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Himachal Pradesh High Court · body

1992 DIGILAW 26 (HP)

STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH v. VED PRAKASH

1992-03-31

S.S.SIDHU

body1992
JUDGMENT S. S Sidhu, I. A. S.—This is a reference made by the learned District Collector, Solan, under section 17 of H. P. Land Revenue Act, for reversing the order dated 22-3-1976 made by the Assistant Collector, II Grade, Kandaghat, on mutation No. 779 pertaining to village Dharyan, Tehsil Kandaghat, District Solan, in respect of land comprised in Khasra Nos. 4, 53 and 54, measuring 7-14 bighas, situated in village Dharyan. 2. Briefly stated, the facts of the case as gathered from the order dated 26-11-1990 of the District Collector, Solan are that the Tehsildar, Kandaghat, paid a surprise visit to Patwar Kahana, Dharyan and also the record of his land reforms branch. He found that the case pertaining to aforesaid land was pending with the branch since 1983. The pendency could not be explained by the staff in the land reforms branch The land comprised in Khasra Nos. 4, 53 and 54, Kita 3, measuring 7-14 bighas was given on lease by the Gram Panchayat, Sakorf, vide resolution No. 16 dated 9-3-1968 to S/Shri Mathu and Sahabu, sons of Shri Gulabu, resident of village Dochi being landless. Since under section 3 of H P. Village Common Lands (Vesting and Utilization) Act, 1974 all the Shamlat lands in Himachal Pradesh were vested in the State of Himachal Pradesh, the learned Collector, Kandaghat Sub-Division, took up the case on 25-11-1982 at Chail in accordance with the provisions contained in section 4 of Act ibid. The learned Sub-Divisional Collector observed that the land in question has forcibly been occupied by the respondents and be further observed that S/Shri Mathu and Sahabu, the persons to whom the above mentioned land had been leased out by the Gram Panchayat, were evicted forcibly. It also came to his knowledge that the respondents had got proprietary rights of the land in question under section 104 of the Himachal Pradesh Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972 vide mutation No. 779, sanctioned on 22-3-1976 pertaining to village Dharyan The learned Sub-Divisional Collector directed the Tehsildar to make out a case for the review of the above order since tenancy on Government land had wrongly been created. 3. The file, thereafter, is reported to have been sent by the Sub-Divisional Collector, Kandaghat to Tehsildar on 14-3-1983. 3. The file, thereafter, is reported to have been sent by the Sub-Divisional Collector, Kandaghat to Tehsildar on 14-3-1983. On this, Naib Tehsildar, Kandaghat directed the Office Kanungo to put up the case alongwith the original mutation but it appears that no action was taken by the staff on the order of the Naib Tehsildar When the file came to the notice of Tehsildar on his surprise visit, he called for the copies of Jamabandi and mutation. On perusal of the record, it came to the notice of the Tehsildar that the respondents had been recorded as owners in the Jamabandi of village Dharyan for the year 1978-79. Since the Jamabandi entries could not be amended by way of review under section 16 of the H. P. Land Revenue Act, the Tehsildar suggested that the case be referred to the Financial Commissioner under section 17 of the H. P. Land Revenue Act. This is how the proceedings were started by the learned District Collector, Solan. 4. On receipt of the record, a show cause notice was issued to the respondents but they were not available on the given address. As such, the service was got affected by the learned Collector by way of pasting on the premises of the respondents. Since none turned up, the respondents were ordered to be proceeded ex pane. Later on, the learned Collector went through the lease file of the Sob-Divisional Collector, Kandaghat, report of the Tehsildar and also the copies of the relevant record brought on the file. The learned Collector came to the conclusion that the Gram Panchayat vide resolution No. 16 dated 9-3-1968 granted lease of the land in favour of S/Shri Mathu and Sahabu, sons of Shri Gulabu, village Dharyan, for agriculture purpose, The other thing which came to the notice was that the mutation No. 779 sanctioned on 22-3-1976 had wrongly been entered and attested. The learned District Collector observed that the possession of the respondents on the land comprised in Khasra Nos. 4, 53 and 54, measuring 7-14 bighas was illegal and unauthorised and as such the provisions of section 104 of the H P Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972 were not attracted in this case. The learned District Collector observed that the possession of the respondents on the land comprised in Khasra Nos. 4, 53 and 54, measuring 7-14 bighas was illegal and unauthorised and as such the provisions of section 104 of the H P Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972 were not attracted in this case. It was in view of this that he recommended for reversing the order made by the Assistant Collector, II Grade, Kandaghat, on mutation No 779 on 22-3-1976 and also for correction of subsequent entries in the Jamabandi. 