C. K. THAKKER, J. ( 1 ) THIS revision application is filed by the petitioner-defendant against the decree of eviction passed by the Trial court and confirmed by the appellate court. ( 2 ) TO appreciate controversy in question few relevant facts may now be stated: the plaintiff is the owner of the suit property comprising of a room, Osari and a kitchan in a building called "prem bhuvan" in the city of Jamnagar. It was the case of the plaintiff that the defendant was a tenant of the suit premises at a monthly rent of Rs. 6/ -. Regular Civil suit No. 432 of 1974 was filed by the plaintiff in the Court of the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Jamnagar against the defendant for recovery of possession of the suit premises inter alia on the ground that the plaintiff required the suit premises for reasonable use and occupation; the defendant had not used the suit premises without reasonable cause for the purpose for which they were let for a continuous period of six months immediately preceding the date of the suit; and after coming into operation of the bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House rates Control Act, 1947, (hereinafter referred to as the Act), the tenant had acquired vacant possession of suitable residence and, therefore, he was liable to be evicted under the provisions of section 13 (1) (1) of the Act. ( 3 ) THE defendant filed written statement at Exh. 9 and denied the facts stated and averments made in the plaint. It was denied that the plaintiff required the suit premises for reasonable use and occupation; there was non-user on the part of the defendant; the defendant acquired an alternative suitable residence and was liable to be evicted. She asserted that the property situated near Hansbais masjid was ancestral property and other family members had also right in the property. On partition, that propeety had gone to the share of her son Jitendra and under the circumstances, it could not be said that the defendant had acquired suitable alternative residence. It was also contended that Dolatrai Jethalal, husband of the defendant was the tenant of the suit premises and he died in the year 1969 leaving behind him several heirs who resided with him at the time of his demise. It was also contended that Dolatrai Jethalal, husband of the defendant was the tenant of the suit premises and he died in the year 1969 leaving behind him several heirs who resided with him at the time of his demise. It was pleaded that all the heirs were tenants-in-common and were, therefore, necessary parties to the suit and since all of them were not joined as parties the suit was bad for non-joinder of necessary parties. The suit filed against the defendant was not maintainable at law and required to be dismissed on ground also. ( 4 ) ON the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the Trial Court framed necessary issues at Exh. 11. It appears that the plaintiff purchased the property after 1964 and in these circumstances a pursis came to be filed by the learned Advocate for the plaintiff giving up the ground of reasonable and bona fide requirement in view of the statutory provision that such a landlord is not entitled to possession on the ground of reasonable and bona fide requirement. That issue was, therefore, treated not pressed by the plaintiff. The Trial court after appreciating evidence - documentary as well as oral - held that it was not proved by the plaintiff-landlord that the premises were not used for a period of six months immediately preceding the date of the suit and refused to pass decree on the ground. It, however, upheld the contention of the landlord that after coming into operation of the Act, the defendant got possession of the property which was let to the tenant and, therefore, she was liable to eviction under Section 13 (1) (1) of the Act. Regarding the maintainability of the suit, the Trial Court held that the defendant was tenant of the suit property and, therefore, the suit filed against her was maintainable and it was not necessary to join other persons as parties. In view of these findings, the Trial court passed a decree of eviction" against the defendant. ( 5 ) BEING aggrieved by the decree of eviction, the defendant preferred Regular civil Appeal No. 13 of 1978 and the learned Assistant Judge confirmed the decree of eviction by dismissing the appeal. It is this decree which is challenged by the defendant by filing the present revision application. ( 6 ) MR. S. M. Shah, learned Counsel for the petitioner raised three contentions. It is this decree which is challenged by the defendant by filing the present revision application. ( 6 ) MR. S. M. Shah, learned Counsel for the petitioner raised three contentions. Firstly, he submitted that Dolatrai, husband of the present petitioner was tenant and after his death, tenancy rights were required to be decided in accordance with the provisions of Section 5 (11) (c) of the Act. He submitted that as held by the Full Bench of this Court in babubhai and Jayantilal Kalyanbhai and ors. v. Shah