J. N. HORE, J. ( 1 ) FOR committing rape on Nirupama Bank of village Kankabati, P. S. Kotwali, Midnapore District-Midnapore appellant Sushil Pati was convicted by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Midnapore under section 376, Indian Penal Code and sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for 4 years and to pay fine of Rs. 1,000/- (one thousand), in default, rigorous imprisonment for one year more. The appellant, Seeks to assail the said order of conviction and sentence. While admitting the appeal a suo motu Rule was issued by this Court on the accused- appellant as to why the sentence should not be enhanced. Both the appeal and the Rule were heard together and this Judgment would, govern both. ( 2 ) BRIEFLY stated, prosecution case is as follows:on 30. 1. 1985 at about 3-30 p. m. Nirupama Bank (P. W. 2), a minor girl aged about 12 years, was collecting cowdung cakes on the lonely field adjoining the river Kangsabati; Being chased by appellant Sushil Pati the girl fell into a ditch where she was caught and raped by the appellant. P. W. 5 Sabita Bera, who happened to be present at a distance, noticed the accused chasing the girl. She then came close to them and found the appellant committing sexual assault on Nirupama. Sabita immediately rushed to the house of Nirupama and reported the to her mother P. W1 Bimala Bank. After committing rape the appellant fled away. Nirupama came home weeping and reported the matter to her mother. The matter was immediately brought to the knowledge of the father arid elder brother of the appellant who are residents of the same village. They assured of an amicable settlement and agreed to the proposal of P. W. 1 Bimala Bank for marriage of Nirupama with the appellant but about a week after they backed out and arranged for marriage of the appellant with another girl. P. W. 1 accordingly lodged information with the police on 9. 2. 1985 on the basis of which a case under section 376, Indian Penal Code was registered against the appellant. After completion of investigation police submitted charge-sheet against the appellant under Section 376, Indian Penal Code which in the usual course ended in committal of the case to the court of Session. In defense, the accused pleaded innocence. The defense case was that the accused was falsely implicated out of political rivalry. After completion of investigation police submitted charge-sheet against the appellant under Section 376, Indian Penal Code which in the usual course ended in committal of the case to the court of Session. In defense, the accused pleaded innocence. The defense case was that the accused was falsely implicated out of political rivalry. ( 3 ) IN order to bring home the charge to the accused, the prosecution examined 11 witnesses while the defense examined none. The first point for our consideration is whether the prosecution has been able to prove the charge under section 376, Indian Penal Code against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt and whether order of conviction can be sustained. ( 4 ) LET us first advert to the evidence of the victim girl; Nirupama Bank, who has been examined as P. W. 2. Her evidence is that on the date of occurrence at about 3-30 p. m. She was collecting cowdung cakes on the bank of river Kansai when she saw the appellant running towards her. At this she got scared and started running. While running she fell into a ditch, where she was caught by the appellant who stripped her of her under garment, raised his own lungi and committed rape on her and then fled away. She came home crying and narrated the incident to her mother. She has further deposed that she saw P. W. 5 Sabita Bera while she was collecting cowdung cakes 7 or 8 days after she was taken by her mother and a co-villager to kotwali P. S. and then she was taken to hospital for her medical examination. She has further stated in her evidence that she had never any sexual experience before the occurrence and that her menstruation did not commence before the incident. ( 5 ) IT is not disputed before us that P. W. 2 was under 16 years at the time of the occurrence. According to testimony of the mother (P. W. 1 Bimala Barik)-she was about 12 years old at the time of occurrence. This has not been challenged in the cross-examination. P. W. 4, radiologist attached to Midnapore Hospital, held ossification test on P. W. 2-and on the basis of the findings he opined that the girl was between 13 to 14 years of age on the date of examination, i. e. 25/4/1985. This has not been challenged in the cross-examination. P. W. 4, radiologist attached to Midnapore Hospital, held ossification test on P. W. 2-and on the basis of the findings he opined that the girl was between 13 to 14 years of age on the date of examination, i. e. 25/4/1985. The evidence of P. W. 2 shows that she did not attend puberty at the time of the occurrence. It has, therefore, been