JUDGMENT The judgment of the Court was as follows :– Mukherji, J. : This application filed on 5.3.92 by the petitioners urges us to draw up a proceedings suo motu against the contemnors for abusing the process of the court and for obstructing due course of judicial proceeding and administration of justice. The main grievance of the petitioners is to the effect that the contemnors respondents Madan Mohan Shroff and Sahadud Ul Haque are persistently taking proceedings against them under Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It has been specifically alleged that on 12.2.92 the respondent No. 2 moved a petition under Section 144 Cr. P. C. against the petitioner No. 1 as well as one Tapan Bhattacharjee in which he falsely stated that the petitioner No. 1 along with its associates had been systematically trespassing at 10, Sunny Park and contended that the respondent No. 2 was given to understand that the petitioners would not allow him as well members of his family to live in that flat and they would disturb his peaceful possession thereto. In the said application under Section 144 Cr. P. C. the respondent No. 2 falsely stated that the Southern flat of the first floor of 10, Sunny Park was given in monthly tenancy to him by the contemnor respondent No. 1 Madan Mohan Shroff on and from 16.10.91 on rental basis @ Rs. 3000/- per month and he became a tenant under the contemnor respondent No. 1 and others and is residing in the said flat. It was more or less admitted in the said application under Section 144 Cr. P. C. filed by him that the petitioners at all material times had been tenants in respect of Southern flat on the first floor of 10, Sunny Park as a monthly tenant prior to his induction into the premises as a tenant under the contemnor respondent No. 1. We are however, not materially concerned with other averments made by the contemnors respondent No. 2 in the said application. It has been alleged by the petitioner No. 1 company that it became monthly tenant on the first floor of 10, Sunny Park which it has been peacefully occupying by paying rent to the landlady Sm. Neena Shroff, wife of Hari Mohan Shroff (who is the brother of contemnor respondent No. 1) at a monthly rent of Rs. It has been alleged by the petitioner No. 1 company that it became monthly tenant on the first floor of 10, Sunny Park which it has been peacefully occupying by paying rent to the landlady Sm. Neena Shroff, wife of Hari Mohan Shroff (who is the brother of contemnor respondent No. 1) at a monthly rent of Rs. 12,000/- per month which rent was regularly paid to landlady till 19.12.91. It has been further alleged that the contemnor respondent No. 1 had been trying to oust the petitioner company from the tenancy in respect of the said flat and to that end had been indulging in false and frivolous litigation against the petitioner company one after another. On 17.1.92 the respondent No. 2 filed Title Suit No. 20 of 1992 against the petitioner No. 1 company, in which the respondent No. 1 Madan Mohan Shroff was impleaded as a party defendant only to show his bonafides. In fact the suit was filed on 17.1.92 in collusion with the contemnor respondent No. 1. In the Title Suit the respondent No. 2 filed an application for injunction whereupon the Ld. Munsif by his order dated 17.2.92 directed the parties to maintain status quo. He however, did not disturb the petitioner No. 1 company in any manner whatsoever since it was already in possession of the said premises. The respondent No. 2 thereafter filed an application under Section 144(2) Cr. P. C. before the executive Magistrate, Alipore being M. P. Case No. 138 of 1992. In his application he completely suppressed that he had filed a title suit earlier and even prayed for injunction and only had obtained an order of status quo. In that proceeding he contended that he was inducted by respondent No. 1 as a monthly tenant on 16.10.91 in respect of the flat which comprised of three bedrooms with attached bath and privy, one drawing room, one dining room, one separate kitchen, one pantry and a corridor where he had been living with the members of his family. It was falsely alleged in the said proceeding under Section 144 Cr. P. C. that the petitioner No. 1 company vacated the flat on or about October 14/15, 1991 by removing all their articles and materials from the premises. It was falsely alleged in the said proceeding under Section 144 Cr. P. C. that the petitioner No. 1 company vacated the flat on or about October 14/15, 1991 by removing all their articles and materials from the premises. It was falsely alleged that since the financial position of the company was not sound and it has faced difficulties in retaining the flat and to pay monthly rents and in fact defaulted in payment of monthly rents from March 1991 onwards, it expressed its intention to quit and vacate the premises on receipt of some money as shifting charges upon which the respondent No. 1 agreed to pay the petitioner No. 1 company such shifting charges of Rs. 25,000/-. The petitioner No. 1 company having already received the said amount vacated the premises on or about October 14/15, 1991. On the said application being moved the learned Executive Magistrate, 1st Court, Alipore by his order dated 18.1.92 in M. P. Case No. 138 of 1992, without drawing up a proceeding under Section 144 Cr. P. C. directed the Officer-in-Charge, Ballygunge Police Station to enquire and report by 18.2.92 directing the police to see that no breach of peace took place. He further passed direction on the Officer-in-Charge to see that the petitioners and their men might not illegally take forcible occupation or disturb the peaceful possession of the respondent No. 2 and his men at the scheduled premises until further orders. He asked the Officer-in-Charge, Ballygunge Police