Indian Drugs And Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Labour Court, Meerut
1992-02-21
R.B.MEHROTRA
body1992
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT R.B. Mehrotra, J. - By means of the present writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has challenged the order of the Labour Court, Meerut passed in Adjudication case No. 36 of 1979 between M/s Indian Drugs and Pharmaceuticals Ltd., and Sri R. S. Goel. By the aforesaid order, the Labour Court rejected the application of M/s Indian Drugs and Pharmaceuticals Ltd., Virbhadra, Rishikesh, district Dehradun (hereinafter referred to as the employer) seeking permission to lead evidence that the termination of the workman respondent No. 2 is justified on the basis that he had committed theft of Rs. 1000/-. 2. The facts necessary for the decision of the case are that Sri R. S. Goel, respondent No. 2 (hereinafter referred to as the workman), was in the employment of the petitioner employer. The workman was last employed as an Assistant in the Accounts section of the establishment. The services of the workman were discharged simpliciter by an order of termination, dated 16 7.1977. The workman felt dissatisfied against the termination of his services aforesaid. The matter not having been conciliated, reference was sought under Section 2-A of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act. The State Government referred the matter for adjudication to the Labour Court, Meerut, treating it to be an industrial dispute covered by Section 2-A of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) by an order, dated 11.4.1979. This dispute was registered as Adjudication case No. 36 of 1979 before the Labour Court, Meerut. The employer claims to have filed their written statement in the month of July, 1979. The workman claims to have filed his written statement in the month of August, 1979. Subsequent thereto both the employer and the workman also filed their rejoinder statements. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the Labour Court framed the following issues : "1. Was the State Government incompetent to make the Reference under Section 4-K of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act. If so, is the order of reference bad in law ? 2. Is the dispute in question not an industrial dispute ? 3. Did the workman concerned commit theft as alleged by the Employer ? 4. Had the employer sufficient reasons for losing confidence in the workman concerned ? 5. To what relief ? 3.
If so, is the order of reference bad in law ? 2. Is the dispute in question not an industrial dispute ? 3. Did the workman concerned commit theft as alleged by the Employer ? 4. Had the employer sufficient reasons for losing confidence in the workman concerned ? 5. To what relief ? 3. Thereafter on 5.2.1980, a statement was made by the Agent of the employer, who stated that the order terminating the services of the workman was not an order of punishment, as such issue No. 3 should be reframed. The extract order-sheet of the Labour Court, dated 5.2.1980 is as under : "5.2.80 Statement made by Sri Gautam on 5.2.80. 22.D/23-D. The agent for employers states that the order terminating the services of the workman concerned was not an order of punishment. Since Sri R. P. Gautam has stated that the order terminating the services of the workman concerned was not an order of punishment, Issue No. 3 is reframed as follows : Did the Employers act bona fide in terminating the services of the workman concerned ?" 4. After a lapse of three years on 6.6.1983 the employer moved an application that without prejudice to their contention and without going into the merits of the matter on point of law, they may kindly be permitted to justify the action taken by them against the workman Sri R. S. Goel on the basis of the allegation of theft contained in the order of the General Manager, dated 16.7.77 to satisfy the Hon'ble Court that the action was justified on merits. This application was followed by another application, dated 12.1.1984 seeking permission of the court to prove the action taken by them against the workman for the misconduct alleged against him as punitive. Both the aforesaid applications came up for consideration before the Labour Court on 9.10.1984.
This application was followed by another application, dated 12.1.1984 seeking permission of the court to prove the action taken by them against the workman for the misconduct alleged against him as punitive. Both the aforesaid applications came up for consideration before the Labour Court on 9.10.1984. The Labour Court by its order of the same date rejected the application on two grounds: "(a) Such proof could be allowed to be done by evidence in Court only if the termination was punitive but on 5.2.80 Sri R. P. Gautam for the employers had stated in the Court that the termination was not done by way of punishment, and (b) there was no suggestion in the pleadings of the employers that the termination was punitive or was there any prayer in the pleadings for permission to prove misconduct in the Court." This order passed by the Labour Court, dated 9.10.1984 has been challenged by the employer in the present writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 5. Sri Dilip Gupta, the learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the Labour Court committed an error apparent on the face of the record by rejecting the employer's application seeking permission to lead evidence as the application was moved before the conclusion of the proceedings and at the stage when the parties even did not lead any evidence. Sri Gupta also contended that the Labour Court was not justified in taking a view that necessary statement was not made in the employers' written statement regarding termination of the services of the workman on the basis of theft inasmuch as in the employers written statement all necessary facts regarding theft committed by the workman were stated and on the basis of the aforesaid statement it was contended that workman has committed theft and has also filed false and bogus claims for reimbursement and on the basis of the aforesaid facts, it was stated that it would be prejudicial in the interest of the company to keep Sri Goel in service any more. The employer completely lost confidence in him. It was, therefore, decided to terminate the service under Clause 24 (a) of the Standing orders. 6. Sri Dilip Gupta strongly relied on a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Shankar Chakravarti v. Britannia Biscuit Co.
