Deba Prasad Banerjee v. State of West Bengal — 1992 DIGILAW 266 (CAL)

Judgment : The subject matter of challenge in this writ petition is an order dated 2.5.89 issued by the State Government under Section 32(2) of the West Bengal Co-operative Societies Act, 1983 (referred to as the Act) rescinding a resolution passed by the Board of Directors of the Nadia District, Central Cooperative Bank Limited (referred to as the Bank) on 27.6.88. 2. There are several distinct strands of facts in this case relating to Departmental Proceedings, Criminal Proceedings, Governmental Proceedings and Court Proceedings. The facts are closely interwoven. 3. The writ petitioner has been an employee of the Bank since 1961. The petitioner became the Branch Manager of the Shantipur Branch of the Bank. On 30th June, 1982 the petitioner was transferred to Silinda Farmers Service Cooperative Society as the Managing Director. On 9th August, 1982, a show cause notice was issued to the petitioner why disciplinary action should not be taken against him for persistent negligence of duty, indiscipline, insubordination misconduct, direction duty, manipulation of records and irregular investment. Articles of change were drawn up against the petitioner on 23.7.83. 4. On 19th March, 1984 an order of suspension was issued to the petitioner pending enquiry. 5. Six months later, on 2nd September, 1984 the Executive Officer of the Bank lodged an FIR on the basis of which a police case was started. It appears from the records that the FIR was lodged in respect of a alleged criminal breach of trust with regard to a sum of Rs, 63,70,120/- which was shown to have been disbursted in favour of the Dhakuria Karmachari Unayanan Samiti Ltd. between 1978-79 to 1979-80 towards supply of Pump sets and Shallow tubewells. The allegation further was that out of the 39 Loanees, 18 Loanees had not got the delivery of the suction and delivery pipes amounting to Rs. 3,600/-. It was further alleged that the amount of loan shown against each member was above the cost of materials stated to have been supplied to them. It was also alleged that a sum of Rs. 45,000/- had been misappropriated by the petitioner. 6. On 23rd November, 1984 the petitioner challenged the appointment of the Enquiry Officer as well as the order of suspension under Article 226. It was also alleged that a sum of Rs. 45,000/- had been misappropriated by the petitioner. 6. On 23rd November, 1984 the petitioner challenged the appointment of the Enquiry Officer as well as the order of suspension under Article 226. An interim order was issued by B. P. Banerjee, J. allowing the disciplinary proceedings to continue, but restraining the authorities from passing any final order on the basis of the enquiry without the leave of Court. This writ petition (hereinafter referred to as the first petition) was subsequently numbered as C. O. No. 19572(W) of 1984. 7. On 15th March, 1985 the District Enforcement Branch after investigation submitted a report in the Police Case to the effect that there was no case against the petitioner for framing charges under Sections 409 & 418 of the Indian Penal Code. 8. The Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate not being satisfied with the final report of the District Enforcement Branch, a re-investigation was ordered. The re-investigation was made and a final report was submitted on 5.8.87. This final report was also in favour of the petitioner. The matter was heard at length by the SDJM. On 2.1.88 the SDJM referred the matter to the Special Court at Nadia. 9. In the mean time, a new Board of Directors of the Bank was constituted. As the petitioner had not answered the show cause notice, the enquiry authority on the basis of materials before him found that of the 14 Articles of charge Nos. 1, 2, 7, 10, 12 & 13 had not been established. As far as charge No 14 was concerned, namely in subordination and defiance, the enquiry officer recorded that he had no opinion. It can be taken that charge No. 14 was not found to be established. 10. On 17th June, 1988 the Secretary of the Bank issued notice for convening a meeting of the Board of Directors of the Bank on 27th June, 1988. On 27th June, 1988 five members of the Board attended the meeting. Amongst other resolutions, a resolution was passed to the following effect :- "Considering the acts of Vice-Chairman (Ref. Proceedings of the Board meetings dated 16.1.88; 3.2.88), Final Reports submitted twice by D. B. B., Police, Books of Accounts Records, Audit Report, etc. On 27th June, 1988 five members of the Board attended the meeting. Amongst other resolutions, a resolution was passed to the following effect :- "Considering the acts of Vice-Chairman (Ref. Proceedings of the Board meetings dated 16.1.88; 3.2.88), Final Reports submitted twice by D. B. B., Police, Books of Accounts