simply proved that the victim girl was below 16 years at the time of occurrence and the question of consent does not arise. If sexual intercourse by the appellant is proved he would undoubtedly be guilty of the offence of rape under Section 376, Indian Penal Code. ( 6 ) P. W. 2 was subjected to a: lengthy cross-examination but was not shaken in the least in any material particular. She has stood the cross-examination well and nothing transpires from her cross-examination, which impeaches her credibility. Her evidence appears to be straightforward and there is no inherent improbability in her version of the occurrence. She is a rustic young girl having no animus against the appellant and it is quite improbable that she would falsely implicate the appellant in such a crime exposing herself to the danger of scandal and social ostracism. Ordinarily a woman, more so a young girl, will not stake her reputation by levelling a false charge concerning her chastity. ( 7 ) THERE is no invariable rule that there must, in every case, be corroboration of the testimony of the prosecutrix before a conviction can be allowed to stand. The question whether the statement of the prosecutrix requires corroboration and in what particular and, what kind of corroboration should be sufficient, are in the ultimate analysis questions relating to the correct and proper appreciation of evidence and must be answered with reference to the facts and circumstances of individual cases. The principles relating to the need of corroboration of a prosecutrix in rape cases, have been laid down in two decisions of the Supreme Court, namely, Rameswar s/o. Kalyan Singh v. State of Rajasthan and Sidheswar Ganguly v. State of West Bengal. The principles relating to the need of corroboration of a prosecutrix in rape cases, have been laid down in two decisions of the Supreme Court, namely, Rameswar s/o. Kalyan Singh v. State of Rajasthan and Sidheswar Ganguly v. State of West Bengal. In the first case, the Supreme Court made it clear that (1) the prosecutrix in a case of rape cannot be treated as an accomplice and consequently, the principle requiring corroboration in respect of an accomplice witness cannot have application in considering the evidence of prosecutrix in a rape case; (2) that the Evidence Act nowhere provides that the evidence of the prosecutrix in a rape case requires corroboration and that (3) as a matter of prudence Courts have insisted on the need of corroboration of the evidence of the prosecutrix. The eventual principle laid down by the Supreme Court was finally stated in paragraph 19 at page 57 as follows: The rule, which according to the cases has hardened into one of law, is not that corroboration is essential before there can be a conviction but that the necessity of corroboration, as a matter of prudence, except where the circumstances make it safe to dispense with it, must be present to the mind of the Judge, and injury cases, must find place in the charge, before a conviction without corroboration can be sustained. It was further added. The only rule of law is that this rule of prudence must be present to the mind of the judge or the jury as the case may be and be understood and appreciated by him or them. There is no rule of practice that there must, in every case, be corroboration before a conviction can be allowed to stand. T ( 8 ) DEALING with the nature and extent of corroboration. Their Lordships observed: It would be impossible, indeed it would be dangerous, to formulate the kind, of evidence which should, or would, be regarded as corroboration. Its nature and extent must necessarily vary with the circumstances of each case and also according to the particular circumstances of the offence charged. But to this extent the rules are clear. Their Lordships observed: It would be impossible, indeed it would be dangerous, to formulate the kind, of evidence which should, or would, be regarded as corroboration. Its nature and extent must necessarily vary with the circumstances of each case and also according to the particular circumstances of the offence charged. But to this extent the rules are clear. First, it is not necessary that there should be independent confirmation of every material circumstance in the sense that the independent evidence in the case, apart from the testimony of the complainant or the accomplice should in itself be sufficient to sustain conviction. Secondly, the independent evidence must not only make it safe to believe that the crime was committed but must in some way reasonably connect or tend to connect the accused with it by confirming in some material particularly the testimony of the accomplice or complainant that the accused committed the crime. Thirdly, the corroboration must come from independent sources. Fourthly, the corroboration need not be direct evidence that the accused committed the crime. It is sufficient if it is