Judgment Dharampal Sinha, J. 1. Since the petitions at Flags 1, 4 and 5 are to be disposed of and hearing has to be done in those petitions in view of the order dated 30-7-1992, this case ought to have been listed under the heading For orders. 2. Heard learned Counsel of both the sides on the petitions at Flags 4 and 5 and thereafter on the petitions at Flag-1 and rejoinder and reply at Flags 2 and 3. 3. So far the petitions at Flags 4 and 5 are concerned, one filed by Mohd. Zahir Hussain and other filed by Mohd. Quamrul Haque, it appears that they have made similar prayer to "permit the applicant to file his show cause and also provide him an opportunity of being heard in the matter and to cross examine the above-named witnesses in the larger interest of justice" Both petitions purport to have been filed under Sec. 99 of the Representa-tion of the People Act, 1951 and it is alleged that these petitioners came to know from some other person that in this election petition some witnesses have deposed to the effect that these petitioners had indulged in some corrupt practices along with the respondent in this case. 4. 4. Sec. 99 of the Representation of the People Act reads as follows : Other orders to be made by the High Court.-- (1) At the time of making an order under Sec. 98 the High Court shall also make an order : (a) Where any charge is made in the petition of any corrupt practice having been committed at the election, recording-- (i) a finding whether any corrupt practice has not been proved to have been committed at the election and the nature of that corrupt practice; and (ii) the names of all persons, if any, who have been proved at the trial to have been guilty of any corrupt practice and the nature of that practice; and (b) fixing the total amount of costs payable and specifying the persons by and to whom costs shall be paid: Provided that a person who is not a party to the petition shall not be named in the order under Sub-clause (ii) of clause (a) unless-- (i) he has been given notice to appear before [the High Court] and to show cause why he should not be so named; and (ii) if he appears in pursuance of the notice, he has been given an opportunity of cross-examining any witness who has already been examined by [the High Court] and has given evidence against him, of calling evidence in his defence and of being heard. A perusal of the provisions obviously indicates that when the High Court intends to make an order giving a finding of any corrupt practice against any person, who is not a party to the election petition, the Court has to issue notice to show cause and give opportunity to that person of cross-examining witnesses, giving evidence in defence and of being heard. Unless a notice to show cause is issued as contemplated under Sec. 99 of the Representation of the People Act, no person is required to appear and file show cause. The peti-tioners seem to have acted only on the whisper of some person, who said to them that some evidence has been led against them to the effect that they indulged in corrupt practice. There is nothing to indicate that the Court ever thought of giving a finding that they had committed any corrupt practice. 5. The peti-tioners seem to have acted only on the whisper of some person, who said to them that some evidence has been led against them to the effect that they indulged in corrupt practice. There is nothing to indicate that the Court ever thought of giving a finding that they had committed any corrupt practice. 5. It may be noticed that out of the witnesses, who have been examined on behalf of the election petitioner, only P. Ws. 6, 7 and 8 stated that they were not allowed to vote by these two petitioners. They did not even state as to what was actually done by any of these two petitioners whether they had given any threat to them or whether they physically obstructed them. Signi-ficantly, the election petitioner, who was examined as witness No. 1, did not name any of the two petitioners though he generally stated that the respondent along with his supporters had indulged in booth capturing and corrupt prac-tices. It is not alleged even in the election petition that these petitioners Mohd. Zahir and Quamrul Haque had not allowed any person to cast his vote. 6. To be sure at one place in schedule I (at page 23) of the election petition there is mention of one Zahir and Quamrul, who were said to have indulged in both capturing of two different booths. Even if this schedule in the plaint may be taken to go against the petitioners the evidence that they did not allow any particular vote cannot be considered to be in support of what is mentioned in the schedule for booth capturing may be done even before any particular voter reached there. 7. But apart from the fact as to whether evidence on the record was sufficient or not for taking a view by the Court that finding should be given against the petitioners regarding their indulging in corrupt practices, the peti-tion and the prayer made therein seeking permission to file show cause seems to me to be ill-advised and misconceived. 7. But apart from the fact as to whether evidence on the record was sufficient or not for taking a view by the Court that finding should be given against the petitioners regarding their indulging in corrupt practices, the peti-tion and the prayer made therein seeking permission to file show cause seems to me to be ill-advised and misconceived. There is no question of giving per-mission to file show cause as has been prayed in these two petitions, for it is for the Court to take a view in the matter and if the Court would think a find-ing against them has to be recorded, the Court is duty bound under the provi-sion of Sec. 99 itself to issue show notice and to give proper opportunity to them as laid down in the proviso to the Section. 