( 1 ) IN these writ petitions, the petitioners, essentially question the validity of Section 3 of kamataka cotton control Act, 1964, ('the State Act' for short) and the notification dated 7-4-1972 issued by the state government under the said Section 3. Petitioners also seek a declaration that the said notification does not prohibit the trade or use of cotton, cotton seeds of varieties other than those specified in the said notification. Another relief sought is for a direction to the state government to finalise a draft notification issued on 2-6-1988; since this has been done, petitioners are now questioning the final notification No. 439 dated 20-8-1989, which in effect makes an addition to the earlier notification dated 7-4-1972. ( 2 ) PETITIONERS contend that the subject legislated by the State Act has be ensubsequently covered by the legislation enacted by the parliament as per the Central Act called the seeds Act, 1966. According to the petitioners the Provisions of the State Act are repugnant to the Provisions of the Central Act and therefore the State Act to the extent of repugnancy becomes unenforceable and void. It is further contended that several varieties of cotton seeds are covered by the Provisions of the seeds act and therefore the petitioners are entitled to use the said seeds subject to specifying the conditions laid down by the Provisions of the seeds act and the state is not competent to impose any restrictions as to the user of those cotton seeds. The Provisions of the State Act are also challenged as violative of Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution as imposing an unreasonable restriction on the fundamental rights of the petitioners. The impugned notification of the year 1972 issued under the Provisions of the State Act fixes the variety of cotton seed or seedling as the permitted varieties for cultivation in the local area specified in the relevant entries of the table to the said notification. At the same time the notification prohibits cultivation of any variety of cotton, cottonseed or seedling other than those specified in the relevant column of the table in the specified local areas. Similarly it prohibits mixing any one variety of cotton, cotton seed or seedling specified in the table with any other variety of cotton, cotton seed or seedling specified therein, etc. Similarly it prohibits mixing any one variety of cotton, cotton seed or seedling specified in the table with any other variety of cotton, cotton seed or seedling specified therein, etc. There is also a prohibition against possession, use or trade in any variety of cotton, cotton seed or seedling specified in column (iii) of the table mixed with any other variety of cotton, cotton seed or seedling specified therein, etc. The table of the notification divides the state into four localities. Certain varieties of cotton are specified against each of the local areas, thus the user of the variety of cotton, cotton seed or seedling by way of cultivation or for the purpose of mixing are prescribed by the notification. Similarly, the possession, use or trade also is restricted. Cultivation, mixing up of, possession, use or trade in any variety of cotton, cotton seed or seedling not specified against a particular area, is thus not permitted. According to the petitioners the notification of the year 1972 has ignored several varieties of cotton seeds recognised under the Provisions of the seeds act and therefore the notification was unenforceable, either because the main act under which it is issued is unconstitutional or because the notification itself imposes an unreasonable restriction on the rights of the petitioners. A contention was also addressed that there has been non-application of mind to the relevant matters while considering the draft notification issued in the year 1988 wherein six more varieties were proposed as permitted varieties for inclusion in the earlier notification of the year 1972. Though six varieties were mentioned in this draft notification of the year 1988, ultimately only one variety called dch-32 was permitted to be used in the whole state of karnataka. ( 3 ) THE state contended that the purpose and effect of the State Act are differentf rom objectives of the seeds act and in no way there is any conflict between the two enactments and therefore question of repugnancy does not arise between the two legislations. The object of the State Act is to provide for regulating and prohibiting the cultivation of any specified variety of cotton, mixing up of any specified variety of cotton, cotton seed or seedling with any other variety of cotton, cotton seed or seedling and the possession or use of or trade in any specified variety of cotton, cotton seed or seedling in the state. While the purpose of the seeds act is to regulate the quality of certain seeds for sale and for matters connected therewith. The dominant purpose of the State Act is to regulate the production of the cotton and in that process safeguard the interest of the farmers as well as that of the traders in cotton and cotton seeds. In paragraph 16 of the statement of objections, while referring to dch-32 cotton seeds it is said. ". . . In fulfilling that demand it is difficult to permit all these farmers in the state who are interested to take said production to give permission. And if all the farmers take up the seed production there would be uncontrolled production of seeds of doubtful quality which in turn would result in falling of prices and there will be no market and fanners would be forced to go in for distress dales, which ultimately leads to heavy financial loss. Under these circumstances the government is forced to restrict the area and number of farmers organising dch 32 seeds production with the larger interests of the farmers in particular and the state in general. "the clear implication of the statements made in the statement of objections and the additional statement of objections is that the quality of the produce will have to be maintained. Further the fibre content of the cotton which has a bearing on its marketing would be maintained by prohibiting the varieties of the seeds that could be used for cultivation. The prohibition regarding the possession, use or trade is only