merely circumstantial evidence in connection with the crime. ( 9 ) IN State of Maharashtra v. Chandra Prakash Kewalchand Jam, the Supreme Court has similarly held that a prosecutrix of a sex offence cannot be put on par with the accomplice. She is in fact a victim of the crime. The Evidence Act nowhere says that her evidence cannot be accepted unless it is corroborated in material particulars. She is undoubtedly a competent witness under section 118 of the Evidence Act and hert evidence must receive the same weight as is attached to an injured in cases of physical violence. The same degree of care and caution must attach in the evaluation of her evidence as in the case of an injured complainant or witness and no more. What is necessary is that the Court must be alive to and conscious of the fact that it is dealing with the evidence of a person who is interested in the outcome of the charge levelled by her. If the Court keeps this in mind and feels satisfied that it can act on the evidence of the prosecutrix, there is no rule of law or practice which requires it to look for corroboration. If the Court keeps this in mind and feels satisfied that it can act on the evidence of the prosecutrix, there is no rule of law or practice which requires it to look for corroboration. If for some reasons the Court is hesitant to place implicit reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix, it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The nature of evidence required to lend assurance to the testimony of the prosecutrix must necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. ( 10 ) WE have already seen that the evidence of P. W. 2 is reliable. Moreover, there is ample corroboration of her testimony, both direct and circumstantial. P. W. 5 Sabita Bera claims to have, witnesses the occurrence. It transpires from her testimony that she was grazing goats in the field and found P. W. 2 Nirupama collecting dry cowdung cakes from a distance. Some time after she noticed the appellant moving towards Nirupama and that Nirupama fell into a ditch. In order to see what had happened to the girl, she moved towards the girl and found her lying on her back and the appellant lying on her and committing sexual intercourse. She at once rushed to the girls mother and narrated the incident to her. P. W. 5 appears to be an independent witness having no animus against the appellant. She has not been shaken in the least in the cross-examination. In her cross- examination she has stilted that she did not inform the matter to any other person on way to Nirupamas house as there was none available in the field. ( 11 ) IT also transpires from the evidence of P. W. 1 that Nirupama came back home crying and reported to her that she had been raped by the appellant. P. W. 8 Bhabesh Singh saw Nirupama on the river bank adjacent to the vacant field with a basket in her hand. He also saw Sushil Pati in the field. The witness had gone to the river side for collecting fire wood cut on the previous day. It appears from his evidence that he came back home carrying the fire wood just before the occurrence. The evidence P. Ws. He also saw Sushil Pati in the field. The witness had gone to the river side for collecting fire wood cut on the previous day. It appears from his evidence that he came back home carrying the fire wood just before the occurrence. The evidence P. Ws. 6 and 7 who are relations of P. W. 2 also shows that the occurrence was reported to them in the same evening. It is also in evidence that P. Ws. 1, 6 and 7 went to the house of the accused and there was a Proposal for marriage of the victim girl with the accused in order to avoid social scandal and that father and elder brother of the accused were at first agreeable to the proposal but ultimately backed out. ( 12 ) THE medical evidence also lends support to the testimony of the victim girl. P. W. 3 Dr. Sudhir Ranjan Maitra, the then D. M. O. Midnapore Sadhar Hospital, examined the victim girl Nirupama on 11/2/1985 and found old rupture of hymen at 6 0 Clock and 8 a Clock positions. The wound was just healed up. According to the doctor such an injury is normally healed up after 7 days. He has opined that the injury was caused by rape more than 7 days before. The girl was examined 11 days after the occurrence. It is no wonder that the doctor could not find any other external injury such as bruise or swelling after a lapse of 11 days. ( 13 ) THE learned Advocate for the appellant has laid much stress on the unusual delay in lodging the First Information Report. The occurrence took place on 30/1/1985 at about 3. 