JUDGMENT D. P. Sood, J.—This Regular Second Appeal under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure against the judgment dated 15-9 1985, of the learned District Judge Una, was admitted on the question "whether bar under section 112 of the H. P, Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) does not apply to the proceedings under Chapter 9 relating to the acquisition of the proprietary rights by the occupancy tenants. Another question pertain to the effect of section 101 of the Act was also one of the questions whether it bars the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts" as is evident from the order dated 10th November, 1982, passed by this Court. It was also directed to be heard alongwith R. S. A. No. 147 of 1982, Chet Ram and others v Ganga Ram and others Thus the only substantial question of law pertains to the above said limited question 2. The bone of contention in between the parties is the land measuring 10 Kanals contained in Khata Khatoni No. 320/1367 Khasra Nos. 3114 and 3115 as per entries in the Jamabandi for the year 1976-77 situate in village Gagret, Tehsil and District Una, (hereinafter shortly referred to as the suit land). 3. The defendants are the appellants and the plaintiff is respondent. The plaintiff filed a suit for declaration that he is owner in possession of the suit property and consequently and permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering into his peaceful possession of the suit land and consequential relief thereto. 4. The plaintiff alleged that the suit land was in cultivating possession of Shri Lachhman son of Sohnu and Lakhu son of Faquira of village Ambota prior to the year 1970 as a tenant. The said tenants relinquished their tenancy rights and delivered vacant possession of the suit land to him. Thereafter he mortgaged the suit land with possession for a consideration of Rs. 800 with Lekh Raj (PW 2) in the year 1971, vide registered mortgage deed and the same was got redeemed in June, 1974. The said tenants relinquished their tenancy rights and delivered vacant possession of the suit land to him. Thereafter he mortgaged the suit land with possession for a consideration of Rs. 800 with Lekh Raj (PW 2) in the year 1971, vide registered mortgage deed and the same was got redeemed in June, 1974. The assertion of the plaintiff is that he or the mortgagee never inducted defendant No 1 as a tenant-at-will and consequently the entries in the revenue records showing defendant No. 1 as a tenant-at-will of the suit land, are null and void and not binding upon him The said entries in the revenue record were result of connivance of defendant No. 1 with the revenue staff. According to him, he came to know about the wrong entry during the consolidation proceedings in the year 1976. He claims to have agitated the matter before the Consolidation Officer but latter refused to correct the entry. It is alleged that the defendants threatened the plaintiff to take forcible possession of the suit land on the basis of the above said wrong entry which circumstance forced him to institute the instant suit on 12-6-1978. 5. Defendants resisted and contested the suit by denying the allegations of the plaintiff and contended himself to be the tenant earlier and owner of the suit land thereafter under the provisions of the Act. He pleaded his possession. As a preliminary objection, he contended that the suit was not maintainable and that the suit was bad for non-joinder and mis-joinder of necessary party. 6. Learned Court below framed various issues on the pleadings of the parties. On appraisal of the evidence adduced by both the parties, the learned Court below held the defendants to be the owners of the suit property and consequently dismissed the suit vide its judgment dated May 13, 1980. 7. The plaintiff appealed against the judgment of the learned Sub-Judge 1st Class, Una, who reversed the same by holding that the plaintiff is proved to be in self cultivating possession of the suit land and defendants have failed to prove that the suit land is under cultivation of defendant No. 1 as tenant-at-will or that defendant No. 1 has become owner of the suit land aster coming into force of the Act. Resultantly, the suit of the plaintiff stood decreed with costs throughout in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants. Resultantly, the suit of the plaintiff stood decreed with costs throughout in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants. Feeling aggrieved with the aforesaid judgment and decree, the defendants challenged the said judgment and decree on the aforesaid substantial question of law. 8. It is pertinent to state that during the pendency of appeal mutation No. 3416 dated 20-8-1981 (Ex. DX) was allowed to be placed on record by way of additional evidence on the application of the appellant under Order 41, Rule 27, C P. C. vide order of this Court dated 12-8-1991. The respondent was given an opportunity to produce the evidence in rebuttal thereof within four weeks but no evidence was produced. 9. On the basis of the aforesaid documentary evidence revealing the conferment of proprietary rights of the suit land upon defendants now appellants, their learned Counsel has placed reliance upon the observations made by the Full Bench of this Court in case of Chuhniya Devi v. Jindu Ram etc., 1991 (1) Sim LC 223, wherein the following observations have been made : "...... The Civil Court has no Jurisdiction to go into any question connected with the conferment of proprietary rights under section 104 of the H P Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972, except in a case where it is found that the statutory authorities envisaged by that Act had not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure or where the pro visions of the Act had not been complied with." 10. In other words he has also sought support of the case of Chuhniya Devi (supra) while advancing his arguments on the substantial question of law referred to above. 11. On the other hand, the plaintiff/respondent has contended that mutation No. 3416 dated 20-8-1981 (Ex. PX) was attested and sanctioned at his back without due notice served upon him. Farther, he pointed out that appeal against the judgment dated May 13, 1980 of the learned Sub-Judge 1st Class, Una, was pending in the first appellate Court of which fact he did not apprise the concerned Revenue Court, and therefore, this mutation is not binding upon him. According to him the aforesaid mutation Ex. DX is the result of fraud played upon by the appellants in collusion with the revenue staff. 12. According to him the aforesaid mutation Ex. DX is the result of fraud played upon by the appellants in collusion with the revenue staff. 12. Considering the arguments, so advanced by the rival parties through their learned Counsels, suffice it to state that this Court is bound by the decision of the Full Bench referred to above. There is no material on record to show that the statutory authorities conforming the proprietary rights upon the appellant had not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure or that the provisions of the Act had not been complied with. The conferment of proprietary rights can only be ordered under the provisions of the Act There is no such provision whereunder such proprietary rights can be conferred upon a tenant under the H. P. Land Revenue Act, 1954 (Act No. 6 of 1954). Even otherwise the case of the defendants/appellants set up in the pleadings was that he was a tenant. On the contrary the pleadings of the plaintiff/respondent was that he came to know about the wrong entry of the defendant in the revenue record as tenant-at-will during the consolidation in the year 1976 and he agitated the matter before the Consolidation Officer but the latter refused to correct the entry. In any case the appellant/defendant has already been conferred the proprietary rights under Chapter 9 of the Act. Accordingly, this Court has no jurisdiction to go into any question connected with the conferment of proprietary rights pertaining to the land in question. In other words, Civil Court had no jurisdiction to determine the disputed relationship in between the parties inter se. This conclusion equally applies to both the Courts below also, In case the plaintiff/respondent is aggrieved with the sanctioning of the mutation (Ex. DX), he may have his remedy, if available, in accordance with law. The appellant thus succeeds to this extent on the substantial question of law raised by him. The appeal stands disposed of in terms of the above. Order accordingly.