Judgment : The Inspector of Police (Law& Order), Thiruvotriyur Police Station, Madras, laid an information under Sec. 107 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Act II of 1974 for short ‘the Code’) against the counter-petitioners, namely, (1) sister Yogammal, (2) Pastor Amirtharaj, (3) Pandian, (4) Devasagayam, (5) John Wosly, (6) Albert, (7) John Meslock, and (8) Company Commander Krishnamoorthi, between whom and another group led by Ka.Ki.Anandan, President, Thirunagar Welfare Association, Madras-90, it is said, there were frequent quarrels and skirmishes, resulting in breach of the peace and thereby affecting the public tranquillity in that locality, on which, the Sub Divisional Executive Magistrate, and Sub Collector, Saidapet, deriving subjective satisfaction, passed a preliminary order dated 19. 1991 in R.C.NO.10478/19-E under Seel 11 of the Code requiring them to appear before him on 10. 1991 and to show cause as to why they should not be ordered to execute a bond for Rs.l,000each for keeping the peace for a period of one year. 2. Three out of eight counter-petitioners, being petitioners 1, 2 and 4, namely, Sister Yogammal, Paster Amirtharaj and Devasagayam filed Crl.O.P.No.9940 of 1991, impleading the State represented by its Inspector of Police (Law & Order), Thiruvolriyur, Madras as the sole respondent, to quash the said proceedings initiated against them and the same had been admitted and interim stay of all further proceedings had been granted in Crl.M.P.No.5815 of 1991 on 10. 1991. 3. It is at this state, Ka.Ki.Anandan filed Crl.M.P.No.-541 of 1992 therein to implead him as second respondent. 4. Meenakshi Mouldings Private Ltd., is having its office at Mayiladuthurai, Nagappattinam-Quaid-E-Millet District. One G.Sureshkumar, it is "said, was appointed as the Full-time Director of the said company and he was, in that capacity, in the administration of the day-to-day affairs of the factory of the said company at Mayiladuthurai. By a duly constituted meeting of the Board of Directors, it is said, he was removed from the Directorship on 2. 1990 and also in the Extraordinary! General Body Meeting with effect from 30.4.1990. On his removal from Directorship, it is alleged, he engaged himself in nefarious activities and committed theft by removing the moulds from the! factory in the early hours of 30.3.1990. 1990 and also in the Extraordinary! General Body Meeting with effect from 30.4.1990. On his removal from Directorship, it is alleged, he engaged himself in nefarious activities and committed theft by removing the moulds from the! factory in the early hours of 30.3.1990. A com, plaint, it is said, was lodged on 30.3.1990 with the Inspector of Police (Law and Order), Mayiladuthurai, who in turn, it is said, registered a case in Crime No.408 of 1990 for alleged offences under Sees. 147, 448 and 379, I.P.C. and further investigation had been taken up. 5. After complying with the formalities of the investigation, a final report under Sec.173(2) of the Code, it is said, had been laid before learned Judicial Magistrate, Mayiladuthurai on 14. 1990, referring the matter as ‘mistake of fact’ in R.CS.No.3 of 1990. 6. It seems, however, reinvestigation had been taken up, for quashing of which, Crl.O.P.No.10058 of 1991 had been filed before this Court. The same, it is said, had been admitted and in fact, interim stay of all further proceedings was also said to have been ordered in Crl.M.P.No.5864 of 1991 on 110. 1991. 7. In order to circumvent that stay order, it is said, the said company lodged another complaint on 111. 1991 for alleged occurrence that took place on the night of 23. 1990, which was stated to have been registered in Crime No.1361 of 1991 by the same police station for alleged offences under Secs.379, 380, 406 and 409, I.P.C., without even making a whisper about the earlier complaint and its subsequent disposal. .8. It is that this juncture, the said G.Sureshkumar filed Crl.O.P.No.1209 of 1992 impleading the Inspector of Police, Mayiladuthurai, Nagai-Quide-Millet District as the sole respondent, to.quash the sard criminal proceedings as against him. The same had been admitted and interim stay of all further proceedings had been granted in Crl.M.P.No.807 of 1992 on 2. 1992. 9. The aforesaid company now filed Crl.M.P.No.1718 of 1992 therein praying to implead it as the second respondent. 10. The same had been admitted and interim stay of all further proceedings had been granted in Crl.M.P.No.807 of 1992 on 2. 1992. 9. The aforesaid company now filed Crl.M.P.No.1718 of 1992 therein praying to implead it as the second respondent. 10. One Subbulakshmi, it is said, lodged an information before the Inspector of Police (Dowry Cell), Crime Branch, Egmore, Madras, as against her husband M.Damodhara Rao and his relations, namely M.Achutharamakrishanadas, Sivagami and Kunjikannan for alleged offences under Scc.498-A, I.P.C., which culminated in the registration of a case and filing of a final report under Sec. 173(2) of the Code, and which, after taking on file by the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, Madras, as a calendar case, it is said, ended in conviction and sentence to various terms of imprisonment, in addition to fine, resulting in the filing of an appeal in C.A.No.112 of 1991 before the Principal Sessions Judge, Madras. 11. During the pendency of the said appeal, the said Subbulakshmi filed Crl.M.P.No.688 of 1992 under Sec.301 of the Code seeking for permission for engagement of a counsel of her choice to assist the City Public Prosecutor prosecution and the permission, so sought for, had been complied with. 12. When the appeal was listed for hearing, the arguments of ‘learned counsel for the appellants-accused as well as the arguments of learned City Public Prosecutor were heard. It was at that juncture, learned counsel engaged by the complainant, who was permitted to assist the prosecution, wanted to have a right of audience, by filing an additional memo, in the sense of adducing oral arguments, to which course, strong, and stout opposition emerged from both learned counse for the appellants-accused as well as learned C ty Public Prosecutor. Learned Principal Sessions Judge, after hearing the arguments of all concerned, negatived the right of audience of learned counsel engaged by the complainant-P.W.l of ther own choice, who was permitted to assist the prosecution. It is to set aside the said order, the coriplainant-P.W.l filed Crl.O.P.No.2410 of 1992 on the file of this Court. .13. Learned Principal Sessions Judge, after hearing the arguments of all concerned, negatived the right of audience of learned counsel engaged by the complainant-P.W.l of ther own choice, who was permitted to assist the prosecution. It is to set aside the said order, the coriplainant-P.W.l filed Crl.O.P.No.2410 of 1992 on the file of this Court. .13. Even at the stage of admission of the said petition, Mr.A.Raghunathan, learned counsel appearing for the complainant-P.W.l have advanced elaborate arguments, touching upon the moot question of right of audience to a private counsel engaged by a complainant to assist the prosecution, with reference to various salient provisions adumbrated in the Code and the arguments so advanced by him, had been practically endorsed, besides being supplemented by Mr.B.Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in Crl.M.P.No.1718 of 1992 and Mr.P.N.Prakash, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in Crl.M.P.No.541 of 1992. 14. Learned Public Prosecutor Mr.B.Sriramulu, Mr.S.Doraisami, learned counsel appearing for first respondent in Crl.O.P No.1718 of 1992 and Mr.Calvin Jacob, learned counsel appearing for respondents 1 to 3 in Crl M.P.No.541 of 1992 countered the said arguments, with all vehemence and force. 15. Since the question invclved is of paramount importance, being agitated before courts, day-in and day-out, an open invitation has been extended to the Members of the Bar for rendering assistance to the court for solving the tangle posed in all these matters, in the best of fashion possible. 