Station to maintain peace and to post police pickets as necessary at the cost of the respondent No. 2. A notice was issued upon the petitioner Nos. 1 & 2 to appear and file show-cause. On getting this order the respondent No. 2 collected men and material on 19.1.92 and on the subsequent days the respondent No. 2 in collusion with respondent No. 1 prevented the members of the company and its staff and employees from entering the disputed Premises on 20.1.92. They also caused one of the employees of the company Parimal Bag to be abducted on 19.1.92 under the cover of the order dated 18.1.92. The respondent No. 2 prevented the members of the company and its staff from entering the disputed premises. They also caused one of the employees of the company Parimal Bag to be abducted on 19.1.92 under the cover of the order dated 18.1.92. The respondent No. 2 prevented the members of the company and its staff from entering the disputed premises. Thereafter the petitioner No. 1 company went in revision against the order dated 18.1.92 and a learned Single Judge of this Court stayed operation of the impugned order until further orders. We are given to understand that after the expiry of 60 days of proceeding in M. P. Case No. 138 of 1992 had been dropped as infructuous and the revisional application stood disposed of. The petitioners contacted the Ballygunge Police Station so as to help the company to get back to its rightful possession in respect of the disputed flat. The petitioner No. 2 was contacted over phone at his residence by police Sub-Inspector. As and when the petitioner No. 2 went to police station on 29.1.92 he found both the contemnors together. The petitioners were escorted by several police personnel to the premises at 10, Sunny Park but the police did not enter on the plea that they saw some women in the said flat. On 30.1.92 an application was again moved by the contemnor respondent No. 1 who acted in collusion with contemnor respondent No. 2. The respondent No. 1 filed an identical application as that of the previous M. P. Case No. 138 of 1992. The self-same learned Executive Magistrate passed an order on identical terms with the previous one. The learned Executive Magistrate in M. P. Case No. 253 of 1992 directed the Officer-in-charge, Ballygunge Police Station to enquire and report by 29.2.92 and directed him further to see that no breach of peace took place and that the petitioners and their management might not take forcible or illegal possession of the said flat including garage or any portion of the flat or including garage of the respondent No. 2 and any portion of the building at No. 10 Sunny Park. The petitioners were called upon to appear and file show-cause by 29.2.92. The petitioner Nos. The petitioners were called upon to appear and file show-cause by 29.2.92. The petitioner Nos. 1 & 3 thereupon moved a revisional application before this Hon’ble Court impugning the order of Executive Magistrate dated 30.1.92 whereupon another learned Single Judge of this Hon’ble Court directed the revisional application to come up as a contested one three weeks from the date of the order i.e. from 13.2.92 and stayed operation of the impugned order dated 30.1.92 passed by the Executive Magistrate. Just one day before the aforesaid order was passed by the Hon’ble Court staying operation of the order purportedly made under Section 144 Cr. P. C. the contemnor respondent No. 2 filed another application under Section 144 Cr. P. C. alleging that there was a threat to breach of peace by the petitioners and their men and gents whereupon the learned Executive Magistrate passed yet another order in M. P. Case No. 363 on 12.2.92 directing the Officer-in-Charge, Ballygunge Police Station to enquire and report by 13.3.92 directing him further to see that no breach of peace took place. 2. In the background of the sequence of events the petitioners prayed that in view of the contemnor respondents resorting to frivolous litigations one after another, there is really an abuse of the process of the Court. In order to cover up their misdeeds and preventing inter alia the petitioners and the staff from entering the office premises at 10, Sunny Park from 20th January, 1992 onwards, the respondents re resorting to repeated false applications thus making them guilty of abusing the process of the Court rendering them liable for criminal contempt. 3. A preliminary objection was raised by the opposite party No. 1 who entered appearance through Mr. Balai Chandra Roy, Mr. Sekhar Bose and Mr. Subrata Chatterjee Advocates contending inter alia that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the application for criminal contempt under Section 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. 4. Mr. Balai Roy, the learned Senior Advocate appearing for the respondent No. 1 contended before us that it was not a case of contempt committed in presence or hearing of this Court and was not covered by Section 14 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. This Court might take action only on a motion made by the Advocate General or any other person with the consent of the Advocate General. This Court might take action only on a motion made by the Advocate General or any other person with the consent of the Advocate General. In the case of criminal contempt of any subordinate court, this court might take action only on a reference made to it either by the Subordinate Court itself or on a motion made by the Advocate General. Mr. Chatterjee fairly conceded that there was no reference by the subordinate court and there was no consent obtained before us that even though there was no consent of the Advocate General, this Court might, on the presentation of the facts before it, take action suo motu on its own motion. We re afraid that as and when the application