Bharatkumar Ratilal and ors. , reported in 21 GLR, p. 103, the said question ought to have been decided either before or latest in the proceedings but no decree could be passed without deciding the said question. Secondly, he submitted that three rent receipts Exhs. 38, 39 and 40 were produced during the course of the trial. At the time of filing of the pursis, no objection was raised by Advocate for the other side. Having taken on record those receipts, the court below have committed an error in not relying upon those documents observing that they were not proved in accordance with law. According to Mr. Shah from those rent receipts, it was established that dolatrai was the tenant of the suit premises. Finally, Mr. Shah submitted that even on merits, the decree passed by the courts below requires to be reversed inasmuch as the case does not fall within the mischief of Section 13 (1) (1) of the Act. According to him even if the property near Hansbais Masjid was acquired by the defendant and was disposed to by her, since it was not the property of the defendant, she did not incur liability of eviction under the above provision and the Courts below have committed an error of law in passing the decree against her. ( 7 ) MR. D. M. Shah learned Counsel for the respondent-landlord, on the other hand, supported the decree of the eviction passed against the petitioner. He submitted that it was the case of the defendant that she was tenant of the suit premises and when she acquired alternative accommodation, the decree passed by the Courts below, cannot be said to be contrary to law. He submitted that it was the case of the defendant that she was tenant of the suit premises and when she acquired alternative accommodation, the decree passed by the Courts below, cannot be said to be contrary to law. ( 8 ) HAVING heard the learned Counsel for the parties and having gone through the record of the case, it seems to be that the decree for possession passed in favour of the plaintiff-landlord does not require interference by this Court in the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 29 (2) of the Act. So far as the first contention of Mr. Shah is concerned, after appreciating the evidence on record, both the Courts negatived it. Looking to the record it appears that the courts below have not committed an error of law in coming to the conclusion. Exh. 15 is a notice issued by the plaintiff-landlord through an Advocate on June 8, 1974 to the defendant. In the said notice, the defendant was described as tenant of the suit premises. It was also mentioned that the defendant was the owner of a house situated near Hansbais Masjid and she had acquired vacant possession of that house in Regular Civil Suit No. 479 of 1971. The notice was replied by the defendant at Ex. 16 on July 8, 1974 again through an Advocate. In the reply, the fact that the defendant was staying in the suit premises on rent was admitted. It was also admitted that possession of the property near Hansbais Masjid was obtained by the defendant. It was, however, stated that the said property belonged to the joint family and as per the agreement between the family members of the defendant, it had gone to the share of her son Jitendra, who was staying separately. It was, therefore, stated that she was not liable to eviction under Section 13 (1) (1) of the Act. Exh. 23 is a copy of the plaint in Regular Civil suit No. 479 of 1971 which the plaintiff had filed against her tenant claiming possession of that property. In para 1 of the plaint, it was specifically mentioned that the suit property was of the exclusive ownership of the plaintiff (present defendant ). Further that suit was filed by the present defendant alone. It was not filed on behalf of the family. In para 1 of the plaint, it was specifically mentioned that the suit property was of the exclusive ownership of the plaintiff (present defendant ). Further that suit was filed by the present defendant alone. It was not filed on behalf of the family. Again, in para 1 it was clearly, specifically and unequivocally stated that that property was the exclusive property of the present defendant. That suit was compromised and the compromise is also on the record of the present proceeding at Exh. 20. That compromise was also signed by the plaintiff (present defendant) and her advocate as well as by defendant of that suit. Pursuant to the pursis filed by the plaintiff as well as the defendant, the suit was ordered to be disposed of by the court on November 22, 1972. Pursuant to the decree possession was also handed over to the present defendant. Mr. D. M. Shah, also drew my attention to the plaint as well as to the written statement in the present suit. In para 1 of the plaint, it was stated by the plaintiff that he was the landlord and the defendant was tenant while in para 2 it was stated that the defendant was the tenant on a monthly rent of Rs. 6/ -. In written statement, para 2, it was specifically stated that the facts stated in paras 1 and 2 of the plaint were true. It was no