Judgment :- This Appeal by sixth defendant in the suit is directed against the concurrent findings of the courts below. The courts below declared that a court sale, pursuant to Ext. A7 decree in O.S.147/68, was not binding on the respondent/ plaintiffs. 2. The chronology of events, leading to the Suit from which the Second Appeal arises, is as follows: The original owner of the Suit property, 4th defendant, sold it to 5th defendant by Ext. A2 dated 18-2-1958 and he, in turn sold it to 'Nair Sahodhara Sangham' by Ext. A1 dated 6-7-1960. Plaintiff N.S.S. Karayogam stepped into the shoes of the 'Nair Sahodhara Sangham' by reason of Exts. A3 and All. While so, one Sankaran Narayanan filed a Suit, OS 359/63 against the aforesaid Sangham, and that ended in a compromise (Ext. A5). Earlier, 4th defendant had executed Ext. B4 chitty bond in favour of first defendant. Based on that, first defendant filed OS 147/68 against the 4thdefendant. Ext. A6 the judgment in that Suit and Ext.A7 the decree: Plaintiffs were not parties to the Suit. 3. In execution of Ext. A7 decree, the suit property was sold in court auction. Defendants 2 & 3 purchased the same. Ext. A8 is the Delivery Kychit. Later, 3rd defendant executed Ext. A9 release deed in favour of second defendant. Second defendant conveyed her rights to 6th defendant under Ext. B1 dated 24-9-1975. 4. Coming to know of the Court sale, plaintiffs filed the present Suit for setting aside the same and for a declaration that the sale was not binding on them. Appellant/ 6th defendant resisted the Suit on the ground that plaintiff N.S.S. Karayogam, had not obtained any rights in the property. The courts below concurrently found that the court sale was not binding on the plaintiffs. 5. In addition to the contentions raised in the suit, counsel for appellant contended that the Suit was barred by limitation, and that the Courts below should not have invoked S.151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, to restore possession to plaintiffs. Elaborating his contention, counsel submitted that a Suit for setting aside the sale has to be filed within one year of the confirmation of sale by reason of Art, 99 of the Limitation Act, and that the Suit filed beyond one year of that period is barred by limitation. Elaborating his contention, counsel submitted that a Suit for setting aside the sale has to be filed within one year of the confirmation of sale by reason of Art, 99 of the Limitation Act, and that the Suit filed beyond one year of that period is barred by limitation. Answering this contention, counsel for respondents submitted that the Suit was due for a declaration, that the sale will not bind respondents, and that the question of limitation, relating to a Suit falling under Art.99, was alien to the context. 6. The imprecise language in which the prayers are couched, gives rise to an argument that the prayer is to set aside the court sale. The time for filing a suit for that purpose, is one year under Art.99. Indisputably, the suit was filed beyond that period. But, a prayer for a declaration that the sale is not binding on the plaintiffs, is incorporated in prayer (b). True, there is also a specific prayer for setting aside the sale. Clarity of thinking and precision in drafting, are not virtues of the plaint in question. But, on a reasonable understanding of prayer (b), a prayer for the declaration aforesaid, can be gleaned. 7. More importantly, the relief that can be claimed in a case like this, where the plaintiff is not a party to the suit leading to the sale, can only be one for a declaration that the decree and sale will not bind him, a stranger. It will not be proper for him to seek the remedy of setting aside the sale. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council had held consistently that the remedy for a stranger to a suit, in which a sale is ordered, is a declaratory relief and not a suit to set aside the court sale. In Manohar Lal v. Jadunath Singh (33 Indian Appeals 128), the Judicial Committee observed that the appropriate relief in such circumstances would be a declaration that the decree does not bind one who was not a party to the suit. The principle, upon which this view rests, is that decision cannot bind a stranger to the proceedings. It is not proper to set aside the decree either, in cause it may be good against others. The Privy Council expressed the same view in 'Khiarajmal v. Daim (ILR 32 Calcutta 296). The principle, upon which this view rests, is that decision cannot bind a stranger to the proceedings. It is not proper to set aside the decree either, in cause it may be good against others. The Privy Council expressed the same view in 'Khiarajmal v. Daim (ILR 32 Calcutta 296). Regarding a stranger, the Judicial Committee observed: "Against such persons the decree sale would be a nullity ant} might be disregarded with out any proceedings to set them aside". (emphasis supplied) In Kedar Nath Geonka v. Munshi Ram Narain Lai (AIR 1935 P.C.139), the Judicial Committee held that where a property