16. Mr.M.Karpaga Vinayagam volunteered his services an amicus curiae and rendered his able assistance by bringing 10 the notice of this Court all the precedents of this and other High Courts of Judicature as well as the apex court of this country on the subject in issue. 17. Since the question of law arising for decision is one and the same, arguments in all these petitions are taken up together for rendering a common order. .18. The moot question that arises for consideration in all these pel itions revolves on the following point. ."In a case instituted on a police report, where prosecution is in charge of either Public Prosecutor or Assistant Public Prosecutor, is it legally permissible either for the aggrieved complainant or anyone claiming to be interested in prosecution to seek his/her impleadment, as a necessary party and pray for right of audience, through a counsel of his/her own choice, in various stages inquiry, trial or appeal of the proceedings?" 19. Before delving deep into discussion as to various hues of views on this vexed question of learned Judges of this as well as other High Courts, I may feel impelled to refer to the various salient provisions indicative of the scheme of the Code, relevant for our purpose and also to a decision of the apex court of this country as to what is meant by ‘ratio of decision’, in a bid to rather have a good grasp and understanding as to the tenability or otherwise of those: views. 20. Under the Code, offences have been classified into two categories, namely, ‘cognizable’ and ‘non-cognizable’. While making such a classification, gravity of the offences had apparently been taken into account, Special procedures had been prescribed for inquiry, investigation and trial of those offences. A criminal offence of non-cognizable nature is construed in law as trivial in nature, affecting the individual only, against whom such an offence is committed and an option thereby is given to such an aggrieved person to launch prosecution and the Stale cannot be slated to be interested in prosecuiing persons accused of such offences. But, on the other hand, a criminal offence of cognizable nature is construed as a crime against social interest of the community at large and that periiaps is the reason for the State to take all steps necessary for bringing the person, who has acted against social interest of the community, to book, by stepping into the: shoes of the person aggrieved, notwithstanding the fact that such aggrieved person is or is not interested in pursuing the matter further, thereby making it clear that the person really arrived in such a contingency cannot be anyone other than the State. It is obviously on the score of this principle, the administration of criminal justice system is founded upon. 121. Special provisions had also been made in the Code as to persons, to be in charge and conduct of the prosecution, besides making provision, for the conduct of trial for and on behalf of a person accused of such an offence. The various provisions adumbrated in the Code on this aspect of the matter are traceable to Secs.2(u), 24,25,225,234, 301, 302,303 and 304 thereof. .22. The various provisions adumbrated in the Code on this aspect of the matter are traceable to Secs.2(u), 24,25,225,234, 301, 302,303 and 304 thereof. .22. A survey of these provisions does indicate appointment of a Public Prosecutor either by the State or the Central Government to be in charge of a prosecution in respect of cases filed before court and conduct prosecution therefor. This apart, in certain contingencies and circumstances, a police officer of a specified rank, who is not in charge of an investigation, is permitted to conduct a case. Excepting the mode and manner indicated in the provisions adumbrated under Secs.301 and 302of the Code, there is no mention as to the allowing of a private party to engage a counsel of its choice so as to conduct the prosecution. 123. Sec.225 specifically mandates that a prosecution before a court of session shall be conducted by a Public Prosecutor. As such, a prosecution conducted by a counsel engaged in brief by a complainant and not by the Public Prosecutor is in violation of the express and mandatory provisions adumbrated therefor. It is also clear from Secs.24 and 301 of the Code that a pleader privately engaged by a party cannot plead, although he can act under the control, supervision and directions of the Public Prosecutor and may with the permission of the court submit written arguments, after the evidence is closed in the case and the prosecution shall be conducted by the Public Prosecutor himself. .24. Pertinent it is at this juncture to refer to the views expressed by the Joint Select Committee, in support of the change introduced in the last part of sub-sec.(2) of Sec.301 of the Code and the committee said thus: "The committee considers that where a private person instructs a pleader as provided in sub-sec.(2),such pleadershould have the facility of submitting written arguments of the case on the evidence with the permission of the court. This is considered necessary because in some cases the complainant may have a feeling that the arguments of the Public Prosecutor or the Assistant Public Prosecutor require to be supplemented.“ .25. This is considered necessary because in some cases the complainant may have a feeling that the arguments of the Public Prosecutor or the Assistant Public Prosecutor require to be supplemented.“ .25. A discretion, that is exercisable by a Magistrate, during the course of any inquiry or trial, for allowing a private pleader or counsel to conduct prosecution, cannot at all be construed, in the context of the other provisions in the Code, to mean that such pleader or counsel can act in isolation or independent of the Public Prosecutor or Assistant Public Prosecutor, in charge of the case and if at all, such a pleader or counsel should have no place other than that of one strictly supporting the officer, who prosecutes on behalf of the State, on the salutary principle that the State stands not necessarily for conviction, but for justice and that criminal law is not to be used as an instrument of wreaking private vengeance of an aggrieved party, whose desire to help prosecution is based on personal grudge only against the person accused of the offence. 126. Sec.303 of the Code recognises the right of any person accused of an offence before a criminal court, or against whom proceedings are instituted under this Code, to be defended by a counsel of his choice. Legal aid to an accused at State expense in certain cases had been provided for in Sec.304 and sub-sec.(1) of the said section, which is relevant for the present purpose prescribes that where, in a trial before the Court of Session, the accused is not represented by a pleader, and where it appears to the court that the accused has not sufficient means to engage a pleader, the court shall assign a pleader for his defence at the expense of the State. .27. The apex court in Ambica Quairy Works v. State of Gujarat, A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 1073, had the occasion to consider as to what is meant by ‘ratio of any decision’ and their Lordships expressed in the paragraph 18 therein thus: .”The ratio of any decision must be understood in the background of the facts of that case. It has been said long time ago that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides, and not what logically follows from it. (See: Lord Halsbury in Quinn v. Leathern, 1901 AC 495)“ 128. It has been said long time ago that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides, and not what logically follows from it. (See: Lord Halsbury in Quinn v. Leathern, 1901 AC 495)“ 128. A discussion may now be entered into the arena of various hues of views of different High Courts on the vexed question as posed above. 