doubt true that thereafter the written statement was amended by getting para 2-A, added, wherein it was contended that Dolatrai, husband of the defendant, was the tenant of the suit property and after his death in the year 1969 the defendant, her sons Jitendra and manharlal and her daughters Hari Ichha, veena and Premila as heirs of deceased dolatrai have become tenants-in-common and without joining them. as party defendants, the suit was not maintainable. The amendment was allowed. The Courts, in my opinion, however, rightly held that it was an afterthought on the part of the present defendant and the plaintiff had treated the defendant as tenant. The court also held that even if original tenant was Dolatrai Jethalal, after his death in 1969 there was an agreement between the defendant and her sons and daughters by which the defendant was treated as tenant of the property. ( 9 ) MR. The court also held that even if original tenant was Dolatrai Jethalal, after his death in 1969 there was an agreement between the defendant and her sons and daughters by which the defendant was treated as tenant of the property. ( 9 ) MR. D. M. Shah also drew my attention to the deposition of defendant at Exh. 36. In the deposition she has admitted that she was tenant in the suit premises. She has also admitted that she had filed Regular Civil Suit No. 666 of 1975 against the present plaintiff in connection with the use of lavatory of the plaintiff-trust. That suit was filed only by her and it was pending. In these circumstances, in my opinion, it cannot be said that the Courts below have committed any error in appreciating the evidence on record and in coming to the conclusion that the suit filed by the plaintiff against the defendant alone was maintainable at law. ( 10 ) IN view of my finding hereinabove, it is not necessary to discuss evidentiary value of rent receipts Exhs. 38, 39 and 40. But the contention of Mr. Shah is well founded that having taken those rent receipts on record and having exhibited, the Courts below should not have refused to look at those receipts on the ground that they were not proved. The point is concluded by the pronouncement of the honble Supreme Court in the case of p. C. Purushothama Reddiar v. S. Perumal, reported in AIR 1972 SC 608 . In that case, certain reports were marked without any objection. Thereafter it was contended on behalf of the opposite party that those reports were inadmissible in evidence since Head Constables who covered those meetings were not examined. The High Court upheld the contention. Their Lordships of the supreme Court, relying on the decision in Bhagat Ram v. Khetu Ram, reported in AIR 1929 PC 110 held that the objection was not sustainable and the reports were admissible in evidence since they were allowed to be produced on record without there being any objection. ( 11 ) AGAIN, Exhs. 38, 39 and 40 are rent receipts issued by the predecessor of the present plaintiff. Mr. ( 11 ) AGAIN, Exhs. 38, 39 and 40 are rent receipts issued by the predecessor of the present plaintiff. Mr. D. M. Shah is right contending that whatever might have been position with the earlier owner prior to the purchase of the property by the plaintiff, so far as the plaintiff is concerned, it treated the defendant as a tenant of the suit property and as such, exhs. 38, 39 and 40 is of assistance to the defendant. ( 12 ) THE last point is. of acquisition of suitable residence by the petitioner and application of Section 13 (1) (1) of the act. Mr. S. M. Shah submitted that the property near Hansbais Masjid belonged to joint family. It was not an afterthought inasmuch as that case was put up by the present defendant even in the reply dt. July 8, 1974 to the show-cause notice of the plaintiff. Strongly relying upon the decision of the Single Judge of this Court (Coram: J. B. Mehta, J.) in the case of kadia Gangaram Raiya v. Shantilal bhimji, in Second Appeal No. 654 of 1963 decided on 9th/14th March 1966. Mr. Shah contended that this Court has taken a view that the acquisition of the premises by a joint family would not incur liability of eviction under Section 13 (1) (1) of the Act. ( 13 ) I am afraid, the ratio laid down by my learned Brother J. B. Mehta, J. cannot be pressed into service in the instant case. In that case, the facts were entirely different. The defendant who was the tenant of the suit property was having independent tenancy rights in his favour. Another property was purchased by his father. The family consisted of 12 members including a married son. In the light of the facts and circumstances of the case, this Court observed that in the suit premises, members of the joint family who stayed with the defendant (tenant) were staying at sufferance only and the tenancy rights and right of exclusive possession of the suit premises was of the defendant alone. As members of the joint family, all the family members were entitled to remain in possession of the newly acquired house alongwith the defendant but the defendant had no right of exclusive possession and they