JUDGMENT - K. SUKUMARAN, J.:---Viru Muthu Sukhlingam was one among the migrant labour to Bombay. He hails from a village in Salem District of the State of Tamil Nadu. He joined the service of the International Airport Authority (which came into being in 1971, under a Parliamentary enactment, the International Airport Authorities Act of 1971) as a Khalasi or Assistant Fitter. He rendered service, and without complaint, from 5-5-1978 to 13-8-1982. Thereafter, there was continued absence, for about two years. He has his own version on his absence from work. 2. He pleaded that he had availed of leave in July, 1982 and that the leave had expired on 13-8-1982. According to him, he was then the victim of an oppressive array of adversities. Adversities, it is well known, do not, quite often, come singly. The demolition of his hut in the Bombay slum area of Kamrajngar, and his being forcibly repartriated to Tamil Nadu by the State authorities, his managing to put up a small hut when the Supreme Court stayed the eviction of the slum dwellers, the destruction of that hut too in a fire that engulfed it, and the loss of his entire worldly assets including the title deed to the plot of land in his native village, the exploitation of the situation by a greedy relative, who betrayed his trust and grabbed his immovable property in his absence, and the cumulative effort of the conspiring circumstances driving him to insanity are all narrated with a naturalness and neatly set chronology. He claims he had sent a post card to his official superior in August, 1982 intimating about the mental ailment for which he was under the treatment of Dr. Peter. It was only by 1984 that he was all right. Soon, he soughted re-employment. His employer turned a deaf ear-is his grievance. 3. On 5-10-1984, he approached the Airport Authority for employment. That letter of 5-10-1984, was not favourably responded to. Another letter dated 13-10-1984, admittedly received by the authority, was also ignored by it. (The stand of the authority in regard to the letter admittedly received, is some what vague. His employer turned a deaf ear-is his grievance. 3. On 5-10-1984, he approached the Airport Authority for employment. That letter of 5-10-1984, was not favourably responded to. Another letter dated 13-10-1984, admittedly received by the authority, was also ignored by it. (The stand of the authority in regard to the letter admittedly received, is some what vague. Paragraph 4 states, "The petitioners, having already terminated the Ist respondent's services in December, 1982 could not entertain the said belated demand for being taken on service." Whether the workman was given a reply is veiled in vagueness.) The authority admits receipts of 'some further letters' in November and December 1984. The workman tenaciously continued writing, although less frequently. The receipt of letters in 1985, 1986 and 1987 is admitted by the authority. 4. A formal demand for reinstatement was made by letter dated 17-8-1987. The conciliation machinery was moved thereunder. Conciliation failing, a reference was ultimately made in 1989. 5. The workman filed his claim statement on 25-6-1989. At the out set, it had to be emphasised that the statement highlighted that face of his contention about the termination being illegal on the ground of an omission to conduct the mandated domestic enquiry. 6. The management filed its written statement on 11-9-1989. It was supplemented by an additional one dated 12-12-1989. Not merely a supplementation. Even an amendment was sought and got on a petition filed on the same day. 7. Ultimately the Industrial Tribunal passed its order-Ext. F on 26-11-1991. In a commendably well considered order, the Industrial Tribunal posed in the prefactory paragraph the actual issue that had been referred. It recapitulated the undisputed facts in paragraph 2. The plea of the management about the workman's abandonment of service, its assertion of having sent to the workman a notice requiring the reasons for his unauthorised leave, and other versions on facts leading to the termination of his services, are thereafter referred to. 8. Though initially the Airport Authority sought umbrage under Regulation 33 (which enables it to pass an order of termination without an enquiry, when disciplinary authority if satisfied in that behalf that it is not a reasonably practicable to hold such an enquiry), the old plea was again adhered to : 'that in view of the abandonment no enquiry was necessary'. 9. 9. The management sat between two stools, when on the one hand it resorted to Regulation 31(2) of the Service Regulation, and on the other, sought refuge under Regulation 33 of the (Conduct Appeal) Regulation. The workman raised a contention that neither of these regulations had been brought into force. Consequently the Airport Authority could not avail of or rely on either of them-contended workman. 10. The fact that the Regulations have not been brought into effect, it is significant to note, is an admitted position. The Airport Authority posed a querry : what if? Even if it is assumed so, the authority could not proceed with the draft Regulations, treating them as guidelines. It has been so held by the Supreme Court in (Mysore State Road Transport Corporation v. Gopinath)1, (1968)II L.L.J. 144, and in (V. Balasubramaniam v. Tamil Nadu Housing Board and others)2, (1988)II L.L.J. 435. 