is sold at a time when the title to the property was not in the judgment debtor, the sale would be anullity. A Full Bench of the Madras High Court had occasion to consider a situation similar to the one on hand in Abdul Hameed v. The Provident Investment Company Ltd. (AIR 1954 Madras 961). Subba" Rao (J) (as His Lordship then was), delivering the opinion of the Bench, stated that a sale cannot affect the title of a party, who was not a party to the suit, leading to the sale and it is not necessary for him to have the sale set aside: "The terms of the Article (corresponding to Article 99) indicate that it applies only to a case where the court sale is required to be set aside..." Other decisions which have taken a similar view are Venkatasiva Rao v. VenkatanaraSimha (AIR 1932 Madras 605-DB), Thancachi Nachial v. Ahamed Hussain (AIR 1957 Madras 194), Bhai Ishar Das v. Smt. Govindi (AIR 1975 Rajasthan 45), Ganapathy Koundan v. Chella Kumaraswami Koundan (1972 KLT1028) etc. 8. Authority is thus legion for the proposition that article 99 of the Limitation Act will not govern cases, where strangers seek to set aside a court sale pursuant to decrees, to which they were not parties. What they can seek, and what they should seek, are declarations to avoid the effect of the decree or sale, so far as it concerns them. The contention based on Art.99 of the Limitation Act, must be repelled. As for the declaration, it is not in dispute that the Suit was within the period. 9. It was then contended that possession was with the appellant, and that S.151 of the Code of Civil Procedure should not have been invoked. The contention based on Art.99 of the Limitation Act, must be repelled. As for the declaration, it is not in dispute that the Suit was within the period. 9. It was then contended that possession was with the appellant, and that S.151 of the Code of Civil Procedure should not have been invoked. Physical possession cannot be presumed in every instance of delivery. As rightly pointed out by the first appellate court, there is no evidence of possession in favour of appellant. Ext. AS which is the main plank of appellant's case, is only a delivery kychit and not even the Amin was, examined. In this state of evidence, the contention regarding possession, has to be rejected. 10. The allegation that Ext. A2 evidences a sham transaction was not substantiated. Nor, has the appellant succeeded in establishing that appreciation of evidence by the courts below was unreasonable. It is pertinent to note that the title of 5th defendant was not successfully challenged by appellant. 11. The only other contention urged is that S.151 CPC should not have been invoked, by the court below to 'restore' possession. The court below stated that it was 'competent to restore possession'. For want of elucidation, this statement has lent an argument to appellant. What was obviously meant by the court below was that by violating the order of injunction, appellant could not gain possession and that S.151 CPC enables the court to make an order necessary for the ends of justice. When un lawful means are adopted by a party, it is plainly the responsibility of the court to invokes. 151 CPC to secure the ends of justice„ prevents abuse of-process of court. In the instant case, an order of injunction was issued under Order 39 Rule 1. In disregard of that, the appellant took possession of trip property. In such circumstances, the court was bound intervene, and intervention was not to give an unrelated relief, but only to enforce the order under Order 39 Rule 1. As observed in Satish Chandra v. Saila Bale (AIR 1978 Calcutta 499), when a party comes into possession of property violating an order of injunction, it is the duty of the court to restore possession, by recourse to its inherent powers under S.151 CPC. As observed in Satish Chandra v. Saila Bale (AIR 1978 Calcutta 499), when a party comes into possession of property violating an order of injunction, it is the duty of the court to restore possession, by recourse to its inherent powers under S.151 CPC. The High Court of Rajasthan also in Magna v. Rustam (AIR 1963 Rajasthan 3) held that S.151 CPC can be invoked when one of the parties obtained possession, violating an order of injunction. The same view finds acceptance in Ha/ 7 Nandan Agrawal v. S.N. Pandita (AIR 1975 Allahabad 48), in State of Bihar v. Usha Devi (AIR 1956 Patna 455) and in Kochira Krishnan v. Joseph Desouza (1985 KLJ 453). Consensus of judicial opinion, without divergence, is that S.151 CPC cannot only be invoked, but should also be invoked to effectuate an order validly made by a Court of competent jurisdiction. That is what the Court below did, and no more, and that is what they are required to do. The judgment and decree do not call for interference. The Appeal is without merit, and it is accordingly dismissed, but without any order as to costs. I record appreciation of the help rendered by counsel on both sides and particularly by Shri N. Subramaniam who addressed the Court as Amicus Curiae.