JUDGMENT 1. - There is yet another challenge to the order dated December 23, 1976, passed by Hon'ble Chief Justice, which order was issued under the High Court of Rajasthan (Establishment of a Permanent Bench at Jaipur) Order, 1976 (for short, the Presidential Order). Before we take up the order of the Hon'ble Acting Chief Justice, we may state briefly the position after inauguration of the Constitution on January 26, 1950. After the inauguration of the Constitution on January 26, 1950, the old State of Rajasthan became a Part 'B' State. The new State of Rajasthan comprising of the territories mentioned in Section 10 of the State Reorganisation Act, 1956 (for short, the Act) was constituted on November 1, 1956, i.e., from the appointed date. Section 49 (2) of the Act contained a provision that from the appointed date, there shall be established a High Court for the new State of Rajasthan. As provided in Section 50(1) of the Act the existing High Court in the State of Rajasthan which till then was part B" State, ceased to function and 'stood abolished. The President issued an order on October 27, 1956 under sub-section(1) of Section 50, under which it was directed that the principal seat of the High Court for the new State of Rajasthan shall be at Jodhpur. The Chief Justice in exercise of his powers under Section 51(3) established a temporary Bench at Jaipur w.e.f. November 1, 1956. Subsequently, the said temporary Bench of the High Court at Jaipur was abolished by the Hon'ble Chief Justice under his order dated July 14, 1958. Since then the question of a permanent Bench of the High Court as under consideration of the Central Government. Eventually, the President in exercise of his powers conferred by sub-section(2) of Section 51 of the Act and after consultation with the Governor of Rajasthan and Chief Justice of the High Court of Rajasthan issued the Presidential Order which had come into force on January 31, 1977. The Presidential Order may now be read which reads as under: "In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (2) of Section 51 of the State Reorganisation Act, 1956 (37 of 1956), the President, after consultation with the Governor of Rajasthan and the Chief Justice of the High Court of Rajasthan, is pleased to make the following Order, namely: 1. The Presidential Order may now be read which reads as under: "In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (2) of Section 51 of the State Reorganisation Act, 1956 (37 of 1956), the President, after consultation with the Governor of Rajasthan and the Chief Justice of the High Court of Rajasthan, is pleased to make the following Order, namely: 1. Short title and commencement - (1) This Order may be called the High Court of Rajasthan (Establishment of a Permanent Bench at Jaipur) Order, 1976. (2) It shall come into force on the 31st day of January, 1977. 2. Establishment of a Permanent Bench of the Rajasthan High Court at Jaipur - There shall be established a permanent Bench of the High Court of Rajasthan at Jaipur, and such Judges of the High Court of Rajasthan, being not less than five in number, as the Chief Justice of that High Court may, from time to time nominate, shall sit at Jaipur in order to exercise the jurisdiction and power for the time being vested in that High Court in respect of cases arising in the districts of Ajmer, Alwar, Bharatpur, Bundi, Jaipur, Jhalawar, Jhunjhunu, Kotah, Sawaimadhopur, Sikar and Tonk: Provided that the Chief Justice of that I ugh Court may, in his discretion, order that any case or class of cases arising in any such district shall be heard at Jodhpur. Sd/- F.A. Ahmed President "After the aforesaid Presidential Order was issued the Hon'ble Acting Chief Justice, as said earlier, issued an order dated December 23,1976 which reads as under: "RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT JODHPUR NOTIFICATION No.1 /J-D Dated. Sd/- F.A. Ahmed President "After the aforesaid Presidential Order was issued the Hon'ble Acting Chief Justice, as said earlier, issued an order dated December 23,1976 which reads as under: "RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT JODHPUR NOTIFICATION No.1 /J-D Dated. December 23,1976 In pursuance of the High Court of Rajasthan (Establishment of a Permanent Bench at Jaipur) Order,1976 and in exercise of the powers under sub-section(2) of Section 44 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 read with Section 54 and 57 of the State Reorganisation Act, 1956, the Hon'ble the Chief Justice has been pleased to order that with effect from the 31st day of January, 1977- (a) all cases arising in the revenue districts of Banswara, Barmer, Bikaner, Bhilwara, Chittorgarh, Churu, Dungarpur, Ganganagar, Jaisalmer, Jalore, Jodhpur, Nagaur, Pali, Sirohi and Udaipur (except such case or class of cases as may by special order be transferred to the Jaipur Bench) shall be disposed of by the Court at Jodhpr, and (b) all cases arising in the revenue districts of Ajmer, Alwar, Bundi, Bharatpur, Jaipur, Jhalawar, Jhunjhunu, Kotah, Sawaimadhopur, Sikar and Tonk (except such case or class of cases as may by special order be transferred to the Court at Jodhpur) shall be disposed of by the Court at Jaipur: Provided that a Vacation Judge, whether sitting at Jodhpur or at Jaipur may hear any case irrespective of the