ORDER Dr. T.N. Singh; J--1. Five persons have been charged to stand trial under Clause 3 of the M.P .Cement (Dealers Licensing and Control) Order, 1973 read with section 3 and 7 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. 2. Trial has not begun because before evidence could be recorded on 20.12.1988 three of the accused petitioners rushed to this Court and trial Court's records are since lying tagged up with this revision. A conditional stay order was also passed in this matter on 13.11.1988 and proceedings in the trial Court of Special Judge, Gwalior, are held up since then. 3. In the offence report five persons are arrayed. Of them three are the instant petitioners and other two are -- Ramniwas and Surendra Kumar. The allegations in brief stated in offence report are that on 3.4.1986 at about 4.00 a.m. in the early morning on the Agra-Bombay road at the cross-road of Simaria-Tanka the S.D.O. detained Truck No. CPG 3152 and checked the vehicle. He found 300 bags of levy cement being carried in unauthorised manner. It is also stated that accused Ravikant through his agent Shahzad Khan, petitioner No.1 and Truck-driver, Gajrajsingh, petitioner No.2 was carrying the cement for Ramniwas from whom the cement was purchased. The further allegation is that the transaction was made through accused Surendra Mishra. The submission of Shri Bansal is that in the instant case revisionists are being wrongly tried because under no provisions of law they have committed any offence and charge against them is liable to• be quashed. 4. It is true that the same argument was made before the learned Special Judge and finding recorded by him is, "there is sufficient ground to connect the accused persons with the contravention in question." He has further held, "There is prima facie evidence to involve all the accused persons in the so-called deal pertaining to the unauthorised sale and transportation of the levy cement bags kept in the custody of accused Ramniwas." Evidently, Court below has not made up its mind as yet as to the provisions under which any offence was committed by any of the accused persons and verily that is not done because in the course of trial the charge could be altered as contemplated under section 216 Cr. P.C. Much stress is laid by Shri Bansal on section 211 to contend that within the four comers of the charge stated in the offence-report there could be trial and not beyond that. But that contention I have found to be devoid of merit as it runs counter to the express provision of section 216 Cr. P.C. 5. The crux of Shri Bansal's contention is that under the cement control order aforesaid clause 3 (referred to in the offence-report) does not penalise any person other than a manufacturer of cement who deals in cement or offers for sale any cement except under and in accordance with the terms and conditions of a licence issued in that behalf by the Licensing Authority. He has also submitted that the expression "deal in cement" is defined in clause 2(c) and that concerns only persons who carry on business of sale or supply or storage for sale or supply to a consumer or another dealer of cement. Accordingly, it is submitted by Shri Bansal, there could be no charge and no trial of the instant revisionists on the basis of the allegations made in the offence-report. It is also his contention that in the course of movement of the vehicle it is said that offence was committed and if that offence was committed and if that be the position clause 11 is to be read and that provision also penalises a stockist or dealer and not any other person. 6. On the other hand reliance is placed by Shri Khot on clause 10(2) of the Cement Control Order to submit that any person who does not possess any "authorisation or permit" issued to him by the Licensing authority for use or disposal of the levy cement also commits an offence there under and he is liable to be tried for that offence. To that contention Shri Bansal has replied submitting that the Cement Control Order does not anywhere contemplate issuance of any authorisation or permit to any other person save stockiest or dealers. However, that has not appealed to me. Because, absence merely of the definition of the terms "authorisation" and "permit" would not mean that the Licensing Authority is not required to issue such a document to a consumer or any other person other than stockiest or dealer when the cement in question is a levy cement. However, that has not appealed to me. Because, absence merely of the definition of the terms "authorisation" and "permit" would not mean that the Licensing Authority is not required to issue such a document to a consumer or any other person other than stockiest or dealer when the cement in question is a levy cement. In my view, if the contention advanced by Shri Bansal is accepted there will be hardly any scope in some cases to convict any person who has committed any offence of sale of levy cement. 