8. I may notice here that the learned Counsel for these two petitioners in course of argument cited and relied upon the decision reported in the case of D.P.Mishra V/s. Kamal Narayan Sharma and Anr. -- , Travancore Rayan Ltd. V/s. Union of India -- and Rahim Khan V/s. Khurshid Ahmad and Ors. -- and submitted that opportunity must be given to show cause to a person if the Court decides to record a finding against any person not a party to the election petition about his indulging in corrupt practice. A perusal of these decisions would indicate that the principle contained in Sec. 99 regarding show cause has been elaborated and emphasised in these decisions which were given in a completely different factual contexts. There can be no doubt that if it comes to the notice of the Court considering any election petition that any person (who may be an election agent of any candidate) has committed a corrupt practice but is not a party to the election petition, the Court has to proceed against that person in accordance with the proviso of Sec. 99 and only after taking recourse to the proviso a final finding can be given as to whether such person has committed any corrupt practice. But that appears peculiar in this case is that the two petitioners have sought permission to file show cause etc, when the law itself imposes a duty to issue show cause and due opportunity to the person concerned to cross-examine the witnesses and to adduce evidence in defence, if occasion would arise of giving a finding by the Court against that person. Indeed it looks bizarre and ludicrous that persons would seek permission to file show cause from any court when show cause notice has not been issued. In my opinion, the petition at Flag 4 and 5 is completely ill-advised seeking in advance of some opportunity, which opportunity the Court was legally bound to give if there would have been occasion or reason for the same. 9. So in that view of the matter, these two petitions at Flags 4 and 5 are rejected. 10. As regards petition at Flag I which has been filed by the respon-dent on 27-9-1991, it appears that the respondent has made a prayer "to permit the respondent to inspect the High Court records ot the said cause to enable this respondent to file petition in order to seek an opportunity of being heard for the ends of justice and also to do complete justice between the parties." 11. In this petition, the main ground taken is that this respondent had no knowledge prior to 25-9-1991 about filing of the election petition against him and no summon either through Court or through Post Office was served on this respondent. According to his stand, it was on 25-9-1991 that he learnt for the first time that petition had been filed. It has also been stated in the petition of the respondent that he had been residing at different places for about a month in Marwari Hotel, Patna and then at the house of the father in-law before he finally occupied the official quarter No. 7, off Polo Road and this was suggested to the reason for not serving of the summons which had been sent to different addresses. 12. 12. A rejoinder has been fild asserting, inter alia that the petition is not maintainable, that the respondent had knowledge about the filing of the election petition; and that summons had been duly served and that even in the news-paper there was publication of a news item about filing of the election petition and the respondent being a lecturer in a College of Muzaffarpur knew about filing of the election petition and that he was himself negligent. 13. A reply to the rejoinder has also been filed reiterating the stand that he had not received summon and that for the first time he knew about the filing of the election petition from one Baidy Nath Rai son of Faudi Roy of village Simhauti. It was also said that publication of any news in newspaper about filing of election petition will not amount to service of summon as con-templated by Rule 20 of Order V of the Code of Civil Procedure. 14. The contention of the learned Counsel for the respondent-petitioner is that in the interest of justice it is necessary that he should be given opportunity for inspection of record and to present his case thereafter. Reliance was placed during the course of argument by the learned Counsel for the respondent on the decision reported in the cases of Sangram Singh V/s. Election Tribunal, Kotah and Anr. AIR 1953 SC 425 at paragraph-16, The State of Punjab and Anr. V/s. Shamlal Murari and Anr. AIR 1971 SC 1177 at paragraph-8 and Shit Chand V/s. Ujagar Singh and Anr. -- at paragraph 5. 15. learned Counsel for the election petitioner has contended that the petition at this stage is not maintainable, that it was filed after judgment has been reserved on the conclusion of the ex-parte hearing; that the respondent cannot now appear and claim an opportunity to put his defence if he neglect d to appear at the appropriate stage of hearing of the election petition. learned Counsel also contended that the petition is not maintainable under Sec. 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure in view of the decision of the Supreme Court reported in the case of Arjun Singh V/s. Mohindra Kumar and Ors. learned Counsel also contended that the petition is not maintainable under Sec. 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure in view of the decision of the Supreme Court reported in the case of Arjun Singh V/s. Mohindra Kumar and Ors. AIR 964 SC 993 and there is no other provision either in the C.P.C. or under the election law which permits to the respondent to come at the late stage and make a prayer like the one made in this petition. 16. From perusal of the record, it would appear that by order dated 25-3-1991 the case was listed for ex-parte hearing and thereafter witnesses of the petitioner were examined from 30-8-1991 to 16-6-1991. and as many as 22 witnesses were examined. Some documents were later taken into evidence on 19-9-1991 on which date the case was fixed for argument and on 5-9-1991 argument was concluded and judgment was reserved. It was on 27-9-1991 i.e. two days after the judgment had been reserved that petition was filed. I do not think that at the stage at which the case had reached, such a petition (making a prayer already quoted above in paragraph-10) under Sec. 151 can be entertained/allowed in view of the decision of the Supreme Court reported in the case of Arjun Singh V/s. Mohindra Kumar and Ors. -- Obviously the statge of hearing had passed and thereafter it was only for the Court to deliver judgment. The Hon ble Supreme Court appears to have laid down in the aforementioned judgment: Thus every contingency which is likely to happen in the trial vis-a-vis the non-appearance of the defendant at the hearing of a suit has been provided for and Order IX, Rule 7 and Order IX, Rule 13 between them exhaust the whole gamut of situation that