has been specifically moved by the petitioners, contrary to Rules of Contempt of Court’s Jurisdiction made by the Calcutta High Court, specifically Rule 2 (2)(d), this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain this application. Mr. Chatterjee further pointed out that the provisions under Article 215 of the Constitution have also been invoked in this matter. This Court as a court of record has all the powers of such court including the powers to punish for the contempt of itself. We do not think even though we are a court of record and we do have the power to determine the questions about our own jurisdiction and we have an inherent power to punish for contempt summarily by providing the norms of a fair and reasonable opportunity to the contemnor to defend himself, the procedure prescribed by Section 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 has been circumscribed by the Constitution of India in exercise of the power conferred by Entry 14 of list III and thus we cannot interfere at our sweet will we fail to appreciate the contention of Mr. Chatterjee that in moving frivolous applications one after another in the manner resorted to by the contemnor respondents, they have in fact interfered or they do intend to interfere or have really obstructed the administration of justice. None of the proceedings brought by the respondents have really been adjudicated upon on merits and no final decision has been reached on the propriety of the contentions of the petitioners or the respondents inter se. 5. The decision in (1) Hastings Mills Ltd. v. Hira Singh & Ors. None of the proceedings brought by the respondents have really been adjudicated upon on merits and no final decision has been reached on the propriety of the contentions of the petitioners or the respondents inter se. 5. The decision in (1) Hastings Mills Ltd. v. Hira Singh & Ors. reported in 1978 Calcutta High Court Notes 64 was placed before us. In the facts of the said case it was held that even though mens rea is not an essential ingredient, yet the court cannot punish any one for contempt of court unless the act is willful. The decision in (2) S. Abdul Karim v. M. K. Prakash reported in AIR 1976 SC 859 was referred to in this context. The standard of proof required to establish a charge of criminal contempt is the same as in other criminal proceedings. Under the English Law any act which is likely to interfere with the course of justice will amount to contempt. Acts which are likely to interfere with the course of justice may be classified into 4 categories viz. (1) Acts which interfere with persons having duties to discharge in a court of justice, (2) acts which amount to a breach of duty committed by persons officially connected with the court or its process, (3) acts which interfere with persons over whom the court exercises special jurisdiction and (4) act which amount to an abuse of the court’s processes (the Law of Contempt, Borrie and Lowe 1973 edition, Chapter VIII). Abusing the court’s process may mean different types of acts but generally the term connotes some misuse of the court’s process, the most serious example of which is an act which is intended to deceive the court, for example, by the deliberate suppression of facts or by the presentation of falsehood, but the same term also includes bringing of frivolous and vexatious proceedings. In (3) Wright v. Bonnett, 1948(1) AER 227 and (4) Stevenson v. Garnett 1898 (1) Q.B. 677 it has been held that taking of successive actions covering the same ground and litigating over again the same question is clearly an act of abuse of the process of the court. Such acts are necessarily frivolous and vexatious apart from being oppressive to the defendant. Such acts are necessarily frivolous and vexatious apart from being oppressive to the defendant. In the present case we have to remember that no final adjudication has yet been made in any one of the proceedings brought by the respondents about the merits of their claim regarding induction of the respondent No. 2 into the tenancy premises. The Civil Court has also not decided the matter finally but only directed continuance of a status quo. In the present case when one of the revisional applications impugning the 144 Cr. P. C. order is still pending decision, it would not be proper to hold that the respondents are really resorting to successive frivolous vexatious proceedings by litigating over again the same question which have already been decided, where such acts might become clearly contumacious. 6. It is indeed true that while Section 250 Cr. P. C. confers jurisdiction on a criminal court to award compensation on a false accusation being made by the complainant in respect of a criminal offence, there re no appropriate provisions of the line nature in respect of emergency provisions under Section 144 Cr. P. C. This court might have rightly interfered in revision against the issuance of the orders under Section 144 Cr. P. C. brought at the behest of the respondents as was so done by the Executive Magistrate for the mere asking of it without a proceeding in effect being drawn up under Section 144(2) Cr. P. C. The petitioners should, however, draw attention of the Executive Magistrate to this aspect of the matter to that there may not be any recurrence in future. As the matter rests now, with one of the revisional applications still being sub-judice and there being clear restriction imposed by the statute on our entertaining the application for contempt under Section 15 of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and there not having been really any real case of criminal contempt made out in the facts and circumstances of the present case, we have no other alternative but to dismiss the application. There will be no order as to cost. Hore, J. : I agree.