DIVECHA, J. ( 1 ) ALL these appeals are directed against the judgment and order of acquittal passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate of Sabarkantha at himatnagar on 30/11/1982 in Summary Cases Nos. 195 of 1982 to 206 of 1982. Identical questions of fact and law arise in all these appeals. By consent of the learned Advocates for the parties appearing before me, i have heard all of them together and I have thought it fit to dispose of all these appeals by this common judgment of mine. ( 2 ) THE facts giving rise to these appeals are not many and not much in dispute. The appellant is the original complainant. He is the Chairman of the Agricultural Produce Market Committee (the committee for convenience) at Bhiloda. That Committee is for the market area comprising of the Taluka of Bhiloda as well as that of Vijaynagar. The declaration of the intention of establishing a market area for these two Talukas was made by one notification issued under Sec. 5 of the Gujarat Agricultural produce Markets Act, 1963 (the act for brief) on 27/05/1977. Thereafter, another notification under Sec. 6 thereof was issued on 2 7/01/1978 establishing the market area as specified in the notification under Sec. 5 thereof. The respondents in all these appeals are dealing in certain varities of agricultural produce which fall within the purview of the aforesaid two notifications issued on 27/05/1977 and 27/01/1978. The Committee issued notices to them calling upon them to obtain the necessary licence from it for dealing in agricultural produce covered by the aforesaid two notifications. They did not obtain any such lcence from the Committee. It appears that the Chairman of the Committee was authorised to institute criminal proceedings against such persons dealing in such agricultural produce without obtaining its licence. The complainant thereupon filed as many as 12 complaints on 24/02/1982 in the court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate of Sabarkantha at Himatnagar on 2 4/02/1982 against the respondents in all these appeals charging them with the offence punishable under Sec. 36 read with Sec. 8 of the Act. These complaints came to be registered as Summary Cases Nos. 195 to 206 of 1982. No respondent as the accused pleaded guilty to the charge. All of them were thereupon separately tried. After recording the prosecution evidence, the further statement of each accused came to be recorded. These complaints came to be registered as Summary Cases Nos. 195 to 206 of 1982. No respondent as the accused pleaded guilty to the charge. All of them were thereupon separately tried. After recording the prosecution evidence, the further statement of each accused came to be recorded. No accused stepped into the v/itness box nor was any witness examined at trial in defence. No accused led any documentary evidence either in defence. After hearing the arguments, by his identical judgment and order passed on 30th november, 1982 in Summary Cases Nos. 195 to 206 of 1982, the learned chief Judicial Magistrate of Sabarkantha at Himatnagar acquitted all the accused of the charge levelled against them. That aggrieved the complainant. He has therefore preferred all these 12 appeals before this Court after obtaining the necessary leave for the purpose on 4/08/1983. ( 3 ) THREE factors have weighed with the learned trial Magistrate in acquitting all the accused of the charge levelled against them. In the first place, the learned trial Magistrate found that it had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence in view of the fact that the offence was alleged to have been committed in Village Chikoda and other different Villages in Vijaynagar falling within the jurisdiction of the Judicial Magistrate (First Class) at Idar. Secondly, in the opinion of the learned trial Magistrate the prosecution failed to establish whether the accused in all these cases were wholesale dealers or retail dealers and retail sale was outside the purview of the Act. Thirdly, the accused were not required to obtain any licence from the Committee when no principal market yard or sub-market yard of market proper was established under Sec. 7 of the Act. ( 4 ) SHRI Vakharia, for the appellants has assailed all these conclusions reached by the learned trial Magistrate. Shri Vakharia has urged that retail sale is also sought to be regulated by the Act and the Gujarat agricultural Produce Market Yards Rules, 1965 (the rules for brief) framed thereunder. According to Shri Vakharia, the learned trial Magistrate has not considered this aspect of the case and incorrectly placed reliance on the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Jan Muhammad noor Mohamad Bagban v. State of Gujarat and Anr. , reported in air 1966 SC 385 without distinguishing it on the basis of the rules framed under the Act. , reported in air 1966 SC 385 without distinguishing it on the basis of the rules framed under the Act. Shri Vakharia, has further urged th at the learned trial Magistrate has not correctly interpreted the law contained in Sec. 14 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (the cri. P. C. for brief) for the purpose of deciding the jurisdiction of the Court for taking cognizance of the offences involved in all these cases. It has also been urged by Shri Vakharia, for the appellants that non-establishment of a principal market yard, a submarket yard or a market proper does not authorise a person to deal in articles of agricultural produce covered by the aforesaid notifications issued on 2 7/05/1977 and 27/01/1978. Shri S. T. Mehta, Additional Public prosecutor, appearing for respondent No. 2-State has supported Shri Vakharia, for the purpose of these appeals. As against this, Shri Desai for the respondent accused in each case has submitted that the impugned judgment and order passed by the learned trial Magistrate is unassailable and it is not required to be interfered with in these appeals. ( 5 ) SHRI Vakharia seems to be right in his submission to the effect that the aforesaid ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Jan Moham-mad noor Mohamad (supra) is distinguishable on its own facts. At that time, the rules framed under the Act were not in existence. The Rules framed under bombay Act No. XXII of 1939 were in force. Under the Rules in force at the relevant time, retail sale of agricultural produce was not sought to be regulated. In that context, the Supreme Court has held:"the Act read together with the Rules does not purport to place any restriction upon retail transactions in agricultural produce. Therefore, no licence is required under the Gujarat Act for carrying on retail trade in agricultural produce in the market area, and there is no prohibition against the carrying on of retail sale in agricultural produce in the market area. "it is not in dispute now that the Rules under the Act have come to be framed with effect from 2/09/1965. It is not in dispute that the Act seeks to regulate retail sale in agricultural produce as well. The rules also provide for regulation