M. M. MIRDHE, J. ( 1 ) THIS cr. R. p. is cited under Section 397, cr. P. c. by the petitioner who was accused in the trial court, against the Order, dated 21-8-1991 passed by the 1st additional sessions judge, dharwad, silting at hubli, in cr. A. No. 103/1989 and the judgment dated 10-8-1989 passed by the jmfc, 11 court, hubli, in c. c. No. 3142/1987. ( 2 ) I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned government pleader for the slate and perused the records of the case. ( 3 ) THE case of the prosecution is as follows:that on 31-5-1987, at about 10. 00 a. m. the parents of the deceased amrut had sent him to market to bring mutton. He went on a bicycle. On his way be requested P. W. 8 santosh to accompany him to ihe shop. When they were going on old-hubli road towards the market, near new english school, at about 10. 00 a. m. , the petitioner who was driving the truck No. Mez 5232 on old-hubli road rashly and negligently dashed against the cycle of amrut and caused injuries to santosh and also catal injuries to amrut, as a result of which he died. P. w. 5 the father of amrut gave a complaint as per Ex. P-8 and his complaint was registered by the police and after investigation, the police filed charge sheet against the petitioner in the court of the j. m. f. c. , 11 court, hubli, cor offences punishable under sections 279,337 and 304-a, 1pc. The trial court framed a charge against the petitioner tor all the said offences and he pleaded not guilty. The prosecution was called upon to prove the guilt of the accused. The prosecution examined p. ws. 1 to 10, got exhibited exs. P-1 to p-11 and got marked m. os. 1 to 4. The defence got exhibited Ex. D-l in the course of the prosecution evidence. The petitioner was examined under Section 313, cr. C. p. and he denied the incriminating evidence led against him by the prosecution, but he did not choose to lead any evidence on his own behalf. P-1 to p-11 and got marked m. os. 1 to 4. The defence got exhibited Ex. D-l in the course of the prosecution evidence. The petitioner was examined under Section 313, cr. C. p. and he denied the incriminating evidence led against him by the prosecution, but he did not choose to lead any evidence on his own behalf. After hearing both sides, the learned jmfc, ii court, hubli, convicted the petitioner for the offences under sections 279, 337 and 304-a, 1pc and sentenced him to undergo simple imprisonment for two years and to pay a fine of Rs. 2,000/-, in default to undergo 6 months imprisonment for all these offences. ( 4 ) BEING aggrieved by the judgment of ihe learned j. m. f. c. the petitionerp referred cr. A. No. 103/1989 in the court of the sessions judge, dharwad, and it came to be heard by the 1st additional sessions judge, dharwad, sitting at hubli, who allowed the appeal in part and he reduced the sentence of imprisonment awarded to the appellant from two years to one year. The petitioner is aggrieved by the judgment of both the courts-below and therefore, lie has filed this revision petition. ( 5 ) IN 1977 (2) kar. L. j. 216, Narasingappa v State of karnataka, the Jurisdiction of the high court in criminal revision petition has been dealt with. This high court has laid down as follows:"the jurisdiction of the high court in a criminal revision application is severely restricted and it cannot embark upon a reappreciation of evidence. It is only in rare and exceptional cases where there is some manifest illegalily or grave and serious miscarriage of jusiice lhat the court will embark on appreciation of evidence. In short, the perversity or the illegality of the order made by the court is the question with which the high court is essentially concerned. If the argument merely exlcnds so that an attempt is made to point out a discrepancy here and there, and it is subtnilted that although some evidence was there but it was not sufficient to record a f hiding of conviction, perhaps that would be outside the domain of the restricted jurisdiction under revision to be exercised by the high court"in view of the restricted jurisdiction of the high courts in criminal revision petilions, this court cannot embark upon a reappreciation of evidence. There is concurrent finding of the two courts-below, finding the petitioner guilty of the offences punishable under sections 279, 337 and 304-a, 1pc. Though the prosecution examined some witnesses as eye-witnesses to the incident, none has supported the prosecution except P. W. 8. In view of the evidence of P. W. 8 and also the fact that has been proved, that the deceased amrut died due to the injuries sustained by him in the accident, the prosecution has been able to prove that the accident took place and in that accident P. W. 8 sustained injuries and the deceased also sustained injuries, resulting in his death. In his statement under Section 313, cr. P. c. the petitioner has admitted that he was the driver of the vehicle on that day. So the points that have been proved beyond reasonable doubtby the prosecution are that the petitioner was the driver of the vehicle in question and that vehicle caused an accident, causing injuries to P. W. 