The employer completely lost confidence in him. It was, therefore, decided to terminate the service under Clause 24 (a) of the Standing orders. 6. Sri Dilip Gupta strongly relied on a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Shankar Chakravarti v. Britannia Biscuit Co. Ltd. and another 1979 (39) FLR 70 : AIR 1979 SC Pages 1652 and 1664 wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held : At page 1664 "If the request is made before the proceedings are concluded the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal should ordinarily grant the opportunity to adduce evidence. But, if no such request is made at any stage of the proceedings, there is no duty in law on the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal to give such an opportunity and if there is no such obligatory duty in law failure to give any such opportunity cannot and would not vitiate the proceedings." At Page-1666 : "It is undeniable that there is no duty cast on the Industrial Tribunal or the Labour Court while adjudicating upon a penal termination of service of a workman either under Section 10 or under Section 33 to call upon the employer to adduce additional evidence to substantiate the charge of misconduct by giving some specific opportunity after decision on the preliminary issue whether the domestic enquiry was at all held or if held was defective in favour of the workman. Cooper Engineering Ltd. case merely specifies the stage at which such opportunity is to be given, if sought. It is both the right and obligation of the employer, if it so choose, to adduce additional evidence to substantiate the charges of mis-conduct. It is for the employer to avail of such opportunity by a specific pleading or by specific request. If such an opportunity is sought in the course of the proceedings the Industrial Tribunal or the Labour Court, as the case may be, should grant the opportunity to lead additional evidence to substantiate the charges." 7. On the basis of the aforesaid decision, Sri Dilip Gupta has submitted that since the opportunity to lead evidence for justifying the action as punitive was sought for specifically, the Labour Court should have granted the opportunity to the petitioner to lead such additional evidence.
On the basis of the aforesaid decision, Sri Dilip Gupta has submitted that since the opportunity to lead evidence for justifying the action as punitive was sought for specifically, the Labour Court should have granted the opportunity to the petitioner to lead such additional evidence. The Labour Court was wholly unjustified in refusing to grant the permission particularly when the permission was sought even before the parties led their evidence. Since the employer sought permission to lead evidence before the conclusion of the proceedings before the Labour Court and even before the parties led the evidence, it was obligatory on the Labour Court to have granted the permission. The Labour Court was also not justified in refusing the permission on the ground that necessary pleadings were not raised. In the written statement the employer had categorically stated that the workman committed theft and in the aforesaid circumstances, the services of the workman were terminated by a simple order of termination. 8. Replying to the aforesaid submissions, Sri Ambarish Sharma, the learned counsel for the workman contended that from the very beginning the case of the employer was that the services of the workman had been terminated by a simple order of termination. The employer stated the necessary facts regarding theft for submitting that the employer had lost confidence in the workman. On the basis of the aforesaid pleadings, an issue was framed being Issue No. 3 as to whether the workman concerned committed theft as alleged by the employer. The employers' representative gave a specific statement that the order terminating the services of the workman concerned was not an order of punishment and on the aforesaid basis sought reframing of Issue No. 3. The employers' representative specifically stated that the order of termination was not punitive. If the employers themselves come out with a case that the services of the workman were discharged by a simple order of termination and make a statement before the Court, they cannot be permitted to riggle out from their statement and take a different stand that they should be permitted to lead evidence to prove that the services of the workman were terminated by way of punishment. Sri Ambraish Sharma also contended that after a lapse of five years, the employer should not be permitted to take this stand.