Records, Audit Report, etc. demands of the Employees Union, the slim total interest of the Bank, this meeting resolves that the Bank will not proceed further regarding all cases pending indifferent Law Courts in the matter of Sri Deba prasad Banerjee now under suspension and that the Inquiry Authority or Authorities of any other authority of similar nature, so constituted before, for the purpose of inquiry into the charges and allegations, proceedings etc. against Sri Banerjee are dissolved and terminated and all charges, allegations or proceedings as alleged against him are dropped and withdrawn considering there as baseless and without foundation. Suspension order is hereby revoked and withdrawn. Sri Banerjee is now entitled to join his duty at present in the Head Office of the Bank and to report accordingly. Further, it is resolved that Sri Banerjee will be entitled to get all privileges including financial dues, arrears and current in accordance with the provision of Acts and Rules, by-laws concerned according, to his service status. C.E.O. will act according to his contents of this resolution." 11. A copy of the resolution was made available to the writ petitioner. 12. On the basis of the resolution dated 27.6.88 the petitioner sought to resume his duties but apparently was not allowed to join. The petitioner made a representation for withdrawal of the suspension order and for reinstatement. It is stated by the petitioner that on 10th August, 1988 the resolution dated 26.6.88 was confirmed by the Board or Directors of the Bank. 13. Because of the continued refusal of the respondent authorities to allow the petitioner to join his duties inspite of the resolution dated 27.6.88, the petitioner moved a second writ petition challenging such refusal. This writ petition (C. O. No. 10804(W) of 1988) (referred to as the Second petition) is still pending. No interim order however, appears to have been passed. 14. This writ petition (C. O. No. 10804(W) of 1988) (referred to as the Second petition) is still pending. No interim order however, appears to have been passed. 14. In the meantime, as far as the State Government was concerned, prior do the resolution dated 27.6.88 a letter was written by the Assistant Registrar of Cooperative Societies, Nadia, to the Registrar of Cooperative Societies complaining about the move to reinstate the writ petitioner by the Board. The matter appears to have been considered by the Registrar of cooperative Societies as well as the State Government. On 26th December, 1988 a Memorandum was submitted by the Registrar to the State Government recommending that the resolution dated 27th June, 1988 should be rescinded. 15. The Memorandum is a lengthy one in which it has been stated that the Directorate had made a reference to the department for rescinding the resolution on the ground that the meeting dated 27.6.88 was not validly held. It appears that legal advice was sought regarding the validity of the resolution. The legal advice was that a resolution could not ipso facto bring about the withdrawal of pending criminal proceedings or investigation but that the bank had jurisdiction to withdraw an order of suspension. The Registrar himself was of the view that the petitioner had not been suspended because of the fact that an F. I. R. was lodged against him but that he was placed under suspension when he was found prima facie guilty of an offence revealed through a preliminary departmental enquiry. It is stated that the then Managing Committee having approved the suspension and framing of chargesheet, the present Managing Committee enjoying the same powers as the previous Managing Committee should not go against the decision of the previous Managing Committee. It was further stated that the order of the High Court giving liberty to the Bank to complete the enquiry but not to communicate any final order was in effect an order of status quo which would preclude any final decision by the Bank. The Registrar further stated that before the resolution dated 27.6.88 was passed the Bank had sought legal advice. The legal advice was that the Bank could not withdraw the charges against the writ petitioner without the leave of the Court and also that the order of suspension could not be withdrawn. The Registrar further stated that before the resolution dated 27.6.88 was passed the Bank had sought legal advice. The legal advice was that the Bank could not withdraw the charges against the writ petitioner without the leave of the Court and also that the order of suspension could not be withdrawn. The Registrar was of the view that it was not a healthy procedure if the Managing Committee formed on a subsequent date annulled or nullified or negated the actions taken by a previous Managing Committee. It was stated that the continuity of the administration was interrupted thereby. It was also stated by the Registrar tint the petitioner was the younger brother of the Secretary of the Board of the Bank who called the meeting on 27.6.88 and a relative of the Vice-Chairman who chaired the meeting on 27.6.88. The resolution dated 27.6.88 was, according to the Registrar, vitiated by personal influence and convenience. 