R. L. Gupta, J. ( 1 ) IN this petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution, the petitioner, a partnership firm, prays for quashing the demand ofrs. 54,90,089. 00 raised by letter dated 24/03/1992 issued by the Assistantcollector, Nazul, under Section 68 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887, asextended to Delhi. The demand is admittedly towards arrears of ground rentand interest accrued thereon respecting plot of land bearing No. 6, Nehruplace, New Delhi, purchased by the petitioner on perpetual leasehold basis inan auction conducted on 5/08/1980 by the first respondent Delhi Development Authority. The bid of the petitioner in the sum of Rs. 5,18,00,000. 00had been accepted by letter dated 21/08/1980 of the DDA. This premiumwas to be paid within a certain period for which, it appears, there is nodispute. ( 2 ) THE terms of auction stipulated that the petitioner would have toerect a building in accordance with the plans prescribed within two years ofthe date of possession of the plot. the possession of the plot was handedover to the petitioner on 8/05/1981. In addition to the premium thepetitioner was to pay yearly ground rent. The ground pent was at the rate ofrupee one per annum for first two years allowed for. the purpose of construction and thereafter it was to be charged at the annual rate of 2-1/2% of theamount of premium. The petitioner construsted the building and sold flatsto various persons. On our direction the petitioner filed the purchaseagreement entered into between it and the purchasers of the flats. This agreement also provides that ground rent is payable to DDA at the rate of 2-1/2%per annum on the premium of the plot w. e. f. 8/05/1983. The agreement provides that the ground rent has to be paid by the buyers to the petitioner inproportion to the area of their respective flats and the share payable by eachbuyer shall be determined by the petitioner on the basis of the total saleable areain the building. This share is to be paid by the buyer on or before the firstapril of every year. The agreement-also stipulates that if the ground rent isrevised by the DDA it shall be payable by the buyers proportionately whenincreased/enhanced. This share is to be paid by the buyer on or before the firstapril of every year. The agreement-also stipulates that if the ground rent isrevised by the DDA it shall be payable by the buyers proportionately whenincreased/enhanced. ( 3 ) THE petitioner contended that in the letter dated 21/08/1980the DDA while accepting the bid of the petitioner also stated that the yearlyrent would be payable in advance at the time of the execution of the leasedeed. Since the lease deed has not so far been executed, the petitioner says itis not bound to pay any ground rent. This to our mind is misreading of theletter. We have set out the terms of, the auction. It is not that petitionerhas not paid any ground rent so far. He has done so without any protest. He is, however, in arrears. It. has also not been disputed that the petitionerin turn would have recovered-ground rent proportionately from various buyers. The petitioner has, however, not cared to file any such statement as to howmuch ground rent he has recovered from various buyers of the flats thoughhalf-heartedly it was contended by Mr. Kumar, learned Counsel for the petitioner, that the buyers were not paying their shares of ground rent and thepetitioner had to file about 200 suits. There are no such particulars and weare unable to accept any such submission. ( 4 ) IT may be noted that the petitioner earlier filed writ petition in thiscourt on 16/05/1989, it being C. W. No. 1412/89. In this writ petition,which was also respecting the same plot of land, the petitioner said thatmoratorium of ground rent should be for five years and not two years. Thisplea was rejected by this Court and the petition was dismissed in limine. Theletter dated 21/08/1980 now sought to be taken advantage of was alsoone of the annexures in that writ petition, but no such plea,- as now beingraised, was ever raised there which clearly is an after thought and withoutmerit. Mr. Kumar, however, submitted that a Special Leave Petitionagainst the order dismissing the earlier writ petition was filed in the Supremecourt. ( 5 ) WHEN this writ petition was filed, apart from filing the impugneddemand, the petitioner filed no document if there was any demand raised,,earlier. Mr. Kumar, however, submitted that a Special Leave Petitionagainst the order dismissing the earlier writ petition was filed in the Supremecourt. ( 5 ) WHEN this writ petition was filed, apart from filing the impugneddemand, the petitioner filed no document if there was any demand raised,,earlier. We adjourned the matter to find out if the petitioner did not receiveany letter regarding payment of ground rent by this period and what wouldbe the rate of interest for delayed payment of ground rent. Then a letterdated 22/03/1990 of the DDA was brought on record wherein the DDAhad raised a demand for payment of. Rs. 22,14,488. 75 towards arrears ofground rent and interest. The petitioner sent a reply to this letter which isdated 2/04/1990 in which it mentioned filing of the earlier writ petitionwhich made us to look into that petition. ( 6 ) THEN Mr. Kumar contended that after the impugned notice wasreceived from the Assistant Collector a partner of. the petitioner "met therespondents" and he was threatened that in case the demand was not paid by 31/03/1992 the partners would be arrested and their property attached. It is stated that the partner met the respondents on 30/03/1992. Thoughwe will give no credence to any such meeting, we do not find any infirmity inthe impugned notice of demand ( 7 ) MR. Kumar said that provisions of the Revenue Recovery Act,1890, and the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887 as extended to Delhi, have beenviolated inasmuch as the Assistant Collector had no authority to issue such anotice under Section 68 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887. He saidsomewhat similar point was taken by him in Criminal Writ No. 54-D/64 filedby him in the Circuit Bench of the Punjab High Court, at Delhi. We sent forthat file also. In that case the petitioner had been detained for recovery ofarrears of land revenue, he having been held to be adefaulter. In that casethe petitioner himself pleaded that procedure laid down in Section 5 of therevenue Recovery Act and Section 69 (2) of the Punjab Land Revenue Act hadnot been followed. The petitioner had been detained by the Tehsildar, Nazul,in that case. That writ petition was dismissed as having been infructuous andthere is nothing in that writ petition to our mind supports the contentionraised by Mr. Kumar. The petitioner had been detained by the Tehsildar, Nazul,in that case. That writ petition was dismissed as having been infructuous andthere is nothing in that writ petition to our mind supports the contentionraised by Mr. Kumar. ( 8 ) UNDER Section 40a of the Delhi Development Act, 1957, anyamount due to DDA can be recovered as arrears of land revenue if no othermode is specifically prescribed for the purpose. It is not disputed that thearrears of ground rent and the interest accruing thereon are recoverable, asarrears of land revenue. Under Section 5 of the Revenue Recovery Act, DDAcould request the. Collector of the District for. recovery of the amount due toit as if it was an arrear of land revenue. Then the mode of recovery has to beexercised under the provisions ofthe Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887, asextended to Delhi. For the time being only a notice of demand has beenraised. For the purposes of this petition, it is not disputed before us that theamount as contained in the notice is not due to the DDA. The petitionercannot sit over such a huge amount when particularly he must have recoveredthe same from the buyers of the flats and utilised the money for his ownbenefit. In spite of our specific order the petitioner did not file all the correspondence leading to his payment of ground rent and interest thereon. Ratherhe filed an affidavit that this Court directed him to give particulars of the correspondence only after 1989. This is not correct. With such a conduct ofthe petitioner we would not like to interfere in exercise of our jurisdictionunder Article 226 of the Constitution. The petition is, therefore, dismissed inlimine.