129. In S.Dharniar v. State by the Inspector of Police, 1985 L.W. (Crl.) 219, three persons accused of an offence punishable under Ssc.302,I.P.C. moved application before this Court for their release on bail. The brother of the father- of the deceased filed an application for impleading himself as a party to that bail application. Learned counsel appearing for the three accused opposed thesaid application on the ground that there was no provision of law by which interested parties can get themselves impleaded in criminal proceedings and such a procedure would give rise to endless complications in the matter of administration of criminal law. Learned counsel appearing for the third party, namely, the brother of the father of the deceased, who brought her up and go: her married, contended that as an interested party, he can get himself impleaded on record and assist the prosecution and see that justice is rendered. ”(a) After considering the rival submissions, Sengottuvelan, J., dismissed the application for impleading by expressing thus: “(i) There is no provision to get the third party impleaded in a criminal proceeding; and (ii) At the same time, the third party can be permitted to assist the Public Prosecutor in the matter of prosecuting the evidence and in which case, Sec.301 gives the third party a right to assist the prosecution and also to submit a written argument.” 30. In P.S.Saravanabhavanandan v. S.Murugaiyyan, (1986) CrLL.J. 1540, one Packia Rani alias Usha died on the morning of 110. 1985 at the Kilpauk Medical College Hospital, Madras. Earlier on 110. 1985, at about 4.15 p.m., the said Packia Rani alias Usha was admitted in the hospital for extensive burn injuries, by her husband Murugaiyyan. A dying declaration was said to have been recorded from her. One Saravanabhavanandam, the brother of the deceased, who proceeded to the hospital on 110. 1985 at the Kilpauk Medical College Hospital, Madras. Earlier on 110. 1985, at about 4.15 p.m., the said Packia Rani alias Usha was admitted in the hospital for extensive burn injuries, by her husband Murugaiyyan. A dying declaration was said to have been recorded from her. One Saravanabhavanandam, the brother of the deceased, who proceeded to the hospital on 110. 1985 afternoon, finding that his sister was dead, gave a complainant to the SubInspector of Police, who was in the hospital,saying that he suspected foul play on the part of Murugaiyyan, in the sense of his sister having been murdered by his pouring kerosere over her clothes and setting fire to her. The husband Murugaiyyan, apprehending arrest at the hands of police, moved a petition before this Court praying for grant of anticipatory bail. The brother of the deceased as well as the father of accused filed two independent applications, not for the purpose of impleading them as parties to the bail application but for the purpose of intervening in the matter to submit necessary facts for the court to come to proper conclusion. The question that was focussed for decision therein was whether the relatives of the deceased had a right to intervene themselves in proceedings.relating to grant of bail. (a) Sengottuvelan, J., of this Court in answering the question so posed, placing implicit reliance on his own decision in the case of S.Dharmarv State by the Inspector of Police, 1985 L. W. (Crl.) 219 and also on thedecision in A.R.Antulay v.R.S.Nayak,A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 718: 1984 Crl.LJ. 647: (1984)2 S.C.C. 500 : 1984 S.C.C. (Crl.) 277, said in paragraph 13 thus: “There is no provision in the Crl.P.C. which enables a third party to get himself impleaded in the proceedings before the criminal court. As already observed, we have only Sec.301, Crl.P.C. which enables the private parties to assist the prosecution and also submit written arguments with the leave of the court. According to Sec.301, Crl.P.C. such assistance is to be given at the inquiry, trial or appeal in a criminal case. As already observed, we have only Sec.301, Crl.P.C. which enables the private parties to assist the prosecution and also submit written arguments with the leave of the court. According to Sec.301, Crl.P.C. such assistance is to be given at the inquiry, trial or appeal in a criminal case. The question that arises is whether private parlies can be allowed to intervene in the anticipatory bail petition with a view to represent matters before the court, when there is no provision for intervention in the Crl.P.C. By ‘intervention’ it is understood that a party who is possession of facts may appear before the court as an intervener and make his submissions on the matter in issue. In such cases, such a party is shown as intervener in the proceedings before the court. When a party cannot be impleaded in a criminal proceeding, as held by this Court in the decision referred to above, he cannot be permitted to come in under the guise of an intervener. But, at the same time bearing in mind the wholesome observations of the Supreme Court extracted above, the right of a party to represent matters before the Court cannot be whittled down into a strait jacket formula of locus standi, which is unknown, to criminal jurisprudence. It is open to any party to make his representations in the bail proceedings pending before this Court before the inquiry or trial starts, (b) After stating so, learned Judge concluded in paragraph 14 thus: “In the result, the request of the petitioners to figure as interveners is negatived, but at the same time, it is open to the petitioners to make representations to this Court relating to the application for anticipatory bail to further the ends of justice. Subject to the above observations, both these petitions are dismissed.” 31.In R.Sekar v. Narayanan, (1992) M.L.J. (Crl) 76, R.Sekar, Manager of M.O.H. (P) Ltd., Karaikkal, lodged an information before the Inspector of Police, Karaikkal against three persons for alleged commission ofoffences of criminal breach of trust, cheating and other offences, which in fact, getting registered as a case, culminated in the filing of a final report under Sec.173(2) of the Code and taken on file as C.C.No.110 of 1989 on the file of the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Karaikkal. Two of the persons accused of offences, namely,accused 2 and 3 filed a petition before this Court to quash the criminal proceedings so initiated against them. The said R.Sekar filed an application praying for his impleading as a party-respondent. His impleadment petition was opposed, tooth and nail, by the other side. (a) Pratap Singh, J., placing reliance on the deci-sionin the case of S.D/tamiflrv. State by the Inspector of Police, 1985 L. W. (Crl.) 219 and also on the decision of the apex court in Bhagnant Singh v. Commissioner of Police, (1985) OIL.J. 1521, allowed the petition by directing the petitioner to be impleaded as a respondent for the limited purpose of hearing him at the time of final disposal. 32. In Roop K.Shorey v. The State, A.I.R. 1967 Punjab 42, the construction and interpretation of Secs.493 and 495 of the (old) 1898, Code (corresponding to Secs.301 and 302 of the new Code) as respects the part to be played by the Public Prosecutor as well as the private pleader appointed by the complainant for the conduct of prosecution came up for consideration before the Punjab High Court and S.K.Kapur, J., of the said.High Court expressed in that context thus in paragraph 5: ”(5) I now proceed to consider the ambit and scope of the said two provisions. It is well-settled that the language of a statute constitutes the repository or reservoir of the legislative intent, and in order to ascertain or discover that intent, the statute must be construed as a whole just as it is necessary to consider a sentence in its entirety in order to grasp its true meaning. Meanings of certain words used in a section may be construed by attending to such other provisions of the statute as may tend to throw light upon them. This is a principle based upon human experience with man’s modes of expression and the inevitable limitations of language. It would, therefore, be legitimate to construe the meanings of the words in Sec.493 in the light of the provisions of Sec.495 and vice versa. “Applying these principles I am of the opinion that