) Supreme Court cases, 765, wherein except for a difference that H.E.C. petitioner of that case was a Government Company and the petitioner of the present case is a registered Society, all criteria for ascertaining as to whether the concerned Industry is "under the authority of the Central Government or not" are the same. It was held in that ease that an incorporated company has a separate existence and the law recognises it as a juristic person separate and distinct from its members. Accordingly after considering all aspects of the matter, it was held that the appropriate Government to make the reference was the State Government and not the Central Government. Accordingly, in my view, in the present case as well the appropriate Government is the State Government and, therefore, the reference was competent. 6. So far as the second ground of challenge is concerned it may be relevant to quote bye-laws 4, 5, 6 and 7 of the bye-laws of the petitioner - society in the matter of the classification and method of appointment and terms and conditions of service of non-teaching employees. 4. Probation and confirmation : (A) Every person appointed permanently to a post under the Society, after the commencement of these bye-laws, whether by promotion or by direct recruitment, shall be on probation in such post for a period of one year, provided that the appointing authority may, in any individual case, extend the period of probation to such extent as it deems necessary, the reasons thereof to be recorded in writing. (B) Where a person appointed to a post under the Society on probation is, during his period of probation, found unsuitable for holding that post or has not completed his period of probation satisfactorily - the appointing authority may : (i) in the case of a person appointed by promotion revert him to the post held by him immediately before such appointment; and (ii) in the case of a person appointed by direct recruitment terminate his services under the Society without notice. (C) Every person appointed to a permanent post under the Society by promotion or by direct recruitment shall on satisfactorily completing his period of probation, be eligible for confirmation on that post. (D) No employee shall be confirmed in any post unless; (i) the service of the employee under the Society is approved by the appointing authority. 5. Seniority: The seniority of employee in a particular grade shall be determined with reference to the date of satisfactory completion of probation, provided that the relative seniority of all direct recruits shall be determined by the order of merit in which they are selected for such appointments; persons appointed as a result of earlier selection being senior to those appointed as a result of subsequent selection. 6. Temporary and permanent service : (A) An employee shall be a temporary employee of the Society, until he is confirmed in a permanent post under the Society; (B) An employee confirmed in any permanent post under the Society shall be a permanent employee of the society. 7. Termination of service : (A) The service of a temporary employee may be terminated by the Board without assigning reasons. (i) during the period of probation following the first appointment, at any time without notice; and (ii) if the post is temporary, at any time by a notice of one month in writing given by the appointing authority to the employee, or, at any time without notice on payment of one month's pay. (B) The services of a permanent employee may be terminated by a notice of three months or on payment of pay for such period as the notice falls short of three months, or, without notice on payment of three months pay, if the post in which he was confirmed is abolished. (C) An employee who is given notice of termination of service under Bye-law 7 (B) may be granted, during the period of notice, such earned leave as may be admissible to him, and, where the leave so admissible and granted is more than three months, his services shall be terminated on the expiry of such leave. 7. On the basis of the evidence recorded during the adjudication proceeding before the Labour Court, it has been held in the impugned Award that the post on which the respondent - workman was employed was a permanent post. 7. On the basis of the evidence recorded during the adjudication proceeding before the Labour Court, it has been held in the impugned Award that the post on which the respondent - workman was employed was a permanent post. It is an admitted fad that he had remained on the post for more than 2 years i.e. from 30.8.77. Even if it is presumed that his initial appointment was on probation still under bye-law 4 (A) the period of probation at the first instance was only for one year. No doubt there is no document to show that by any specific order his services were confirmed but since after the expiry of the period of probation no adverse order was passed, therefore, it has to be presumed that his services were confirmed. In this view of mine, I find full support from a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of the State of Punjab vs. Dharam Singh reported in AIR 1968 Supreme Court, 1210, wherein it has been held that where, the service rules fix a certain period of time beyond which the probationary period can not be extended, and an employee appointed or promoted to a post on probation is allowed to continue in that post after completion of the maximum period of probation without an express order of confirmation, he can not be deemed to continue in that post as a probationer by implication. 8. In the order bf termination power has been sought to be exercised under bye-law 7 (A) (ii). But it has rightly been pointed out by the Labour Court that this provision can apply only to a situation where the post is temporary. But in the present case according to the evidence adduced on behalf of the Management, the post on which the Respondent - workman was working was a permanent post, therefore, placing of reliance on the said bye-law by the petitioner is wholly misplaced and misconceived. Since the petitioner has been in service for more than 240 days as has been found by the Labour Court, there has been admittedly non-compliance of Section 25F of the Act and, as such, the termination of the Respondent no. 3 is bad on this reason as well. 9. Keeping in view the aforesaid facts and circumstances of this case, I do not find any merit in this writ petition. It is, accordingly, dismissed. 3 is bad on this reason as well. 9. Keeping in view the aforesaid facts and circumstances of this case, I do not find any merit in this writ petition. It is, accordingly, dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.