16. The Registrar noted that the affairs of the Bank were mismanaged and that the Board which ought to have been reconstituted had been continuing on the basis of an injunction passed by this Court. The Registrar finally concluded with the following statement :-- "The directorate strongly feels that the resolution adopted in the socalled meeting of the Board of the bank on 27.6.88 on agenda No. 4 pertaining to reinstatement of the delinquent Shri D.P. Banerjee, younger brother of the present Secretary Mr. Nripendra Nath Banerjee should be rescinded immediately in the interest of the Bank as well as in the interest of sanctity of management which should be free from influence, personal consideration or convenience and also to allow justice to flow in the right direction." 17. On 10th April, 1989 an order was passed by the State Government to the following effect :- "Whereas the Board of Directors of Nadia District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the said Bank) in the meeting held on 27.6.88 adopted a resolution on agenda No.4 to withdraw all charges allegations and proceedings and to drop all departmental proceedings drawn up by the Chief Executive Officer of the said bank against Shri Deba Prasad Banerjee, Officer Gr. II of the said Bank for his gross misconduct and wilful delinquent activities and to approve his reinstatement without taking leaving of the Hon'ble High Court before which the matter was sub-justice : And whereas the Governor is satisfied that, aforesaid resolution shall adversely affected the interest of the said bank and shall be clearly violative of the Hon'ble Court's orders; Now, therefore, in exercise of the power conferred by sub-section (2) of section 32 of the West Bengal Co-operative Societies Act, 1983, the Governor is hereby pleased, in the interest of the aforesaid bank, to rescind the resolution of the board under agenda No.4 adopted on 27.6.88 by which the said Sri Deba Prasad Banerjee was allowed to join his duty at the head office of the bank and all disciplinary proceedings and charges directed against him were dropped and with drawn." 18. This order has been impugned in this writ proceedings. The writ application was filed on 2nd May, 1989. The writ application was m wed under notice. An interim order was passed restraining the respondents from giving any effect or any further effect to the impugned order dated 10.4.89. The petitioner was however, directed not to join but was granted full salary in terms of the resolution dated 27.6.88. 19. The order dated 2.5.89 was sought to be modified by the respondents Nos. 3 & 6 by filing an application. That an application was in effect rejected. The Court directed the respondent Bank to pay the petitioner the full salary of the petitioner including arrears after deducting the subsistance allowances already raid but subject to the final decision in this writ petition. 20. On 24.5.89 the Special Judge in the Criminal proceedings found that there was no material to substantiate the allegations contained in the First Information Report. The Special Judge found the accusation against the petitioner as groundless and directed that he should be discharged and released from his bail bond. 21. The Special Judge however in discharging the petitioner observed as follows :- "It is however, apparent from the C D. that the accused did not comply with all the directions issued by the Central Co-Operative Bank from time to time specifying the procedure to be observed in the case of giving loans by way of supply of shallow tubewells and pump sets. But there is nothing before me to show that there was any breach of trust by the accused. The irregularities committed by the accused calls for departmental action against him." "This will not, however, prevent the Central Co-operative Bank, Nadia, from resorting to any departmental action against the accused for violation of rules and regulations specified by the Central Co-operative Bank, Nadia to be observed in the matter of making disbursements to the loanee members in the shape of delivery of pump sets and shallow tubewells." 22. On 1st December, 1989 the first writ application was dismissed at the instance of the petitioner for non-prosecution. 23. On 17.1.92 Board of Directors of the Bank passed a resolution to the effect that in view of the report of the enquiry officer and in view of the fact that the Special Judge had permitted departmental proceedings to continue, the petitioner should be called upon show cause as to why he should not be dismissed from service. 