district in which it has arisen for the purpose of deciding any matter which in his opinion requires immediate action. Explanation-A writ case shall be deemed to arise in the district where the cause of action for issuing the first order pertaining to that case passed by a Court, Tribunal or Authority has arisen irrespective of the district in which the appeal or revision from that order is heard and irrespective also of the fact whether or not there has been any modification or reversal of the order in appeal or revision." Sd/- Ved Pal Tyagi Chief Justice."There was a challenge to the Presidential Order as well as the aforesaid extracted order of the Chief Justice as well as few other orders issued by him, in the case of Ram Rakh Vyas v. Union of India, 1977 RLW 65 . The challenge to the aforesaid Presidential Order was inter alia on the grounds - (1) prior consultation with the Chief Justice is a sine qua non to the making of an order under Section 51 (2), the holding of consultation with the Acting Chief Justice was no 'consultation' within the meaning of Section 51 (2) of the Act; (2) the President has no power tinder Section 51(2) of the Act to curtail the jurisdiction of the principal seat of the High court at Jodhpur or to divide the High Court into territorial jurisdictions, nor can exclusive jurisdiction be conferred on the High Court Bench at Jaipur to hear the cases arising in the district falling within its jurisdiction as detailed in the Presidential Order; (3) the Act being of a transitory nature to meet certain exigencies arising out of the reorganisation of States on the appointed dated i.e. November 1, 1956, the exercise of power by the President of India under Section 51(2) after a lapse of 21 years is a complete nullity. The challenge on the aforesaid grounds did not survive and in the aforesaid case of Ram Rakh Vyas (supra) the court said that the Presidential Order was valid. In the aforesaid case of Ram Rakh Vyas (supra) the validity of various orders issued by the Chief Justice including the order dated December 23, 1976, was also challenged, but the challenge to it also did not survive. 2. The learned counsel for the petitioner as well as the learned Advocates who intervened on behalf of the Rajasthan High Court Bar Association, Jaipur contended that despite the aforesaid judgment in the case of Ram Rakh Vyas, under which the validity of the order of Hon'ble Chief Justice has been upheld, the matter needs re-examination because in that case the learned Judges did not examine in detail the validity of the Explanation to the Order dated December 23, 1976 of Hon'ble Acting Chief Justice had no jurisdiction to interpret the Presidential Order dated December 8, 1976, nor he had jurisdiction on the administrative side to lay down as to when a writ case shall be deemed to arise in the district where the cause of action for issuing the first order pertaining to that case passed by a court, tribunal or authority has arisen. It was also contended by the learned counsel that under clause (2) of Article 226 the power conferred by clause (1) of Article 226 to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, Authority or person may also be exercised by the High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or Authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories. Learned counsel therefore contend that the explanation to the aforesaid order of Hon'ble Acting Chief Justice is contrary to clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution and is in contravention of it and as all Acts and Rules including Notifications are subject to the provisions of the Constitution, the Explanation should be struck down being in contravention of clause (2) of Article 226 of. the Constitution of India. Learned counsel contended that the order of Hon'ble Acting Chief Justice curtails the jurisdiction of the Permanent Bench of the High Court at Jaipur and confines it to the districts mentioned in the order and it amounts to curtailment of the jurisdiction of the Permanent Bench at Jaipur. According to some of the learned counsel though not according to all of them, option is with the party to invoke the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution either at the principal seat at Jodhpur or at the permanent Bench at Jaipur. Looking to the controversy involved and the importance of the issues raised, we had given notice to the President of the Jodhpur Bar Association Jodhpur. We would have liked and appreciated if somebody on their behalf would have placed their point of view and assisted us in arriving at the right decision, but despite service none appeared on their behalf. The learned counsel for the respondents has contended that the aforesaid order as well as various orders made by the Hon'ble Chief Justice had been challenged in the case of Ram Rakh Vyas (supra) and even if it be assumed that they were challenged on some of the grounds and not on the grounds on which they are not challenged, the present is exercise in futility and the petitioner cannot be allowed to challenge it on other ground. 3. 