5. I have gone through the record and have also heard the arguments adduced by Shri R L. Sharma, District Attorney (Revenue), who appeared on behalf of the State and Shri R. K. Verma, Advocate, who appeared on behalf of the respondents. The learned Counsel for the respondents raised preliminary objections that the reference/revision was not maintainable at all since the order dated 22-3-1976 on mutation No. 779 was passed by the learned Assistant Collector, II Grade, Kandaghat under the Himachal Pradesh Tenancy and Land Reforms Act while the reference had been made by the learned District Collector under section 17 of the H P. Land Revenue Act. He argued that the H P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act is a complete Act and the order should have been challenged in appeal under the provisions of that very Act. In this respect, he drew my attention to ruling contained in 1969-PLJ-335, wherein the learned Financial Commissioner, Punjab held in case "Mahant Govind Dass v. Gram Panchayat, Chak Ramun" that the revisional jurisdiction conferred upon the Financial Commissioner under section 16 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act (which is similar to section 17 of Himachal Pradesh Land Revenue Act), is limited to proceedings arising under that Act alone and that revisional jurisdiction could not be invoked in respect of proceedings arising under section 7 of the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act. more so when this latter section provides a self-contained law with regard to first and second appeals. As regards the powers of Financial Commissioner, he cited 1972-PLJ-319 wherein Honble High Court of Punjab and Haryana held that an issue of fact cannot be tried and determined by the Financial Commissioner. more so when this latter section provides a self-contained law with regard to first and second appeals. As regards the powers of Financial Commissioner, he cited 1972-PLJ-319 wherein Honble High Court of Punjab and Haryana held that an issue of fact cannot be tried and determined by the Financial Commissioner. They have further observed that it is well settled that the powers of the Financial Commissioner in revision are the same as the powers of the High Court under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 6. The learned Counsel for the respondents argued that the revision made by the State Government was hopelessly time-barred. He stated that no appeal had been filed and the limitation prescribed under the H. P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act for filing revision was 90 days. He stated that though the Financial Commissioner can call for the case at any time yet "at any time" does not mean eternity. He argued that the sword of revision cannot be allowed to hang over from generation to generation. In support of his arguments, he cited the following rulings ; (i)"Jagir Chand and others v. Gulab and others,” 1932 LLT 16 : In which, it was held by Financial Commissioner, Punjab that no limitation is fixed for the exercise by the Financial Commissioner of his power of revision, But it is to be expected that the applicant will use due diligence and unless a special cause is shown this Court will not admit an application for revision after the period of 90 days fixed for an appeal. (ii) "Mongla v. Rai Bahadur Pt. Shiv Dutt,”1959 LLT 4 : Wherein, Financial Commissioner, Punjab held that in the absence of any special and satisfactory cause being shown for presenting a revision petition after the expiry of 352 days, the petition should not be entertained. (iii) "The State of Punjab v. The Mahalakshmi Farms;” 1965 PLJ 13 : In which, the Financial Commissioner, Punjab held that the period normally allowed for revision petitions is only 90 days. (iii) "The State of Punjab v. The Mahalakshmi Farms;” 1965 PLJ 13 : In which, the Financial Commissioner, Punjab held that the period normally allowed for revision petitions is only 90 days. The requirement as to the remedy in revision being sought within a reasonable time obtains as much in the case of State Government as in that of private parties and there would be no justification for delay on the part of the State Government being overlooked when there is no plausible explanation in respect of it, (iv) "Gurdial Singh and another v. Sant Prakash Singh and others", 1966 PLJ 268 : Wherein, the Financial Commissioner, Punjab held that it is correct that there is no statutory limitation for filing revision petitions but it is the recognised practice that revision petitions are normally not entertained after a period of 90 days. Delay can no doubt be condoned but only if there is sufficient reason for doing so (v) "Jagrup Singh v. Sadhu Singh" 1975 PLJ 260 ? Wherein, the Financial Commissioner, Punjab held that it is now well settled and recognised practice obtaining in the Court of the Financial Commissioner that although no period of limitation is expressly prescribed for preferring a revision petition yet the Financial Commissioner would refuse to entertain a revision petition after 90 days, the period assigned for an appeal, unless some plausible and satisfactory cause of delay is shown to his satisfaction. The party seeking condonation has to explain the cause of delay for each and every day to the fullest satisfaction of the Court. (vi) Pat Ram and others v, Bharat Bhushan and another" 1981 PLJ 118 : Wherein, the Financial Commissioner, Haryana held that in admitting revision petitions beyond the period of 90 days the Financial Commissioners no doubt have to be satisfied whether the delay was justified and whether grave injustice would occur if the delay is not condoned. 