24. On 20th February, 1992 a second notice was issued to the petitioner to show cause :- "Within 15(fifteen) days from the date of receipt of this Notice as to why his services from Nadia District Central Co-operative Bank Ltd. shall not be terminated for maintainance of cash beyond permissible limit is clear violation of Bank's instruction; for appointing an appraiser without obtaining adequate security in violation of office order; for disbursement of NT. loan amounting to Rs. 3,17,120 00 to Dhakuria SKUS Ltd. in clear violation of Bank's norms, directions and instructions in an unauthorised manner and thereby causing loss to the bank and impairing the goodwill of the bank; for flouting of orders and instructions' of the bank in the matter of supervision of C.M.I. Scheme and for his persistent misconduct and indiscipline-all of which amount to gross misconduct as per Service Rule of Nadia Dist. Central Co-operative Bank Ltd," 25. The petitioner has contended :- (i) The resolution dated 27.6.88 had been validly taken and could not be rescinded in exercise of powers under S. 32(2) of the Act. (ii) The impugned order was void as no hearing had been given 10 the Board before rescinding the Board's resolution. Reliance has been placed on several decisions of the Supreme Court in this connection : (1) A. K. Kraipak & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. (ii) The impugned order was void as no hearing had been given 10 the Board before rescinding the Board's resolution. Reliance has been placed on several decisions of the Supreme Court in this connection : (1) A. K. Kraipak & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. AIR 1970 SC 150 ; (2) Sukhdev Singh & Ors. v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi & Ors., AIR 1975 SC 1331 ; and (3) K. I. Shepherd & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., 1987(4) SCC 431 . (iii) The impugned order merely recited the language of S. 32(2) of the Act. The satisfaction on the basis of which the impugned order was passed was justiciable. The order was issued 10 months after the resolution dated 27.6.88. (iv) There was a total non-application of mind by the State Government. There was no question of violation of the interim order passed on the first petition by passing the resolution dated 27.6.88. In any event the interim order had been vacated on 1.12.89. Reliance has been placed on (4) M. A. Rasheed v. State of Kerala, AIR 1969 SC 295 and (5) Barium Chemicals Ltd. v. Company Law Board, AIR 1967 SC 295 in this connection. (v) The action of the State Government was issued malafide to render the Second writ petition challenging the non-implementation of the notice dated 27.6.88 infructuous. (vi) Finally it is contended that the Chief Executive Officer of the Bank could not override the decision of the Board. Reference has been made to a Bench decision of the Court in (6) Howrah District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. & Ors. v. S. K. Dutta & Ors., 89 CWN 744. 26. The respondents 1, 2, 4 and 5 have not used any affidavit but have produced the records. 27. The respondents 3 and 6 being the Chief Executive Officer and the Bank represented through its Chairman, respectively, have filed an affidavit in opposition and have contended at the hearing :- (i) The Disciplinary proceeding had been concluded and Second Show Cause Notice had been issued to the petitioner. (ii) The meeting at which the resolution dated 27.6.88 had been passed had been called irregularly in that no notice of the meeting had been issued. (iii) The resolution dated 27.6.88 was invalid because it had been passed in violation of the interim order passed in the first writ application. (ii) The meeting at which the resolution dated 27.6.88 had been passed had been called irregularly in that no notice of the meeting had been issued. (iii) The resolution dated 27.6.88 was invalid because it had been passed in violation of the interim order passed in the first writ application. It is further contended that there was no material on the basis of which the Board could have passed the resolution. It is finally contended that the resolution was against the interest of the Bank since a disciplinary proceeding was pending. 