30 p. m. and the First Information Report was lodged 10 days after on 9/2/1985. It has been contended that in view of this unusual delay in lodging the First Information Report the prosecution case must be discarded. We are unable to accept this contention because there is very satisfactory explanation for the delay in lodging the First Information Report. We have already been told that after such scandalous incident P. Ws. 1, 6 and 7 visited the house of Subal Pati for an amicable settlement. We are unable to accept this contention because there is very satisfactory explanation for the delay in lodging the First Information Report. We have already been told that after such scandalous incident P. Ws. 1, 6 and 7 visited the house of Subal Pati for an amicable settlement. They approached Subal Pati, father of the appellant, and suggested that in view of the scandalous incident marriage between Nirupama and Sushil was, desirable and that the elder brother of Sushil agreed to the proposal. The conduct on the part of P. W. 1 and other relations in deferring lodging of the complaint with the police was a very logical reaction in the circumstances of the case. There could have been no better arrangement than to marry the victim with the rapist. The evidence shows that the initial agreement for an amicable settlement and for marriage of the victim girl with the rapist was, however, given by a go-bye and the father and elder brother of the accused soon arranged for his marriage with another girl. It was only Tafter all hopes for an amicable settlement were dashed to the ground that P. W. 1 lodged a written complaint with the police. In fact, the evidence suggests that the conduct of the guardians of the accused in giving a false assurance and then backing out was responsible for the delay in lodging the complaint. Thus the circumstances in which the delay was made appear to be more in keeping the natural reaction of the close relatives of the victim girl who wanted to see the girl well placed in life free from stigma through her marriage with the accused and it was only after the elder relations of the accused backed out that the complaint was lodged. ( 14 ) THE next contention of the learned advocate for the appellant is that according to the evidence of P. W. 1 she herself and the Anchal Pradhan are supporters of C. P. I. (M) and the accused and his father are supporters of Congress (I) and C. P. I. (M) tried to bring them into the folds of the party but failed and it is contended that the accused has, therefore, been falsely implicated in this case as a measure of retaliation. This argument does not bear a moments scrutiny. This argument does not bear a moments scrutiny. It is wholly unbelievable that a rustic woman just to fulfil the vegeance of the party of her liking and to chastise a man of her opponent political camp would falsely implicate him in such a case of rape at the risk of social scandal and ruination of the life of her own young unmarried daughter. In our tradition-bound orthodox society, particularly in rural areas, the extra-marital sex is looked with such contempt and the innocent victim of rape ist made to carry on such stigma and total disgrace on herself and the family that the same tends to ruin her life. It is inconceivable that despite exposure to such hazards, P. W. 1 would gamble with her minor daughters future and the reputation of the family by making a false allegation against the accused merely against the accused belongs to a rival political party. The accused and his father ate not leaders of such consequence that by disgracing them the C. P. I. (M) would get an edge over the Congress Party and that too at such a high stake as the reputation of an unmarried girl who is daughter of a supporter of their own party. ( 15 ) THE learned Advocate for the appellant has urged that the evidence of P. Ws, 2 and 5 does not really prove sexual intercourse in as much as they simply speak of Commission of Kharap Kaajt which means bad act which is explained by P. W. 5 as 'ashavya Kaaj' which means uncivilized act. According to the learned Advocate for the appellant, the appellant may at best be, convicted of the offence under Section 354, Indian Penal Code. But we are of the opinion that the expressions 'kharap Kaaj and Ashavya Kaaj' used by these two witnesses while describing the incident cannot but mean sexual intercourse in the context. It must not be foregut on that the rustic Bengali equivalent of the word rape is considered highly vulgar and that utterance of it publicly is considered as an act of indecency, particularly by our women folk. Hence, the two witnesses have deliberately avoided the exact Bengali equivalent of the word rape or sexual intercourse. It must not be foregut on that the rustic Bengali equivalent of the word rape is considered highly vulgar and that utterance of it publicly is considered as an act of indecency, particularly by our women folk. Hence, the two witnesses have deliberately avoided the exact Bengali equivalent of the word rape or sexual intercourse. The testimony of P. W. 2 that the accused caught her, removed her panties, raised his lungi and then committed Kharap Kaaj and continued that act on