11. The workman had an effective reply and an alternate contention. He referred to the instructions issued by the management or the Airport Authority in 1980. The existence of such instructions, which mandate an enquiry in such circumstances, was not disputed by the Airport Authority. It took an extreme stand that the administrative instructions are inefficacious, as they cannot over ride the statutory Regulations. It can be at once pointed out that an ugly contradiction is easily visible in the stand of the Airport Authority. Under section 38 of the Act, the Government is competent to issue directions. They have legal effect. When the instructions of 1980 referred to such directions, the AirportAuthority cannot successfully wriggle out of it. 12. A Regulation achieves its statutory status only if and when the necessary publication mandated by the legal provision has been punctiliously carried out. Publicity is the soul and sustenance for the efficacy of a legislative exercise. The legal proposition has been operating in the field of administrative Law soon after the advert of the Constitution. The words of Vivian Bose, J., in (Harla v. State of Rajasthan)3, case 1952 S.C.R. 110, should be familiar to every student of Law, and should necessarily be known to any administrative agency, particularly a State or State instrumentality under our Constitution. Sans statutory force, the draft regulations may be looked up on only as a helpful norm or internal guide line. Sans statutory force, the draft regulations may be looked up on only as a helpful norm or internal guide line. It will not have the vitality and impact of a Statute which generally can be make inroads into the individual's rights, even without his consent. 13. The Industrial Tribunal declined to treat the regulations as having any efficacy whatever, in view of the omission of the delegate of Statutory legislation, in conforming to the time limit expressly mandated by the positive provisions in the Act under section 38(1). It pertinently noted that regulations had not finalised despite the passage of twenty one years. Cases where such time limit had not been specifically fixed in the Act could be distinguished for that reason, according to the Tribunal. The logic and force of its reasoning has much to earn approbation. It may not be necessary to pronounce finally on that question here and now. 14. In the present case, if the unpublished regulations are treated as guide lines, then, other guide lines (in the form of instructions of 1980, for example), also had to be so reckoned and recognised. The Airport Authority cannot adopt an attitude that it would pick up only a handy gun or a convenient tool. 14. The Industrial Tribunal found, and according to me rightly, that the conduct of a domestic enquiry was a condition precedent for passing a drastic order (termination of the services) in disciplinary jurisdiction. Concedely, no such exercise had been attempted. Ordinarily then, the declaration of illegality as regards the managerial action should follow and be proclaimed promptly. 15. Under the Indian industrial jurisprudence, when the justifiability of such termination is posed for trial, the management has a right to establish the guilt of the workman by evidence aliunde, and for the first time, before the Tribunal. The second opportunity can be availed of by a management either when it omitted to conduct an enquiry, or when the earlier enquiry was found to be legally infirm on any one of the recognised legal grounds. The exercise of this right, is however, has its conditionality, as indicated by the law laid down by the apex Court. Shambunath's case is that well known decision. (Shambhu Nath Goyal v. Bank of Baroda and others)4, A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 289. The exercise of this right, is however, has its conditionality, as indicated by the law laid down by the apex Court. Shambunath's case is that well known decision. (Shambhu Nath Goyal v. Bank of Baroda and others)4, A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 289. Paragraph 18 of the order of the Tribunal neatly analyses the decision of the Supreme Court, and pointedly extracts the relevant passage, and with refreshing care, furnishes the emphasis on the sentence that called for such emphasis. That sentence is well worth re-producing in the present context as well. "If it does not choose to do so at that stage it cannot be allowed to do it any later stage of the proceedings by filing any application for the purpose which may result in delay which may lead to wrecking the morale of the workman and compel him to surrender which he may not otherwise do." 18. The stage for exercise of the Management's right as indicated in the aforesaid decision, is ordinarily the time of filing of the written statement of the management, when it notices in the workman's claim statement a plea about an omission to conduct the domestic enquiry or about the enquiry being vitiated. 17. An important submission initially projected by Counsel (C.P. Singh) and latterly adopted by Mr. Andhyarjuna was about a different note struck by the Supreme Court itself, in later decisions. According to Counsel, the Tribunal sinned awfully when it omitted to refer to all the decisions cited before it. 18. In the absence of other assuring materials, it is difficult to assume that the Tribunal (which carefully assessed every argument) omitted a reference to citations seriously urged or strongly relied on. Be that as it may, Counsel has been unable to bring to my notice even a single sentence, where the Shambhunath's decision has been referred to but dissented from, let alone over-ruled. The principle enunciated by the Supreme Court in Shambhunath's case is not by way of obiter. It cannot be treated as an unguarded observation; for the apex Court never makes one of that description. A clear principle is discernible for the ratio. The principle is in consonance with the soul and spirit of social justice, which is the insignia of industrial jurisprudence. It is upto the management to conduct a domestic enquiry in circumstances which require the same. A clear principle is discernible for the ratio. The principle is in consonance with the soul and spirit of social