PANDYA, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner has come before this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India with a prayer that by issuing an appropriate writ or order or direction against the respondent No. 1-The District magistrate and the Collector of the District of Jamnagar and respondent no. 2-The State of Gujarat, through the Additional Secretary (Spl.), Home department, Detention Branch, Sachivalaya, Gandhinagar the petitioner may not be detained under the provisions of the Prevention of anti-Social Activities Act, 1985 (pasa for short ). By an amendment in the prayer clause para 24 (A) of the petition, it was further prayed that the aforesaid two respondents be directed to obey the order of Civil Judge (S. D.), Jamnagar and also that of this Court. ( 2 ) SO far as latter direction is concerned, it is obvious that it is never required to be passed because orders of a competent Court are always required to be obeyed and no directions are necessary in that regard under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. Consequences of disobeyance are much too known to be specified here. ( 3 ) THAT apart, so far as the main prayer, namely, preventing the aforesaid two respondents from detaining the petitioner under PASA is concerned, it may be noted here that no order of detention has yet been passed. It is only an apprehended action. This apprehension is based mainly on the fact, as stated in para 9 of the petition, with reference to one Ramniklal Popatlal Patel, who has been detained on 2-7-1992 by an order PASA passed by the respondent no. 1. The grounds of detention and the detention order in respect of the said Ramniklal are not annexed to the petition and they are not forming part of the record before us. No doubt Mr, patel, learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner, is right in submitting that whatever has been stated on oath has not been countered so far by either of the respondents and as such whatever is stated in the petition goes uncontroverted. No doubt Mr, patel, learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner, is right in submitting that whatever has been stated on oath has not been countered so far by either of the respondents and as such whatever is stated in the petition goes uncontroverted. However, so far as the material aspect of there being any basis for feeling the apprehension is concerned, in our opinion, unless these materials in the form of detention order and the grounds of detention, if possible accompanied by the annexure thereto, had been shown to us, prima facie we are not satisfied that the apprehension is well founded. ( 4 ) THAT apart the point is that one Ramniklal Patel has already been detained and the petitioner has his own reasons to feel that he is likely to be so dealt with because the said Ramniklal happens to be the co-accused of the petitioner in a Criminal Case registered in the Jamnagar City Police Station being C. R. No. 1-152 of 1987, in which a charge-sheet has already been filed in the Court of J. M. F. C. at Jamnagar. ( 5 ) THE aforesaid Criminal Case relates to some property transaction in respect of which proceedings under the Urban Land Ceiling Act are elso pending. The aforesaid Ramniklal alongwith one more person happened to be the owners on record, as stated by Mr. Patel, learned Advocate for the petitioner. The petitioner at the relevant time was concerned with one M/s. Anand Trading corporation, a separate legal entity, that came to be constituted under the provisions of the Bombay Non-Trading Corporation Act, 1959, from which by the year 1989 the petitioner has already resigned. The said Corporation, however, entered into some transaction with said Ramniklal and his co-owner and that is how, according to Mr. Patel, the petitioner came to be dragged into the criminal proceedings, against which proceedings have been initiated in this Court by way of Misc. Criminal Application No. 1229 of 1987 in which rule came to be issued on 28-7-1987. The matter is still pending. The aforesaid misc. Criminal Application has been filed by Ramniklal; copy of the Memo of petition is at Annexure d (page 26) and the copy of the writ is at page 36. ( 6 ) ACCORDING to Mr. Criminal Application No. 1229 of 1987 in which rule came to be issued on 28-7-1987. The matter is still pending. The aforesaid misc. Criminal Application has been filed by Ramniklal; copy of the Memo of petition is at Annexure d (page 26) and the copy of the writ is at page 36. ( 6 ) ACCORDING to Mr. Patel, learned Advocate for the petitioner, throughout his life, the petitioner has been involved in a solitary case of alleged criminal activity and that too as a co-accused and a mere abettor, though according to Mr. Patel there is no substance in the criminal complaint. ( 7 ) AS could be understood in the aforesaid background, we are not concerned with the maintainability or otherwise of the criminal proceedings nor are we concerned with the circumstances under which the petitioner came to be involved in the said criminal proceedings. The matter, which is now being dealt with, is whether this Court would pass an order of the aforesaid nature when no order under PASA has been passed. ( 8 ) IN our opinion, in the field of preventive detention, when no order is passed, the Court will not interfere. Preventive detention has to be viewed in the backdrop of the Constitutional provisions of Arts. 21 and 22 and other analogous legal provisions and in the instant case it being the PASA. As mandated by