so long as the Public Prosecutor does not abdicate his functions and retains with himself control over the proceedings a private counsel can examine or cross-examine the witnesses or even address arguments. “Applying these principles I am of the opinion that so long as the Public Prosecutor does not abdicate his functions and retains with himself control over the proceedings a private counsel can examine or cross-examine the witnesses or even address arguments. Comparison of Secs.493 and 495, Crl.P.C, shows that it is only when a private counsel is entrusted with an independent charge of the case that permission is necessary under Sec.495, Crl.P.C. So long as he acts under the supervision, guidance or control of the public prosecutor he can examine and cross-examine the witnesses. The dichotomy in Sec.493, Crl.P.C, is between ‘conducting the prosecution’ and ‘acting under the directions of the public prosecutor’. ‘Conducting the prosecution’ therefore, must mean taking charge of the entire proceedings free from any guidance and control by anyone else. In my view, the same meaning must be given to the words ‘prosecution to be conducted’ in Sec.495, Crl.P.C. It follows, therefore, that if a private counsel is to be given a completecharge of the prosecution case so that he can conduct the case independently of the Public Prosecutor a permission is necessary. So long as a private counsel acts under the guidance and control of the public prosecutor he is entitled to so act under Sec.493, Crl.P.C. In Medichetty Ramakistiah v. State of A.P., A.I.R. 1959 A.P. 659, while dealing with Sec.270, Crl.P.C, it was held that the mere fact that a pleader, privately instructed, has acted for the prosecution in a sessions case does not involve the violation of Sec.270, if the conduct of the prosecution could be said to have been in the hands of the Public Prosecutor and that ‘act’ in Sec.493 is not to be understood in the technical sense as meaningsomething distinct and different from the word ‘plead’. It does not mean something on her than examining or cross-examining witnesses of addressing the courts. It was further held that... “Where the circumstances indicated that the Public Prosecutor had entirely effaced himself and given up his charge of the case to the counsel appearing for the private complainant leaving the entire conduct of the case to him, there was an irregularity in the trial which prejudiced the accused. Again, In re. It was further held that... “Where the circumstances indicated that the Public Prosecutor had entirely effaced himself and given up his charge of the case to the counsel appearing for the private complainant leaving the entire conduct of the case to him, there was an irregularity in the trial which prejudiced the accused. Again, In re. Bhupalli MaViah, A.I.R. 1959 A.P. 477, Krishna Rao, J., held that- “The word ‘to conduct’ neans ‘to lead, guide, manage’ and Sec.493 merely requires that the public prosecutor should guide the prosecution and direct the private party’s advocate.” In my opinion so long as the Public Prosecutor conducts the prosecution in the sense that he determines all important questions of policy involved in the course of the trial and the attitude to be adopted by the prosecution and keeps control and guidance with himself, Sec.493, Crl.P.C, is not violated. The whole object of Secs.493 and 495 is that no private party should, when a case has been taken over by the Slate, be permitted to wreak his personal vengeance which may inevitably result in case the charge of the prosecution is handed over to a private party. The salutary provisions are based on the well-a xepted principle that the public prosecutors must work as ministers of justice assisting the State in the administration of justice and not as represer tatives of a party. If Public Prosecutors are permitted to efface themselves and allow the prosect tion to be conducted by private party it may be nothing short of legalized means authorising a private party to wreak his personal vengeance. PublicProsecutors are expected to act in a scrupulously fair manner and present the case with detachment and without anriety to secure a conviction. If this principle is alowed to be departed, it may result in a serious peril to the rule of law. The Legislature was, therefore, conscious of this salutary rule of jurisprudence and it was in this view, that it chose to enact Secs.493 and 495, Crl.P.C, which in effect recognise the principle aforesaid. The courts trying the case must not permit a Public Prosecutor to surrender his functions completely in favour of a private counsel. But as I have said earlier so long as he keeps the control with him a private counsel can act in the case. The courts trying the case must not permit a Public Prosecutor to surrender his functions completely in favour of a private counsel. But as I have said earlier so long as he keeps the control with him a private counsel can act in the case. lam further of the opinion that the word ‘act’ in Sec.493, Crl.P.C, is not used in its technical sense in contra distinction to ‘appear and plead’. In the context, this expression must mean and include the power to examine and cross-examine witnesses and address the courts.” 33. In T.V.Sarma v. A.NagaKoteswara Rao, (1980) M.L.J. (Crl.) 24, the role of a public Prosecutor visa-vis the role of a private counsel appointed by the complainant to conduct prosecution in a sessions case, arising out of private complaint, came up for consideration before the Andhra Pradesh High Court and Punnayya, J, of the said Court expressed in paragraphs 26,27 and 35 thus: “26. From a careful reading of the provisions of Secs.2(u), 24(2), 209,225 and 301, it is clear that every trial before a Sessions Judge should be conducted only by a Public Prosecutor and the counsel engaged by the complainant cannot be permitted by a Sessions Judge or Assistant Sessions Judge, as the case may be, to conduct the prosecution unless permission is granted by the Public Prosecutor to the complainant’s counsel to act under his control or directions and the counsel so permitted should act under the directions and supervision of the Public Prosecutor-in conducting the prosecution. 27. These provisions are clearly conceived in the public interest as well as in the interest of the accused, because the position of the Public Prosecutor is different from an advocate appearing for a private party. A Public Prosecutor is regarded as Minister of Justice and he will present a fair and dispassionate attitude while conducting the prosecution whereas an advocate appearing for a private party will be zealous in conducting the prosecution as he is primarily concerned with the interests of his client and is therefore determined to get better of the other by whatever means available. A Public Prosecutor is not a prosecutor and is expected to be scrupulously fair both to the State as well as to the accused and present his case with attachment without evincing any anxiety to secure a conviction and such a principle is based upon the high policy. A Public Prosecutor is not a prosecutor and is expected to be scrupulously fair both to the State as well as to the accused and present his case with attachment without evincing any anxiety to secure a conviction and such a principle is based upon the high policy. Such a fairplay and dispassionate attitude cannot be expected from an advocate engaged by the complainant in conducting the prosecution. It is right to remember that the Public Prosecutor though an executive officer is, in a large sense, also an officer of the court and that he is bound to assist the court with his fairly considered view and the court is entitled to have the benefit of the fair exercise of his function. The court cannot have such an assistance from an advocate engaged by a complainant. The Legislature therefore, felt in its wisdom that it is not desirable to permit the complainant or his counsel to conduct the prosecution independently and it, therefore, mandates (hat every trial before a Sessions Judge should be conducted by a Public Prosecutor and even if the Public Prosecutor permits a counsel engaged by the complainant, should act under the direct control and supervision of the Public Prosecutor and the Public Proseculor should not abdicate himself from conducting the prosecution or assisting the Court leaving the prosecution in its entirety to the counsel engaged by the complainant... 