might arise during the course of the trial. If, thus provision has been made for every contingency, it stands to reason that there is no scope for the invo-cation of the inherent powers of the Court to make an order necessary for the ends of justice. So the petition filed by the respondent at a stage when the judgment has been reserved cannot be allowed by invoking inherent jusisdiction of the Court given by Sec. 151 of the C.P.C. under which the petition purports to have been filed. So the petition filed by the respondent at a stage when the judgment has been reserved cannot be allowed by invoking inherent jusisdiction of the Court given by Sec. 151 of the C.P.C. under which the petition purports to have been filed. To me it appears that the dispute which seems to have raised from the petition and rejoinder as to whether or not summons had been served on the respondent or he had any notice of the election petition earlier than 25-9-1991 cannot be raised and decided at the stage after conclusion of the ex-parte hearing and reservation of the judgment. I also do not think it would be in the interest of justice to embark on such an enquiry at the stage. 17. On perusal of the three decisions cited above by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. I am of the opinion that ratio of none of the cases has any application to the situation of this case. Paragraph 16 of the decision reported in 1955 S.C. 425, which was relied upon by the learned Counsel of the respon-dent reads as follows: (16) Now a code of procedure must be regarded as such. It is procedure something designed to facilitate justice and further its ends : not a penal enactment for punishment and penalties: not a thing designed to trip people up. Too technical a construction of Sections that leaves no room for reasonable elasticity of inter-pretation should therefore be guarded against (provided always that justice is done to both; sides) lest the very means designed for the furtherance of justice be used to frustrate it. This para obviously emphasises that procedure-laws are designed to facili-tate justice and further its ends, but I do not think that this principle can be extended to another principle that a person should be heard at any time he comes and whenever he comes. Procedure-laws cannot be completely ignored, though too technical interpretation should not be given on any provision of procedural law to defeat the ends of justice. 18. The other decision reported in AIR 1976 SC 1177 appears to relate to a situation when interpretation of a rule which required furnishing of three copies of memorandum of appeal, in case appeal was to be filed under clause 10 of the Letters Patent. Non-filing of three copies was held to be only irregularity by the Supreme Court. 19. 18. The other decision reported in AIR 1976 SC 1177 appears to relate to a situation when interpretation of a rule which required furnishing of three copies of memorandum of appeal, in case appeal was to be filed under clause 10 of the Letters Patent. Non-filing of three copies was held to be only irregularity by the Supreme Court. 19. The portion of paragraph-5 of the judgment reported in 1978 SC 1583 on which reliance was placed appears to emphasise the same idea that there should be no hyper-technicality. That portion reads as follows: (5) The substance of the matter must govern because hyper-technicality, when the public policy of the statute is fulfilled, cannot be permitted to play the procedural tyrant to defeat a vital judicial process namely, investigation into the merits of the election petition. 20. So all these three decisions appear to have been given in entirely different context and the ratio of the same, in my opinion, cannot be pressed into service to accept the contention of the learned Counsel for the respondent. 21. On facts also, it may be noticed that when the petition was filed initially on 27-9-1991, it was not even specified as to who was the person from whom, or what was the source of information by which, the respondent came to know about the filing of the election petition for the first time on 27-9-1991. It was only after a rejoinder was filed, that in reply the name of the person was disclosed obviously belatedly. learned Counsel for the respondent also produced during the coarse of the argument even the news item that had been published and respondent being a lecturer in Muzaffarpur College would have got the knowledge about filing even from the newspaper. To be sure such newspaper could not amount to service of notice under Rule 20 of Order V of the C.P.C. But this reflects on the question as to whether the assertions made by the respondent that he had no notice of filing of the election petition earlier than 25-9-1991 is correct or not. 22. The election laws contemplate expeditious disposal of election petition and in that context also to entertain a petition like the one filed by the respondent after judgment has been reserved will amount to going against the spirit of law requiring of expeditious disposal. 23. 22. The election laws contemplate expeditious disposal of election petition and in that context also to entertain a petition like the one filed by the respondent after judgment has been reserved will amount to going against the spirit of law requiring of expeditious disposal. 23. Finally I may notice one submission that was made by the learned Counsel for the respondent that there is no othere remedy in law to the respondent as provided under Order IX, Rule 13 of the C.P.C. and so he will be helpless in this regard after the reserved judgment is delivered and goes against him. It is not for this Court to consider this point as to whether or not any legal remedy is open to the respondent. 24. In the light of the discussions made and reasons indicated above, I reject the petition at Flag "1". 25. Later on Learned Counsel for the respondent as well as the learned 12-8-1992counsel on whose behalf the petitions at Flags 4 and 5 have been filed, submit immediately after the above order is dictated in Court they intend to move the Supreme Court against the order recorded rejecting their petitions at Flags 1, 4 and 5 and they further pay that the judgment which had been reserved may not be delivered in the meantime. Four weeks time as prayed is allowed to move the Supreme Court and to bring stay order, if any.