incidental to the main object of regulating the varieties of cotton, cotton seed or seedling to be used in any particular locality. If any variety other than permitted one could be possessed, used or dealt with, it will not be possible to enforce the main regulatory Provisions contained in the notification. Regarding the notification issued in the year 1988, and the acceptance of dch 32 variety only, it was pointed out in the additional statement of objections that the decision of the state government was based on the opinion of an expert and it was found that other varieties notified in the draft notification were found to be not satisfactory qualitatively for user in the state of karnataka. ( 4 ) THE first question that arises for consideration is whether the State Act is repugnant to the Provisions of the Central Act and therefore cannot be enforced. ( 5 ) BEFORE considering the principle applicable, it is necessary to refer to the two enactments involved. ( 6 ) THE seeds act was enacted in the year 1966 by the parliament it is stated in the statement of objects and reasons that"in the interest of increased agricultural production in the country, it is considered necessary to regulate the quality of certain seeds, such as seeds of food crops, cotton seeds, etc. , to be sold for purposes of agriculture (including horticulture ). The methods by which the bill seeks to achieve this object are (a) Constitution of a central committee consisting of representative of the central government and the state government, the national seeds corporation and other interests, to advise those governments on all matters arising out of the proposed legislation; (b) fixing minimum standards of germination, purity and other quality factors; (c) testing seeds for quality factors at the seed testing laboratories to be established by the central government and the state governments; (d) creating of seed inspection and certification service in each state and grant of licences and certificates to dealers in seeds; (e) compulsory labelling of seed containers to indicate the quality of seeds offered for sale; and (f) restricting the export, import and inter-state movement or nondescript seeds. In order to eliminate undue hardship, provision has been made in the bill for exempting the sale of seed by (i) plant breeders, (ii) certain classes of producers, and (iii) any other persons for purposes other than for the purpose of sowing or planting. " ( 7 ) THE preamble also states that is was to provide for regulating the quality of certain seeds for sale and for matters connected therewith. Section 2 (11) (ii) covers the cotton seeds in the definition of the word seed. Section 3 provides for the Constitution of a central seed committee to advice the central government and state governments on matters arising out of the administration of the act and other functions assigned to the committee. The committee is empowered to appoint one or more sub-committees. Section 4 provides for the establishment of a central seed laboratory and state seed laboratories. The committee is empowered to appoint one or more sub-committees. Section 4 provides for the establishment of a central seed laboratory and state seed laboratories. Obviously these laboratories are to analyse the seeds of any notified kind or variety. Section 5 is the key provision. In order to regulate the quality of seed of any kind or variety to be sold for the purpose of agriculture, the central government may declare such kind or variety to be a notified kind or variety. The power includes to notify different kinds or varieties to be notified for different states or areas. Sections empowers the central government to specify the minimum limits of germination and purity with respect to any seed of any notified kind or variety and also to specify the mark or label to indicate that such seed conform to the minimum limits of germination and purity specified. Thereafter Section 7 reads thus:"7. Regulation of sale of seeds of notified kinds or varieties: no person shall, himself or by any other person on his behalf, carry on the business of selling, keeping for sale, offering to sell, bartering or otherwise supplying any seed of any notified kind or variety, unless (a) such seed is identifiable as to its kind or variety;. (b) such seed conforms to the minimum limits of germination and purity specified under clause (a) of Section 6; (c) the container of such seed bears in the prescribed manner, the mark or label containing the correct particulars thereof, specified under clause (b) of Section 6; and (d) he complies with such other requirements as may be prescribed. "section 8 provides for the establishment of a certification agency for a state. Section 9 provides for the grant of certificate by certification agency to any person selling, keeping for sale, etc. , of any notified kind or variety. Section 12 provides for the appointment of a seed analyst. There are other Provisions regarding seed inspector, etc. It is unnecessary to refer to other Provisions. A reading of this act shows that the effective mode by which the act becomes operative is when the central government notifies any kind or variety of seed to be a notified kind or variety. On such a notification being issued the said notified kind or variety will have to satisfy the specifications stated in Section 6. A reading of this act shows that the effective mode by which the act becomes operative is when the central government notifies any kind or variety of seed to be a notified kind or variety. On such a notification being issued the said notified kind or variety will have to satisfy the specifications stated in Section 6. Section 7 is only consequential to these Provisions and regulates the sale of seed of notified kinds or varieties. If any variety of seed is not notified under Section 5, the regulatory Provisions of the seeds act do not govern the same. It is only when a variety is notified under Section 5, the said notified kind becomes the subject of Regulation under sections 6 and 7. When the minimum limits of germination and purity are specified under Section 6, it is necessary to effectuate that specification by prohibiting the said variety or kind from being sold or kept without satisfying