JUDGMENT : M. Katju, J. The Petitioner was appointed as Lekhpal on 12-6-80. On 28-5-86 the Petitioner was suspended and on 23-7-86 a charge sheet was issued to him True copy of the charge sheet is Annexure 2 to the writ petition. The Petitioner submitted his reply on 27-9-86, true copy of which is Annexure 3' to the writ petition. There after the S.D.M. Saidpur sent a show cause notice dated 23-12-86 to the Petitioner, true copy of which is Annexure 4' to the writ petition. By this notice the Petitioner was asked to explain why his services be not terminated. The Petitioner sent a reply on 30-12-86, true copy of which is Annexure 5 to the writ petition. Ultimately the termination order dated 31-12-86 was passed against the Petitioner. A true copy of the said order is Annexure 6 to the petition The Petitioner filed an appeal before the District Magistrate, Ghazipur which was rejected on 22-5-87. 2. The Petitioner has alleged in para 10 of the writ petition that the show cause notice dated 23-12-86 was not accompanied with the enquiry report. The reply to paragraph 10 of the writ petition is contained in para 5 of the counter affidavit. Paragraph 5 of the counter affidavit states that paragraphs 10 to 16 of the writ petition are not admitted and the same are argumentative in nature. This is hardly a reply to the allegation in para 10 of the writ petition that the report or the Inquiry Officer was not supplied to the Petitioner. I take it, therefore, that the enquiry report was not supplied to the Petitioner along with the show cause notice. 3. The question which arises is whether the termination order will become illegal on this account. Counsel for the Petitioner has urged on the basis of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India and others Vs. Mohd. Ramzan Khan, (1991) 1 SCC 588 , that the department should have supplied a copy of the enquiry report to the Petitioner along with show-cause notice before passing of the termination order. In my opinion, this judgment does not help to the Petitioner because in para 17 therein it has been stated that this judgment has prospective application, and no punishment imposed shall be open to challenge on this ground. In my opinion, this judgment does not help to the Petitioner because in para 17 therein it has been stated that this judgment has prospective application, and no punishment imposed shall be open to challenge on this ground. It follows, therefore, that if a termination order is passed prior to 20-11-1990 (the date of the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court) the termination order cannot be challenged on the ground that the enquiry report was not supplied. The ruling in Mohammad Ramzan Khan's case is prospective as held in S.P. Viswanathan (I) Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, (1991) 2 SCC 633 Supp. As such the Petitioner cannot get benefit of the decision in Mohammad Ramzan Khan's case, since admittedly his service was terminated on 31-12-86, which is much prior to the aforesaid decision. It is only when the termination order is passed, after 20-11-90, that the decision in Md. Ramzan Khan's case can be availed of. 4. Counsel for the Petitioner has relied upon the decision of Hon'ble B.M. Lal. J. in Hari Prasad Shukla v. State of U.P. 1991 AWC 950. In my opinion, this judgment is per incuriam as it has been passed in ignorance of para 17 of the judgment in Mohammad Ramzan Khan's case, and also in ignorance of S.P. Vishwanathan's case, which clearly lays down that the judgment in Mohammad Ramzan Khan's case is prospective In Hari Prasad Shukla's case the impugned termination order was of 29-8-1986, i.e. much before the judgment in Mohammad Ramzan Khan's case. Hence, with great respect to the Hon'ble Judge who decided Hari Prasad Shukla's case the Petitioner in that case was wrongly given the benefit of the judgment in Mohammad Ramzan Khan's case. Since the judgment in Hari Prasad Shukla's case has been passed overlooking the decision in S.P. Vishwanathan's case as well as para 17 of the judgment in Mohammad Ramzan Khan's case, I am of the view that the said decision of Hon'ble B.M. Lal, J. is a judgment per incuriam. 5. The next contention of the counsel for the Petitioner is that his version has not been considered by both the authorities, and hence, their orders are vitiated. As can be seen from a perusal of the charge-sheet the main allegation against the Petitioner is that he had not submitted the Khatauni of village Koriadeeh, Pergana Saidpur in the Record Room. The next contention of the counsel for the Petitioner is that his version has not been considered by both the authorities, and hence, their orders are vitiated. As can be seen from a perusal of the charge-sheet the main allegation against the Petitioner is that he had not submitted the Khatauni of village Koriadeeh, Pergana Saidpur in the Record Room. It is also alleged in the charge-sheet that some names were recorded as Bhumidhars in a farzi manner in certain Khataunis. The Petitioner has submitted his reply to the charge-sheet vide Annexure-3 to the writ petition. In this reply he has stated that he took over charge of the village only in March, 1983, and he submitted the records quickly. Since he was newly posted in the area, there was some delay in submission of the relevant khataunis, but, in fact, they were submitted and the Petitioner derived no benefit out of the delay. As regards the second charge, the Petitioner has stated that the names in the Khataunis had been recorded from the time of his predecessor. Hence, the Petitioner was not to blame in any manner. The impugned termination order dated 31-12-86 (Annexure-6 to the writ petition) does not discuss the explanation of the Petitioner at all. Instead, the termination order simply states that the Petitioner has prayed for forgiveness. This view of the Sub-Divisional Officer in his order dated 31-12-86 is not correct. A perusal of the petitioner's reply dated 30-12-86 which is Annexure-5 to the petition, shows that the Petitioner submitted a detailed reply to the charge-sheet, and he did not accept his guilt The impugned order dated 31-12-86 is, thus based on complete mis-reading/misaporeciation of the petitioner's reply dated 30-12-86. The appellate order of the District Magistrate, Ghazipur dated 22-5-87 is also vitiated in law for the same reason. The explanation of the Petitioner has not been considered in this order also. Thus, both the impugned orders are illegal and liable to be set aside, as they are based on non-consideration of the petitioner's version. 6. For the above reason, the impugned orders dated 31-12-86 and 22-5-86 are vitiated in law and are hereby quashed. The petitioner's termination of service is wholly illegal He shall be reinstated within a month of production of a certified copy of this order. 6. For the above reason, the impugned orders dated 31-12-86 and 22-5-86 are vitiated in law and are hereby quashed. The petitioner's termination of service is wholly illegal He shall be reinstated within a month of production of a certified copy of this order. Since the termination order is bad in law, the Petitioner will also be entitled to arrears of salary from the date of the termination order till to-day. It will, however, be open to the Respondents to take fresh proceedings against the Petitioner in accordance with law. There shall be no order as to costs.