35. Sec.385(1)(iv), of course, requires notice to be given to the complainant in case of appeal under Sec.377 for enhancement of sentence or in case of an appeal under Sec.378 against the order of acquittal. Sec.401(2) also requires that notice should be given to the complainait. In all these cases, the Legislature felt it necessary that the complainant also should be heard along with the Public Prosecutor. Even under these provisions, the presence of the Public Prosecutor is not effaced and the Public Prosecutor is given first place and the complainant is given the next place. But on that account it cannot be concluded that a complainiant or his counsel alone should be permitted to conduct the prosecution of a trial in a sessions case before the Sessions Judge. But on that account it cannot be concluded that a complainiant or his counsel alone should be permitted to conduct the prosecution of a trial in a sessions case before the Sessions Judge. As lung as the express provisions of Secs.209(d), 225,301(2) explicitly govern the trials in a Sessions Court, the complainant’s counsel has no in dependent status in a trial ofsessions case and he takes his place according to the dictates and directions of Public Prosecutor and the complainant has no right to demand that the Public Prosecutor should abdicate his presence and functions in a trial of sessions case on the ground that the proceedings which give rise to sessions trial have been initiated by private complainant. The provisions of Secs.225 and 301 (2) do not authorise the Public Prosecutor to abdicate his functions and efface his presence in the trial of sessions case giving place to the complainant or his counsel.” 34. In In re. Rakhan Ojha, (1988) Crl.LJ. 278, the question that arose for consideration was as to whether a lawyer engaged by a private person has a right of audience in a case, which is in charge of a Public Prosecutor and in answering the question, the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court consisting of Monojkumar Mukerjee and Mukul Gopal Mukerji, JJ., after quoting various provisions of the Code, expressed thus in paragraphs 8 to 12 thus: “8. A plain reading of the above quoted provisions makes it abundantly clear that if in a case which is in charge of a Public Prosecutor or Assistant Public Prosecutor a private person engages a lawyer then notwithstanding such engagement, the Public Prosecutor or Assistant Public Prosecutor, who is in charge of the case shall (emphasis supplied) conduct the prosecution and the lawyer engaged by the private person shall (emphasis supplied) act therein under the directions of the Public Prosecutor or Assistant Public Prosecutor and he can only submit written arguments-and that too with the permission of the Court. In other words, lawyer engaged by a private person has no right of audience in a case which is in charge of a Public Prosecutor. 9. Law is now well settled that the intention or object of the legislating authority is hardly relevant when the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous and when it does not admit of two possible interpretations. 9. Law is now well settled that the intention or object of the legislating authority is hardly relevant when the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous and when it does not admit of two possible interpretations. To put it differently, when the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous nothing can be added or subtracted so as to give a different meaning to the statute as the functions of the Court is to interpret and not to legislate. When Sec301(2) specifically says that the lawyer engaged by the private person can submit written arguments there is no scope for going behind the letters of the law to hold that such a lawyer can address the court really also. 10. We reach the same conclusion regarding the role of such a lawyer in a sessions trial through a different route. Chapter XVIII of the Code lays down the procedure for trial before a Court of Session; and Sec.225 thereof specifically lays down that in every trial before a Court of Session the prosecution shall be conducted by a Public Prosecutor. The other section in the said Chapter which is relevant for our present purposes, is Sec.234. It states that after the examination of the witnesses, including that of the defence is complete, the prosecutor shall sum up his case and the accused or his lawyer will then have a right of reply. Proviso thereof enitles the Prosecutor to make further submissions with regard toany point of law raised by the accused or his lawyer, if the court so permits. In view of the above two express provisions there is therefore no scope for the lawyer engaged by the private party to address the court orally. 11. In our considered view, the definition of ‘Public Prosecutor’ in Sec.2(u) of the Code cannot also be relied upon to contend as was contended by the learned lawyer appearing for the brother of the deceased in the case of S.K.LutfarRahaman v. State, 1987 Cal.Crl.L.R 52, that the lawyer engagd by a private person answered to the description of ‘Public Prosecutor’ if he was acting under the direction of the Public Prosecutor. It is true that ‘Public Prosecutor’ under Sec.2 (u) includes a person acting under the directio of a Public Prosecutor but it does not and cannot mean and include a lawyer engaged by a private party, who is acting under direclion of a Public Prosecutor. If such an interpretation is taken to its logical conclusion it would mean that any private lawyer acting under the direction of Public Prosecutor would be the ‘Public Prosecutor’within the meaning of Sec.2(u) and therefore will be entitled to conduct the prosecution in a sessions trial by virtue of Secs.225 and 301(1) of the Code. In such a case not only Sec.301(2) of the Code would be redundant, but such a lawyer would be even entitled to withdraw from a case by virtue of Sec.321, Crl.P.C. 12. The reason why an ir elusive definition of Public Prosecutor has been incorporated in Sec.2(u) of the Code is not far to seek. For’ engagement on behalf of the State in the High Court and in the Courts below a panel of lawyers is maintained at the instance of the State and one or some of them are engaged by the Public Prosecutor to conduct some of the cases pending there as it is not possible for the Public Prosecutor himself to conduct all such cases. Such lawyer has to act under the directions of the Public Prosecutor and is to be treated as the Public Prosecutor in the case he is so engaged but by no stretch of imagination can it be said that a private lawyer.acting under the direction of a Public Prosecutor is also the Public Prosecutor.” 35. In Manharlall Shah v. Yogeshkumar Kanaiyalal Saraia, (1988)2 Crimes 13 , the question that arose for consideration was as to whether a lawyer engaged by a complainant to assist the Public Prosecutor in charge of sessions trial can be permitted to either conduct the trial or to address the court under Sec.301 of the Code and the Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court consisting of P.R.Gokulakrishnan, C.J. (as he then was) and G.T.Nanavathi, J., answering the question, stated in paragraph 15 thus: “We. hold that on true interpretation of Sec.301(2), a-lawyer instructed by a private person to assist the Public Prosecutor has no right of audience except to the extent permitted by that section. hold that on true interpretation of Sec.301(2), a-lawyer instructed by a private person to assist the Public Prosecutor has no right of audience except to the extent permitted by that section. If he feels that trial is not conducted fairly it will be open to him to draw attention of the court in that behalf. If the court feels that some assistance is necessary on a point arising before it, it may appoint such lawyer or any other lawyer as amicus curiae. Subjected by a private person to assist the Public Prosecutor a lawyer has no right of audiance in a trial before the Sessions Court.” 