JUDGMENT : A. Pasayat, J. - In this revision application Under Sections 397 and 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short, the 'Code'), the informant labels the judgment passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Balasore to be unreasonable, perverse and seeks interference of this Court. 2. Filtering out the unnecessary details, the background in which opposite party Nos. 1 to 4 and one Saheban Bibi faced trial is as follows : On 7-2-1987 Saheban Bibi, who has not yet faced trial because she is absconding, along with some other females came to the house of one Sk. Abas Mahammad (hereinafter referred to as the 'deceased') and abused him in filthy language. On 8-2-1987 in the morning at about 10 a. m. when the deceased was going in a rickshaw from his house to Balasore Bus Stand accused Sk. Imran detained the rickshaw and challenged him as to why he was leaving the village when there was likelihood of confrontation on that day. Some people intervened and the deceased proceeded towards the bus stand. After some distance near Motiganj post office Sk. Imran, Sk. Furkan and Saheban came running and detained the rickshaw again. Those three asked the deceased to get down from the rickshaw, but he refused. The three accused forcibly dragged him out of the rickshaw and pushed him to the ground. In the meantime, accused Sk. Iran and Sk. Jangu arrived there. All the five gave fist blows, slaps and kicks on the deceased. He was also given a blow on the back side head by an iron rod by Saheban as a result of which he became senseless and was taken to hospital and there doctor declared him as dead. 3. The accused persons took a plea of denial of the occurrence. After describing the facts, findings of the Court below and submission of both the sides, their Lordships held ; On consideration of rival stands, we find that the order of acquittal of Sk. Jangu is not sustainable. Since the learned Sessions Judge held that the evidence of PWs. 1, 4 and 5 is credible and there is nothing infirmity or inconsistency in their evidence to discard their testimony to the effect that all the accused persons were involved in the assault on Sk. Abbas the deceased and Sk. Jangu participated in the assault, the order of acquittal does not stand to reason. 1, 4 and 5 is credible and there is nothing infirmity or inconsistency in their evidence to discard their testimony to the effect that all the accused persons were involved in the assault on Sk. Abbas the deceased and Sk. Jangu participated in the assault, the order of acquittal does not stand to reason. He has committed an error of record by holding that PW 1 did not tell before the investigating Officer about the assault by Sk. Jangu. The Investigating Officer has clearly stated that PW 1 fully corroborated the version given in the First Information Report and stated some additional features. In the First Information-Report, PW 1 has clearly implicated Sk. Jangu. It has been indicated that Sk. Jangu and other opposite parties herein gave fist blows and slaps to the deceased. Of course, it has not been indicated that Sk. Jangu is a friend of others. Similarly PW 4 had stated before the Investigating Officer about assaults by the four male accused persons. It is, however, true that he had not stated specifically about kick blows and slaps. These cannot be characterised as omission on material points. 7. We shall presently deal with the hypothesis of 'reasonable doubt' as pressed into service by the learned counsel for opposite party Nos. 1 to 4. The maxim that the prosecution must prove its case beyond reasonable doubt is a rule of caution laid down by the Courts of Law in respect of assessing the evidence in criminal cases. It can no doubt be argued that the concept of 'reasonable doubt' is vague in nature. The 'reasonable doubt' is one which occurs to a prudent and reasonable man. Section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, while explaining the meaning of the words 'proved', 'disproved' and 'not proved' lays down the standard of proof, namely, about the existence or non-existence of the circumstances from the point of view of a prudent man. The section is so worded as to provide for two conditions of mind, first, that in which a man feels absolutely certain of a fact, in other words, 'believe it to exist' and secondly in which though he may not feel absolutely certain of a fact, he thinks it so extremely probable that a prudent man would under the circumstances act on the assumption of its existence. The Act while adopting the requirement of the prudent man as an appropriate concrete standard by which to measure proof at the same time contemplates of giving full effect to be given to circumstances or condition of probability or improbability. It is this degree of certainty to be arrived where the circumstances before a fact can be said to be proved. A fact is said to be disproved when the Court believes that it does not exist or considers its non-existence so probable in the view of a prudent man and coming to the third stage where in the view of a prudent man the fact is not proved, i.e., neither proved nor disproved. It is this doubt which occurs to a reasonable man, has legal recognition in the field of criminal disputes. It is something different from moral conviction and it is also different from a suspicion. It is the result of a process of keen examination of the entire material on record by a prudent man. These aspects were highlighted by the apex Court in Vijayee Singh and Ors. v. State of U. P [1990 (II) Crimes 584.] As observed by Lord Du Faraq, J, all that the principle enjoins is a reasonable scepticism, not an obdurate persistence is disbelief. It does not demand from the Judge a resolute and impenetrable incredulity. He is never required to close his mind to the truth. The order of the learned Sessions Judge directing acquittal of Sk, Jangu is, therefore, vacated. 8. Additionally we find that the learned Sessions Judge ruled out the question of formation of an unlawful assaibly. because after acuqittal of Sk, Jangu the number of persons involved was less that five. About sharing of the common object and the assault, the learned Sessions Judge has observed that in the absence of any evidence about prosecution of common object and particularly in the absence of any positive evidence that all the five accused assaulted Sk. Abbas, the offence of rioting and forming unlawful assembly was not proved and therefore, the accused persons cannot be made liable for the said offences for which they stood trial. As indicated above, the conclusion is contrary to the findings recorded in the judgment there is nothing to disbelieve or discredit the evidence of PWs 1, 4 and 5. Since we have already held that acquittal of Sk. As indicated above, the conclusion is contrary to the findings recorded in the judgment there is nothing to disbelieve or discredit the evidence of PWs 1, 4 and 5. Since we have already held that acquittal of Sk. Jangu is indefensible, the question is whether the accused persons in the occurrence shared any common object has to be considered afresh. The Court has to assess the evidence keeping in view the requirements of Section 141, IPC defining unlawful assembly. The matter is remitted back to the learned trial Judge for a fresh trial on the already existing evidence. The question whether the prosecution has proved that the accused persons shared any common object shall be gone into afresh. The alternative plea of the informant is that even if the common object has not been established, common intention can be garnished from the conduct of the accused persons. This is a matter which the learned trial Judge shall consider. The revision application is allowed. The matter shall be considered afresh by the learned trial Judge on the basis of observations made above. D.M. Patnaik, J. 9. I agree. Final Result : Allowed