the prescribed specifications. No where the act states that the notified kind or variety could be sold without any other kind of Regulation by any one else, only because the said notified kind or variety satisfies the specifications stated in Section 6. ( 8 ) THE State Act was enacted in the year 1964, its preamble reads thus: "an act to provide for regulating and prohibiting the cultivation of any specified variety of cotton, the mixing of any specified variety of cotton, cotton seed or seedling with any other variety of cotton, cotton seed or seedling and the possession or use of, or trade in any specified variety of cotton, cotton seed or seedling in the state of mysore. Whereas it is expedient to specify the variety of cotton to be grown, to prohibit the mixing of the prohibited variety of cotton, cotton seed or seedling with any other variety of cotton, cotton seed or seedling and to prohibit or restrict the possession or use of, or trade in, the specified variety of cotton, cotton seed or seedling in the state of mysore;" the main Section is Section 3. The power granted thereunder could be gathered from Section 3 (2xa) which empowers the issuance of a notification by the state government after following the procedure stated in Section 3 (1 ). The power granted thereunder could be gathered from Section 3 (2xa) which empowers the issuance of a notification by the state government after following the procedure stated in Section 3 (1 ). Section 3 (2) (a) reads:"after the expiry of the period specified in the notification issued under sub-section (1) and after considering such objections and suggestions as may be received by it within such period, the state government may, by notification in respect of the local area specified in the notification issued under sub-section (1) or any part thereof i) fix the variety of cotton, cotton seed or seedling the cultivation of which is permitted in such ares; ii) prohibit the cultivation of any other variety of cotton, cotton seed or seedling in such area; iii) prohibit in such area the mixing of any standard cotton, cotton seed or seedling with any other cotton, cotton seed or seedling or the variety of cotton, cotton seed or seedling specified in sub-clause (ii) with any standard cotton, cotton seed or seedling; and iv) prohibit or restrict in such area the possession or use of, or trade in, any standard cotton, cotton seed or seedling mixed with any other cotton, cotton seed or seedling or the variety of cotton, cotton seed or seedling specified in sub-clause (ii) whether or not mixed with any standard cotton, cotton seed or seedling. "from this provision it is clear that the state government is empowered to fix the variety of cotton, cotton seed or seedling which could be cultivated in any particular area. Other varieties could be prohibited in that area. Similarly prohibit the mixing of the varieties of cotton, cotton seed or cotton seedling in the said area. The notification also, may prohibit or restrict the possession or use of or trade in any variety other than the one permitted. Obviously sub-cluase (iv), providing for the prohibition or restriction as to the possession or use of or trade in any variety, is consequential to the earlier specifications of the permitted varieties. In fact to effectuate the notification permitting the varieties of cotton, cotton seed, etc. , in particular locality it will be necessary to prohibit other varieties being used, traded or possessed by any one in the said area. In fact to effectuate the notification permitting the varieties of cotton, cotton seed, etc. , in particular locality it will be necessary to prohibit other varieties being used, traded or possessed by any one in the said area. Section 4 slates that no person in a controlled area shall raise cotton from cotton seed or seedling other than the variety of standard cotton seed or seedling which has been obtained from an ofeicer authorised by the director or from a licensed dealer. Section 4 (2) states that no licensed dealer shall withhold from sale or refuse to sell any standard cotton seed or seedling to any cultivators. Controlled area is as defined in area specified in notification under Section 3. However there is no reference to the term 'controlled area' in Section 3. Obviously it means the local area wherein the user of particular varieties are only permitted. Section 5 provides for permission to be granted to the factories to mix standard cotton with any other standard cotton or prohibited variety of cotton with standard cotton. It is unnecessary to refer to other Provisions. ( 9 ) IT is thus clear that the subject-matter of the State Act is mainly cultivation of any specified variety of cotton which is sought to be achieved by the Provisions of sections 3 and 4. This act no where refers to the mode of fixing the quality of cotton or cotton seeds. The object of this act is to see that proper varieties are used for cultivation having regard to the geographical conditions and the economic factors relevant to the state. ( 10 ) FROM the above, one has to examine as to whether there is any repugnancy between the two legislations. ( 11 ) MR. Datar, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners, contended that parliament intended to cover the entire field touching seeds and purposely refrained from enacting any provision similar to sections 3 and 4 of the State Act. For this purpose the learned counsel referred to the objects and reasons against the original clause 9 of the bui, which reads:"the committee feel that there should neither be licensing of sale of seeds nor compulsory certification of seeds. The committee further feel that no separate provision need be made to regulate the sale of varieties or hybrids of seeds. For these purposes, the clause has been suitably amended. The committee further feel that no separate provision need be made to regulate the sale of varieties or hybrids of seeds. For these purposes, the clause has been suitably amended. " it was contended that the subject of licensing of sale of seeds and compulsory certification of seeds being thought of and given up, the state is not competent to legislate on the same subject affecting the sale of seeds. It was pointed out as an illustrative case