3. We may state that there has been no challenge to the validity of the legal provisions of Section 51 of the Act in the present writ petition. If that be so, the Presidential Order dated December 8,1976, having been made by the President in exercise of the powers conferred on him under Section 51 (2) of the Act, firstly the same cannot be challenged and secondly the challenge to the aforesaid Presidential Order has been made, adjudicated and has been upheld to be valid. A permanent Bench at Jaipur had been created under the aforesaid Presidential Order and but for that order the Bench would not have been there. We fail to understand as to how on one hand there can be challenge to the aforesaid Presidential Order and on the other hand it can be argued that the permanent Bench at Jaipur has jurisdiction to issue writs throughout the territory of Rajasthan. We are of the opinion that so far as the validity of the Presidential Order is concerned, it is beyond challenge and as said in the earlier part of this order, its validity has already been tested and it has been held to be a valid order. 4. A bare reading of the Presidential Order dated December 8, 1976 will show that this permanent Bench at Jaipur had been created in order to exercise jurisdiction or power for the time being vested in the High Court in respect of cases arising in the districts of Ajmer, Alwar, Bharatpur, Bundi, Jaipur, Jhalawar, Jhunjhunu, Kotah, Sawai Madhopur, Sikar and Tonk in all 11 districts. In the aforesaid case of Ram Rakh Vyas a contention was raised that the President could not confer exclusive jurisdiction on the High Court Bench at Jaipur to hear the cases arising in the districts falling within the aforesaid eleven districts. In para 24, the learned Judges said- "The next contention that the President has no power under Section 51 (2) of the Act to curtail jurisdiction of the principal seat of the High Court at Jodhpur or to divide the High Court into two territorial jurisdictions, cannot also be accepted. Nor can it be accepted that the President could not by issuing the Presidential Order confer exclusive jurisdiction on the High Court Bench at Jaipur to hear the cases arising in the districts falling within its jurisdiction. Nor can it be accepted that the President could not by issuing the Presidential Order confer exclusive jurisdiction on the High Court Bench at Jaipur to hear the cases arising in the districts falling within its jurisdiction. These contentions are wholly devoid of substance. The curtailment of the territorial concomitant to the establishment of a permanent Bench, under Section 51(2) of the Act." In the case State of Maharashtra v. Narayan Shamrao Puranik and others, AIR 1983 SC 46 , the Apex Court was considering the provisions of the Act. Apex Court dealt with the scheme of the Act and in para 17 said- "Under the scheme of the Act, it would appear that having constituted a High Court for the new State of Bombay under sub-section (1) of Section 49 of the Act and conferred jurisdiction on it under Section 52 in relation to the territories of the new State, Parliament left it to the various high Constitutional functionaries designated in the three sub-sections of Section 51 of the Act to determine the place where the principal seat of the High Court should be located and places where permanent Bench or Benches of the High Court may be established, or where the Judges and Division Courts of the High Court may also sit." In para 25 again the Apex Court said that- "It is clear upon the terms of S. 51 of the Act that undoubtedly the President has the power under sub-section (1) to appoint the principal seat of the High Court for a new State. Likewise, the power of the President under sub-section (2) thereof, after consultation with the Governor of a new State and the Chief Justice of the High Court for that State pertains to the establishment of a permanent Bench or Benches of that High Court of a new State at one or more places within the State other than the place where the principal seat of the High Court is located and for any matter connected therewith clearly confer power on the President to define the territorial jurisdiction of the permanent Bench in relation to the principal seat as also for the conferment of exclusive jurisdiction to such permanent Bench to hear cases arising in districts falling within its jurisdiction. The creation of a permanent Bench under sub-section (2) of Section 51 of the Act must therefore bring about a territorial bifurcation of the High Court." A learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Suraj Mal v. State, AIR 1954 Rajasthan 303 , was examining the question of powers of the Vacation Judge in respect of cases arising in Jaipur division. Rule 63 of the rules of the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan, 1952 contemplate the arrangement that while a Judge sits at Jodhpur he disposes of the work arising in the area allotted to the court at Jodhpur and likewise a Judge sitting at Jaipur must dispose of work arising in the revenue division of Jaipur and Kotah. Against the order of the Sessions Judge, Bharatpur, a Revision Petition had been filed at Jodhpur, but it should have been filed at the Bench at Jaipur. In view of the Court an important question for determination was as to whether the principal seat at Jodhpur had jurisdiction to entertain the same ? The Revision Petition was filed during vacations. In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 42(2) of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (For short, the Ordinance) a Notification No. 50. Gen. dated November 26, 1952, was issued by which it was directed that (a) all cases arising in the revenue divisions of Bikaner, Jodhpur and Udaipur (except such as may by special order of the Chief Justice be transferred to Jaipur Bench) shall be disposed of by the Court at Jodhpur and (b) all cases arising in the revenue divisions of Jaipur and Kotah (except such as may by special order of the Chief Justice be transferred to the Court at Jodhpur) shall be disposed of by the Jaipur Bench. Learned Judge, I.N. Modi, J. said that- "It follows from the notifications set out above that the present case which has arisen in the revenue division of Jaipur can be disposed of only by the Jaipur Bench of this High Court, that is, a Bench sitting at Jaipur, unless such case has by special order of the Hon'ble Chief Justice been transferred to the Court at Jodhpur." Learned Judge, therefore, arrived at the conclusion that in accordance with the provisions of the Notifications and the Ordinance referred to above, the Court sitting at Jodhpur cannot dispose of the case and it is the Court at Jaipur which has jurisdiction to decide it. 5. We are of the opinion that there can be hardly any dispute that under the Presidential Order dated December 8, 1976, exclusive jurisdiction has been conferred on the permanent Bench to hear cases arising within the eleven districts falling within its jurisdiction and to that extent there is a curtailment of the territorial jurisdiction of the principal seat of the High Court at Jodhpur. Cases have come to our notice that on the ground that the view taken in the case of Ram Rakh Vyas (supra) is under challenge before the Apex Court the cases are being entertained by the principal seat of this Court, though arising within the revenue districts falling within the jurisdiction of the permanent Bench of this Court at Jaipur, they are being entertained at Jodhpur. In the case of Ram Rakh Vyas (supra) a Division Bench of this Court has taken a clear view that the aforesaid Persidential Order confers exclusive jurisdiction on the permanent Bench of this Court at Jaipur so far as cases arising in 11 districts mentioned therein are concerned and therefore unless that view is set aside by the Apex Court the principal seat of this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain cases arising within 11 districts covered by the Presidential Order. We are, therefore, of the opinion that so far as 11 districts are concerned, exclusive jurisdiction in respect of cases arising in those 11 districts is conferred on the permanent Bench of this Court at Jaipur. 6. We will now take up the challenge to the Notification dated December 23, 1976 issued by Hon'ble Acting Chief Justice and more so to its Explanation. 6. We will now take up the challenge to the Notification dated December 23, 1976 issued by Hon'ble Acting Chief Justice and more so to its Explanation. The Notification alongwith the Explanation has already been extracted in the earlier part of this order. So far as the aforesaid Notification without Explanation is concerned, it is virtually the reproduction of the Presidential Order dated December 8, 1976 and no argument has been advanced insofar; as the challenge to it is concerned. The main thrust of the learned counsel for the petitioner as well as interveners is that the aforesaid Explanation is counter to the Presidential Order and is against the mandate of clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It was contended by the learned counsel that Hon'ble Chief Justice had no jurisdiction to define as to when the cause of action in a writ case shall be deemed to arise. A perusal of the aforesaid Notification of the Hon'ble Chief Justice will show that source of power/powers under which the aforesaid Notification has been issued is (i) Presidential Order, (ii) sub-section (2) of Section 44 of the Ordinance, and (iii) Sections 54 and 57 of the Act. A perusal of the Presidential Order which has already been extracted in the earlier part of this order, will show that proviso to its para 2 confers on the Chief Justice only discretion to order that any case or class of cases arising in the eleven districts mentioned in para 2, shall be heard at Jodhpur. In our opinion, the said Explanation cannot be issued and has not been issued in exercise of the discretion conferred by the proviso to Para 2 of the Presidential Order, as the proviso does not confer any power on the Chief Justice to provide as to when a writ case shall be deemed to arise. A bare reading to sub-section (2) of Section 44 of the Ordinance will show that it provides that the Chief Justice shall be responsible for the distribution and conduct of the business of the High Court, and shall determine which Judge in each case will sit alone and which Judges of the Court will constitute a Bench. The aforesaid proviso has nothing to do with the allocation of work to the Judges. The aforesaid proviso has nothing to do with the allocation of work to the Judges. This question was examined by a Full Bench of this Court in the case of State v. Sri Narain and others, 1950 RLW 10 and in para 28 of the judgment, the Full Bench of this Court said- "According to the plain grammatical construction of the sentence, the