7. It is submitted by Shri Bansal that the expression "deal in cement" having not included also within its ambit the term "purchase" and not penalising the "purchaser" another category of such persons cannot be judicially created. I have found myself unable to accept that contention because in my view clause 10deals with various activities which may amount to offences because each of the sub-clause of clause 10 is mutually exclusive of the other. In my view, sub-clause (2) of clause 10 is to be read independently of other provisions and there is scope under sub-clause (2) of clause 10 to hold liable even a purchaser who is using or disposing levy cement without obtaining "authorisation or permit" for doing so. There is intrinsic evidence for that view inasmuch as the marginal heading of the provisions is "acquisition and disposal" which in my view indicates acquisition not only by stockiest or dealer but by any person in contravention of the provisions of the Cement Control Order. Reliance is placed by Shri Bansal on a decision of this Court in 1990 JLJ 348 (Mohan v. State of M.P.) but that will not avail him inasmuch as that was a case of conviction and the Court was not required to pronounce on the validity of trial at the stage of framing of charges. Reliance is also placed on AIR 1964 SC 1533 , (Manipur Administration v. Nila Chandra Singh). It was on Manipur Food Grains Licensing Order. I do not think if that decision would bail out the revisionist, because each piece of Legislation has to be construed in its own terms, and it is not known if there was provision similar to clause 10(2) of the Cement Control Order in the Manipur Law. It was on Manipur Food Grains Licensing Order. I do not think if that decision would bail out the revisionist, because each piece of Legislation has to be construed in its own terms, and it is not known if there was provision similar to clause 10(2) of the Cement Control Order in the Manipur Law. The provisions construed in that case was Clause 3 of the Order barring business as dealer of food grains except in accordance with terms and conditions of the licence issued by the Licensing Authority. For the same reason I do not think if decision of a learned Single Judge of Madras High Court reported in 1971 Cri. LJ 770 (Traders Syndicate v. State) would be helpful because the short decision dealt with only definition of the term "dealer" in Madras Paddy and Rice Dealers Licensing and Regulation Order (1968). Another decision of learned Single Judge in the case of M. Subba Rao (AIR 1966 Orissa 27) is cited which deals with statutory presumption under clause 3(2) of Food grains Order in force in that State. It was held that a single or solitary transaction of sale and purchase will make a person a dealer. 8. I wonder how Dinabandhu's case (AIR 1960 Orissa 26) can at all be cited but that is done. That was a case of dismissal of a Govt. Servant in respect of a charge preferred against him under Article 311 of the Constitution. That decision can have no bearing on the controversy mooted. However, Shri Khot Deputy Govt. Advocate, has drawn my attention to para 20 of the decision in the case of Stree Atyachar Virodhi Parishad (1989) I SCC 715) to submit that High Court should not interdict ordinarily any "trial" to proceed because at the stage of framing charges Courts may take different view and finality is achieved when trial is concluded. As I have already referred earlier to section 216 Cr. P.C., I reiterate that even later at any stage it shall be open to the trial Court to alter the charge made in the offence report under clause 3 to any other provisions of Cement Control Order on the basis of the evidence adduced by the parties. As I have already referred earlier to section 216 Cr. P.C., I reiterate that even later at any stage it shall be open to the trial Court to alter the charge made in the offence report under clause 3 to any other provisions of Cement Control Order on the basis of the evidence adduced by the parties. It is too early now at this stage to hold that there was no material at all for trial to proceed against the' accused-revisionist and rightly in my view the trial Court has found on perusal of the statement of the prosecution witnesses of there being sufficient ground to connect the accused persons with the contravention of the Cement Control Order. At this stage, it has been found that there is prima facie evidence to involve all the accused persons in the so-called deal pertaining to the unauthorised sale and trans portion of the levy cement bags. At this stage reference may be made also to the settled law emphasised in State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh ( AIR 1977 SC 2018 ). At the stage of framing of charges the Court has to see merely if there is "strong suspicion" against the accused, of his being guilty of committing an offence. If the evidence which the prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused even if accepted before it is rebutted by defence evidence does not show that the accused committed the offence then there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial. At the stage of framing of charge the Court is not to see whether there is sufficient ground for conviction or the trial is sure to end in his conviction. 9. For all the aforesaid reasons I found no merit in this revision petition and it is accordingly rejected. Records shall go down at once.