28. The respondent No.7 being the Present Board of the Bank has not used any affidavit but has contended at the hearing:- (i) The order by which the Special Judge had discharged the petitioner had specifically retained the right of the authorities to proceed with the disciplinary proceedings, The petitioner had not challenged this order and had accepted this and was estopped from challenging the disciplinary proceedings. (ii) The Board had exclusive power regarding tile disciplinary action to be taken against the Bank's employees under Rule 48 of the West Bengal Cooperative Societies Rules, 1987 (referred to as the Rules). The earlier resolution was not a fetter on the passing of a second resolution. The Board had power to pass the second resolution dated 17.1.92. It is stated that if by the Resolution dated 27.6.88 the earlier resolution in 1983 could have been superseded, there was no reason why the present Board could not reverse the resolution dated 27.6.88 by the resolution stated 27.1.92. (iii) The earlier resolution had been withdrawn by the passing of the second resolution by necessary implication. The second Show Cause Notice had already been issued on the basis of the resolution dated 17.1.92. The writ petition was therefore infructuous. (iv) The Second resolution and show cause notice were not the subject matter of challenge in the writ application and therefore no relief could be granted to the petitioner. 29. This contention was not raised at the hearing but was included in the written note submitted by the Respondent No.7. 30. The first question to be decided is whether the impugned order can be sustained. 29. This contention was not raised at the hearing but was included in the written note submitted by the Respondent No.7. 30. The first question to be decided is whether the impugned order can be sustained. Section 32(2) of the Act under which the impugned order bas been issued reads as follows :- "The State Government may, by order for reasons to be recorded in writing, rescind or suspend for a period specified in the order, any proceeding or resolution of any general meeting of a cooperative society or of any meeting of the board thereof which it considers to be not in conformity with the provisions of this Act or the rules or with any order validly issued by the State Government or the Registrar, and may do all things necessary to secure such conformity, or may rescind any proceeding or resolution which it considers likely to affect adversely the interest of any cooperative society or members thereof or of the cooperative movement in general." 31. The two reasons for rescinding the resolution as stated in the impugned order are :- (i) that the resolution would adversely affect the Bank; and (ii) that the resolution was in violation of the High Court's order (presumably the interim order in the first writ petition). 32. Although under Section 32(2) of the Act the State Government has a power to rescind a resolution on the ground that it was invalid, the State Government also has a power to rescind a resolution which though otherwise valid is likely to adversely effect the interest of a Cooperative Society or of the Cooperative movement in general. In this case the State Government has not sought to rescind the resolution of the ground that it was invalid but on the ground that it was likely to adversely effect the interest of the bank. The mere fact that the resolution is a valid one does not therefore deprive the State Government from exercise in its powers under Section 32(2) of the Act. The first contention of the writ petitioner therefore cannot be sustained. 33. As far as the second contention of the writ petitioner is concerned the statute itself does not expressly require the State Government to give any opportunity of being heard to the Board whose resolution is sought to be rescinded under Section 32(2). The first contention of the writ petitioner therefore cannot be sustained. 33. As far as the second contention of the writ petitioner is concerned the statute itself does not expressly require the State Government to give any opportunity of being heard to the Board whose resolution is sought to be rescinded under Section 32(2). The Section however requires the State Government to record its reasons for passing the order. What is being exercised is a quasi-judicial power. "It is well established that even where there is no specific provision in a statute or rules made thereunder for showing cause against action proposed to be taken against an individual, which affects the rights of that individual, the duty to give reasonable opportunity to be heard will be implied from the nature of the function to be performed by the authority which has the power to take punitive or damaging action. "(See: (7) Maneka Gandhi Vs. Union of India reported in AIR 1978 SC 597 )." 34. Even if the power under S. 32(2) were to be constituted as administrative, the distinction is one without a difference as it is well established that order be they quasi-judicial or administrative having civil consequences must comply with the principles of natural justice unless exceptional and emergent circumstances dictate otherwise. No such emergent or exceptional circumstance has been pleaded (ibid). 35. On the other hand the impugned order was issued ten months after the resolution sought to be rescinded was passed. 