Chief Justice has to determine which particular Judge shall sit alone and which Judges shall constitute a Division Bench. It has nothing to do with the allotment of cases to a Judge or Judges." "..... after framing of the roster and the rules for the constitution of Benches and distribution of cases, it becomes only a matter of routine for the Registrar to prepare a list showing the allotment of cases to various Judges. In any case, it is a matter relating to administrative control... Coming to Sections 54 and 57 of the Act, Section 54 deals with practice and procedure and under it subject to the provisions of part V, the law in force immediately before the appointed day with respect to practice and procedure in the High Court for the corresponding State shall with necessary modification apply in relation to the High Court for a new State and accordingly, the High Court for the New State shall have all such powers to make and orders with respect to practice and procedure as are immediately before the appointed day, exercisable by the High Court for the corresponding State. Section 57 of the Act deals with the powers of Judges. We fail to understand as to how Section 54 and 57 of the Act can confer any administrative powers, much less legislative powers, on the Hon'ble Chief Justice to provide as to when a writ case shall be deemed to arise. It will depend on the facts of each case as to where a writ case arises and it will be for the Judge to decide whether the writ case arises within the jurisdiction of the permanent Bench at Jaipur or not. Thus, we are of the opinion that the Explanation which was inserted in the aforesaid Notification dated December 23, 1976 by the Hon'ble Chief Justice, is beyond the power of Hon'ble Chief Justice to say as to when a writ case shall be deemed to arise. Thus, we are of the opinion that the Explanation which was inserted in the aforesaid Notification dated December 23, 1976 by the Hon'ble Chief Justice, is beyond the power of Hon'ble Chief Justice to say as to when a writ case shall be deemed to arise. So far as Presidential Order is concerned, it only provides that the judges nominated by the Chief Justice sitting at Jaipur shall exercise their jurisdiction in respect of cases arising in the eleven districts mentioned therein and as to whether any case arises in any of the eleven districts mentioned therein, or not, it is not for the Hon'ble Acting Chief Justice to say and it would have been for the court to say when the occasion would have so arisen. In the case of Ram Rakh Vyas (supra) it appears that though the validity of the Notification dated December 23, 1976 of Hon'ble Acting Chief Justice was examined, but it does not appear that there was any specific challenge to the Explanation or to the powers of Hon'ble Acting Chief Justice to provide any Explanation as to when a writ case shall be deemed to arise. A look at the Explanation will show that it provides that a writ case shall be deemed to arise in the district where the cause of action for issuing the first order pertaining to that case passed by a Court, tribunal or authority has arisen. In the case of Ram Rakh Vyas (supra) in para 31, the learned Judges said that the words 'arising in' must in the context mean 'pertaining to the districts or' or 'arising from'. Any other meaning given to these words would result in a construction reduction absurdum. It will appear from a perusal of para 2 of the Presidential Order that the expression used therein is "in respect of cases arising in the districts of ....... Almost similar expression in respect of cases arising in such areas came up for consideration before the Apex Court in the case of Nasiruddin v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, AIR 1976 SC 331 . The Apex Court was considering para 14 of the United Provinces High Courts (Amalgamation) Order, 1948. Almost similar expression in respect of cases arising in such areas came up for consideration before the Apex Court in the case of Nasiruddin v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, AIR 1976 SC 331 . The Apex Court was considering para 14 of the United Provinces High Courts (Amalgamation) Order, 1948. The said para 14 of that Order is as under : "The new High Court, and the Judges and division courts thereof, shall sit at Allahabad or at such other places in the United Provinces as the Chief Justice may, with the approval of the Governor of the United Provinces appoint : Provided that unless the Governor of the United Provinces with concurrence of the Chief Justice, otherwise directs, such judges of the new High Court, not less than two in number, as the Chief Justice, may from time to time nominate, shall sit at Lucknow in order to exercise in respect of cases arising in such areas in Oudh, as the Chief Justice may direct, the jurisdiction and power for the time being vested in the new High Court : Provided further that the Chief Justice may in his discretion order that any case or class of cases arising in the said areas shall be heard at Allahabad." The view of the High Court in respect of the aforesaid expression was that with regard to an application under Article 226 of the Constitution the same will be a case arising within the areas in Oudh only if the right of the petitioner in such an application arose first