36. In Praveen Malhotra v. Stare, (1990) Crl.L.J. 2184, the question that arose before the Delhi High Court who as to whether the permission to intervene and to be heard to oppose the bail application of the accused in a case of bride burning can be claimed by the father of the deceased and some women organisations as of right and Y.K.Sabharwal, J., of that High Court, in a bid to find a solution for the question so posed, said in paragraph 13 thus: ”13. ‘Public Prosecutor’ within the meaning of Sec.2(u) of the Code is any person appointed under Sec.24 and includes any person acting under the directions of a Public Prosecutor. For every High Court, the Central Government or State Government has to appoint a Public Prosecutor after consultation with the High Court, the provisions of the Code also provides for the necessary qualifications which are essential before a person can be t. ppointed either as a Public Prosecutor or as an Additional Public Prosecutor under Sec.301 of the Code, the Public Prosecutor under Sec.301 of the Code, the Public Prosecutor in charge of case can appear and plead without any written authority before any court in which that case is under inquiry, trial or appeal... under sub-sec. (2) of Sec.301, the pleader instructed by any private person has to act under the directions of the Public Prosecutor or the Assistant Public Prosecutor. Thus it is clear that pleader of a private party can only assist the Public Prosecutor when proceedings are at the stage of inquiry, trial or appeal. After close of evidence such pleader with permission of court, can submit written arguments. Thus it is clear that pleader of a private party can only assist the Public Prosecutor when proceedings are at the stage of inquiry, trial or appeal. After close of evidence such pleader with permission of court, can submit written arguments. The scheme of the Code is that when a case is at the stage of enquiry, trial or appeal,-the Public Prosecutor is in charge of the case. He represents the prosecuting agency before the court. Even in cases where a pleader has been instructed by a private person, such peader has to act under the directions of the Public Prosecutor and such a pleader is included in the definition of ‘Public Prosecutor’ as provided in Sec.2(u). Thus it is evident that no pleader an be permitted to intervene or act except in the manner provided under Sec.301 (2) of the C ode. The combined effect of Secs.2(u), 24 and 301 of the Code is that a pleader engaged by a private party cannot plead though he can act and that too under the directions of the Public Prosecutor.” Learned Judge also expressed at the fag end of paragraph 18 thus: “In my opinion the grant of permission to the applicants to intervene as claimed by them would amount to extending the creed, of populism in the realm of judicial action.’ After saying so, he went on to quote Justice Anand in Brij Lalv. State of Delhi, (1985) D.R.J 322, who said: “Extension of the creed of populism in the realm of executive, legislative or judicial action must be discouraged in any system based on the concept of rule of law, even though one may have no control over it in a purely political field.” 37. In P.Thinagaran v. State, (1991) L.W. (Crl) 587, the accused, who has been committed to Sessions, faced trial for alleged offences under Secs.307,323,423 and 447 read with Sec.35,I.P.C. The complainant filed an application before Court of Session praying for grant of permission to engage a counsel of his choice to conduct the prosecution during trial. The Court of Session dismissed the application. The Court of Session dismissed the application. Consequently, he preferred a revision before this Court to quash that order contending that certain circumstances necessitated for having a private counsel to conduct the prosecution in sessions trial, since prior to his complaint in court, out of which the present Sessions Case arose, he had given another complaint about the occurrence to the police, who in turn, without proper investigation wantonly referred the complaint, compelling him to file a private complaint into court and under those circumstances, he could not expect the Public Prosecutor of the court to conduct the prosecution before the Court of Session in an effective manner and a well-briefed private counsel would be able to do justice to the prosecution case. The question that arose for consideration was whether the order of learned Sessions Judge refusing to grant permission to private counsel to conduct the prosecution before him would be legally sustainable. In answering the query, Padmini Jesudurai, J., after referring to the provisions of Secs.2 (u), 24 and 225 of the Code, expressed thus in paragraphs 7 and 8: "The above provisions read with Sec.2(u) extracted above, makes it clear that it is only the Public Prosecutor appointed under Sec.24 and any one acting under the directions of the Public Prosecutor are the only persons competent to conduct the prosecution in a Sessions Court. A private pleader, acting independent of the Public Prosecutor and as a substitute for the Public Prosecutor, does not come into the picture at all. If a private pleader is to conduct the prosecution, he could come only within the category of one ‘acting under the directions of the ‘Public Presecutor’. The prayer of the petitioner seeking permission of the Sessions Court to his private pleader to conduct the prosecution, is contrary to the above provisions of the Code. 8. Sec.301(2) lays down the nature of the assistance that a private pleader assisting the Public Prosecutor could render. This provision applies not only to Sessions Courts but also to other courts as well, and includes Public Prosecutor appointed under Sec.24 of the Code and Assistant Public Prosecutors appointed under Sec.25 of the Code..... 8. Sec.301(2) lays down the nature of the assistance that a private pleader assisting the Public Prosecutor could render. This provision applies not only to Sessions Courts but also to other courts as well, and includes Public Prosecutor appointed under Sec.24 of the Code and Assistant Public Prosecutors appointed under Sec.25 of the Code..... As far as the Sessions Case is concerned, if a private person instructs a private pleader to prosecute any person, the Public Prosscutor alone could conduct the prosecution, and the pleader so instructed shall act therein, under the directions of the Public Prosecutor and may, with the permission of the court submit written arguments after the evidence is closed in the case. The object betind these provisions in not permitting a private pleader to conduct the prosecution, is not far to seek. Unlike civil wrongs, wherein parties vindicate their rights and seek redress, criminal offences are considered as offences not against the victim as such, but against society. The State, which is the ultimate custodian of law and order and the protector of the rights of individuals is given the task of prosecuting the offenders. When the State thus prosecutes, It can choose a counsel of its own choice, subject to the limitations mentioned in Sec.24 of the Code and appoint him under Sec.24 Neither the victim of the crime nor the trial court come into the picture. This is the scheme of the Crl.P.C..." .38. The catena of decisions, as referred to above, may fall for consideration now as to the binding effect as precedents. In P.S.Saravanabhavanandam v. S.Murugaiyyan, (1986) Crl.LJ. 1540, Sengottuvelan, J., expressed the view that though it is not legally permissible for third parties to figure as interveners in Criminal proceedings, yet it is open to them to make representations in the bail proceedings before inquiry or trill starts. The expression of such a view, learned Judge, would say, is based