that the petitioner in W. P. No. 7531/1989 is a company which has setup seed processing units in several places and it has been producing hybrid seeds and selling the same successfully. However, by virtue of the notification issued under Section 3 the petitioner is not permitted to sell all varieties of hybrid seeds and its rights are cramped in this regard. It was contended that so long as the central government has not thought of issuing any notification under Section 5, a variety could be bought and sold anywhere and that regarding notified kind or variety, what is needed is to satisfy the specifications provided under Section 6 of the seeds act. Thus according to the learned counsel for the petitioners the subject is fully covered by the seeds act and hence the earlier State Act ceases to have any effect by virtue of Article 254 of the constitution. Ll (a ). The principle governing the interpretation of the legislative entries are now quite firmly established. In the instant case we are concerned with entry 33 of list iii of schedule vii to the constitution. There is no dispute here, that entry 33 of list iii of schedule vii to the Constitution covers the subject-matter of seeds Act, enacted by the parliament as well. Said entry reads: "trade and commerce in, and the production, supply and distribution of, (a) omitted here; (b) foodstuffs, including edible oil seeds, and oils; (c) omitted here; (d) raw cotton, whether ginned or unginned, and cotton seed; (e) omitted here;"this legislative head is quite comprehensive to comprise within itself various aspects of seeds. The parliament and the state legislatures are competent to enact laws governing various aspects of "trade and commerce in seeds"; "production of seeds" and "supply and distribution of seeds". ( 12 ) A law enacted in respect of a subject-matter may fall within one or morelegislative entries. The parliament and the state legislatures are competent to enact laws governing various aspects of "trade and commerce in seeds"; "production of seeds" and "supply and distribution of seeds". ( 12 ) A law enacted in respect of a subject-matter may fall within one or morelegislative entries. Similarly the enacted law need not cover the entire field of legislation, stated in a particular entry. These are well accepted principles. ( 13 ) AS both the parliament and the state legislature are equally competent to enact a law in respect of a matter falling within any entry of list iii, tie Constitution has taken sufficient care to see as to which law should prevail, in case there is a conflict between the two legislations-one enacted by theparliament and the other by the state legislature. ( 14 ) ARTICLE 254 of the constitution, reads as follows: "article 254 (1); if any provision of a law made by the legislature of a state is repugnant to any provision of a law made by parliament which parliament is competent to enact, or to any provision of any existing law with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the concurrent list, then, subject to the Provisions of clause (2), the law made by parliament, whether passed before or after the law made by the legislature of such state, or, as the case may be, the existing law, shall prevail and the law made by the legislature of the state shall, to the extent of the repugnancy, be void. Article 254 (2): where a law made by the legislature of a state. . . With respect of one of the matters enumerated in the concurrent list contains any provision repugnant to the Provisions of an earlier law made by parliament or an existing law with respect to that matter, then, the law so made by the legislature of such state shall, if it has been reserved for the consideration of the president and has received his assent, prevail in that state: provided that nothing in this clause shall prevent parliament from enacting at any time any law with respect to the same matter including a law adding to, amending, varying or repealing the law so made by the legislature of the state. " ( 15 ) BY virtue of Article 254 (1), the law enacted by parliament would prevail if the subject-matter of the law comes within the purview of list I or list hi of schedule vii, and the law enacted by the state legislature with respect to a matter enumerated in the concurrent list (list iii) to the extent of its repugnancy will be void. There is also no doubt that as to matters falling under list i, state legislature has absolutely no competence and therefore the entire law enacted by it will be void. ( 16 ) IN case the law enacted by the state legislature in respect of a matterenumerated in list iii has received the assent of the president, then, to that extent, state law would prevail in that state, unless subsequently, parliament enacts a law in respect of the same matter. ( 17 ) THEREFORE, when the law enacted by the parliament is faced with a lawenacted by the legislature and both these legislations fall within list iii, and a question is posed as to whether both of them could operate effectively, answer lies in finding out as to whether the state law or any of its Provisions, is repugnant to the law enacted by the parliament. . ( 18 ) THE term 'repugnancy' means being opposed, contradictory, inconsistent or incompatible to each other. ( 19 ) WHEN the two legislations cannot stand together operating effectively with out hurting each other and one of them cannot be obeyed, without at the same time disobeying the other, it can be said that there is incompatibility between the two; Provisions of one would be repugnant to that of the other. ( 20 ) IN the matter of the central provinces and berar sales of motor spirit and lubricants taxation Act, 1938 (AIR 1939 f. c. 1) the federal court was concerned with the validity of the central provinces and berar sales of motor spirit and lubricants taxation Act, 1939; the basic question was whether in enacting the said law, the provincial legislature had trespassed into the field of legislation set apart for the central legislature to levy excise duty, under the government of India Act, 1935 or whether the impugned law was a law relating to the levy of sales tax, a law which could be validly enacted by the provincial legislature. In this situation, the federal court had to conslder