at a place within an area in Oudh. In view of the Apex Court the implication according to the High Court is that if the right of the petitioner arise first at any place outside any area in Oudh and if the subsequent orders either in the revisional or appellate stage were passed by an authority within an area in Oudh, then in such cases the Lucknow Bench would not have any jurisdiction. The Apex Court is that in most cases where an appeal or revision would lie to the State Government, the impugned order would be made at Lucknow and on that view practically all writ petitions would arise at Lucknow. The Apex Court in para 36 said that:- "The conclusion as well as the reasoning of the High Court is incorrect. The Apex Court is that in most cases where an appeal or revision would lie to the State Government, the impugned order would be made at Lucknow and on that view practically all writ petitions would arise at Lucknow. The Apex Court in para 36 said that:- "The conclusion as well as the reasoning of the High Court is incorrect. It is unsound because the expression 'cause of action' in an application under Article 226 would be as the expression is understood and if the cause of action arose because of the appellate order of the revisional order which came to be passed at Lucknow then Lucknow would have jurisdiction though the original order was passed at a place outside the areas in Oudh. It may be that the original order was in favour of the person applying for a writ. In such case an adverse appellate order might be the cause of action. The expression 'cause of action' is well known. If the cause of action arises wholly or in part at a place within the specified Oudh areas, the Lucknow Bench will have jurisdiction. If the cause of action arises wholly within the specified Oudh areas, it is indisputable that the Lucknow Bench would have exclusive jurisdiction in such a matter. If the cause of action arises in part within the specified areas in Oudh it would be open to the litigant who is the dominus litis to have his forum convenient. The litigant has the right to go to a Court where part of his cause of action arises. In such cases, it is incorrect to say that the litigant chooses any particular court. The choice is by reason of the jurisdiction of the Court being attracted by part of cause of action arising within the jurisdiction of the Court. Similarly, if the cause of action can be slid to have arisen partly within specified areas in Oudh and partly outside the specified Oudh areas, the litigant will have the choice to institute proceedings either at Allahabad or Lucknow. The court will find out in each case whether the jurisdiction of the Court is rightly attracted by the alleged cause of action." The aforesaid case of Nasiruddin (supra) was referred to in the case of Ram Rakh Vyas by this Court but in a different context. The court will find out in each case whether the jurisdiction of the Court is rightly attracted by the alleged cause of action." The aforesaid case of Nasiruddin (supra) was referred to in the case of Ram Rakh Vyas by this Court but in a different context. It will appear from a perusal of para 35 of the aforesaid decision that the learned Single Judge against whose decision the Special Appeal had been filed and was being considered, had held that the cases 'instituted' at the Jaipur Bench after 31.1.1977 shall be heard only at Jaipur Bench. The Division Bench in the aforesaid case of Ram Rakh Vyas (supra) said that the view of the learned Single Judge is contrary to the proviso to the Presidential Order, and in the view of the Division Bench, learned Single Judge appears to have in reaching that conclusion, followed the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Nasiruddin's case (supra), which was distinguishable. The court said that- "Their Lordships decision in Nasiruddin's case (supra) is dearly distinguishable. There, their Lordships were concerned with amalgamation of two High Courts. After the amalgamation, the two High Courts ceased to exist and became Benches of the newly constituted High Court. In those circumstances, their Lordships held that a case 'instituted' at a particular Bench had to be 'heard' at that Bench. Here, there is creation of a permanent Bench by a Presidential Order issued under Section 51(2). The matter falls to be determined by the terms of the Presidential Order which by the proviso enables the withdrawal of a case or Class of cases from the permanent Bench at Jaipur to the main seat at Jodhpur." It appears from the aforesaid case of Ram Rakh Vyas (supra) that strictly speaking the Explanation to the Notification dated December 23,1976, modified by the Notification dated January 12, 1977, never came up for consideration before this Court, its validity was not under challenge and was not adjudicated. We have already said that Hon'ble Acting Chief Justice had no power or jurisdiction to issue the Explanation either under the Presidential Order or under sub-section (2) of Section 44 of the Ordinance or under Sections 54 and 57 of the Act. We have already said that Hon'ble Acting Chief Justice had no power or jurisdiction to issue the Explanation either under the Presidential Order or under sub-section (2) of Section 44 of the Ordinance or under Sections 54 and 57 of the Act. Hon'ble Acting