upon the wholesome observations of the Supreme Court in the case of A.R.Antulay v. RS.Nayak,A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 718:1984 Crl.L.J. 647: (1984)2 S.C.C. 500 : 1984 S.C.C. (Crl.) 277. The expression of such a view, learned Judge, would say, is based upon the wholesome observations of the Supreme Court in the case of A.R.Antulay v. RS.Nayak,A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 718:1984 Crl.L.J. 647: (1984)2 S.C.C. 500 : 1984 S.C.C. (Crl.) 277. The extraction of the observations made by the apex Court is necessary to find out as to whether the expression of the view by the said learned Judge in the case of P.S.Saravanabhavanandam v. S.Murugaiyyan, (1986) Crl.L.J. 1540, decided by him is in accord therewith and it reads as follows: ."It is well-recognised principle of criminal jurisprudence that anyone can act or put the criminal law into motion except where the statute enacting or creating an offence indicates to the contrary... Locus standi of the complainant is a concept foreign to criminal jurisprudence save and except that where the statute creating an offence provides for the eligibility of the complainant, by necessary implication the general principle gets excluded by such statutory provisions... Punishment of the offender in the interest of the society being one of the objects behind penal statutes enacted for larger good of the society, right to initiate proceedings cannot be whittled down, circumscribed or fettered by putting it into a strait-jacket formula of locus standi unknown to criminal jurisprudence, save and except specific statutory exception." .39. The observations, as extracted above, if carefully read in broad spectrum analysis, can by no stretch of imagination, be stated to mean in a blanket form that locus standi of the complainant is a concept foreign to criminal jurisprudence, without any exception whatever. The true meaning, import and purport of the observations, as above, is to the effect that punishment of offenders, in the interests of the society, being the prime objects behind the penal statutes, right to initiate proceedings cannot at all be put into a straitjacket formula of locus standi, which is unknown to criminal jurisprudence, save and except specific statutory exception (emphasis is mine). In other words, if there are specific provisions in a statute, as respects locus standi, the same has to be given effect to in all its splendours and rigour. 40. The question that fell for consideration before the apex court in the case was locus standi of the person to commence or initiate proceedings in a grave offence of a cognizable nature. 40. The question that fell for consideration before the apex court in the case was locus standi of the person to commence or initiate proceedings in a grave offence of a cognizable nature. In that context alone, the Supreme Court made the observations, as extracted above. There was therefore no occasion for the Supreme Court to consider the question as to the right of a third party either to get himself impleaded simply as a party or as an intervener in criminal proceedings. Now was there an occasion to consider the question of right of audience of such a party. But all those questions arose for consideration in the case of P.S.Saravanabhavanandam v. S.Murugaiyyan, (1986) Crl.L.J. 1540, by learned Sengottuvelan, J. In such a situation, the said decision of Sengottuvelan, J., based upon the observations, torn out of context, of the apex court in A.R.Antulay v. R.S.Nayak, A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 718:1984 Crl.LJ. 647: (1984)2 S.C.C. 500 :1984 S.C.C. (Crl.) 277, cannot at all be construed as a precedent with binding effect, on the fact of the decision of the apex court in the case of Ambica Quarry Works v. State of Gujarat, A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 1073. 41. In the case of R.Sekar v. Narayanan, (1992) M.L.J. (Crl.) 76, Pratap Singh, J., allowed the petition and impleaded the aggrieved complainant, as a party respondent in the quash proceedings initiated by some of the accused, of course, for the limited purpose of hearing him at the time of final disposal. While so allowing that petition for impleadment, learned Judge relied upon the observations made by the Supreme Court in Bhagwant Singh v. Commissioner of Police, 1985 Crl.L.J 1521, and the same read as follows: "If the Magistrate decides that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding further and drops the proceedings or takes the view that though there is sufficient ground for proceeding against some, there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against others mentioned in the First Information Report the informant would certainly be prejudiced because the First Information Report lodged by him would have failed in its purpose, wholly or in part. Moreover, when the interest of the informant in prompt and effective action being taken on the First Information Report lodged by him is clearly recognised by the provisions contained in sub-sec.(2) of Sec.154, sub-sec.(2) of Sec.157 and sub sec.(2) (ii) of Sec. 173, it must be presumed that the informant would equally be interested in selling that the Magistrate takes cognizance of the offence and issue process, because that would be culmination of the First Information Report lodged by him. There can, therefore, be no doubt that when, on a consideration of the report made by the officer in-charge of a police station under sub-sec.2(i) of Sec. 173, the Magistrate is not inclined to take cognizance of the offence and issue process, the information must be given an opportunity of being heard so that he can make his submissions to persuade the Magistrate to take cognizance of the offence and issue process." 42. From the observations, as extracted above, it is rather crystal clear that the question, which fell for consideration before the apex court in that case was whether the informant must be given an opportunity of being heard for making his submissions before ever the Magistrate prefers to drop further proceedings against all or any of the persons accused of offences in the final report filed under sub-sec.(2) of Sec.173 of the Code and such a question was answered by the Supreme Court with an emphatic ‘yes’. The background facts of that case inviting for such a decision, if probed, would reveal that if the life of the case is sought to be sniffed, even at the threshold by the Magistrate in not taking cognizance of the final report filed under sub-sec.(2) of Sec.173 of the Code, by preferring to drop the proceedings against all or any one of the persons accused of offences therein, the informant, who lodged the information, resulting in such a final report, must be given an opportunity of being heard. .43. .43. But the facts of the case of R.Sekar v. Narayanan, (1992) M.L.J. (Crl.) 76, decided by Pratap Singh, J., are quite different, in the sense of the cognizance having been taken of the final report filed under sub-sec.(2) of Sec. 173 of the Code by the Magistrate and the opportunity being sought foronly subsequently by the informant-complainant of his being heard, in the quash proceedings initiated by some of the accused before this Court. Learned Judge has actually given a logical extension of the ratio of Bhagwant Singh v. Commissioner of Police, (1985) Crl.L.J. 1521, to the facts of the said case decided by him. It is to be remembered at this juncture that the ratio of any decision must be understood in the background of the facts of that case and that a case is only an authority for what is actually decided and not what logically follows from it. Judged from such settled principle, the decision in the case of R.Sekar v. Narayanan, (1992) M.L.J. (Crl.) 76, rendered by Pratap Singh, J., cannot at all be construed as a binding precedent. 