justice, which is the insignia of industrial jurisprudence. It is upto the management to conduct a domestic enquiry in circumstances which require the same. Its omission timeously to conduct such an enquiry cannot cast a liability on the weak workman. It can, however, come to pass that there was some unexpected technical flaw in the conduct of the enquiry, or an omission in conducting one. The management shall not be prejudiced in such a situation. The management has then a right to establish the misconduct of the workman by an independent endeavour before the Tribunal. The conduct of the management in the exercise of that right, is also something to be subjected to careful scrutiny. A management availing of such a right, should demonstrate its diligence and vigilance in the exercise of that right. When the workman pointedly raises the plea about absence of a domestic enquiry or about an infirmity therein, it is time enough for the management to wake up; it is already alerted, and vigorously too. It cannot afford to lose much time thereafter, in buckling up for a fight on merits. The management shall seek that opportunity and use it effectively. The gestation period for seeking the right, in the present case, has been unduly excessive-ten months and more. That was found by the Tribunal, in the circumstances, to be totally unjustified. The fact that the management has filed its written statement on 11-9-1989 and that a plea for exercising the right to adduce evidence before Tribunal was conspicuous by its absence, and that the trial of the reference had been adjourned to 16-11-1989, 13-12-1989, 9-1-1990 and 12-2-1990, had been noted by the Tribunal. There had been much mental exercise on the part of the management, by about the dawn of February, 1990. It made an application for re-structuring its earlier written statement. Even then, there was an omission to make a request for leading evidence before the Tribunal. The Tribunal had further hearings on 2-5-1990 and 18-6-1990, and then on 23-7-1990. It was only on the very last date - 23-7-1990, that an application was made before the Tribunal. It made an application for re-structuring its earlier written statement. Even then, there was an omission to make a request for leading evidence before the Tribunal. The Tribunal had further hearings on 2-5-1990 and 18-6-1990, and then on 23-7-1990. It was only on the very last date - 23-7-1990, that an application was made before the Tribunal. If, in the aforesaid circumstances, the Tribunal has held that there was no justification for delaying the request till 24-7-1990, particularly taking note of the fact that the workman had been left in the cold without any employment or earning, for over eight years, its conclusion cannot be faulted. I am in entire agreement with its reasoning supplied in support of the conclusion. "Not a single word is mentioned in the application in justification of the delay. The Law is clear that the Management do not have the right to make the request for evidence at any time during the pendency of the reference according to their sweet will. About 9 years have passed since the workman's service are terminated. Viewed from any angle, this is a case where the Management cannot be permitted to further perpetrate the agony of the workman." 19. Having repeatedly gone through the decisions which had been cited repeatedly, I am unable to find any flaw in the legal principle as enunciated by the Tribunal. True, there is the decision reported in 1984 itself, (Rajendra Jha v. Labour Court)5, 1984 L.I.C. 1583, equivalent to A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 1699, dealing with a situation concerning adducing of evidence by the management before a Tribunal. As noted earlier, there is no dissent from the proposition in Shambhu Nath's case either in explicit terms or by necessary implication. So also is the position in relation to (Kamal Kishore Lakshman v. Pan American World Airways Inc.)6, 1987(1) C.L.R. 26 or (Desh Raj Gupta v. The Industrial Tribunal)7, 1991(1) C.L.R. 332 equivalent to A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 2174. It is difficult to condemn the Tribunal as having sinned when it chose to prefer brevity and shun prolixity. In that process, it did not miss the needed acquaintence with the broader area of Law; there was no deliberate over looking of a clear land mark decision; nor was there a patent misunderstanding or misconstruction of a legal or judicial decision. In that process, it did not miss the needed acquaintence with the broader area of Law; there was no deliberate over looking of a clear land mark decision; nor was there a patent misunderstanding or misconstruction of a legal or judicial decision. In the context of the present profusion of decisions, many courts and Tribunals are likely to pray : "Oh Lord, give me power to spot spurious arguments and specious charltons." It is true that the apex Court in Desh Raj Gupta v. Industrial Tribunal, A.I.R. 1990 Supreme Court 2174, noted the conduct of a Tribunal which like a good samaritan almost functioned as a Legal Remembrancer of a careless management, which over looked its own right and its duty to lay down the foundation of misconduct by offering independent evidence. That does not declare a rigid preposition about a bounden duty on the part of the Tribunal to condone every careless and contumacious conduct of the management. The facts about the wobbly mind and halting pace of the management when it dealt with a pathetic plight of a workman, who had been almost driven to near extinction of his life, by a cumulative effect of conspiring circumstances' had been properly taken note of and rightly assessed by the tribunal. In such a situation, the Constitutional Court shall not act hearlessly to put the workman again in the pavements of Bombay, until his sustenance is evaporated soon. I am clear in my mind that the order of the tribunal is unamenable to curial correction. The writ petition has to be, and is, therefore dismissed. 