could not be ousted by the defendant. As members of the joint family, all the family members were entitled to remain in possession of the newly acquired house alongwith the defendant but the defendant had no right of exclusive possession and they could not be ousted by the defendant. Comparing the right of the defendant in staying in the suit premises as well as in the newly acquired premises, this Court held that in the suit premises the other members of the family were staying at sufferance of the defendant, while in the newly acquired premises the other family members were staying with their own rights and the defendant had to stay without there being any exclusive right on his part, the provisions of Section 13 (1) (1) could not apply to the facts of the case and the defendant was not liable to be evicted. Mr. S. M. Shah, the learned counsel for the petitioner no doubt contended that though the facts in the case were different, the principle laid down would apply to the present case also. I am, however, of the opinion that the above observations of my learned brother J. B. Mehta, J. must be considered in the light of the facts before the Court. In the instant case, both the courts have held that the defendant was tenant of the suit premises. The defendant was also exclusive owner of the property situate near Hansbais Masjid and that in the suit filed by her alone in individual capacity, she described herself as exclusive owner thereof. The suit was compromised and the compromise terms were also signed by the present defendant alone. No doubt it was the case of the defendant that other family members had interest in that property and in partition, that property had gone to the share of her son Jitendra, there is nothing on record as to when the so-called partition took place and Jitendra became the owner of the property. Again, the defendant alone filed a suit in respect of the said property and consent decree was passed. The consent terms were signed by the defendant and she obtained possession of that property. The property was disposed of some time in September 1975 by the defendant while the notice under section 13 (1) (1) was issued by the present plaintiff on June 8, 1974 and the suit was filed on July 19, 1974. The consent terms were signed by the defendant and she obtained possession of that property. The property was disposed of some time in September 1975 by the defendant while the notice under section 13 (1) (1) was issued by the present plaintiff on June 8, 1974 and the suit was filed on July 19, 1974. Therefore, the defendant disposed of the property after the present suit was filed. As held by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Shivlal Nathuram Vaishnav v. Harshadrai Haribhai Oza and Others, reported in 21 GLR 99, for invoking provisions of Section 13 (1) (1) of the act, cause of action must exist at the time of notice and not at the time of filing of the suit. Since the notice was issued and the suit was filed in the year 1974 and the property was disposed of in 1975, in my opinion, the Courts below were right in invoking Section 13 (1) (1) of the Act and the defendant was liable to eviction. ( 14 ) MR. S. M. Shah submitted that the property was joint family property and it was disposed of not only by the defendant alone but also by other family members. But as stated by me, there is nothing to show that the property was joint family property and other members had interest therein. There is also nothing on record to show that the partition had at any time taken place. The proceedings initiated by the defendant alone also go to show that the property was not of joint family property. The said contention was, therefore, rightly negatived by the courts below. Again, the Courts below in my opinion, have rightly invoked the doctrine of estoppel that when the defendant had filed the suit against her tenant posing hereself to be an exclusive owner of the property, even if subsequently the sale deed or document of transfer was signed by other family members of the defendant, the defendant could not put forward an argument that it belonged to the joint family and she would not be liable to be evicted under section 13 (1) (1) of the Act. 15. In the result, I do not find any substance in any of the contentions raised by the petitioner and the revision application requires to be dismissed. Rule is accordingly discharged with no order as to costs. 15. In the result, I do not find any substance in any of the contentions raised by the petitioner and the revision application requires to be dismissed. Rule is accordingly discharged with no order as to costs. Ad interim relief vacated. , 16. The learned Councel for the petitioner submits that interim relief granted earlier at the time of admission of revision application may be continued for some time so as to enable the petitioner to approach the higher forum. In my opinion, the prayer is reasonable. Interim relief against recovery of possession is ordered to be continued till december 31, 1992. Rule discharged. .