ORDER K.M. Pandey, J. -- 1. This writ petition under Article 226/227 of the Constitution has been filed alleging that the petitioner arc petty bus operators and are operating their vehicles on the routes covering on or part of the route in question. The petitioner No.1 is also an applicant before the learned State Transport Authority and the respondent No.1 is also an applicant for grant of stage carriage for the route in question (Rajgarh to Bakani) which is an inter-State route. The vacancy is only for one permit, and the respondent No.2 has also applied for grant of permit in the said vacancy. Thus, the petitioner No. 1 and respondent No.2 are co-applicants. 2. The route Rajgarh-Bakani is included in the reciprocal agreement arrived at in between the States of Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan and according to this agreement a quota or two permits and two vehicles for four trips daily has been fixed for State of Madhya Pradesh. The respondent No.2 is said to be holding a stage carriage permit No. P. St. S. 17/68 for two S.T. daily by one vehicle for this route. 3. On 26.8.85 one Vimal Kumar Choradia also filed an application for grant of a fresh permit under Section 47 of the Motor Vehicles Act 1939. Both the applications were published for inviting objections. Respondent No.2 filed a revision No. 174 of 1986 before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal against the publication of the application of Vimal Kumar and got stay in respect of consideration of application filed by Virnal Kumar. 4. The matter regarding consideration of the application of the respondent No.2 was fixed for hearing before the learned State Transport Authority, on 19.9.86. The State Transport Authority vide its order dated 19.9.86 kept pending the matter till disposal of the Revision No. 174 of 1986 filed by the respondent No.2. The respondent No.2 has filed a writ petition against the order dated 19.9.86 which is pending before the Indore Bench of this High Court and the High Court, at Indore has directed the State Transport Authority to hear and decide the application of the petitioner expeditiously. 5. During this period the Motor Vehicles Act 1988 came into operation with effect from 1.7.89 and the Motor Vehicles Act of 1939 has been repealed. 5. During this period the Motor Vehicles Act 1988 came into operation with effect from 1.7.89 and the Motor Vehicles Act of 1939 has been repealed. After repealing the Act of 1939 all the applications which have been filed under the aforesaid Act have not been saved. The application (Annexure P-3) has been filed under the provisions of the repealed Act. This Court in the case of Shivchand Amolakchand (AIR 1990, M.P., 300) and Yashwant Singh Chhabra (M.P. No. 2727 of 1990, decided on 14.5.1991) has held that the applications filed under the provisions of 1939 Act do not survive after coming into force the Act of 1988. It is also said that during the pendency of the application (Annexure P-3) the respondent No.2 also obtained renewal of aforesaid permit twice on the existing terms and conditions of permit due to which his application (Annexure P-3) filed for changing the condition of the permit regarding frequency, became infructuous. Respondent No.2 got the last renewal vide order dated 17.1.1991 (Annexure P-5). 6. In the above background the State Transport Authority is said to have heard the matter in its meeting held on 21.5.1991 and after hearing closed the case for order without fixing any date. At the time of hearing the counsel for the respondent No.2 had submitted that the High Court has remanded the matter for reconsideration in accordance with law and since respondent No.2 was the only applicant, therefore, his application has to be considered and the High Court vide order (Annexure P-4) has only directed to consider the application of respondent No.2 (Annexure P-3) expeditiously and as no order has been passed earlier on the application, therefore, there was no occasion for remand. However, the State Transport Authority passed the impugned order on 31.8.1991 allowing the application (Annexure P- 3) of the respondent No. 2 and granted the additional frequency. The State Transport Authority has allowed the additional frequency even without asking for it. According to Section 71 (4) of the Motor Vehicles Act 1988 more than five permits cannot be granted to an individual. Respondent No.2 already holds ten regular permits alongwith temporary permits and consequently, keeping in view the provisions of Section 71 (4) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 no further permit could be granted to him. Grant of frequency amounts to granting the fresh permit. The order (Annexure P-6) is illegal. Respondent No.2 already holds ten regular permits alongwith temporary permits and consequently, keeping in view the provisions of Section 71 (4) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 no further permit could be granted to him. Grant of frequency amounts to granting the fresh permit. The order (Annexure P-6) is illegal. The old applications pending on the date of coming into force of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 have not been saved in the new Act. Consequently, the order of State Transport Authority granting permit is illegal. The petitioners have prayed for quashing the order Annexure P-6 and a direction to the State Transport Authority (respondent No.1) to grant stage carriage permit on the rajgarh-Bakani route, to the petitioner in accordance with the application, Annexure P-1. 