8 and the deceased amrut which resulted in his death. ( 6 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the motor vehicle inspector has not been examined in this case and that is a serious lacuna in the prosecution case and therefore, the conviction based on such an evidence having such a lacuna is not sustainable in law. He relied on kamataka law journal 1989 (2) 255, Veerabhadrappa v State of Karnataka wherein it has been held that non-examination of the motor vehicle inspector is fatal to the case. It is a fact that the motor vehicle inspector has not been examined in this case, but still his certificate has come to be exhibited as Ex. P-11 in the evidence of the i. o. therefore, the courts-below had the benefit of looking into Ex. P-11 which is to the effect that the vehicle in question was not having any mechanical defect. In the cross-examination of the i. o. , no question is put to him regarding the Ex. P-11. The defence has not taken any objection for the exhibiting of Ex. P-11. Ex. P-11 goes to show that there was no mechanical defect in the vehicle. In the cross-examination of the i. o. , no question is put to him regarding the Ex. P-11. The defence has not taken any objection for the exhibiting of Ex. P-11. Ex. P-11 goes to show that there was no mechanical defect in the vehicle. The ruling that is relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner is distinguishable from the facls of this case, on the ground that in that ruling there was no certificate of motor vehicle inspector which was exhibited, because there is no reference to any such certificate in the judgment. If there were to be any such certificate exhibited in that case, a reference would have been made in that judgment. Therefore, it has been held in that case that non-examination of motor vehicles inspector was fatal to that case. But in this case, Ex. P-l 1 has been exhibited and the defence has not put any question regarding Ex. P-ll to the i. o. and therefore, non-examination of motor vehicle inspector when the certificate issued by him Ex. P-l 1 is exhibited without any objection from the defence, cannot be fatal to the prosecution case. ( 7 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner further argued thatp. w. 8 is a child witness and the court has not put any questions so as to satisfy ilself about his competency to give evidence in the case. The evidence of P. W. 8 discloses that no preliminary questions were put by the court so as to ascertain the capacity of the witness to understand the questions and answer them. But in view of the evidence that the witness has given, it is clear that the witness was quite capable of understanding the questions and answering them. Therefore, mere non-mentioning by the court about its satisfying about the competency of p. w. 8 to depose cannot be a ground to discard tbe evidence of P. W. 8 which has been tested by cross-examination. The learned counsel for the petitioner further argued that none of the independent witnesses have supported the prosecution case and except the evidence of P. W. 8 which is the evidence of a child witness, there is no other material to infer that the accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the petitioner. The learned counsel for the petitioner further argued that none of the independent witnesses have supported the prosecution case and except the evidence of P. W. 8 which is the evidence of a child witness, there is no other material to infer that the accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the petitioner. He further submitted that merely because a person has lost his life in the accident, it cannot be a ground to infer that the accident took place due to Rash and Negligent Act of the driver of the vehicle. It is a fact that some witnesses who were sought to be examined by the prosecution as eyewitnesses to the accident, have not supported the prosecution case, but that cannot be a ground for the court to disbelieve the prosecution case. P. w. 8 has given evidence. Now it will have to be seen, whether P. W. 8's evidence was rightly accepted by the court-below. Since it is a revision against the concurrent findings of the two courts- below, this court will not be juslified in reappreciating the evidence of P. W. 8. But at the same time, the court will have to satisfy itself (hat there are no glaring mistakes or perversity in assessing the evidence of P. W. 8 by the trial court or the appellate court. P. w. 8 has deposed that he accompanied the deceased on his request to go to the market on his bicycle. His evidence is corroborated by the injuries that he has sustained in the accident and also by the fact of the death of the deceased amrut. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that in the examination-in-chief, the witness has stated that he was sitting on the back side of ihe cycle, but in the cross-examination he has slated that he was sitting on the front bar of the cycle. This is a minor discrepancy. Whether the witness was silting on the back side of the cycle or on the front cycle bar will not make much difference in view of ihe fact that be was sitting on the cycle and the evidence discloses that the truck came from back side and dashed againsl that cycle. The fact that the hit was from the back side of the cycle is a strong circumstance in favour of the prosecution. The fact that the hit was from the back side of the cycle is a strong circumstance in favour of the prosecution. The vehicle was parked 10 from the spot of the accident. This itself is a circumstance which supports the case of the prosecution that the vehicle was driven with great speed. The accident has taken place in the city on a road and since the hit on the cycle is from its back side, it is obvious that the driver was able to see the cyclist and his companion going on the road who were in front of him. It would not have been difficult for this driver to avoid the accident if he was driving the vehicle cautiously and carefully and wilh a controllable speed. Learned counsel for the petitioner further argued that the cyclist was carrying his companion on the cycle and the possibilily of his losing the balance and dashing against the lorry cannot be ruled out. Jt is not the case of the petitioner that the accident has taken place due to any error of judgment on his part. He has not given his version as to how the accident took place under Section 313, cr. P. c. if it was a case of error of judgment and if it was an accident which had taken place because of error of judgment due to the cyclist losing his balance and coming in the way of the lorry, certainly there would have been such defence taken by the petitioner in his statement under Section 313, cr. P. c. the very fact that the lorry has dashed against the cycle at its back side rules out the possibility of the cyclist losing the balance and coming in front of the lorry at the time of the accident. The trial court and the appellate court have rightly assessed the evidence on record and have come to the correct conclusion regarding the guilt of the accused with which he was charged. There are no grounds to interfere with the orders of the courts-below convicting the accused for tbe said offences. ( 8 ) THE learned counsel for the pclilioncr submitted that both the courts-bclow have not considered about giving the benefit of the probation of offenders Act, to the pelitioner. Neither the trial court, nor the appellate court have bestowed their attention on this aspect of the matter. ( 8 ) THE learned counsel for the pclilioncr submitted that both the courts-bclow have not considered about giving the benefit of the probation of offenders Act, to the pelitioner. Neither the trial court, nor the appellate court have bestowed their attention on this aspect of the matter. But under Section 11 of the p. o. Act, this court can consider tie question whether the benefit of the p. o. act should be given to the petitioner or not. In this case, the petitioner is convicted for an offence of rash an negligent driving of the vehicle resulting in an injury to P. W. 8 and injuries to the deceased resulting in his death. The purpose of punishment is not only reformative but also deterrent. In these days when the vehicular traffic has increased and the accidents also are on the increase, the cases where the guilt of the offenders for Rash and Negligent Act are proved, the court must also keep before it the deterrent purpose of giving punishment. Giving light or formal punishment to these persons will have a sort of demoralising effect which will not be conducive in the interest of justice. In a case reported in AIR 1987 SC 861 , State of Karnataka v Krishna @raju accused was found guilty of offences under Section 304-a and other offences, and he was sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 345/- only. The Supreme Court has observed as follows:"the high court has failed to comprehend that the respondent has been let off with a total fine of rs. 345/- for his convictions under all the five charges relating (o the death of one person and the sustainment of injuries by another due to his rash and negligent driving besides his failure to secure medical assistance to the victims as well as his failure to make a report to the authorities about the accident. The reasons given by the high court are really non-existent as well as irrelevantones. lt is not as if the respondent had been charged or convicted for a grave offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life and his fate had remained in suspense for a long time and as a consequence thereof, he had undergone mental agony and torment for a long period of time. lt is not as if the respondent had been charged or convicted for a grave offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life and his fate had remained in suspense for a long time and as a consequence thereof, he had undergone mental agony and torment for a long period of time. Here was a case where the respondent had not only driven his bus in a reckless manner and caused the death of one person and injuries to another but he had also attempted to escape prosecution by failing to report the accident lo the police authorities. Considerations of undue sympathy