36. Doubtless the impugned order affected the rights of the Board to pass the resolution. The Board therefore should have been heard. It is of no moment that the present Board does not complain about the impugned order. If the law implies a duty to hear, such duty must be complied with. There is nothing to show that the Board which passed the resolution dated 27.6.88 would not have argued against the order. It is also possible that some of the members of the present Board would have also sought to uphold the resolution. The petitioner, being the person directly affected by the impugned order can insist on the principles of fairplay. 37. Admittedly no opportunity of being heard to the Board before the impugned order was passed. The order is thus a nullity. The second contention of the petitioner therefore succeeds. 38. The petitioner, being the person directly affected by the impugned order can insist on the principles of fairplay. 37. Admittedly no opportunity of being heard to the Board before the impugned order was passed. The order is thus a nullity. The second contention of the petitioner therefore succeeds. 38. As far as the third contention of the writ petitioner is concerned the respondents have not disputed that the 'satisfaction' referred to in the impugned order is justiciable. It is stated that the satisfaction has been based on the memorandum dated 26.12.88 written by the Registrar of the Cooperative Societies to the Secretary, Co-operative Department, Government of West Bengal. 39. It cannot be said therefore that the impugned order was based on no material whatsoever. 40. As far as the first ground in the impugned order is concerned, the reason which prompted the State Government to hold that the resolution would adversely effect the Bank cannot be said to be entirely without any substance. 41. Disciplinary proceedings by definition are initiated to maintain discipline in an organisation. By rescinding the resolution dated 27.6.88 the State Government has allowed the disciplinary proceedings to continue. The stopping of disciplinary proceedings against an employee without adequate reason or for colleteral considerations would if true, indeed adversely affect the Bank. 42. Apart from the need for the maintenance of discipline is the principle that it is imperative that the decision of the Board should be free from any element of personal interest. The chance or personal prejudice and the likelihood of bias are factors which the State Government might reasonably want to exclude from any decision making process of the Board. The possibility that the resolution may have been based on considerations of kinship would lead to a distrust in the objectivity of the management of the society and a consequent lack of discipline. The loss of confidence and the potential threat to discipline are circumstances which may rationally be said to adversely effect the interest of the Bank. 43. The second ground mentioned in the impugned order, however, cannot be sustained. The order of B. P. Benerjee, J. on the first application was passed for the benefit of the writ petitioner. The respondents were restrained from passing any final order in the disciplinary proceedings. This order cannot be interpreted as preventing the respondents from dropping the disciplinary proceedings altogether against the petitioner. The order of B. P. Benerjee, J. on the first application was passed for the benefit of the writ petitioner. The respondents were restrained from passing any final order in the disciplinary proceedings. This order cannot be interpreted as preventing the respondents from dropping the disciplinary proceedings altogether against the petitioner. The withdrawal of all charges against the petitioner is not a final order in the disciplinary proceedings. The interim order was a protective measure, intended to protect the petitioner. It cannot be construed to his disadvantage. The second reason in the impugned order is therefore not tenable. 44. The order of Special Judge did not and indeed could not authorise the disciplinary proceedings. The Special Judge merely preserved the right if it existed. The right to proceed departmentally could not have had its source in the observation of the Special Judge. The question of the petitioner challenging this order did not arise as right of the petitioner relating to the Departmental proceedings was sought to be affected by the Special Judge. The Special Judge did not direct that disciplinary proceedings should be initiated against the petitioner. He would have had no jurisdiction to do so. By not seeking to set aside what was, in effect a clarification of the ambit of the order of discharge namely, that it would not affect the disciplinary proceedings if any, could not estop the petitioner from challenging the disciplinary proceedings themselves. 