JUDGMENT In this case, the landlord had filed the suit not only on grounds or bona fide need as provided in section 12 (1) (I) of the Act, but also on grounds provided in section 12 (1) (g) and (h) of the Act. It has come in evidence of the plaintiff during his cross-examination that the suit accommodation was let out to the defendant-appellant after the plaintiff had retired from the Government service. In the opinion of this Court, in such cases where a suit for eviction has been instituted on composit grounds, it will be the civil Court alone that will have the jurisdiction over the matter. Secondly, it is doubtful as to whether in those cases where a Government - servant has let out the accommodation or entered into a business of providing the accommodation on rent after his retirement, shall he allowed to avail of the special protection provided to such Government servants. Similarly, the protection under section 23-A to 23-J of the Act cannot be availed of by a retired Government servant to recover the possession from a tenant of a building which he acquires after his retirement. Reference may be had to Winifred Ross v. Ivy Fonsee (AIR l984 SC 458). Learned counsel for the appellant has referred to Baijnath Prasad Jain v. Daya Shankar Jain ( 1991 JLJ 189 ) and submitted that the provisions of section 23-A to J of the Act shall be attracted in this case; without entering into the controversy and agreeing with the proposition of law, suffice to state here that eviction has been sought on composite grounds, i.e., bona fide need for starting business of his major son and for re- construction and, therefore, the landlord shall not be allowed to avail of protection given in those sections. Learned counsel for the appellant, then, submitted that the trial Court and the first appellate Court have not fixed the time for construction and, therefore, the decree is bad. Since decree has been granted on both the grounds, i.e. bona fide need and re-construction, and, therefore, it was not necessary to fix the time. In case, the decree is granted only on ground of re-construction, time for the same can be fixed by the appellants Court itself. Since decree has been granted on both the grounds, i.e. bona fide need and re-construction, and, therefore, it was not necessary to fix the time. In case, the decree is granted only on ground of re-construction, time for the same can be fixed by the appellants Court itself. Now, the next point for determination is as to whether the landlord has successful in providing his bonafide need and whether the same can be accepted in view of the fact that the landlord has re-constructed four shops and let put the same to different tenants on rent. The bonafide need is a finding of fact. There is and current finding of both the Courts below that the landlord bonafide requires the suit accommodation fur starting a shop fur his major son Santosh Kumar. The same is burn out from the evidence on record. This Court, therefore, finds nothing to interfere in the said finding. The finding of the two Courts below is based on evidence un record and, fur that reason also, this Court is not inclined to interfere in finding of facts. The appellant could not also demonstrate as to whether any material piece of evidence has been discarded. It has come in evidence that the landlord's son Santosh Kumar has attained the age of majority at the time of filing of the suit and, therefore, there was no occasion for opening a shop on his behalf before that. As such, if the plaintiff landlord has let out other accommodation after retirement before the need arose or before his sun attained the age of majority, it cannot be said that he acted mala fide or that his need is not bonafide. It is brought out from the evidence that the other accommodation was let out before the cause of action of the present suit. As such, the plaintiff was entitled to seek eviction of the tenant from the suit accommodation. AIR 1984 SC 458 . followed. 1991 JLJ 189 distinguished. Appeal dismissed.