in such cases will not only lead to miscarriage of Justice butwill also undermine the confidence of the public in the efficacy of the criminal judicial system. It need be hardly pointed out that the imposition of a sentence of fine of Rs. 250/- on the driver of a motor vehicle for an offence under Section 304-a, I. P. C. and that too without any extenuating or mitigating circumstance is bound to shock the conscience of any one and will unmistakably leave the impression that the trial was a mockery of justice. "therefore, I am of the opinion that it is not a fit case in which the petitioner can be given the benefit of p. o. act. ( 9 ) TO reduce the sentence awarded to the pclilioncr only to fine will amount to what is described as 'fleabite' sentence by the Supreme Court in the ruling cited above. The learned counsel for the petitioner relied on accidents claims journal, 1968 page 38, Bhalachandra Waman Pathe v State of Maharashtra, wherein it has been held by lie Supreme Court that it is wrong to think thai a sentence of imprisonment is to be imposed in all fatal cases; even fine can, in certain circumslances meet the ends of justice. In that case, the accused was sentenced to imprisonment by the trial court and the high court in revision altered the sentence of fine to six months imprisonment. In that context their lordships have held that what sentence should be imposed was essentially within the discretion of the (rial court and the high court was not justified in interfering with the discretion unless it was salisfied thai the sentence imposed by the trial court was unduly lenient or otherwise grossly inadequate. In that context their lordships have held that what sentence should be imposed was essentially within the discretion of the (rial court and the high court was not justified in interfering with the discretion unless it was salisfied thai the sentence imposed by the trial court was unduly lenient or otherwise grossly inadequate. The Supreme Court has also referred to its earlier judgment repotted in AIR 1959 SC 436 , Alamgir v State of Bihar, wherein it has been held as follows:"it is unnecessary to emphasize that the question of sentence is normally in the discretion of the trial judge. It is for the trial judge to take into account all relevant circumstances and decide what se. ntence would meet the ends of Justice in a given case. The high court undoubtedly has jurisdiction to enhance such sentence under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, but this jurisdiction can be properly exercised only if the high court is satisfied that the sentence imposed by the trial judge is unduly lenient, or that in passing the order of sentence, the trial judge had manifestly failed to consider the relevant facts. It may be that the high court thought that the appellate order passed by the sessions judge reducing the original sentence was wrong, and in that sense, the issue of notice under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure against the accused to show cause why his sentence should not be enhanced may have been justified but, in enhancing the sentence, the high court should restore the sentence passed by the trial judge himself. In a case under Section 498, penal code since Section 498 docs not purport to protect the rights of women but safeguards the rights of husbands, consideration that in india, women, whetlicr chaste or unchaste, must be protected, in enhancing the sentence, is not helpful or decisive, when it is clear that the woman is of loose moral character, was dissatisfied with the husband, and was willing to marry the accused. In such a case, though the accused is guilty under Section 498, it is difficult to accept the view of the high court that the sentence of two months' simple imprisonment imposed on him by the trial court was so unduly or manifestly lenient as not to meet hie ends of justice. In such a case, though the accused is guilty under Section 498, it is difficult to accept the view of the high court that the sentence of two months' simple imprisonment imposed on him by the trial court was so unduly or manifestly lenient as not to meet hie ends of justice. It would not be right for the appellate court to interfere with the order of sentence passed by the trial court merely on the ground that if it had tried the case it would have imposed a sligiilly higher or heavier sentence. "the sentence awarded to the petitioner is one year's s. i. for each of the offences for which he is convicted. He was 32 years at the time of the filing of this petition. Now, he must be 35 years old. Looking to the facts and circumstances of this case, awarding him a sentence of six months s. i. for each of the offences proved against him will meet tlie ends of Justice in this case. Hence, I proceed to pass the following:the petition is allowed in part. The judgment of conviction of both the courts-below is confirmed. The appellant is sentenced to undergo s. i. for 6 months for each of the offences for which he is convicted. All the sentences to run concurrently. The bail bonds of the petitioner shall stand cancelled. --- *** --- .