7. The learned Counsel for the respondents laid stress on the point that the Government was equally bound by the period of limitation and the fact of the revision being time-barred is admitted by the State Government. 7. The learned Counsel for the respondents laid stress on the point that the Government was equally bound by the period of limitation and the fact of the revision being time-barred is admitted by the State Government. He stated that since no appeal was filed and revision is time barred, the order bad become final and must be given effect He also cited AIR 1974 Allahabad 290 wherein it was held by the Honble Allahabad High Court (Lucknow Bench) that impeachable order becomes unimpenli-able after loss of time. The learned Counsel for the respondents also cited 1970 PLJ-715, wherein the Financial Commissioner, Punjab, held that entries in Jamabandi can be altered only upon the basis of an obvious clerical error of patent fact (to be distinguished from a disputed fact) especially after the lapse of years and in the absence of any appeal against the alleged wrong entry. It was further held that correction cannot be allowed by way of review,. He further supported his contention while citing ruling as contained in 1970-PLJ-729 where, the Financial Commissioner. Punjab held that review application should not be entertained for review of orders passed in mutation proceedings which stood incorporated in Jamabandi after lapse of considerable period. The learned Counsel for the respondents also stated that the respondents were bonafide purchaser from their predecessor-in-interest The respondents also produced a copy of resolution dated 22-11-1965 wherein the Gram Panchayat, Sakori resolved that the land adjacent to the land of Smt. Parkashwati is Shamlat deh and its mutation had been attested in favour of the Gram Panchayat. Since Smt. Parkashwati was in possession of that Shamlat land before 26-1-1950, the Gram Panchayat had no objection if that land is entered in her name. The learned Counsel for the respondents stated that the story of forcible occupation was a concocted one since Shri Mathu never took possession of this land. 8. The learned District Attorney argued that the Tehsildar had not concealed any fact in his report. He argued that the respondents were claiming to be purchasers on one hand while tenants on the other hand. He stated that the District Collector was competent to cancel the lease since the land hid vested in the Government. 8. The learned District Attorney argued that the Tehsildar had not concealed any fact in his report. He argued that the respondents were claiming to be purchasers on one hand while tenants on the other hand. He stated that the District Collector was competent to cancel the lease since the land hid vested in the Government. The learned District Attorney advanced arguments that the Financial Commissioner is competent to pass orders even after lapse of 30 years and mere influx of time is not bar for exercising the revisional powers. He also stated that the delay had been explained and the appeal could not be filed because nothing had come to the knowledge of the State. 9. After careful consideration of the arguments adduced by both the parties, we have no hesitation in saying that the present reference/revision is not maintainable since the order sought to be revised was passed in accordance with the provisions made in section 104 of the H. P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972 while the revision has been filed under section 17 of H. P. Land Revenue Act, The delay in filing the revision or making a reference has not been properly explained by the State. It is a well settled law that the State is to be treated like any private party in the proceedings before a Revenue Officer. As such, the State is not entitled for any preferential treatment. It is also admitted by the parties that order passed on mutation No. 779 had found its way in the subsequent Jamabandis. The entries incorporated in the Jamabandi cannot be corrected unless these happen to be of clerical nature. The proper remedy for correction of revenue- entries incorporated in the Jamabandi is before the Civil Court. In view of this position, the reference/revision is dismissed. To be communicated. Revision dismissed.