the scope of the respective legislative fields. Gwyer, c. j. quoted the observations of the judicial committee, pointing out that unlike an ordinary legislation, the courts were concerned with the interpretation of the words used in the constitution, and "to remember that it is a constitution, a mechanism under which laws are to be made, and not a mere act which declares what the law is to be". Especially this is true of a federal constitution, with its nice balance of jurisdictions. Therefore, the learned chief Justice said, in the now oft quoted words, at page 4:"i conceive that a broad and liberal spirit should inspire those whose duty it is to interpret it; but I do not imply by this that they are free to stretch or pervert the language of the enactment in the interest of any legal or constitutional theory, or even for the purpose of supplying omissions or correcting supposed errors. A federal court will not strengthen, but only derogate from, its position, if it seeks to do anything but declare the law, but it may rightly reflect that a Constitution of government is a living and organic thing, which of all instruments has the greatest claim to be construed ut res magis valeat quam pereat. " ( 21 ) THOUGH these observations were made in the context of interpreting two different legislative fields there is no reason to limit their operation to resolve the alleged rival powers vested in the central and state legislatures respectively; these words of the learned chief Justice would equally govern and aid the courts while interpreting the scope of any particular legislative field so that the ambit and width of the various aspects covered by a particular legislative entry could be properly understood, in the background of a written constitution. Particularly when the court has to examine as to whether a law enacted by the state legislature is repugnant to a law enacted by the parliament, when both the legislations are referrable to the same legislative field, court has to, initially examine whether, the field is so wide as capable of accommodating both the laws without any incompatability or conflict between the two. ( 22 ) IN the above decision, jayakar, j. Said, at page 31, that:"that the Provisions of an act like the government of India Act, 1935, should not be cut down by a narrow and technical construction, but, considering the magnitude of the subject with which it purports to deal in very few words, should be given a large and liberal interpretation, so that the central government, to a great extent, but within certain fixed limits, may be mistress in her own house, as the provinces, to a great extent, but again within certain fixed limits, are mistresses in theirs;" ( 23 ) IN Calcutta gas company ltd. Vstate of West Bengal and others, AIR 1962 SC 1044 , validity of a state law was involved. The contention was that the state legislature bad no competence to enact the impugned law therein. The question arose in the context of interpreting the legislative fields enumerated in lists i, ii and iii of schedule vii to the constitution. At the outset to the discussion, the Supreme Court observed at page 1049,". . . It would be useful to notice some of the well settled rules of interpretation laid down by the federal court and this court in the matter of construing the entries. The power to legislate is given to the appropriate legislatures by Article 246 of the constitution. The entries in the three lists are only legislative heads or fields of legislation: they demarcate the area over which the appropriate legislatures can operate. It is also well settled that widest amplitude should be given to the language of the entries. But some of the entries in the different lists or in the same lists may overlap and sometimes may also appear to be in direct conflict with each other. It is then the duty of this court to reconcile the entries and bring about harmony between them. "at page 1050, it was held:"it may, therefore, be taken as a well settled Rule of construction that every attempt should be made to harmonize the apparently conflicting entries not only of different lists but also of the same list and to reject that construction which will rob one of the entries of its entire content and make it nugatory. "since in recent times there are at least two decisions of the Supreme Court having direct bearing on the question involved before this court. "since in recent times there are at least two decisions of the Supreme Court having direct bearing on the question involved before this court. It is unnecessary to refer to the earlier decisions. ( 24 ) IN M. Karunanidhi v Union of india, AIR 1979 SC 898 , the principle to beapplied in the situation as this has been stated by the Supreme Court in the year 1973 the Madras legislature had enacted a law governing the criminal misconduct of public men. This was amended again in the year 1974 which received the assent of the president. The appellant was sought to be prosecuted under the Provisions of the Indian Penal Code read with certain Provisions of Prevention of Corruption Act. These proceedings were sought to be quashed on the ground that the law enacted by the legislature in the year 1973 as amended in year 1974 would prevail in the state of tamil nadu and therefore the Provisions of law invoked against the appellant were not enforceable. Article 254 (2) of the Constitution was relied by the appellant to contend that the State Act which received presidential assent would prevail over the Central Acts. It is in this context the Supreme Court considered the question of repugnancy and pointed out that under Article 254 (2) of the Constitution the said law would be void to the extent of the repugnancy when there is a central law covering the same subject-matter unless the state law has received the assent of the president at page 902 the Supreme Court observed: "this naturally means that where both the state and parliament occupy the field contemplated by the concurrent list then the act passed by parliament being prior in point of time will prevail and consequently the State Act will have to yield to the Central Act. In fact, the scheme of the Constitution is a scientific and equitable distribution of legislative powers between parliament