7. The main thrust of the petitioner in this case is that the application for the grant of a permit (Annexure P-3) was moved long back (28.7.84) and the matter was kept pending and a decision regarding the grant of permission was taken on 4.9.91. It is clear that the application for the grant of permit was made prior to the coming into force of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. The point for consideration is as to whether an application moved under the old Act could be kept pending and alive, and considered at any time of its choice by the authority. The answer must be in a simple "No". The application moved under the 1939 Act cannot be acted upon. In the case of A.I.R. 1990, M.P. page 300 it was held that-- "On the general scope and effect of a "Saving Clause", the general consensus is that such a clause is inserted ex abundanti cautela because rights vested under the repealed Act are not affected and derogation from that position under the general law is contemplated under such a clause to the extent provided therein. Reading together sub-section (2) (a) and (4) of S. 217 of the new Act, alongwith S. 6 (a) of the General Clauses Act any pending application for a stage carriage permit made under S. 46 of the old Act, which had lost its "force" cannot be kept alive for consideration and disposal under the new Act. The petitioner had made application under S. 46 of old Act for sk1ge carriage permit which was granted for three years. The petitioner had made application under S. 46 of old Act for sk1ge carriage permit which was granted for three years. The petitioner then applied for renewal of permit which could not be granted in view of publication of proposed scheme of nationalisation on route in question under S. 68F (ID) of old Act. During pendency of writ petition against the said order, M. V. Act (1988) the new Act came into force. In view of new Act the petitioner's application must be deemed to have lost its force or efficacy as a result of its exhausting its object and purpose as per order granting him stage carriage permit. This conclusion emerges from the application variously of the provisions of Cls. (a), (b) and (c) of section 6 of General Clauses Act. While revival of a loss on dead right is explicitly barred in Cl. (a) the decision resulting in grant of stage carriage permit to petitioner on the basis of his application has to be regarded as "anything duly done" under the old Act as per Cl. (b). It cannot also be said that under the old or "repealed" Act, any right was acquired or had accrued in terms of Cl. (c) to the petitioner to have his application for renewal be kept pending and such right is not affected by the new Act. He had made the application to secure a permit and that was granted but with respect to his right of renewal or" the permit, he could not say that rejection finally or renewal by order under the old Act would still leave unaffected his right of renewal and provisions of the new Act would not pravail in regard there to." 8. The result is that the old application pending since 1984 could not be saved under the new Act. The Saving Clause provided in Section 217 (2) (a) and (4) does not include an application for grant of stage carriage permit under the old Act. It was held by a D.B. referred earlier that none of the Clauses (a) to (1) of Sec. 217 (2) makes any saving explicitly in regard to any application for permit under the old Act pending disposal on the date of enforcement of the new Act. It was held by a D.B. referred earlier that none of the Clauses (a) to (1) of Sec. 217 (2) makes any saving explicitly in regard to any application for permit under the old Act pending disposal on the date of enforcement of the new Act. Clause (a) of Sec. 217 (2) speaks only of "any notification, rule, regulation, order or notice issued or any appointment or declaration made or exemption granted" and by no stretch of imagination, any of expression used advisedly by the Legislature in that manner can be construed to include an "application" also. The Legislature made its intention clear to limit saving in regard only to any action taken under the repealed enactment. 9. The result is that no action could have been taken on the application for grant of a permit (Annexure P-3) and the impugned order granting the permit has consequently, to be set aside. 10. The impugned order Annexure P-6 is, therefore, quashed and the State Transport Authority is directed to take a decision in accordance with law on the application Annexure P-1 within two months.