Chief Justice has no power to legislate as to how and when the cause of action in respect of a writ case shall be deemed to arise. By virtue of clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution, this Court has jurisdiction to issue writ in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, certiorari etc. mentioned therein not only in case where within its territory the cause of action arises wholly, but also it arises in part. We have already said in the earlier part of this order that creation of permanent Bench at Jaipur confers exclusive jurisdiction on the permanent Bench at Jaipur in respect of cases arising in eleven districts mentioned in the Presidential Order and to that extent the jurisdiction of the principal seat at Jodhpur is excluded, unless under the proviso to para 2 of the Presidential Order, the Chief Justice orders that any case or class of cases arising in any of the eleven districts for which this permanent Bench had been created shall be heard at Jodhpur. The Explanation cannot be said to have been issued under the proviso to para 2 of the Presidential Order. In our opinion, the Hon'ble Acting Chief Justice had absolutely no power to provide as to in which district a writ case shall be deemed to arise. The said Explanation is not confined only to the eleven districts for which the permanent Bench at Jaipur was created but also in respect of revenue districts of Bansw' ra and other districts in respect of cause of actions arising in those districts. In our opinion, even if a part of cause of action arises in any of the districts either within the jurisdiction of principal seat at Jodhpur or within the jurisdiction of permanent Bench at Jaipur, the principal seat at Jodhpur and permanent Bench at Jaipur will have jurisdiction in respect of writ cases. In our opinion, even if a part of cause of action arises in any of the districts either within the jurisdiction of principal seat at Jodhpur or within the jurisdiction of permanent Bench at Jaipur, the principal seat at Jodhpur and permanent Bench at Jaipur will have jurisdiction in respect of writ cases. Ultimately, it will be for the court to decide whether a case arises within the revenue district which is within the districts (sic jurisdiction) of principal seat at Jodhpur or within the jurisdiction of permanent Bench at Jaipur and Hon'ble Acting Chief Justice absolutely had no power to provide as to in which revenue district a writ case shall be deemed to arise. Hon'ble Acting Chief Justice could not provide that a writ case shall be deemed to arise in the district where the cause of action for issuing the first order pertaining to that case passed by a court, tribunal or authority has arisen irrespective of the district in which the appeal or revision from that order is heard and irrespective also of the fact whether or not there has been any modification or reversal of the order in appeal or revision. Though, in the case of Nasiruddin (supra) the Apex Court was considering amalgamation of the High Courts, but in our opinion the ratio of that case will be applicable even in the case of creation of permanent Bench of the High Court under sub-section (2) of Section 54 of the Act and thereby conferring exclusive jurisdiction on the permanent Bench and it is for the court ultimately to decide and to find out whether the jurisdiction of the court is attracted by cause of action and whether it has arisen wholly or in part. If the cause of action arises wholly or in part within the jurisdiction of principal seat at Jodhpur or permanent Bench at Jaipur, they will have jurisdiction even in a writ case. 7. We are therefore of the opinion that the Explanation to the aforesaid order dated December 23,1976, as modified by order dated January 12, 1977, of Hon'ble Chief Justice, is beyond his powers and is contrary to the Presidential Order as well as against the mandate of clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution of India. We strike down the aforesaid Explanation. 8. We strike down the aforesaid Explanation. 8. Consequently, we hereby allow this writ petition and our conclusions are as under : I. By creation of the permanent Bench at Jaipur under the Presidential Order dated December 8, 1976, exclusive jurisdiction has been conferred on the permanent Bench at Jaipur in respect of cases arising in the districts of Ajmer, Alwar, Bharatpur, Bundi, Jaipur, Jhalawar, Jhunjhunu, Kotah, Sawai Madhopur, Sikar and Tonk and the principal seat of the High Court at Jodhpur has no jurisdiction in respect of cases arising in those districts, unless under the proviso to para 2 of the aforesaid Presidential Order the Hon'ble Chief Justice orders that any case or class of cases shall be heard at Jodhpur. II. The Explanation to the Notification dated December 23, 1976 as modified vide Notification dated January 12, 1977 of Hon'ble Chief Justice is without jurisdiction, against the Presidential Order and against clauses (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution of India and it is hereby struck down and whether a case arises within the jurisdiction of the principal seat of the High Court or within the jurisdiction of the permanent Bench of this Court, it will be decided only by the Court as and when occasion arises. Costs made easy. Petition allowed. *******