Sri Ambraish Sharma also contended that after a lapse of five years, the employer should not be permitted to take this stand. The employer can be permitted to lead evidence only if from the very beginning in the pleadings they plead in the alternative that the employer should be permitted to justify the termination of services of the workman by way of punishment. There was nothing of the kind in the pleadings of the employer. On the other hand the employers representative specifically stated that the services of the workman were not terminated by way of punishment. In the aforesaid background, the Labour Court was justified in rejecting the employers application to lead evidence to prove that the services of the workman were terminated by way of punishment. Sri Sharma also contended that the order is interlocutory in nature and this Court should not interfere with the aforesaid order at this stage. In the case of Shambhu Nath Goyal v. Bank of Baroda and others, 1983 (47) FLR 438 (SC). The Hon'ble Supreme Court explained the import of Shankar Chakravartis case (supra). In the aforesaid case, The Hon'ble Supreme Court held : "But when the question arises in a reference under Section 10 of the Act after the workman had been punished pursuant to a finding of guilt recorded against him in the domestic enquiry there is no question of the management filing any application for permission to lead further evidence in support of the charge or charges against the workman, for the defect in the domestic enquiry is pointed out by the workman in his written claim statement filed in the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal after the reference had been received and the management has the opportunity to look into that statement before it files its written statement of defence in the enquiry before the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal and could make the request for the opportunity in the written statement itself. If it does not choose to do so at that stage, it cannot be allowed to do it as any later stage of the proceedings by filing any application for the purpose which may result in delay which may lead to wrecking the morale of the workman and compel him to surrender which he may not otherwise do." 9.
If it does not choose to do so at that stage, it cannot be allowed to do it as any later stage of the proceedings by filing any application for the purpose which may result in delay which may lead to wrecking the morale of the workman and compel him to surrender which he may not otherwise do." 9. Hon'ble Justice Desai, J. in the concurring judgment explaining the import of Shankar Chakravartis case held : "The statement if an application is made during the pendency of the proceedings does not mean that some independent right to make an application at any time is conferred on the employer. Ordinarily, where a party claims reliefs, it must plead for the same. The pleadings can be incorporated in a statement of claim or a written statement of defence. It was not for a moment suggested that an application at any stage of the proceedings without explaining why the relief was not claimed in the original pleading has to be granted. If a separate application is made, it would be open to the Labour Court/Industrial - Tribunal to examine the question whether it should be granted or not depending upon the stage when it is made, the omission to claim the relief in the initial pleading, the delay and the motivation for such delayed action ?" Relying upon the aforesaid decision Sri Ambarish Sharma contended that in the written statement filed long back in the year 1979, the employer did not raise the alternative plea that the employers should be permitted to lead evidence to justify the termination of the workman on the basis that the workman committed theft and the order of termination was passed by way of punishment. The application seeking permission to lead evidence was moved in the month of June, 1983 after a lapse of four years. In between the employer's representative specifically stated that the services of the workman were not terminated by way of punishment. In these circumstances, if the employer is permitted to lead evidence for justifying the action on the basis of punishment, this will amount to permitting the employer to riggle out from the admission made by the employer before the Labour Court.
In these circumstances, if the employer is permitted to lead evidence for justifying the action on the basis of punishment, this will amount to permitting the employer to riggle out from the admission made by the employer before the Labour Court. In these circumstances, the Labour Court was justified in rejecting the employer's application to lead evidence and no interference is called for by this court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 10. I have given a careful consideration to the submissions made by the counsel for the parties. In the present case, the employer came out with a definite case that the services of the workman were not terminated by way of punishment. A specific case of the employer in their written statement was that the workman was discharged from service by a simple order of termination. In Shambhu Nath's case (supra), it has been held that if the employer did not make the request for the opportunity of leading evidence justifying the action by way of punishment in their written statement itself, then the employer cannot be allowed to do it at any later stage of proceedings by filing any application for the purpose. In the present case, the employer did not set out their alternative case in their written statement. On the other hand the employer's representative specifically made a statement that the services of the workman were terminated not by way of punishment. Throughout the employers' case was that the services of the workman have been terminated by a simple order of discharge. On the other hand, the employer's representative protested to the issue of theft being decided by the Labour Court. In view of these pleadings of the parties and in view of the specific case of the employer that the services of the workman were not terminated by way of punishment, the Labour Court was justified in rejecting the employers' application to lead evidence for proving that the services of the workman were terminated by way of punishment. In the present case for almost five years the employer did not take the stand that the services of the workman were terminated by way of punishment. In the aforesaid background the Labour Court did not commit any error in rejecting the employer's application.
In the present case for almost five years the employer did not take the stand that the services of the workman were terminated by way of punishment. In the aforesaid background the Labour Court did not commit any error in rejecting the employer's application. In the facts present case, I am satisfied that the order of the Labour Court does not call for any interference by this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 11. The dispute was referred to the Labour Court in 1979, already it has become too old. Accordingly the Labour Court should decide the adjudication case within six months from the receipt of the certified copy of this order. 12. With the aforesaid observation, the writ petition is dismissed. Parties will bear their own costs.