and the state legislatures. In fact, the scheme of the Constitution is a scientific and equitable distribution of legislative powers between parliament and the state legislatures. First, regarding the matters contained in list, i, i. e. , the union list to the seventh schedule, parliament alone is empowered to legislate and the state legislatures have no authority to make any law in respect of the entries contained in list i. Secondly, so far as the concurrent list is concerned both parliament and the state legislatures are entitled to legislate in regard to any of the entries appearing therein, but that is subject to the condition laid down by Article 254 (1) discussed above. Thirdly, so far as the matters in list ii, i. e. , the state list are concerned, the state legislature alone are competent to legislate on them and only under certain conditions parliament can do so. It is, therefore, obvious that in such matters repugnancy may result from the following circumstances: 1. Where the Provisions of a Central Act and a State Act in the concurrent list are fully inconsistent and are absolutely irreconcilable, the Central Act will ' prevail and the State Act will become void in view of the repugnancy. 2. Where, however, a law passed by the state comes into collision with a law passed by parliament on an entry in the concurrent list, the State Act shall prevail to the extent of the repugnancy and the Provisions of the Central Act would become void provided the State Act has been passed in accordance with clause (2) of Article 254. 3. Where a law passed by the state legislature while being substantially within the scope of the entries in the state list entrenches upon any of the entries in the central list the constitutionality of the law may be upheld by invoking the doctrine of pith and the substance if an analysis of the Provisions of the act it appears that by andlarge the law falls within the four comers of the state list and entrenchment, if any, is purely incidental or inconsequential. 4. Where, however, a law made by the state legislature on a subject covered by the concurrent list is inconsistent with and the repugnant to a previous law made by parliament, then such a law can be protected by obtaining the assent of the president under Article 254 (2) of the constitution. 4. Where, however, a law made by the state legislature on a subject covered by the concurrent list is inconsistent with and the repugnant to a previous law made by parliament, then such a law can be protected by obtaining the assent of the president under Article 254 (2) of the constitution. The result of obtaining the assent of the president would be that so far as the State Act is concerned, it will prevail in the state and overrule the Provisions of the Central Act in their applicability to the state only. Such a state of affairs will exist only until parliament may at any time make a law adding to, or amending, varying or repealing the law made by the state legislature under the proviso to Article ( 25 ) "the point nos. 1 and 2 stated by the Supreme Court specifically high lights that repugnancy results only when two legislations are fully inconsistent and are absolutely irreconcilable. It is not sufficient that the broad field of legislation to some extent is covered by both the legislations. It is possible that a part of the field may be occupied by the central law and another part of it may be covered by the state law. In such a situation unless it is firmly established that there is collision between the two legislations question of repugnancy would not arise. Again at page 907 the Supreme Court observed:"it is well settled that the presumption is always in favour of the constitutionality of a statute and the onus lies on the person assailing the act to prove that it is unconstitutional. Prima facie there does not appear to us to be any inconsistency between the State Act and the Central Acts. Before any repugnancy can arise, the following conditions must be satisfied 1. That there is a clear and direct inconsistency between the Central Act and the State Act. 2. That such an inconsistency is absolutely irreconcilable, 3. That the inconsistency between the Provisions of the two acts is of such a nature as to bring the two acts into direct collision with each other and a situation is reached where it is impossible to obey the one without disobeying the other. 2. That such an inconsistency is absolutely irreconcilable, 3. That the inconsistency between the Provisions of the two acts is of such a nature as to bring the two acts into direct collision with each other and a situation is reached where it is impossible to obey the one without disobeying the other. ""in colin howard's austraila federal constitutional law, ii edition the author while describing the nature of inconsistency between the two enactments observed as follows: 'an obvious inconsistency arises when the two enactments produce different legal results when applied to the same facts. "the earliest of the leading cases in Ch. Tika ramji and others, etc. V The state of Uttar Pradesh and others, AIR 1956 SC 676 was also referred at a later stage in the same judgment. Four propositions were evolved by the Supreme Court at page 910, as follows:"on a careful consideration, therefore, of the authorities referred to above, the following propositions emerge: 1. That hi order to decide the question of repugnancy it must be shown that the two enactments contain inconsistent and irreconcilable Provisions, so that they cannot stand together or operate in the same field. 2. That there can be no repeal by implication unless the inconsistency appears on the face of the two statutes. 3. That where the two statutes occupy a particular field but there is room or possibility of bolh the statutes operating in the same field without coming into collision with each other, no repugnancy results. 