JUDGMENT A.U. Khan, Member - The facts are: A declaratory law suit under Section 229-B Z.A. and L.R. Act is instituted by Shitla in Sub-Divisional Officer's, Mirzapur. On 3.5.1976 Assistant Collector enters an order of dismissal of suit. 2. Shitla lodges an appeal in Commissioner's. Respondent No. 2 is Jaggi. He dies on 26.7.1977 appellant Shitla moves an application to substitute his two sons in place of deceased on 28.9.1977. Additional Commissioner enters an order dismissing substitution. Shitla lodges an appeal. On 29.4.1982 Shri R.S. Verma, Hon'ble Member allows the appeal; substitution is granted and case is remanded to Commissioner for disposal of appeal on merits. 3. It is now the turn of respondent Lakshman Das who files writ petition. On 5.4.1985 Hon'ble High Court quashes the order of this court and command is for re-determination of issues relating thereto according to directions. So is my obligation to do. 4. Heard the counsel for the parties and perused the record. 5. Whether to substitute? The affidavit elaborates that the boat in which Jaggi was on sail in river Ganges had suddenly capsized resulting in his death; tragic and premature, pinning down the day of tragedy; 10 months or thereabouts. The burden is appellant's to precisely tell the actual date of demise of Jaggi. But he will not. Where no precise date of death is given and appeal has abated by reason of expiry of limitation of 90 days, substitution application under Order 22, Rule 4, C.P.C. shall not be treated also as an application to set aside the abatement under Order 22, Rule 9, Cr.P.C. In the absence of date of death no measure with precision can be taken of delay and default as there be no race without a starting line. How then to take a measure of analysis? On expiry of 90 days from the date of death appellant has to give cogent explanation of delay. In the application under Section 5, Limitation Act appellant's contentions are vague and vagrant. Appellant Shitla says some ten days earlier from 26.7.77, a chance encounter with deceased's son Bachchan came to his village on an undisclosed purpose led to the disclosure of death, occurring about 10 months earlier. No passion is for precision... Soon enough he claims to have gone to Jaggi's village to collect details but surely adds nothing concrete. Appellant Shitla says some ten days earlier from 26.7.77, a chance encounter with deceased's son Bachchan came to his village on an undisclosed purpose led to the disclosure of death, occurring about 10 months earlier. No passion is for precision... Soon enough he claims to have gone to Jaggi's village to collect details but surely adds nothing concrete. AIR 1964 SC 215 FB is clear that limitation to bring legal representative starts from date of death of respondent and not from the date of knowledge or part of appellant of such death." When has abatement taken place? 90 days from date of death. What is that date? Some 10 days earlier from 26.7.1977 comes to 16.7.1977. The date of death is about 10 months earlier. This comes to about 16.12.76. This is the approximate date of abatement. In the instant case, there is no specific request to set aside the abatement that has taken place in December or thereabouts in 1976. Whether explanation of delay detailed in application under Section 5, Limitation Act, is cogent? AIR 1964 SC 215 is clear: "It is true, as contended, that it is no duty of the appellants to make regular enquiries from time to time about the health or existence of the Opp. party, but it does not mean that the mere fact of the appellant's coming to know of the respondent's death belatedly will, by itself, justify his application for setting aside the abatement. That is not the law. Rule 9, Order XXII of the Code requires the plaintiff to prove that he was prevented by any sufficient cause from continuing the suit. The mere allegation about his not coming to know of the death of the opposite party is not sufficient. He had to state reason which, according to him, lead to his not knowing of the death of the defendant within reasonable time and to establish those reasons to the satisfaction of the court,specially when the correctness of those reasons is challenged by the legal representatives of the deceased who have secured a valuable right on the abatement of the suit." A precedent to which adherence is proper is: AIR 1968 All 255 . This states that a mere allegation that the Government did not come to know of the death of a respondent prior to the information of death furnished by the other side can, in my humble opinion, not constitute a sufficient cause for setting aside of the abatement." AIR 1960 Punj. 355 a FB is positive that before ignorance of death can be deemed to be a good ground these must exist good grounds for ignorance not attributable to negligence. When law imposes an obligation on a person to bring the legal representative of the deceased opponent on the record within the prescribed period, the mere want of knowledge of death will be insufficient to secure him against consequences of abatement of his appeal; he has further to show absence of want of care. When reasonable vigilance is a duty, unqualified ignorance cannot be deemed venial. Want of information may be overlooked if want was not induced by neglectful indifference or blameworthy remissness. Allowing one self' to remain in the dark cannot be treated as persuasive ground for condonation of delay." AIR 1924 Pat. 607 DB commands that appellant must keep himself informed of any devolution of interest that may have taken place by reason of death of any of the respondents and it was not sufficient, merely to say that appellant had no knowledge of the death of the respondents till many months latter. Abatement has given right and court should not set aside an abatement without sufficient reasons." So is the opinion mediated in AIR 1978 Cal. 394 . In the case in hand, appellant Shitla gives a pedigree which shows that respondent Jaggi was son of his real uncle Baiju. Jaggi was his first real cousin. He was also on terms of intimacy with Jaggi's son as he confesses in his affidavit. Will Bachchan will be the first to tell of death, so unnatural and talk of all villagers here, there and everywhere? Circumstances clearly suggest that he knew it from the date of death. This was troubling him and so he has to show remetness in living. In the plaint the address of Jaggi is: Station Road Mirzapur City. The affidavit changes the tack to say that he was living for the last several years in his in-laws house in village Dalman Deoria. This was troubling him and so he has to show remetness in living. In the plaint the address of Jaggi is: Station Road Mirzapur City. The affidavit changes the tack to say that he was living for the last several years in his in-laws house in village Dalman Deoria. There is a strong rebuttal by Laxman Dass, respondent No. 4, to all such devious contention. He asserts that Shitla has joined in the funeral ceremony of deceased Jaggi as he is a near relation. I agree with this claim on the ground that he was on working relationship with deceased's family. Hon'ble High Court has made clear that death has taken place in the month of December, 1976 and amended provisions enforced on 1.2.1977 will not apply. So I govern myself accordingly. As the date of death is not given, the controversy acquires a new and different perspective. I hold that respondent Jaggi was a necessary party in Commissioner's. Substitution of his heirs and setting aside of abatement is absolutely necessary. Appellant has completely failed on two fronts: (i) Has not given date of death of Jaggi and so application under Order 22, Rule 9, C.P.C. is necessary but not given. (ii) The explanation of delay from date of abatement to 26.7.1977: 7 months or thereabouts is not satisfactorily explained. In AIR 1981 SC 1921 ; Full Bench respondent dies on 10.12.78. Information given on 20.2.1979. State moves substitution on 29.8.1979. Application is found time barred by three months and a half. It was a matter of factly seen that no reason good, bad or indifferent is assigned for the failure. Abatement was not set aside. Here no reason is for 7 months or thereabouts. 6. The counsel for appellant has elaborated all the grounds listed in his memorandum of second appeal, one by one. For the reasons given the grounds are not cogent and persuasive. 7. Second appeal fails and is dismissed. The order of Additional Commissioner dated 28.9.1977 is supportable in law and on facts. Order accordingly.