the Constitution, there is provision for Advisory Board. The right of the detenu to make representation to the appropriate authority including the Advisory Board is also provided for and as is laid down by now in a series of decisions, in a representation made to the State Government by a detenu, the power exercised by the detaining authority is required to be examined, while the Advisory Board will go into the substance of the allegations and decide whether there is any material justifying the detention order. All these are preceded by the exercise required to be carried out by the detaining authority for arriving at a subjective satisfaction. All these are preceded by the exercise required to be carried out by the detaining authority for arriving at a subjective satisfaction. ( 9 ) IT is, therefore, quite clear that in a field where subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority is never reached and detention order is never passed, this Court cannot enter into an arena when it does not know at all whether the detaining authority is arriving at a subjective satisfaction against the petitioner or not or whether he is likely to hold that there is no material and, therefore, no order be passed. ( 10 ) THIS will, therefore, be nothing else but an exercise in shadow boxing, not knowing what is likely to happen and merely because the petitioner may be personally apprehending his detention, it will not be possible for this Court to entertain the above request on that material only. ( 11 ) THE learned Advocate Mr. Patel on behalf of the petitioner had candidly submitted that inspite of considerable efforts on his part, he could not lay his hand on a decision of any Court in the country, which would support his case. He could, however, find out a decision where the Court had decided to entertain the matter when an order was passed but it was not executed. This case has been reported in (Pawan kumar Agarwal v. District Magistrate} 1992 (1) Crimes 368 . It is a case decided by the learned Judges of the Orissa High Court. There also an order was passed under Prevention of Blackmarketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential Commodities Act, 1980 but was not executed. The learned Judges were not convinced of the case, and, therefore, rejected the prayer of intervention. However, in the course of the judgment. Supreme Court decisions have been referred to and cited, more particularly the one of the Additional secretary to Government of India and Ors. v. Smt. Alka Subhash Gadia and Am. , which has been reported in JT 1991 (1) SC 549 with relevant remarks on page 556, para 13. The paragraph has been extracted in the said Orissa Judgment at page 369. ( 12 ) ACCORDINGLY, the Supreme Court has also decided in Smt. Alka Subhashs case that the Courts have power to entertain grievances against any detention order prior to its execution. The paragraph has been extracted in the said Orissa Judgment at page 369. ( 12 ) ACCORDINGLY, the Supreme Court has also decided in Smt. Alka Subhashs case that the Courts have power to entertain grievances against any detention order prior to its execution. Relying on this very statement in the Supreme court judgment, the learned A. P. P. Mr. Raval stated that the power, therefore, is confined only to the cases where the order is passed but the order is not executed. Latter on, as we read the said paragraph further, the learned Judges of the Supreme. Court in Smt. Alka Subhashs case have illustrated by way of example the situations where the Court may interfere and they are five in numbers, viz. , where the Courts are prima facie satisfied (i) that the impugned order is not passed under the Act under which it is purported to have been passed, (ii) that it is sought to be executed against a wrong person, (iii) that it is passed for a wrong purpose, (iv) that it is passed on vague, extraneous and irrelevant grounds, or (v) that the authority which passed it had no authority to do so. ( 13 ) NEEDLESS to say, in the instant case none of these situations can possibly prevail when the order itself is not in existence. For this very reason, in our opinion, the submission sought to be made on behalf of the petitioner by way of an analogy that even in a matter where no order is passed, even at a pre-order stage, the Court can interfere, cannot be accepted. We express our inability to visualize any of those five situations set out in Smt. Alka subhashs case without any material on record. Mr. Patel had submitted that the statements in the petition have not been controverted. To that extent he is right, but it being a statement made by the petitioner on his own interest, it would be mere ipso dixit of the petitioner and it is difficult to accept whatever he says only because he has stated it on oath. Mr. Patel had submitted that the statements in the petition have not been controverted. To that extent he is right, but it being a statement made by the petitioner on his own interest, it would be mere ipso dixit of the petitioner and it is difficult to accept whatever he says only because he has stated it on oath. ( 14 ) AS mentioned earlier, in the field of preventive detention there being specific provision governing set of facts, namely, PASA in the instant case, the entire case of the detenu will be governed thereunder and it will be premature for us if we judge at this stage that any of the aforesaid five situations do exist or even if they do not exist, merely because petitioner has an apprehension, the Court should interfere. ( 15 ) THE learned Advocate Mr. Patel had cited (Khudiram Das v. State of West Bengal} AIR 1975 SC 550 ; (Lal Kamal Das v. State if West Bengal) air 1975 SC 753 and (Debu Mahto v. State of West Bengal), AIR 1974 SC 816 , all of which relate to the legality or otherwise of an order passed under the respective detention laws. He has also cited (Shivaji Jadhav v. State of Karnatake) 1987 0 Crlj 1754 . There also the subjective satisfaction, disclosed by the grounds of detention, has been examined. ( 16 ) ALL the aforesaid decisions relate to the post-order stage where the material will certainly be there supplied to the detenu, based on which or referring to which, the respective detaining authority had arrived at a subjective satisfaction. In absence of any order, which is the situation in the instant petition, absolutely there is no material to go by so as to assess the subjective satisfaction, which is yet to be arrived at. It, will, therefore, certainly be premature to enter into that aspect. In absence of any order, which is the situation in the instant petition, absolutely there is no material to go by so as to assess the subjective satisfaction, which is yet to be arrived at. It, will, therefore, certainly be premature to enter into that aspect. ( 17 ) IN the course of this discussion, one more decision of the Supreme court, which is the latest one and which may have bearing on the subjectmatter involved in the present petition, was pointed out at the Bar and it is that of State of Tamil Nadu v. P. K. Shamsudeen, reported in JT 1992 (4) SC 179, which is on the same line as Smt. Alka Subhasvs case and there also the order was very much in existence, but at a pre-execution stage the matter was brought the Court. Reiterating the principle laid down in Smt. Alka subhas Vs case, the learned Judges had accepted the Appeal filed by the State of Tamil Nadu against the decision of the Madras High Court, where stay order was granted against the execution of detention order on the ground of delay. Actually there was an order of Calcutta High Court where interim orders were passed restraining the authorities from executing the detention order. Taking all these factual position into consideration, the learned Judges of the Supreme court were pleased to accept the Appeal and set aside the order of Madras high Court. ( 18 ) THE learned Advocate Mr. Patel had submitted that the proceedings under the Urban Land Ceiling Act are Yet not complete and, therefore, the property has not vested in the State Government and, therefore, there cannot be any question of property grabbing. His further submission is that there is stay operating by virtue of an order passed by the Civil Judge (S. D.), jamnagar in Regular Civil Suit No. 1056 of 1985. The said Suit has been filed by Shantaben Vithaldas and Prabhaben Ratilal as plaintiffs against the state of Gujarat through Chief Secretary and the Competent Officer and Deputy collector under the Urban Land Ceiling Act. The order passed by the learned llth Joint Civil Judge (S. D.), Jamnagar on 1-6-1987 is to the effect that the aforesaid two defendants, its servants, agents, etc. are restrained from taking any further proceedings in respect of plaintiffs land bearing Survey Nos. 162 and 163 till the final decision of the suit. The order passed by the learned llth Joint Civil Judge (S. D.), Jamnagar on 1-6-1987 is to the effect that the aforesaid two defendants, its servants, agents, etc. are restrained from taking any further proceedings in respect of plaintiffs land bearing Survey Nos. 162 and 163 till the final decision of the suit. ( 19 ) WE have already dealt with the aspect of ownership of land and held to the effect that in the petition before us we are not concerned about the ownership aspect of the land. The pendency of the proceedings or otherwise under the Urban Land Ceiling Act, therefore, in our opinion, will have no bearing on the instant case. The learned Advocate Mr. Patel had argued that the aforesaid order will also have the effect of preventing the respondent No. 1 from taking action under PASA. In this regard he has further submitted that the transaction being of the year 1984, when the PASA Act was not at all in existence, to permit the respondent No. 1 to act on the basis of the 1984 transaction would amount to giving retrospective effect to 1985 Act. ( 20 ) THESE two arguments are noted only because they were advanced before us. In our opinion, they have no bearing whatsoever in the outcome of this petition. However, so far the injunction order is concerned, we may specify here that it relates to the proceedings under the Urban Land Ceiling Act and in connection therewith the aforesaid order of not taking any further proceedings has been passed. In our opinion, therefore, it cannot be read to mean that an injunction is operating even in an action under PASA. . ( 21 ) LASTLY by way of an alternative submission, the learned Advocate Mr. Patel submitted that when no order has been passed and if at all it is passed, under the facts and circumstances of the case the Court may direct the respondents to restrain from executing the order for a given period and on instructions from the petitioner, who is also present in the Court, learned advocate Mr. Patel made a statement that the petitioner will be readily available. We are not inclined to entertain this request because preventive detention will lose its significance, if at all time is given. Request is,. therefore, rejected. ( 22 ) PETITION is, therefore, dismissed. Rule is discharged. .