4. That where there is no inconsistency but a statute occupying the same field seeks to create distinct and separate offences, no question of repugnancy arises and bolh the statutes continue to operate on the same field,"in Vijayahimar skarma v State of Karnataka and others, AIR 1990 SC 2072 again a similar question cropped up. The question was whether the Provisions of the kar- nataka contract carriages acquisition Act, 1976 were repugnant to the Provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, the latter being the central legislation. Having regard to the object and the scheme of the two legislations the contention that the State Act was repugnant was rejected. The question was whether the Provisions of the kar- nataka contract carriages acquisition Act, 1976 were repugnant to the Provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, the latter being the central legislation. Having regard to the object and the scheme of the two legislations the contention that the State Act was repugnant was rejected. On the facts it was held that at page 2080 (ranganatha misra, j. As he then was):"it has already been stated that the slate act intended to eliminate private operators from the state hi regard to contract carriages acquired under the existing permits, vehicle and ancillary property and with a view to giving effect to a monopoly situation for the state undertaking made provision in Section 20 for excluding the private operators. The 1988 act does not purport to make any provision in regard to acquisition of contract carriage permits which formed tbe dominent theme or the core of the State Act, nor does it in Section 73 or Section 74 indicate as to who the applicant shall be while laying down how an application for a contract carriage permit shall be made and how such a permit shall be granted. Section 80 of the 1988 act does contain a liberalised provision in the matter of grant of permits but here again it has to be pointed out that the ancilliary provision contained in Section 20 of the acquistion act effectuate acquisition does not directly run counter to the 1988 provision. "the leading judgment was by p. b. sawant, j. , taking the same view. A discussion at para 29 indicates that Provisions which were incidental and necessary to carry out the main object of the Act, though is similar to the Provisions found in the Central Act would not result in making the said law repugnant because the main objects of tie two legislations are different. The Supreme Court applied the doctrine of pith and substance that is to say to find out the pith and substance of both the legislations to see whether there is any collision between the two so as to invite repugnancy. The Supreme Court applied the doctrine of pith and substance that is to say to find out the pith and substance of both the legislations to see whether there is any collision between the two so as to invite repugnancy. At page 2085 it was held;"evenotherwise, I am of the view that not to apply the theory of pith and substance when the repugnancy between the two statutes is to be considered under Article 254 of the Constitution would be illogical when the same doctrine is applied while considering whether there is an encroachment by the union or the state legislature on a subject exclusively reserved for the other. When the legislative encroachment is under consideration the doctrine of pith and substance comes to the aid to validate a legislation which would otherwise be invalid for the very want of legislative competence. When the repugnancy between the two legislations is under consideration, what is in issue is whether the provision of the state enactment, though otherwise constitutionally valid, has lost its validity because the parliament has made a legislation with a conflicting provision on allegedly the same matter. If it is open to resolve the conflict between the two entries in different list, viz. , the union and the state list by examining dominent purpose and therefore the pith and substance of the two legislations, there is no reason why the repugnancy between the Provisions of the two legislations under different entries in the same list, viz. , the concurrent list should not be resolved by scrutinising the same by the same touchstone. What is to be ascertained in each case is whether the legislations are on the same subject-matter or not in both cases the cause of conflict is the apparent identity of the subject-matters. The tests for resolving it therefore cannot be different"while concluding sawant, j, pointed out at page 2093:"the aforesaid review of the authorities makes it clear that whenever repugnancy between the state and central legislation is alleged, what has to be first examined is whether the two legislations cover or relate to the same subject-matter. The test for determining the same is the usual one, namely, to find out the dominent intention of the two legislations. If the dominent intention. I. e. , the pith and substance of the legislations is different, they cover different subject-matters. The test for determining the same is the usual one, namely, to find out the dominent intention of the two legislations. If the dominent intention. I. e. , the pith and substance of the legislations is different, they cover different subject-matters. If the subject-matters covered by the legislations are thus different, then merely because the two legislations refer to some allied or cognate subject they do not cover the same field. The legislation, to be on the same subject-matter must further coyer the entire field covered by the other. A provision in one legislation to be give effect to its dominent purpose may incidentally be on the same subject as covered by the provision of the other legislation. But such partial coverage of the same area in a different context and to achieve a different purpose does not bring about the repugnancy which is intended to be covered by Article 254 (2 ). Both the legislations must be substantially on die same subjects to attract the article. "25. From the above it is clear that the pith and substance of the two legislations will have to be examined to find out whether they cover the same subject-matter and whether they would overlap each other. For this purpose, again the dominent purpose of two legislations will have to be seen and incidental Provisions which may touch each other would not result in repugnancy. In the instant case the Provisions governing the sale of seeds under Section 7 of the seeds act and the power given to the state government under Section 3 of the State Act are only incidental to achieve the