of such retail sale. "it is not in dispute now that the Rules under the Act have come to be framed with effect from 2/09/1965. It is not in dispute that the Act seeks to regulate retail sale in agricultural produce as well. The rules also provide for regulation of such retail sale. In that view of the matter, the aforesaid ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Jan Mohammad noor Mohammad (supra) will not assist the accused in the present case. ( 6 ) THE learned trial Magistrate has also come to the conclusion that it has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence in view of the fact that the places where the offences are said to have been committed fall within the jurisdiction of the Judicial Magistrate (First Class) at Idar. In this connection a reference deserves to be made to Sec. 14 of the Cr. P. C. The relevant provisions thereof read :"local jurisdiction of Judicial Magistrates : 14. (1) Subject to the control of the High Court, the Chief Judicial Magistrate may, from time to time, define the local limits of the areas within which the magistrates appointed under Sec. 11 or under Sec. 13 may exercise all or any of the powers with which they may respectively be invested under this Code : provided that the Court of a Special Judicial Magistrate may hold its sitting at any place within the local area for which it is established. (2) Except as otherwise provided by such definition, the jurisdiction and powers of every such Magistrate shall extend throughout the District. " ( 7 ) A bare perusal of the aforesaid provisions of Sec. 14 would show that the local limits of the areas within which the Magistrates appointed under sec. 11 or under Sec. 13 may exercise will have to be defined by the chief Judicial Magistrate subject to the control of the High Court. Again, definition of such local limits by itself may not divest the Chief Judicial magistrate of the concerned District of his powers exercisable within the entire district. If, by such definition of local limits, the Chief Judicial Magistrate is divested of his powers with respect to such local limits, he cannot exercise his powers with respect to that area. Again, definition of such local limits by itself may not divest the Chief Judicial magistrate of the concerned District of his powers exercisable within the entire district. If, by such definition of local limits, the Chief Judicial Magistrate is divested of his powers with respect to such local limits, he cannot exercise his powers with respect to that area. But if he is not divested of such power by such definition of local limits, he retains powers to be exercisable within the whole of the district for which he is appointed as the Chief Judicial magistrate. In that view of the matter, the grievance voiced by Shri Vakharia for the appellants is justified. With respect, the learned trial Magistrate has not examined the law from this angle. With respect, the learned trial Magistrate has simply jumped to the conclusion that, since places where the offences are said to have been committed fall within the jurisdiction of the Judicial magistrate (First Class) of Idar, the Chief Judicial Magistrate of Sabarkantha at Himatnagar has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offences in these cases. ( 8 ) ORDINARILY, my aforesaid view would have required me to remand the matters to the trial Court for its fresh decision according to law. However, in view of what is stated hereinafter, no such remend would be necessary. ( 9 ) IT is an admitted position on record that no principal market yard or sub-market yard or market proper was established under Sec. 7 of the act at the relevant time after the aforesaid two notifications under Sees. 5 and 6 thereof were issued. Shri Vakharia for the appellants has fairly conceded that the notification establishing the principal market yard at Bhiloda for the market area of Bhiloda Taluka and Vijaynagar Taluka under Sec. 7 of the act was issued on 31/03/1982 and was published in the Gujarat government Gazette on 29/04/1982. The complaints in all these cases were admittedly filed on 24/02/1982. On that date, no principal market yard or sub-market yard or market proper was in existence with respect to the market area comprising Bhiloda Taluka and Vijaynagar Taluka covered by the aforesaid two notifications under Sees. 5 and 6 of the Act. The complaints in all these cases were admittedly filed on 24/02/1982. On that date, no principal market yard or sub-market yard or market proper was in existence with respect to the market area comprising Bhiloda Taluka and Vijaynagar Taluka covered by the aforesaid two notifications under Sees. 5 and 6 of the Act. If there was no such market in existence at the relevant time, no respondent herein was required to obtain any licence from the Committee for dealing in the articles of agricultural produce covered by the aforesaid two notifications. ( 10 ) SHRI Vakharia for the appellants has then urged that in any case since the respondents herein were found dealing in articles of agricultural produce covered by the aforesaid two notifications, they could be said to have made breach of Sec. 6 read with Sec. 6 (2) of the Act and were therefore liable to be punished under Sec. 36 thereof. I think this submis- sion urged before me by Shri Vakharia for the appellants is not sustainable in view of the complaint given by the complainant in each case. By means of the complaint, each accused was charged with not having obtained any licence from the Committee. Again, breach of Sec. 8 of the Act was alleged in respect of each accused on the ground that each was dealing in articles of agricultural produce covered by the aforesaid two notifications without obtaining any licence from the Committee. The charge was to the effect that each accused was trading in agricultural produce without obtaining any licence from the Committee. There was no charge that no licence as required under the relevant provisions contained in Sec. 6 (2) of the Act was obtained by any of the accused. When no accused was charged with breach of Sec. 6 of the Act, no accused can be convicted of the offence punishable under sec. 36 read with Sec. 6 of the Act. No accused is found to have made any breach of Sec. 8 of the Act in view of the fact that no principal market yard or sub-market yard or market proper was established in the area requiring each accused to take licence from the Committee under Sec. 27 of the Act at the relevant time. No accused is found to have made any breach of Sec. 8 of the Act in view of the fact that no principal market yard or sub-market yard or market proper was established in the area requiring each accused to take licence from the Committee under Sec. 27 of the Act at the relevant time. ( 11 ) IN view of my aforesaid discussion, I am of the opinion that the impugned judgment and order passed by the learned trial Magistrate in each case deserves to be affirmed though on a somewhat different reasoning. ( 12 ) IN the result, all these appeals fail. They are hereby dismissed. .