her for a considerable period of time must be construed to mean that the accused forcibly committed sexual intercourse on her. The testimony of P. W. 5 that she found Nirupama lying on her back and Sushil was lying on her doing 'ashavya Kaaj' must necessarily mean that the accused was committing sexual assault on the victim girl. The presence of tear in the hymen of the victim girl and the opinion of the doctor that she was raped more than 7 days before further strengthen this conclusion. ( 16 ) THE under garment that P. W. 2 was wearing at the time of the occurrence was seized at a very late stage by the Second Investigation Officer and was not sent to the F. S. L. for Chemical examination. The learned Advocate for the appellant has contended that the accused is accordingly entitled to an adverse inference and benefit of-doubt. This lapse shows that the Investigation Officer was either incompetent or utterly callous. But that lapse alone does not affect the prosecution case which had been established by other cogent evidence particularly when, the under part was washed by P. W. 2 before seizure as it transpires from her evidence. No useful purpose would have been served, by sending it to the expert for chemical examination. ( 17 ) THE last contention of the learned Advocate for the appellant is that adverse inference may be drawn for non-examination of the persons present in the field at the time of the occurrence. This argument is passed on the statement of P. W s. that the agricultural land is at a distance of 15 ft. from the place of occurrence and that several persons were engaged in cultivation. The contention does not bear a moment's scrutiny. This argument is passed on the statement of P. W s. that the agricultural land is at a distance of 15 ft. from the place of occurrence and that several persons were engaged in cultivation. The contention does not bear a moment's scrutiny. The boundary of the agricultural land may be abutting the field where the girl was collecting cowdung cakes but that does not mean that the persons were, working near the said boundary of the agricultural land. It is evident from the testimony of P. W. 2 that the village is surrounded by agricultural land. It is clear that the agricultural lands are spreading over a vast area and the evidence of P. W. 2 does not necessarily mean that the persons who were engaged in the fields were at a short distance from the place of occurrence so that they could see the occurrence or prevent such occurrence. Moreover, in reply to a specific question put to P. W. 5, P. W. 5 has stated that on her way to the house of Nirupama she found no one available in the field. In the absence of specific evidence that anyone else was present within the visibility of the place of occurrence, the contention of the learned advocate for the appellant must fail. ( 18 ) THUS upon a careful consideration of the entire evidence on record and facts and circumstances of the case: we have no-hesitation in holding that the prosecution has been able-to prove the charge under section 376, Indian Penal Code beyond any reasonable doubt and that the appellant has been rightly convicted by the lower, Court under section 376, Indian Penal Code. ( 19 ) THE next question for our consideration is whether the sentence as passed by the lower Court is liable to be enhanced. The minimum sentence for an offence punishable under section 376, Indian Penal Code is seven years. The Court can, however, pass a lesser sentence for adequate and special reasons to be recorded by it. There is no extenuating circumstance in favour of the accused. He forcibly committed rape on a helpless minor girl of his own village. The minimum sentence for an offence punishable under section 376, Indian Penal Code is seven years. The Court can, however, pass a lesser sentence for adequate and special reasons to be recorded by it. There is no extenuating circumstance in favour of the accused. He forcibly committed rape on a helpless minor girl of his own village. Though confronted with by the mother and other relations of the victim girl he at first agreed to marry the girl to compensate her for the enormous wrong done to her, he ultimately backed out and married in a hurry another girl within a few days from the date of occurrence, the only reason for imposing a lesser sentence as given by the lower Court is that the accused is a young man having children and wife. This does not appear to us to be an adequate and special reason. We are, therefore, inclined to enhance the sentence to suffer Rigorous Imprisonment for seven Years. ( 20 ) IN the result, the appeal is dismissed and the Rule is made absolute. The order of conviction as passed by the court below is confirmed, but the substantive sentence is enhanced to rigorous imprisonment for seven years. The sentence of fine as passed by the court below, however, stands affirmed. Appeal dismissed.