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1992 DIGILAW 274 (GUJ)

Saurashtra Cement and Chemical Industries Ltd. Ranavav v. Union of India

1992-09-02

M.B.SHAH, M.S.PARIKH

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JUDGMENT : M. B. Shah, J. The dispute in this matter pertains to payment of excise duty on gunny bags which were used as packing material for cement. It is also admitted that gunny bags are primary packing material. It is of a durable nature. It is contend that it is returnable by the buyer to the assess and, therefore, its cost is required to be excluded while determining the value of the excisable goods as provided under section 4(4)(d)(1) of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. After hearing the learned advocates we have arrived at the conclusion that there was no arrangement with the petitioner for return of gunny bags by the wholesale dealers or authorised dealers and that the petitioner has not produced any evidence to that effect before the Assistant Collector. After considering the contentions in detail, we have, by the judgment and order dated 11/12th December 1990 arrived at the conclusion that the order Annexure "F" passed by the Assistant Collector confirming the demand for recovery of preferential duty amounting to Rs. 15,02,721.19p. is just and legal. 2. However, the contention was raised that proceeding initiated under rule 10 of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 would lapse after substitution of that rule by rule 10 from 6th August 1977. That contention was based on the decisions of this Court in the case of Amit Processors Ltd. v. Union of India & Ors, 1985 (21) E.L.T. 24, and in the case of Mahendra Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, 1988 (36) E.L.T.563. That question was referred to the larger Bench and the Full Bench of this Court by its judgment and order dated 26th August 1992 had arrived at the conclusion as under : "In the result, as regards the question which is referred to the larger bench, we hold that the notices issued or actions taken under the substituted rules 10 and 10A or omitted Rule 10 of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 would not stand discharged or terminated upon substitution or omission as the case may be. The proceedings initiated under rule 10 or 10A for recovery of duty of excise by issuance of a show cause notice would not come to an end or lapse as soon as Rules 10 & 10A are substituted with effect from 6th August 1977 or as soon as substituted rule 10 is omitted with effect from 17th November 1980. We therefore answer the question accordingly." In this view of the matter, as the conditions raised by the petitioner are negatived, this petition requires to be rejected and is rejected. Rule discharged with no order as to costs. Interim relief stands vacated. 3. At this stage, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that certificate for appeal to the Supreme Court under Article 134A read with Article 133(1) of the Constitution of India be granted. In our view, considering the reasons recorded by the Full Bench in the aforesaid judgment and order we do not think that this would be a fit case for grant of such certificate. The Full Bench has arrived at the conclusion that the view taken by this Court in the case of Amit Processors Ltd. (supra) that the proceedings for recovery of excise duty initiated under substituted rule 10 or 10A would lapse was not proper. In that decision it is inter alia held that (i) neither the Central Excises & Salt Act nor the rules made thereunder are temporary or for a limited period; (ii) the taxable event for the duty of excise is manufacture or production of the goods within the country as provided in section 3 of the Act. With regard to levy of duty of excise, there is no change by substitution or deletion of the rules. The liability to pay the duty of excise remains as it was; and (iii) the modification in the procedure of recovery of unpaid or short paid excise duty would not mean that liability to pay the excise is wiped out. However, the learned counsel Mr. Nanavati further submits that the appeal against the judgment and order passed by this court is pending before the Supreme Court. However, the learned counsel Mr. Nanavati further submits that the appeal against the judgment and order passed by this court is pending before the Supreme Court. If the appeal filed by the Department against the judgment and order passed by this Court is pending before the Supreme Court, it would not be a ground for grant of certificate as prayed for because in that appeal validity of the judgment and order passed by this Court is challenged. Hence the prayer is rejected. 4. At this stage, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the following relief granted by this Court be continued for some time so that the petitioner can approach the Supreme Court : "Interim relief in terms of para 25 (c) on condition that the petitioners furnish Bank guarantee to the satisfaction of respondents within one month from to-day for the sum of Rs. 15,02,721-19 Paise with interest at 12% per annum till the date of payment. Mr. Vakil for the Respondents is informed that in the event of petitioners succeeding in the petition, the Bank guarantee charges paid by the petitioners may have to the paid by Respondents." Considering the fact that the interim relief has continued from 1978 onwards, we continue it up to 6th October 1992 on a further condition that during that period the petitioner would renew the Bank guarantee if called upon to do so. Petition Rejected.