Judgment :- This Appeal arises out of an application filed by the appellants herein under Order 21 Rule 58 of the Code of Civil Procedure, for raising the attachment over the property in question. According to the appellants, the property is a joint family property in which the appellants are entitled to 3/4th share. First respondent is the decree holder and the second respondent is the judgment-debtor. Admittedly, the property stands in the name of the second respondent. The sale deed under which the properties were purchased is marked as Ex. A.6 dated 30.6.72. It is the contention of the appellants that the family remained joint and there were a lot of ancestral properties providing sufficient nucleus. It is the case that the purchase was made in the name of the second respondent for the benefit of the family. 2. The trial court dismissed the application holding that the appellants have not made out by evidence that the purchase was made with the aid of joint family funds or income from the joint family properties. The trial court has found positively that the second respondent-judgment debtor had enough funds of her own and the property was purchased with the aid of those funds. In addition, the trial court has held that the provisions of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988, Act 45 of 1988, therein after referred to ‘as the Act’ prevent the appellants from raising the plea that they are entitled to a share in the property. 3. On appeal, the appellate court did not consider it necessary to decide the question of fact, but straightaway dismissed the appeal holding that the plea raised by the appellants was barred under the provisions of the Act. In this appeal, it is contended that the view taken by the appellate court is wrong because the provisions of S. 4(3) of the Act enable the parties to plead that a property held by a particular person is so held for the benefit of the entire joint family. It is also argued that the appellate court is wrong in deciding it as a matter of law without considering the question of fact. 4. It is also argued that the appellate court is wrong in deciding it as a matter of law without considering the question of fact. 4. S. 4(3)(a) of the Act reads as follows: “Nothing in this section shall apply (a) where the person in whose name the property is held is a coparcener in a Hindu undivided family and the property is held for the benefit of the coparceners in the family.” Two requisites should be there for attracting that section. First the property should be held by a coparcener in a Hindu undivided family. Secondly, the property should be held for the benefit of all the coparceners in the family. 5. In the present case the property is held by the second respondent who is not a coparcener in a Hindu undivided family. She is undoubtedly a member of the Hindu undivided family, but she cannot be considered to be a coparcener. This particular notion is peculiar to the Hindu Law and a woman cannot claim to be a coparcener inspite of the fact that she is entitled in law to take a share in the family properties under the circumstances provided by the law. Secondly, it should be proved y the parties that the property is held For the benefit of the coparcener in the family. In this case, the property is held by a female member of the family. It has been repeatedly held that there is no presumption that a property standing in the name of a female member of the family is a joint family property and the burden is on those persons who claim it to be a joint family property to prove the same beyond doubt. In the present case, there is absolutely no evidence to prove that the property was purchased with the aid of family funds for the benefit of the family in the name of the second respondent. Consequently, S. 4(3) of the Act is not attracted. 6. On the facts also, I have gone through the records and I find that the trial court is right in holding that the evidence adduced by the appellants does not make out that the property was Purchased with the aid of family funds. On the basis of evidence on record, there can be no doubt whatever that the property was purchased by the second respondent with her own funds. On the basis of evidence on record, there can be no doubt whatever that the property was purchased by the second respondent with her own funds. There is overwhelming evidence to prove that she had ample funds with which she had purchased the property. In these circumstances, this civil miscellaneous second appeal fails on both courts, namely, the bar of plea by the provisions of the Act and the factual finding that the property is purchased by the second respondent with her own funds. This appeal is dismissed with costs.