44. The ratio of the decision in Roop K.Shorey v. The State, A.I.R. 1967 Punjab 42 rendered by S.K.Kapur, J., of Punjab High Court and the decision in T.V.Sarma v. A.Naga Koteswara Rao, (1980) M.L.J. (Crl.) 24, rendered by Punnayya, J., of Andhra Pradesh High Court, is one and the same in entertaining a view that private pleader engaged is having a right to examine the witnesses-examination-in-chief, cross-examination and re-examination, depending upon the exigencies of the case-and also has a right of audience, so long as a Public Prosecutor is in actual control of the case, by not abdicating his functions. Having actually gone through the relevant previsions in the Code I regret my inability to shart the views expressed by learned Judges of those two High Courts and respectfully differ from the same. The reason is rather obvious. .45. No doubt learned Judges of those two High Courts, in expressing the views of theirs, as quoted above, of course, took into cognizance of the lofty and laudable principle of criminal law not to be used as an instrument of wreaking private vengeance by an aggrieved party against a party, who according to that party had caused injury to it. No doubt learned Judges of those two High Courts, in expressing the views of theirs, as quoted above, of course, took into cognizance of the lofty and laudable principle of criminal law not to be used as an instrument of wreaking private vengeance by an aggrieved party against a party, who according to that party had caused injury to it. It cannot be said better than what those learned Judges had said in elucidat ng in a lucid fashion as to the consequences flowing from the act of allowing of a private pleader to conduct the case of the prosecution in charge of a Public Prosecutor or Assistant Public Prosecutor, as the case may be. But, at the same time, it is to be remembered that they expressed such a view in an emphatic manner; but none-the-less, they hat fallen a prey in giving a go-by to the very same principle by allowing the private pleader to conduct the case of the prosecution, so long as a Public Prosecutor is under the actual control of the case, by not abdicating his functions and such a positive statement, in the con text, in which it was stated, cannot be anything, but one done under the facade or camouflage of what was directly sought to be prohibited as being opposed to the fundamental canon of criminal jurisprudence is sought to be effectuated, in an indirect way, as a remedy, which, in my humble view, is worse than the disease itself, in the sense of allowing such a private pleader to conduct the case of the prosecution in the manner as devised by the party, who engaged him by keeping the Public Prosecutor or the Assistant Public Prosecutor, as the case may be, to serve as a dummy, by his physical presence in court alone, and nothing more. 46. The principles enunciated in the cases of In re. Rakhan Ojha, (1988) Crl.LJ. 278, Praveen Malhotra v. State, (1990) Crl.L.J. 2184, Manharlal I.Shah v. Yogeshkumar Kanaiyalal Saraia, (1988)2 Crimes 13 , by various High Courts, in pith and substance, bristle to these: A pleader of a private party can only assist the Public Prosecutor when proceedings are at the stage of inquiry, trial or appeal. After closure of evidence, such pleader, with the permission of the court, can submit written arguments. After closure of evidence, such pleader, with the permission of the court, can submit written arguments. The scheme of the code is that when a case is at the stage of inquiry, trial or appeal, the Public Prosecutor is in charge of the case. He represents the prosecuting agency before court. Even in cases where pleader has been instructed by a private person, such pleader has to act only under the direct control and supervision of the Public Prosecutor and such a pleader is included in the definition of ‘Public Prosecutor’ as provided in Sec.2(u) of the Code. Thus, it is evident that no pleader can be permitted to intervene or act, except in the manner provided under Sec.301(2) of the Code. The combined effect of Secs.2(u), 24 and 301 of the Code is’ that a pleader engaged by a private party cannot plead, though he can act, that too, under the direct control and supervision of the Public Prosecutor. The principles, as above, enunciated in those decisions, really reflect, in letter and spirit, the terms and tenor of various provisions enshrined in the Code and such being the case, there is no reason why I should record my inability to subscribe to the view so expressed. 47. Sengottuvelan, J., of this Court also expressed the same view in Dharmar v. State, by the Inspector of Police, 1985 L. W. (Crl.) 219. 48. In the case of P. Thinagaran v. State, (1991) L.W. (Crl.)587, Padmini Jesudurai, J .,being called upon to decide as to whether a private pleader is entitled to conduct prosecution, actually expressed, in clear-cut terms, that such a course was not legally permissible; as being opposed to the very provisions in the Code. I am in total agreement with the views expressed by learned Judge. 49. I am in total agreement with the views expressed by learned Judge. 49. In view of whar has been stated above, it goes without saying that the resultant position is that the Public Prosecutor or the Assistant Public Prosecutor in charge of the case alone can conduct the prosecution and address arguments and in case, a pleader is engaged privately by the third party to conduct such prosecution, he can act under the direct control and supervision of the Public Prosecutor or the Assistant Public Prosecutor, as the case may be, in the sense of rendering assistance and such assistance cannot be construed to give him an unfettered right of examination of witnesses-examination-in-chief, cross-examination and re-examination, depending upon the exigencies of the situation-besides a right of audience and if at all any right is inhering in favour of such a private pleader, it is only to submit his written arguments, that too, with the permission of the court, after the evidence is closed in the case, and except as provided for under the provisic as of the Code, under any circumstances whatever no third party, inclusive of the informant or the a mplainant, can be allowed to get himself impleaded as a party or as an intervener at any stage in any criminal proceedings before the court. 50. Before parting with the case, I will be ailing in my duty, if I do not place on record a word of my sincere appreciation for the valuable assistance rendered by Mr.B.Sriramulu, learned Public Prosecutor appearing for the State, Messrs. P.N Prakash, B.Kumar, A.Raghunathan, Calvin Jaob and S.Doraisami, learned counsel appearing for the parties and Mr.M.Karpaga Vinayagam amicus curiae in collecting all relevant authoriti is on the subject in issue and making submissions n a scintillating fashion, thereby enabling the court to reach, with ease and grace, a conclusion befitting the background of-the facts and circums ances of these cases. 51. In fine, Crl.M.P.Nos.541 and 1718 of .992 will stand dismissed. 52. Crl.O.P.No.2410 of 1992, which deserves to be dismissed even at the admission stage, is accordingly dismissed. 53. Messrs.A.Raghunathan, B.Kurrar and P.N.Prakash, learned counsels appearing for the respective parties, immediately after the pronouncement of the common order is open Court, made an oral application, individually, praying for grant of a certificate under Art.134 (1) (C) of the Constitution of India that these are fit cases for aspeals to Supreme Court. 53. Messrs.A.Raghunathan, B.Kurrar and P.N.Prakash, learned counsels appearing for the respective parties, immediately after the pronouncement of the common order is open Court, made an oral application, individually, praying for grant of a certificate under Art.134 (1) (C) of the Constitution of India that these are fit cases for aspeals to Supreme Court. I also share the same opinion, inasmuch as there are various hues of views on the vexed question decided by me emerging from various High Courts of this country and such a question deserves to be decided by the apex of the judicial administration of this country, so as to serve as a binding precedent under Art.141 of the Constitution of India. In this view of the matter, the certificate as prayed for is granted.