JUDGMENT K.S. Paripoornan, J. 1. Plaintiffs 1 and 3 in O. S. No. 370 of 1977, Munsiff's Court, Neyyattinkara are the appellants in this appeal. The defendants in the suit and plaintiffs 2 and 4 to 7 in the suit are the respondents herein. The suit was one for redemption. Amongst others, the first defendant raised a plea, that he is a tenant in respect of a portion of the suit property, under S.4A(1) of Act 1 of 1964. The matter was referred to the Land Tribunal, Neyyattinkara. It was found that the first defendant is entitled to the benefit of S.4A(1) of Act 1 of 1964. The learned Munsiff accept the said finding and dismissed the suit. In appeal by the plaintiffs as A. S. No. 192 of 1979, the learned Subordinate Judge, Thiruvananthapuram, by judgment dated 20th February 1982, dismissed the appeal. Plaintiffs 1 and 3 in the suit have come up in second appeal. 2. The following substantial question of law was formulated, at the time of admission of the appeal on 10th January 1984: "Was the lower Appellate Court right in holding that the first defendant and his predecessors in interest were holding the plaint schedule property as mortgagees for a continuous period of more than 50 years of immediately prior to 1st January 1970?" The facts of this case are in a narrow compass. The suit is one for redemption. The plaint schedule property is 2 acres 49 cents in Sy. No. 184/IB of Athiyannoor Village. The property was outstanding on mortgage with one Padmanabhan along with other properties. The rights of Padmanabhan devolved on his son Erulan. The plaintiffs executed an Ottikuzhikanam in respect of that property in favour of Padmanabhan Erulan in 1119 (Ext. A-1). On 6th December 1951 Erulan assigned his right to the first defendant. That is how the mortgage right devolved on the first defendant. Defendants 2 to 17 are in possession of a few items under the first defendant. 3. The first defendant put forward the plea that she is a mortgagee with possession of lands for a continuous period of not less than 50 years of immediately preceding the commencement of the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1969. This plea was accepted by the Land Tribunal. It was affirmed in appeal by the Subordinate Judge, Thiruvananthapuram. 3. The first defendant put forward the plea that she is a mortgagee with possession of lands for a continuous period of not less than 50 years of immediately preceding the commencement of the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1969. This plea was accepted by the Land Tribunal. It was affirmed in appeal by the Subordinate Judge, Thiruvananthapuram. The lower Appellate Court held that the property was outstanding on mortgage with Ananthan Padmanabhan, father of Erulan, ever since 1081 as per deed No. 1015/1081, that thereafter on 2nd of Medom 1119 M. E. by Ext. A-1, the plaintiffs executed the suit mortgage, while Erulan was in possession of the property under the earlier mortgage, and the first defendant obtained the assignment of the said rights. The learned Subordinate Judge found that from the recitals in Ext. A-1, the first defendant and his predecessors in interest were holding the plaint schedule property as mortgagees for a continuous period of more than 50 years of immediately prior to 1st January 1970, the date of commencement of the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1969. It was held that the first defendant and his predecessors were in possession of the properties as mortgagees from 1081 M. E. onwards. So, the first defendant should be a deemed tenant of the suit property under S.4A(1) of the K.L.R. Act and is entitled to fixity of tenure. It was held that the plaintiffs are not entitled to redeem. 4. The appellants' counsel urged two points before me. The first point was that though the property was outstanding on mortgage from 1081 M. E. with Padmanabhan and later with Erulan which devolved on the first defendant, by the execution of Ext. A-1 mortgage deed by the first plaintiff and others in favour of Erulan, the prior mortgage was put an end to. There was an extinguishment of the earlier mortgage. The first defendant is holding the property on the date of the suit only under Ext. A-1. There is no continuous possession of 50 years as contemplated under S.4A(1) of the Act. In order to substantiate the above plea, reliance was placed on the decision in Prithi Nath v. Suraj Ahir ( AIR 1963 SC 510 ), Raghavan Pillai v. Velayudhan Pillai ( 1979 KLT 510 (FB)), Kali Karthyayani v. Pappu ( 1980 KLT 541 (FB)) and Govindan v. Bhaskaran (1992 (1) KLT 577 (SC)). In order to substantiate the above plea, reliance was placed on the decision in Prithi Nath v. Suraj Ahir ( AIR 1963 SC 510 ), Raghavan Pillai v. Velayudhan Pillai ( 1979 KLT 510 (FB)), Kali Karthyayani v. Pappu ( 1980 KLT 541 (FB)) and Govindan v. Bhaskaran (1992 (1) KLT 577 (SC)). By reference to these decisions, it was contended that the mortgage of 1081 stood extinguished or determined and after the execution of Ext. A-1 mortgage deed dated 2nd Medom 1119, it cannot be said that the first defendant was holding the land comprised in the mortgage for a continuous period of not less than 50 years immediately preceding the commencement of the Act. 5. There is no force in this plea. Admittedly, the suit property was outstanding on mortgage with the predecessors of the first defendant from 1081 onwards. A fresh or subsequent mortgage (Ext. A-1) was executed on 2nd Medom 1119. There were certain adjustments and appropriations by which credit was given to the amount covered by the earlier mortgage. There was an adjustment of the mortgage amount of the original mortgage; but the mortgagee continued in possession of the property. The character of his possession was not changed by the execution of Ext. A-1, the subsequent mortgage deed. Erulan did not cease to possess the character of a mortgagee when by execution of