ORDER R.C. Lahoti, J. -- 1. The petitioner, erst-while Civil Judge, Class II, in the subordinate judicial services of the State of Madhya Pradesh is aggrieved by the order dated 5.11.1990 of the State Government terminating his temporary services consistently with Rule 12 of the Madhya Pradesh Government Servants (Temporary and quasi-Permanent Services) Rules, 1960, pursuant to the recommendation made in full Court Meeting of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh. 2. The impugned order of termination is reproduced hereunder :- "Madhya Pradesh State Gazette Part I Orders of State Administration Legal and Legal Works Department Bhopal, Dated 5 November, 1990. No. 6647-3 (B)-8-90 Twenty One-B. Since Shri Anil Kumar Saxena was appointed on the post of Civil Judge II as temporary vide order No. F. 3 (B)-20-83- Twenty-8 dated 13th December, 1985 of this Department till the further order. And because according to the agreement of the abovesaid orders his services can be terminated at any time after informing one month earlier, or on the payment of the amount equal to the salary and allowances of the same period, which is expected under the sub-rule 12 (A) of the Madhya Pradesh Government Servant (Temporary and Quasi-Permanent) Rules. Since the High Court has recommended the termination of the services after making the payment of the amount equal to the amount of salary and allowances for the period informed earlier. Therefore, the State Government after accepting the recommendation of the High Court, terminates the services of said Shri Anil Kumar Saxena Civil Judge II using the power prescribed in Rule 12 of the Madhya Pradesh Government Servants (Temporary and Quasi-Permanent Service) Rules, 1960 after the payment of the salary and allowances for a period of one month as prescribed from the date of the receipt of this order." (N.B.-English Translation-reproduced from petition) 3. The service history of the petitioner is not in dispute. On 13.12.1985 the petitioner was appointed as Civil Judge, Class II, and posted at Damoh for his initial training. After the completion of training period he was given a regular posting. On 2.7. 1987. he completed his period of probation. On 5.11.1990 the order of termination was passed. 4. The present petition was filed under Article 320fthe Constitution of India before Hon 'ble the Supreme Court. On 10.1.1991 their Lordships were pleased . After the completion of training period he was given a regular posting. On 2.7. 1987. he completed his period of probation. On 5.11.1990 the order of termination was passed. 4. The present petition was filed under Article 320fthe Constitution of India before Hon 'ble the Supreme Court. On 10.1.1991 their Lordships were pleased . to direct the petition to be transferred to this Bench of this High Court to be dealt with as a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. 5. The sole and singular ground on which the petitioner attacked the validity of the order is that there was some complaint against the petitioner, which was got enquired through Shri A.K. Tiwari, A.DJ. (Vigilence Cell), who was biased against the petitioner and presumably acting on such enquiry report, in which enquiry petitioner had no opportunity of participation, the High Court and the State Government took a decision to terminate the petitioner. Else the service record of the petitioner was completely clean; there being no adverse entry against him. The order of termination, outwardly innocuous, is a camouflage and in substance is punitive in nature inasmuch as the respondents instead of holding a regular departmental enquiry against the petitioner, have chosen to take shelter behind an order of termination simpliciter because at the enquiry no guilt of the petitioner could have been held proved. 6. Respondents No.2, 3, 4 and 5 have denied all the allegations made by the petitioner. The substance of the stand taken in the return is that there was ample material available in possession of the respondents to formulate an opinion about the unsatisfactory performance in service of the petitioner and hence to terminate him; respondents never intended to take any punitive action against the petitioner, muchless to penalise him. No stigma is cast by the impugned order of termination on the petitioner and hence it is not open to challenge. 7. Annexing about 48 documents with the return respondents have tried to substantiate the pleas taken that the petitioner was not taking any interest in the Court work and was in the habit of leaving often the head quarters without prior permission, remaining on unauthorised leave, spending most of the time at his home town, keeping himself otherwise busy, to the great inconvenience and annoyance of the litigant public and the lawyers. Bar Association at Beohari passed resolution and the District Judge made several timely reports to the High Court inviting attention to the unexpected conduct of the petitioner. Several D.O. letters and cautions issued to the petitioner did not bring any favourable response. Vide para 15 of the return a list of 96 earned leaves, 39 half pay leaves and 38 leaves without pay is given. During the petitioner's posting at Beohari w.e.f. 13.2.1989 during a period of about an year, the petitioner had not attended to his duties for 228 days. His quality of judicial work, too poor and much below the standard of disposal spoke aloud about his apathy towards judicial work. The note- sheet of the District Judge indicated that at times the petitioner had submitted incorrect monthly statements to show a better performance than the reality. The petitioner had no control over his staff too. In the Full Court Meeting held on 21/22-4-1990 the question of continuance or otherwise of the petitioner in service came up for consideration and the Full Court Meeting having given its anxious consideration to the entire service record of the petitioner formed an opinion that the petitioner was a lost case and in the interest of the institution of judiciary it was considered better to chuck off the dead wood but without casting any stigma on him so that he may make such use of him elsewhere as he may deem fit. The State Government was advised to terminate the services of the petitioner and the recommendation of the High Court was accepted by the State Government which acted accordingly. 8. It is not disputed at the Bar that on the date of termination of the petitioner his status was that of a temporary Government servant and the order of termination was in accordance with the service rules. What was contended on behalf of the petitioner was that apparently innocuous order of termination was in reality a punitive action in disguise and hence vulnerable to judicial review. Reliance was placed on Omprakash Goel v. Himachal Pradesh Tourism Development Corporation Ltd. ( AIR 1991 SC 1490 ), Smt. Rajinder Kaur v. Punjab State (AIR 1986SC1790),Govt. Branch Press v. D.B.Bolliappa (AIR 1979SC429) and Gulabsingh Chauhan v. State of M.P. & others ( 1984 JLJ 198 ). 9. We will advert to the cases cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner a little later. Branch Press v. D.B.Bolliappa (AIR 1979SC429) and Gulabsingh Chauhan v. State of M.P. & others ( 1984 JLJ 198 ). 