45. The satisfaction of the Government in issuing to the order being based on two reasons, it cannot be predicated with any certainty whether the satisfaction would have been maintained even if one of the grounds is untenable. 46. The contention of the respondents nos. 3 & 6 that the resolution dated 27.6.88 had been passed irregularly because no notice had been issued is contradictory to the records as well as the pleading of the respondents nos. 3 & 6 themselves. The grievance appears to have been that a notice was issued but that notice was on a plain paper and not on the letter-head of the Bank. This and the contention of the respondents that there was no material on the basis of which the Board could have passed the resolution on 26.7.88 cannot be raised as this was not the ground on the basis of which the impugned order was passed. 47. This and the contention of the respondents that there was no material on the basis of which the Board could have passed the resolution on 26.7.88 cannot be raised as this was not the ground on the basis of which the impugned order was passed. 47. In view of these findings the impugned order cannot be sustained and it is not necessary to consider the other contentions raised by the petitioner in this regard. 48. The next question is-can this Court take cognisance of the subsequent-events viz., the resolution dated 17.1.92 and the second Show Cause notice? In my view it can. The principal grievance of the petitioner is the setting aside of the resolution dated 27.6.88. 49. The respondents themselves have put the matter of the second show cause notice and the resolution dated 17.1.92 in issue by making submissions on that basis for defeating the reliefs claimed by the petitioner. The Court has, in fact, been invited by the respondents to consider the correctness of their contentions which would necessarily raise the question of the validity of the resolution dated 17.1.92 and the second show cause notice. The contention that the second show cause notice and resolution dated 17.1.92 are outside the scope of the writ petition, as already noted had not been raised by any of the respondents except the respondent no. 7 and that too at a stage subsequent to the hearing. 50. That a Court may take note of subsequent events is supported by authority (See (8) Swarnalata v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1952 Cal 687 and that if the injustice is palpable the Court would be justified in striking down such injustice forthwith without driving the petitioner to yet another litigation. (See (9) B. R. Ramabhadriah v. Secretary F & A Department, AIR 1981 SC 1653 . 51. The resolution dated 27.1.92 does not rescind the earlier resolution dated 27.6.88. A second resolution contrary to the earlier one without any reason as to why the earlier resolution was sought to be set aside is incompetent. The Registrar of Co-operative Societies himself in his memorandum to the State Government had stressed on the necessity of continuity of decisions. Apart from this, the Board is the same entity, whatever its composition. A second resolution contrary to the earlier one without any reason as to why the earlier resolution was sought to be set aside is incompetent. The Registrar of Co-operative Societies himself in his memorandum to the State Government had stressed on the necessity of continuity of decisions. Apart from this, the Board is the same entity, whatever its composition. It would be the height of arbitrariness for an authority to take one decision at one point of time and then, for no disclosed reason at all, on the same facts, take a completely different stand. The argument that the resolution of 27.6.88 itself set aside the still earlier resolution of the Board and therefore there was justification for the 1992 resolution cancelling the 1988 resolution is misconceived. It is a truism that two wrongs do not make a right. In any event, the Board, in passing the 1988 resolution, had some new material before it as was mentioned in the resolution itself including the Reports of innocence of the petitioner filed in the criminal proceedings. There was no such new material in 1992 which was not before the Board in 1988. 52. The resolution dated 27.1.92 cannot therefore be upheld. The second show cause notice being based on this resolution must fall with it. 53. For the reasons aforesaid the writ application is allowed. The impugned order and the resolutions dated 27.1.92 and second show cause notice are quashed. The interim order is confirmed. There will, however, be no order as to costs. Stay of operation of the order is prayed, for a period of two weeks. The same is granted. Let xerox copy of the judgment be made available to the concerned parties, if applied for, on the usual terms and undertaking.