Ext. A-1 certain adjustments were made regarding the mortgage amount covered by 1081 mortgage. At best, it can only be said that there is an appropriation of the amount covered by the earlier mortgage and there was no termination of the earlier mortgage at all. The character of possession as mortgagee continued. It is not necessary that the possession for the entire period of 50 years should be under the mortgage under which possession was held on 1st January 1970. The character of possession as mortgagee continued. It is not necessary that the possession for the entire period of 50 years should be under the mortgage under which possession was held on 1st January 1970. In Parameswaran v. Krishnan ( 1980 KLT 280 ) Subramonian Poti, J. delivering the judgment of the Bench, stated at page 282, as follows: "The section indicates that the requirements (leaving out matters which are not relevant for the purpose of this case) are (1) the mortgage with possession must be alive on 1st January 1970 in the sense that the mortgagee must be in possession as mortgagee on that date; (2) the mortgagee must have been holding the land comprised in the mortgage; (3) it should have been so held for a continuous period of not less than 50 years immediately preceding 1st January 1970. In the case before us there is a mortgagee with possession evidenced by Ext. P-2. That mortgagee was in possession as mortgagee on 1st January 1970. He and his predecessor in interest were in continuous possession for more than 50 years though such possession for the entire period of 50 years was not under Ext. P-2 mortgage but an earlier mortgage. The question is whether the fact that the possession for the entire period of 50 years was not necessarily under the mortgage under which possession was held on 1st January 1970 would make any difference. According to us, it would not, for, the section does not require possession under the same mortgage for a continuous period of 50 years. It appears to us that it will be against the spirit of the legislation to say otherwise. What is protected is the right of a mortgagee provided he satisfies certain conditions. One of them is continuous holding for more than 50 years as on 1st January 1970. A person who has taken mortgage of the property and who later advances a further amount and takes a fresh mortgage from the same mortgagor adjusting the mortgage amount under the original mortgage, continues as a mortgagee. One sees no reason by such a person should be excluded from the benefit of S.4A. It is difficult to envisage such a situation as falling outside the scheme of S.4A". One sees no reason by such a person should be excluded from the benefit of S.4A. It is difficult to envisage such a situation as falling outside the scheme of S.4A". A learned Single Judge of this court followed the earlier Bench decision in Parameswaran's case ( 1980 KLT 280 ), in Madhavan Pillai's case ( 1986 KLT 297 ). It was held that in order to attract S.4-A(1)(a) of the Act possession need not be held under the same document. Even if the earlier mortgage is released and a fresh mortgage executed in respect of the same property on the same day, the mortgagee shall be entitled to the benefit of S.4A(1)(a) of the Act. 6. In the light of the above decisions, I hold that the first point raised by counsel for the appellant should fail. The decisions relied on by counsel for the appellant are distinguishable. It was held by Fathima Beevi, J. in Madhavan Pillai's case ( 1986 KLT 297 ) at page 299 as follows: "The principle that the mortgage comes to an end and does not exist after payment of the mortgage money would be applicable in a case where after such termination no fresh rights as mortgagee are created before 1st January 1970. Where the termination of the earlier mortgage is contemporaneous to the creation of the fresh mortgage without any effective change in the character of possession, the subsequent possession under the fresh mortgage would entitle the mortgagee to tack on the earlier possession as mortgagee for the purpose of computing the period of 50 years required under S.4A(1)(a) of the Act." I concur with the above observations. 7. The second and the only other point raised by counsel for appellant was to the effect that the property is in the possession of Kudikidappukars and it is not a case where the first defendant is in possession of the land comprised in the mortgage for a continuous period of not less than 50 years. In other words, the first respondent is not a mortgagee in possession of the entire land for a period of 50 years. Counsel went to the extent of contending that on this hypothesis even the reference to the Land Tribunal was uncalled for. No such plea seems to have been raised either before the Land Tribunal or before the trial court or before the lower Appellate Court. Counsel went to the extent of contending that on this hypothesis even the reference to the Land Tribunal was uncalled for. No such plea seems to have been raised either before the Land Tribunal or before the trial court or before the lower Appellate Court. As such question is specifically formulated at the time of admission of the appeal. I do not think that the appellant should be permitted to raise this belated plea, in second appeal, at the time of hearing. The said plea is without force and it is rejected. 8. Incidentally, I should mention the decision of the Division Bench in Sankaran Krishnan v. Gopalan Appukuttan ( 1990 (2) KLT 170 ), on which reliance was placed on by counsel for the respondents Mr. S. Subramani; therein the expression "comprised" occurring in S.4A(1)(a) was held to be of wide import, to include even cases where mortgagees are in possession of only a portion of land and not all lands or entire lands included in the original mortgage. 9. For the above reasons, I hold that the second appeal is without merit. It is dismissed with costs.