20. There is a further and fundamental ground on which the direction of tribunal could be found to be fully justified. The thrust of the management to show that its decision was just, was on a communication which it is alleged to have sent to the workman in the address of the Bombay slum and in the Salem residence. The address at which the letter was sent to his native place is, "V. Muttu Sukhalingam, Post Woodyaputti." It is difficult to assume that this Khalasi who had left the little village four years back would have had such fame or notoriety as to make the post man to make him out, by merely knowing the village where he lived once but which he was forced to leave. 21. 21. The solid finding of the tribunal contained in paragraph 11 of the Award, is so impregnable, as to make the attempt of the Management in adducing evidence, a mere exercise in futility. The observations of the tribunal read : "The Management's case is that they had tried to serve notice on the workman on his Bombay and Tamil Nadu addresses but without success. I had directed them to produce the file of the proceedings. However the Management pleaded their inability to comply, for the reason that the entire file had been suppeptiously removed from the office by some culprit interested in the workman. Now their is absolutely no evidence on the record on the alleged pilferage of the file or on the issuance of notice to the Workman." It can carry only an empty bag when it comes to let in before the tribunal acceptable evidence in support of its stand. 22. Viewed from all angles, the case of the Airport Authority is irredeemable. The run way is in disrepair, the radar is defective; the systems do not work. Take off is then impossible. 23. International Airport Authority, it must be acknowledged, by an earlier error committed by it in dealing with a tender, contributed to a land mark decision in the field of Constitutional Law-(Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. The International Airport Authority of India and other)8, A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 1628. A similar error, had lead to another litigation. It would serve a good purpose, if it helps to clear up what according to it, is hazy point in a sensitive area in industrial jurisprudence. 24. The writ petition, in its paragraph 5, unfortunately, casts a tinge of sarcasm while referring to the plea of longeliness put forward by the workman. The mental ailment which he suffered, and other unfortunate events already alluded to, should have evoked sympathy for his solitude from any reasonable authority. His loneliness was not one of his own creation. 24. The writ petition, in its paragraph 5, unfortunately, casts a tinge of sarcasm while referring to the plea of longeliness put forward by the workman. The mental ailment which he suffered, and other unfortunate events already alluded to, should have evoked sympathy for his solitude from any reasonable authority. His loneliness was not one of his own creation. It is not like the loneliness that is referred to by the genius of our age, G.B. Shaw, when he wrote to E-instein, "from us in our little loneliness to him in his great loneliness." Nor is it to be likened to the situation making one chuckle, as when the Victorian movelist Bulwer Lytton complained about his solitude, writing direct to his wife, and his extreme embarrassment, when, a worried wife rushed to his residence, only to note, 'Solitude', dressed in while muslim and sitting on his knee.' (See The Literary London page, 168.) The comment of the Management on loneliness need not be further commented upon. 25. Before parting with the case, it may be appropriate to draw the attention of the Government of India to the criminal lapse on the part of the officials entrusted with the regulation-framing work under section 38 of the Act. One year was the peremptory time limit fixed by the Parliament. How dare these officials to flout it with impunity? When delays-though comparatively small-had been noticed on comparable functionaries in England, the new Law Journal came with a forceful plea about the Executive attempting to bye pass the legislature. That Nation-the cradle of Parliamentary democracy-knows too well that eternal vigil is the price of liberty. Possibly, the speaker of the Parliament, may look into this startling revelation and consider whether it involves Parliamentary privilege. That high office, I am sure, would view it with the seriousness the situation deserves. 26. Whatever is happening in the Labour Wing of the Central Secretariat which was once vibrant with hectic systematic activity? Has the pace of working, when Ambedkar was at the wheel, producing legislation after legislation in quick succession, gone for ever? There appears to be an excessive encrustation of dead wood or a deep layer of fossilised indifference. If is time enough for the Government of India to wake up from it slumber. Has the pace of working, when Ambedkar was at the wheel, producing legislation after legislation in quick succession, gone for ever? There appears to be an excessive encrustation of dead wood or a deep layer of fossilised indifference. If is time enough for the Government of India to wake up from it slumber. Let the office despatch direct, a Copy of the judgment to the Secretary, Legislative Department and to the Secretary, Labour Department, in the Government of India, New Delhi. P.C. : Counsel prayed for stay of the other and judgment and the implementation of the Award, having regards to the circumstances. I am not inclined to grant the prayer. It is accordingly declined. Order accordingly. -----