P. N. Nag, J. (Oral) ( 1 ) THIS Second Appeal under Section 39 of the Delhi Rent Control Act (hereinafter called the Act) has arisen out of an order dated 15. 2. 1991 passed by Shri O. P. Dwivedi, Rent Control Tribunal whereby the Tribunal has upheld the order of eviction dated 18th March, 1986 passed by I. C. Tiwari, Additional Rent Controller, Delhi against the appellant/tenant under clause (b) of proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act. ( 2 ) THE only question that requires consideration in this appeal is whether the appellant-tenant Ram Sarup has sub-let, assigned of parted with the possession of the premises in favour of Amrit Lal in 1971 without obtaining the consent in writing of the respondents and as such he is liable to be evicted under clause (b) of proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act. ( 3 ) MR. Sethi, learned counsel for the appellant, has very effectively and neatly put up his case and submitted (i) that the Additional Rent Controller has found as a matter of fact that the Partnkership Deed entered into between Ram Sarup and Amrit Lal (Ext. RW 1/1) is not forged or fabricated and according to him, once it is beld not to be forged or fabcated then clause 4 of the Partnership Deed clearly provides that on the dissolution of the partnership, the tenancy right in the said premises shall remain with Ram Sarup and Amrit Lal will have no right, title or interest in the tenancy right which will be the sole property of Ram Sarup. In other words, the tenancy rights have not been transferred to Amrit Lal by Ram Sarup while entering into the partnership agreement for the purpose of carrying on business in the shop. In other words, the tenancy rights have not been transferred to Amrit Lal by Ram Sarup while entering into the partnership agreement for the purpose of carrying on business in the shop. (ii) that the reasoning given and the inferences drawn by the courts below that some clauses of partnership deed, particularly clause 14 that the firm shall open its bank account which shall be operated by Amrit Lal only, is indicative of the fact that Amrit Lal was only to carry on the business in the tenanted premises, is perverse as this clause cannot lead inevitably to the inference that respondent No. 2 was only intended to carry on business in the tenanted premises to the exclusion of Ram Sarup, Reference was made to Section 4 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932, according to which the business of the partnership can be carried on by all or any of them acting for all and, therefore, Amrit Lal was within his right under the Partnership Act to carry on the business on behalf of Ram Sarup. (iii) that a perusal of various clauses of Partnership Deed, on the other hand, makes it clear rather establishes that by the Partnership Deed Ext. RW 1/1 Amrit Lal was only inducted as a partner to carry on the business of partnership in the shop along with Ram Sarup, (iv) that the finding of the Tribunal that there was no genuine partnership and the partnership was only a camouflage for concealing the real nature of transaction, is perverse and without any evidence and no reasonable man can reach to such a conclusion on the basis of evidence led by the parties. According to the learned counsel, the present appeal, therefore, does raise substantial question of law and is a fit case where the impugned order should be interfered with by this Court ( 4 ) MR. Sethi, learned counsel for the appellant, has also cited certain authorities in support of his contentions/submissions. ( 5 ) MR. According to the learned counsel, the present appeal, therefore, does raise substantial question of law and is a fit case where the impugned order should be interfered with by this Court ( 4 ) MR. Sethi, learned counsel for the appellant, has also cited certain authorities in support of his contentions/submissions. ( 5 ) MR. Mukul Rohatgi, counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, has submitted that the Tribunal on having appreciated the evidence in correct perspective has rightly come to the conclusion that there is no genuine partnership and the partnership was only a camouflage for concealing the real nature of transaction, and that-further the appellant has sub-let* assigned or otherwise parted with the possession of the premises in dispute without obtaining the consent in writing of the respondents. This finding of thetribunal is essentially a finding of fact which cannot be interfered with in this second appeal as this court has jurisdiction only to interfere in second appeal if substantial question of law arises. ( 6 ) I have given careful consideration to the submissions of learned counsel for both the parties and am of the opinion that the sub-mission made by Mr. Rehatgi, learned counsel for the respondents, is well founded. It is no doubt true that the leaned Additional Rent Controller has observed that it cannot be said that the partnership has not been valid and fabricated by the respondents. However, the Tribubal after having appreciated the evidence has clearly found that actually Ram Sarup has no interest or share in the business and he just lent his name so as to conceal the real nature of transaction. Such a finding has been arrived at by the Tribunal on having appreciated and scrutinised the evidence of the parties and after having perused the relevant clauses of the partnership deed, Ext. RW 1/1. It is no dout true that clause 14 of the Partnership Deed, Ext. RW 1/1, itself may not necessarily inevitably lead to the inference that respondent No. 2 Amrit Lal only was to carry on business in the shop. However, various cumulative circumstances have been. taken into consideration by the Tribunal in order to arrive at a finding that there was no genuine partnership and the partnership was only a camouflage for concealing the real nature of transaction. However, various cumulative circumstances have been. taken into consideration by the Tribunal in order to arrive at a finding that there was no genuine partnership and the partnership was only a camouflage for concealing the real nature of transaction. ( 7 ) HE has taken into consideration various aspects of the matter on the basis of evidence he has come to the finding that Ram Sarup has shifted to Klaith Mandi (Haryana) since 1964 and is doing the business as Commission agent and from 1971 Amrit Lal is in exclusive possession thereof. The business was also carried on in that shop exclusively by Amrit Lal. The Tribunal has found that in the partnership deed Ext. RW I/i the share of appellant Ram Sarup is shown to be only 10% while that of Amrit Lal is shown to be 90%. The accounts were to be operated by Amrit Lal only by virtue of clause 14 thereof. The fact that Amrit Lal was in exclusive possession of the shop in dispute and has been running the business exclusively coupled with the fact that he alone was to operate the accounts strongly suggests that Ram Sarup simply tendered his name to give a shape of partnership and actually the business was entirely of Amrit Lal and the appellant-tenant has failed to show otherwise that he has not parted with the possession of the property. in dispute. ( 8 ) HAVING perused the impugned order of the Tribunal and the evidence in the matter, I am of the firm opinion that the findings of the Tribunal are neither perverse nor unreasonable and that further such findings are essentially findings of fact. The appeal does not raisse any substantial question of law and, therefore, the High Court do not have nay jurisdiction to entertain this second appeal. ( 9 ) OTHER submissions of Mr. Sethi as referred to above cannot be accepted once the finding of the Tribunal that there was no genuine partnersship and the partnership was only a camouflage for concealing the real nature of transaction is upheld. It is, therefore, not necessary to discuss the authorities cited by Mr. Sethi. In the light of the above the appeal is dismissed in limine. ( 10 ) A copy of this order be given Dasti to counsel for the parties.