respective dominent purposes of the two legislations. Their purposes are different and therefore an incidental coverage of the subject of sale would not render the two legislations being repugnant to each other. ( 26 ) ALREADY it has been seen, that, as a matter of fact, in practice and effect the rewill not be any collision in the working of the two enactments. In these circumstances the main contention urged on behalf of tie petitioners fail. 26 (a ). While the dominent intention of the seeds act is to regulate the quality of seeds, the dominant intention of the State Act is to regulate the areas of cultivation of cotton in the state. In these circumstances the main contention urged on behalf of tie petitioners fail. 26 (a ). While the dominent intention of the seeds act is to regulate the quality of seeds, the dominant intention of the State Act is to regulate the areas of cultivation of cotton in the state. The State Act can be enforced without disobeying the Provisions of the Central Act, and the notification issued under the Central Act hence question of repugnancy would not arise between the two. The intention of the parliament in enacting the seeds act has to be gathered from the language of its Provisions. The object of the State Act is to regulate the cultivation of cotton, which is an important commercial crop, so that quality-cotton would find good market; the cotton raised should find national and international buyers. Therefore, the Provisions of the State Act by themselves cannot be attacked as imposing any unreasonable restriction on the fundamental right of the petitioners under Article 19 (1) (g ). ( 27 ) IT was contended that the notification issued under Section 3 of the act should have received assent of the president since the notification adversely affects the freedom of trade guaranteed under Article 301 of the constitution. It has to be seen in this connection that the State Act also had received the assent of the president before it was brought into force. The impugned notification is issued under the Provisions of the act. In these circumstances it is not necessary that the said notification should again be preceded by another assent or sanction of the president. Proviso to Article 304-b will not be attracted to such a situation. A bench of this court has already expressed this view after considering the decisions of the Supreme Court in M/s. Jagadale and sons v State of karnaiaka, 1990 (1} kar. L. J. 18 : ILR 1990 kar. 101: AIR 1990 kant. 251. ( 28 ) IT was then contended that the notification of the state government issued in the year 1972 has become stale and ignores the present developments and therefore invalid. It has been pointed out that there are several dozens of varieties of seeds which have been developed in the course of these years and the state government should have considered the advisability of permitting the user of those seeds. Mr. It has been pointed out that there are several dozens of varieties of seeds which have been developed in the course of these years and the state government should have considered the advisability of permitting the user of those seeds. Mr. Dattar referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Motor general traders v State of andhra pradesh, AIR 1984 SC 121 to point out that a law which was valid earlier may become invalid in the course of time depending upon certain circumstances. This submission ignores the tact that the state government had before it the recent developments and therefore the state government notified other varieties of seeds to be included in the notification. The state government therefore issued the draft notification to include six varieties and this draft notification was issued on 2-6-1988. However, having regard to the objections received and the alleged expert opinion obtained by the state government, the state government decided to permit the user of only one variety out of the six notified varieties. The state government has produced as Annexure r-2 the opinion of Dr. S. n. kadapa, sr. Scientist (cotton) and south zone coordinate! And head, dept. Of genetics and plant breeding, ars, dbarwad farm, in this regard. The said scientist has clearly opined that except dch-32 other varieties were not of acceptable quality. ( 29 ) HOWEVER, it could be seen from the said Annexure r-2 that all the varieties were not properly tested and examined. We find that the material placed by the state government in this regard is entirely insufficient to justify a conclusion that several varieties of cotton seeds which lave been developed and were notified by the central government under Section 5 of the seeds Act, were tested for their permissible user in the slate of kamataka. No doubt dch 32 variety has been accepted by the state government and has been included for being used in the entire state of karnataka. Faced with this situation the learned government Advocate submitted before us that the state government would consider the cases of all notified kind or variety if such kinds or varieties are supplied to the concerned authoritics for testing and experimentation to sec whether any one or more of them could be permitted to be used by inclusion in the notification issued under Section 3. The learned government Advocate also submitted that it lakes time to experiment and analyse and arrive at a proper decision on this question and therefore a parlicular time limit cannot be fixed for this purpose. The learned government Advocate also clarified the position that the permission given far dch-32 in no way affects the earlier notification issued in the year 1972 and varieties stated in the said notification also could be used in the areas stated in the said notification of the year 1972. We record this submission of the learned government Advocate and give liberty to the petitioners to move the state government to consider the cases of other varieties or kinds of cotton seeds which should be included in notification under Section 3 of the State Act. ( 30 ) IN view of the above no other contention survives for consideration. Consequently these writ petitions are dismissed subject to the last observation made, and there shall be no order as to costs in these writ petitions. --- *** --- .