JUDGMENT : S.H. Kapadia, J.—Mr. Cama the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner seeks leave to amend the Petition in order to bring the Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay on record as the Petitioner. Since it is formal amendment, leave to amend granted. Amendment to be carried out within one week from today. Miss Baxi has no objection to the said amendment. 2. This Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeks to challenge the order passed by the Industrial Tribunal in Application (I.T.) No, 86 of 1984 in Reference (I.T.) No. 115 of 1981 on 8th April 1986 by which the application made by the applicant Corporation seeking approval u/s 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 came to be rejected. 3. The short facts giving rise to this petition are as follows:- (a) The first Respondent at the relevant time was employed by the Petitioner as a field worker in the Family Welfare Centre attached to Municipal Corporation Khervadi Maternity Home, Bandra (East) Bombay. It is the case of the petitioner that on 4th July 1980 officers of the Municipal Corporation made a surprise check at the Family Welfare Centre referred to above and found that the entries made by the first respondent (employee) in her field diary on 3rd July 1980 were totally false. According to the Petitioner, the first respondent admitted that the entries made in her diary were false. According to the Petitioner, the said admission of the employee further led to a spot enquiry and the Corporation further found that the entries were false and the facts were substantially substantiated by the spot enquiry. (b) On 2nd December 1980 a chargesheet was accordingly given to the first respondent which was followed by full departmental enquiry against the first respondent. According to the Petitioner, the said enquiry was a full fledged and exhaustive departmental enquiry and the first respondent was given full opportunity of defending herself. (c) By a show cause notice dated 7th June 1982 issued to the first respondent together with the copy of the report of the Enquiry Officer, the first respondent was called upon to explain as to why her services should not be terminated. (d) On 16th June 1982 the first respondent submitted her reply. (e) By an order of termination dated 21st July 1982, the services of the first respondent came to be terminated. (d) On 16th June 1982 the first respondent submitted her reply. (e) By an order of termination dated 21st July 1982, the services of the first respondent came to be terminated. (f) Simultaneously, with the issue of the order of termination of the Petitioner filed an application for approval u/s 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act on the ground that there was a pending reference in the Industrial Tribunal with which the workman was concerned being Reference (IT) No. 115 of 1981. It is the case of the Petitioner that they tendered to the workman one month's notice wages under the Proviso to Section 33(2)(b) after deducting therefrom a sum of Rs. 8/- by way of professional tax. (g) On 21st August 1985 the first respondent filed her say opposing the approval application filed by the petitioner. One of the preliminary objections taken on behalf of the first Respondent was that the Corporation has not paid one full month's wages to the first respondent while opposing the order of dismissal dated 29th September 1984. It was further submitted by the first respondent that the Corporation has paid Rs. 879.55 as one month's wages whereas according to the first respondent one month's wages which she was entitled to receive was Rs. 887.55. According to the first respondent, the Corporation was not entitled to deduct an amount of Rs. 8/-from her monthly salary towards the profession tax while calculating wages u/s 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act. (h) By the impugned order dated 8th April 1986 the Industrial Court, Bombay accepted the contention of the first respondent and came to the conclusion that the Corporation has not fulfilled the preconditions and by deducting the amount of Rs. 8/- from the monthly salary payable to the first respondent the precondition of Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act has not been fulfilled. On merits of the case, the Industrial Court in its impugned order referred to a joint Pursis filed by the Corporation on the one hand and the first respondent by which it was recorded that except the question regarding fulfilment of the precondition on merits of the case there was no challenge before the Industrial Court in the approval application. It was made clear that the validity of domestic enquiry is not being challenged. It was made clear that the validity of domestic enquiry is not being challenged. At this stage it may be mentioned that the first respondent has already sought an adjudication of the dispute u/s 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 by way of Reference (IDA) 813 of 1985 which reference is pending. At this stage it may also be mentioned that against the order of termination an appeal has been preferred by the first respondent to the Municipal Commissioner which is also not decided till today. 4. Since the only contention raised by the first respondent before the Industrial Court was with regard to deduction of professional tax from her monthly wages payable to the first respondent it may be pointed out that by the Judgment of this Court in the case of Air India v. S. Ganapathi and Ors. reported in 1986 1 CLR 406 the question in issue is no more integra. By this Judgment it has been held that the employer was entitled to deduct the professional tax from the wages payable to the workmen and in such a case there would be due compliance of the provisions of Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Miss Baxi, the learned counsel for the first respondent fairly stated that the ratio of the said Judgment in Air India v. S. Ganapathi's case (supra) would squarely apply to the facts of the present case. However, she submitted that since the matter has not been decided on merits the matter should be remanded back to the Industrial Court. 5. Mr. Cama, the learned counsel for the Corporation, in reply to the above submission made by Miss Baxi has rightly pointed out that in view of the Pursis being filed before the Industrial Court, there was no question of the matter being remanded to the Industrial Court to decide the matter de novo on merits. In normal circumstances, I would have remanded the matter despite the Pursis. However, as mentioned here in above since the first respondent has already invoked the provisions of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act by way of Reference (IDA) 813 of 1985 which is pending in the Labour Court in which the first respondent has sought substantial reliefs, it would not be in the fitness of things to remand this matter back to the Industrial Court. It is well settled principle of law laid down by the various judgments of the Supreme Court that the scope of Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act is narrow as compared to the adjudication machinery which is provided u/s 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act. In view of the fact that the first respondent workman has already raised an Industrial Disputes no purpose would be served in remanding the matter back to the Industrial Court to decide the approval application u/s 33(2)(b) of Industrial Disputes Act. 6. Mr. Cama fairly stated that the appeal filed by the first respondent employees which is pending before the Municipal Commissioner will be decided as expeditiously as possible. Since the matter has been pending before the Municipal Commissioner from 1985 the appellate authority will decide the appeal within 3 months from today. Since Reference (IDA) No. 813 of 1985 is pending in the Labour Court for a quite some time, the Labour Court concerned will decide the said Reference (IDA) 813 of 1985 as expeditiously as possible and preferably within six months from today. 7. In the circumstances rule is made absolute in terms of prayer (a). In the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs. Certified copy, if applied for, to be furnished out of turn expeditiously within one week.