9. We will advert to the cases cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner a little later. For the present, we propose to read the law laid down, by the Apex Court very recently, considering the earlier law laid down by the Apex Court and relied on by the learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the respondents because in our opinion the law laid down in those decisions clinches the issue and covers the case at hand. The learned Additional Advocate General has relied on Triveni Shankar Saxena v. State of V.P. ( AIR 1992 SC 496 ) and Kaushal Kishore Shukla's case (1991) 1 SCC 691 . 10. In Triveni Shankar Saxena's case (supra) a number of adverse entries in the service record of the employee were taken into consideration and on the basis of those entries an order of termination simpliciter was passed against the temporary employee without casting any stigma on him or disclosing penal consequences. Their Lordships repelled challenge to the validity of the order and followed the law laid down, in Kaushal Kishore Shukla's case (supra) to the following effect :- "Under the service jurisprudence a temporary employee has no right to hold the post and his services are liable to be terminated in accordance with the relevant service rules and the terms of contract of service. If on the perusal of the character roll entries or on the basis of preliminary inquiry on the allegations made against an employee, the competent authority is satisfied that the employee is not suitable for the service whereupon the services of the temporary employee are terminated, no exception can be taken to such an order of termination. A temporary Government Servant has no right to hold the post, his services are liable to be terminated by giving him one month's notice without assigning any reason either under the terms of the contract providing for such termination or under the relevant statutory rules regulating the terms and conditions of temporary Government servants." (Emphasis supplied by us) 11. A temporary Government Servant has no right to hold the post, his services are liable to be terminated by giving him one month's notice without assigning any reason either under the terms of the contract providing for such termination or under the relevant statutory rules regulating the terms and conditions of temporary Government servants." (Emphasis supplied by us) 11. If any inquiry was conducted by the Vigilence Judge under order of the High Court, it was with the view of finding truth and satisfying the High Court of the truthfulness of the complaint about unsuitability of the petitioner for judicial services received by the High Court. It was not with the idea of initiating any departmental enquiry against the petitioner. Having perused the several documents filed with the return we are satisfied that the present one is not a case where we may hold that the material available with the High Court could not have enabled formation of the opinion which the High Court and the State Government formed. 12. In all fairness to the learned counsel for the petitioner we proceed to refer to the cases cited by him, in the succeeding paragraphs. 13. Om Prakash Goel's case (supra) is one where the employee was charged with facilitating and abeting emhezzlement and having failed to serve the employer corporation honestly and faithfully. The charges were denied as false and vague. Instead of proceeding with the enquiry ahead the petitioner's services were abruptly terminated as no longer required. These circumstances coupled with the fact that juniors in the service were retained while the petitioner was turned out persuaded the Court in forming the opinion that the order of termination simpliciter was only a camouflage and a cloak for an order of punishment and hence hit by Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. 14. In Rajinder Kaur's case (supra) also there was an allegation of misconduct against a lady constable which was found proved on an enquiry confidentially conducted. The Court concluded that the order was made on the ground of• the employee's misconduct, was penal in nature and cast a stigma on her service career. It is noteworthy on her that the order itself stated that she was being discharged from the police force as she was unlikely to prove an efficient police officer. 15. The Court concluded that the order was made on the ground of• the employee's misconduct, was penal in nature and cast a stigma on her service career. It is noteworthy on her that the order itself stated that she was being discharged from the police force as she was unlikely to prove an efficient police officer. 15. In D.B. Belliappa's case (supra) the services of a temporary Government servant were terminated arbitrarily and not on the ground of his unsuitability and unsatisfactory conduct or the like which would put him in a class apart from his juniors in service. 16. The Single Bench decision of Madhya Pradesh High Court in Gulab Singh Chauhan's case (supra) also shows that an oral order terminating the employee's service was passed by the. Minister and repeated by the Chief Secretary without any rhyme or reason. The Court held that the real reason being not known, the reason that the services were no longer required did not appear to be true reason and that the order was punitive in nature which could not have been passed. 17. It hardly needs any futher reasoning to demonstrate that none of the cases relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner help him. On the contrary, the law laid down in D.B. Belliappa's case run counter to the petitioner's own contentions. 18. The law laid down by the Apex Court in Ravindra Kumar v. V.P. State Handloom Corporation Ltd. ( AIR 1987 SC 2408 ) is also in line with Triveni Shankar Saxena's case (supra) and Kaushal Kishore Shukla's case (supra) relied upon by the learned Additional Advocate General. 19. For the foregoing reasons we are unhesitatingly of the opinion that no fault can be found with the impugned order of termination. 20. It was faintly contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that juniors to the petitioner were retained in service while the petitioner's services were dispensed with as no longer required, this by itself smacks of arbitrariness an the part of the respondent, vitiating the order of termination under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. We see no substance in this submission also. We see no substance in this submission also. Firstly, such a ground of challenge is not to be found mentioned in the petition and being essentially a question of fact, we cannot allow it to be raised without there being a foundation in pleadings and the respondents too having been afforded an opportunity of having their say on the plea. Secondly, as we have already stated, there was ample material available with the respondents enabling formation of an opinion as to unsuitability of the petitioner for judicial service and that would make the petitioner as a class by himself distinct from such other employee whose suitability was not doubted. It is not the case of the petitioner that there are any other civil Judges as unsuitable as the petitioner was, but retained in service. 21. No other point was urged. 22. The petition is wholly devoid of any merit. It is dismissed. However, we make no order as to costs.